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  * The Mind as Missing Link * 
 
0.1 Introduction 
Philosophical perplexities are the prize of an increased intelligence, as extraterrestrial 
exobiologists would probably agree. Organisms finding themselves on whatever piece of 
grit circling around whatever center of gravity-driven nuclear fusion (perhaps our own sun) 
will probably always need some time to realize their precarious situation. It would be very 
implausible that an organism that per accident would evolve an ability to do something like 
thinking or reflecting would immediately hit upon the right frame-work to understand its 
origin and position amongst other things. 
 Such an understanding can only emerge if a knowledge capacity has evolved with 
the right categorical structures and, even then, it can only emerge as a result of philosophical 
and scientific puzzle-solving during millennia. Probably it can only arise despite a lot of 
resistance, both within the psyche of the thinking organism in question as within the society 
in which it probably will live - as a social environment seems to be a condition for the 
evolution of intelligence. Therefore, it is not surprising that humans have always tended to 
cherish somewhat too noble and premature conclusions about their descent, their being and 
position in the world. Nor is it surprising that we feel sometimes startled, alienated and 
confused by new discoveries about ourselves, our ancestors and the series of accidents that 
made us what we are. 
 After all, our cognitive apparatus didn't arise in order to enable us to achieve truth or 
even philosophical sophistication. As `survival machines of our genes' we and other animals 
can do perfectly well with only a modest degree of correspondence between our cognitive 
token-systems and our environment. Certain delusions, including an amount of self-
deception, could simply be adaptive, and certainly the way in which things are perceived 
and in which the most urgent practical information is selected, must have been adaptive in 
the past. After all, why should a non-perspectivistic, non-applicable truth matter? For an 
organism that is `designed' to perpetuate its own genotype, the world beyond the horizon of 
everyday life could just as well be a stimulating fantasy. Why should we frustrate ourselves 
by reflecting on the many less elegant survival tricks that enabled our ancestors to live on in 
our genes? Why should we not cherish a more flattering self-image if it tends to be more 
reassuring and stimulating? 
 Moreover, both the mind and its evolution aren't easy to understand. Apart from 
some hints in Empedokles, Epicure and Hume, it took a long time before philosophers 
started to understand that the organic world is evolving and that this complex mysterious 
process is perhaps driven by the unintuitively simple mechanism of the differential 
reproduction of successful variants. And it took a still longer time before philosophers 
started to realize that their favorite object of discussion, the mind itself, is just such an 
evolved property that one can only understand by understanding evolution. 
 Finally, philosophers have always preferred to believe in a relatively simple world - 
one that one can start to understand simply by assuming a thinking attitude like Rodin's 
thinker. But the idea that one can solve philosophical problems by reflection only could be 
comparable to the idea that one can understand the workings of a television by watching 
only. Classical philosophical problems could simply result from the inability of an evolved 
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self-conscious organism to make sense of its own design-features intuitively. Let us look at 
some of these problems: 
- The problem of goal-directedness: how can goal-directedness arise in a world 
characterized by simple linear causality and a universal tendency towards decay 
instead of order? 
- The problem of human uniqueness: how unique are we as a species and to what 
extent are we separated from all other animals? 
- The problem of knowledge: how is it possible to know something? If an idea and the 
reality to which it `refers' are not identical or similar, on what then is the claim of 
knowledge based? 
- The mind-body problem: how is it possible that mind and body interact apparently 
without being made of the same stuff? 
- The problem of self-consciousness: what is the self that we are aware of, if we claim 
self-awareness? Is it the body or the mind or some combination of the two? 
- The problem of freedom and self-determination: how can we both be determined by 
heredity and circumstances ànd believe that we are the creators of our own life? How 
can our actions be based on both emotions and on reasons? If some behavioral 
`patterns' are characteristic for particular characters, does this mean that they are 
predetermined? 
- The problem of values and a meaning of life: how do values arise in a world 
of facts? Is there a meaning of life apart from what we desire? To what extent 
are values and meanings purely subjective chimarae and to what extent are 
they intersubjective or objective? 
- The quest for the roots or foundations of society. Why would we live together? Is 
living together something which comes naturally or which is forced upon us by 
convention or law? Were we originally enemies that have to be forced to live 
together peacefully or are we by nature social animals? 
- The problem of good and evil: do we call something `good' because we want 
it, or do we want things, sometimes, because they are good? Is there a `good' 
that must be acknowledged as good by all rational creatures or is there just a 
battle of interests in which all parties defend their own good? 
- To some extent all these questions come together in the problem of our origins, 
identity, and ultimate destiny. Paul Gauguin painted three questions in the corner of 
one of his paintings (exhibited in Boston): "D'où venons-nous - Que sommes-nous - 
Où allons nous?" These questions are fundamental to some extent, because one can 
claim that to understand human life, one first has to get its story right. 
The pages that follow are all written on the basis of the premiss that the theory of evolution 
offers us the `right story' to understand and to solve most of these issues, although not all 
their details. One can only understand knowledge and consciousness as adaptive properties 
that somehow enabled `survival machines' to cope with the challenges posed by the 
environment in which they had to survive and propagate their genes during their history. A 
neglect of this historical dimension will always result in explanatory gaps. 
 For example, if one studies teleology the way Aristotle did, one never gets to 
understand why teleology arose in the first place. If one studies love without phylogenetic 
analysis, one will never understand why it is often directed at young `beautiful' people and 
why it often leads to jealousy, insanity, poetry, suicide or children. If one wants to study 
knowledge, but claims that one isn't interested in the original adaptive function of it - an 
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updated version of the harmonie préétablie of ideas and things that Kant considered to be 
impossible -, one will never grasp its dual nature: both subjective - that is essentially 
perspectivistic and limited - and referential. A glance at the history of epistemology and the 
history of the philosophy of science shows that if one doesn't look at this original function of 
knowledge, it is very tempting to fall into one-sided claims like the claim that all knowledge 
corresponds with objects or that all knowledge is relative to the knower. Therefore, a 
detailed analyses is needed that shows how knowledge evolved as part of the evolution of 
biological decision systems and how from this basis in one particular kind of ape science 
grew into a collective representational system that is continually revised and updated and 
that is, as a result, less limited and bound to one particular perspective, its specific delusions 
and idiosyncrasies. 
 Of course, if it is true that we need the theory of evolution to solve philosophical 
questions, it is strange indeed that philosophers in the twentieth century didn't pay more 
attention to it. Why did they hope so stubbornly that they could do without a naturalistic 
analysis of the mind and why did they continue to think that an introspective or intuitive 
analysis would be enough? Apparently, our desire to understand is often stronger than our 
ability to see the limits of our current frame-work, especially if this frame-work happens to 
be `folk psychology' or the series of concepts that have arisen as a way to describe and 
manipulate our own psychological processes. 
 One wonders why `folk psychology' is so successful even though it doesn't give 
insight in the wiring and working of our minds. Perhaps the success of folk psychology 
reflects the necessity of an `evolutionary design' for a mind that looks relatively simple from 
`within': its categories could simply be convenient `handles' on our own psyche as they have 
arisen as a result of linguistic variation and selection. A car may also look relatively simple 
as long as we only drive in it and we don't need to repair it. If a car looked very complex 
from behind the wheel, we could make mistakes while driving. Therefore `folk automobile-
theory' doesn't see more than a window, a couple of mirrors, a clutch, a wheel and a 
dashboard with some indicators. Similarly `folk psychology' simplifies the workings of our 
own mind and gives us a comfortable sense of oversight and insight which is sometimes 
used as a starting-point for empiricistic, rationalistic, and phenomenological philosophers. 
 It seems to me that our minds look deceptively simple and that the reason is that all 
their complexity was put away smoothly behind our `phenemenologically privately open-to-
inspection dashboards': the reason being that we should be able to concentrate on a limited 
collection of survival tasks. A certain degree of integration and simplicity was achieved as a 
result of the continually smoothing forces of selection. A clear overlook is for the organism 
that has to take the right - adaptive - decisions simply a sine qua non. A simple, 
straightforward model of agency is probably the most adaptive way to judge one's 
conspecifics. As a result, many philosophers of the past have underestimated the complexity 
of mind and tended to stress one aspect of its functioning, be it the sensory input, the 
processing according to categorical forms, or the creative, interpretative manner in which it 
`constructs' a world. As a result, also, many philosophers seem to have thought that mental 
phenomena - love, the moral emotions, awareness, human agency - are relatively 
`elementary', `transparent' and `sui generis' instead of being emergent properties of a 
complex neural circuitry that seldomly is open to inspection and which is a result of a series 
of ecological and social circumstances that mostly has wiped out its own traces. 
 With that we come to another problem that stands in the way of an understanding of 
the mind: the fact that it is a product of history. Evolutionary histories are always the  
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product of a series of accidents that are very difficult to reconstruct, because most of the 
times the traces have been erased by the series of events itself. While it has been suspected 
for more than a century that our species must be very closely related to gorillas and 
chimpanzees, it has been possible only recently to compare DNA of the different species: 
the discovery that the common ancestor must have been relatively young (5 to 7 myr) has 
been made only in the early eighties. While already one skull of a Neanderthal had been 
found by the time Darwin published his Origin of Species, paleontological findings that 
slowly start to map out the actual course of human evolution are only piling up since the 
1974 discovery of `Lucy', Australopithecus afarensis. No wonder that the different 
theoretical models that explain the divergence of Pan, Australopithecus and, later, Homo, 
are still speculative. 
 In the third part of this book I will do an attempt to integrate some of the existing 
models and to show how they could be made compatible with paleontological data. Of 
course, much hubris is involved, but this may be justified with reference to the playfulness 
and curiosity without which there would be no progress. Above that, philosophers have 
always been amateur and arm-chair scientists, because they were always concerned with our 
position in the world. 
 The general purpose of this book, thus, is to defend the possibility of a general 
evolutionary reconstruction of the human mind as a somewhat exceptional animal mind. 
Because of the complexity of the issues involved, and because of the deceitful nature of the 
mind in general and the human mind in particular, an evolutionary understanding of the 
mind isn't possible without some philosophical acrobatics. Those who exhibit the required 
limberness to rise above the traditional dichotomies and presuppositions, however, will be 
rewarded by vast panoramas and completely new perspectives. 
 
0.2 Teleonomy, adaptation and `Why?'-questions 
This brings me to the original meaning of the word `theory', Θεωρία, a way of viewing 
things. Of course, I do not believe scientific theories are just ways of viewing things. 
Although they never can be definitely `proven', it can be shown that one theory has much 
more explanatory and predictive power and more unifying possibilities than another theory. 
Often these virtues can only be discovered, however, by people who make a particular 
theory their way of viewing things. 
 Seeing things from an evolutionary perspective requires a fundamental paradigm 
shift or Gestalt-switch, even a kind of `conversion'. Human life can not longer be seen as a 
self-evident phenomenon, that is merely `given'. No longer can it be seen as self-evident that 
something like `life' arose on this spinning ball of grit. No longer can it be viewed as self-
evident that multi-cellular organisms evolved, of which some are mobile, and of which some 
use environmental clues to orient themselves. And for us, humans, the strangest thing of all, 
and the most difficult to understand, is why we ourselves evolved, as eusocial predatory 
apes that use symbols to communicate and to transcend their immediate ecological and 
cognitive horizon. 
 Therefore, the central questions of this book can all be rephrased as `Why?'-
questions. Why are we here? Why does our mind, at least sometimes, represent the world? 
Why are we conscious of ourselves, our emotions and our position of the world? Why do we 
have culture? Why do we have scientific theories and why do we fight over them? I will try 
to give an inventory of the ways in which these questions, arising from the evolutionary 
perspective, affect epistemology, the philosophy of mind and the humanities. 
 Traditionally, for example in the aristotelian tradition, `Why?'-questions were often 
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part of a frame-work in which the whole world had a `purpose'. The moment this 
teleological view of the universe came to be doubted, metaphysical-minded philosophers 
kept asking for ultimate reasons. Thus philosophers like Leibniz and Heidegger can ask 
themselves why there would exists something rather than nothing. Perhaps there is no 
answer to such kinds of questions. More likely, such a questions themselves are misguided, 
because it suggests that all causes are ultimately reasons or that all causes do ultimately arise 
from one universal `foundation'. Certainly the metaphysical `Why?' is posed from a 
perspective which is fundamentally at odds with the perspective which I will try to defend. 
 Happily enough, a much more concrete, non-metaphysical way of asking `Why?'-
questions has arisen from within the theoretical framework of modern evolutionary biology, 
as it was first developed by Darwin and Wallace (fig. 0.1). It presupposes a theory according 
to which complex nonarbitrary structures do not arise accidentally, that is: purely as a 
consequence of one-shot dice-throwing. Rather, according to evolutionary theory, 
complexity can arise as a result of both chance and the cumulative effects of selection on 
self-replicating systems. As a result of such a process, goal-directed structures can arise. 
This goal-directedness has been designated `teleonomy' (Mayr, 1988) to distinguish it from 
Aristotelian teleology. During the process of evolution on our planet, at least some brands of 
such teleonomic structures have evolved into lineages of complex organisms, characterized 
by an integrated hierarchy of functional elements, some of which are called organs. Often 
`Why?'-questions refer to the evolutionary logic behind the evolution of such new functional 
elements. In other words, `Why?'-questions refer to the function or adaptive meaning of a 
particular organ, sub-system or behavior within the teleonomic whole of the organism. 
 In this century, it was especially ethology which demonstrated the autonomy of 
`Why?'-questions. Tinbergen, for example, starts his Study of Instinct (1951) by pointing out 
that behavior results from many causes, which are described by physiology and psychology, 
but that one still needs the `Why?'-question to make sense of a particular behavior within the 
survival strategy of a particular animal. At a later stage the distinction was made between 
proximate and ultimate causes. It is to these ultimate causes that the `Why?'-question refers 
if we ask, for example "Why do birds sing?". The presupposition of such `Why?'-questions 
is, of course, that birds do not sing purely accidentally. The complexity of the required 
syrinx and its neurophysiological controls make such a hypothesis unlikely. The idea is that 
bird song evolved as a result of a series of adaptations, that is: as a result of the chronic 
differential reproductive success of those birds that had characteristics which ultimately 
caused some birds to sing. Only because this process of `natural selection of favored races' 
of birds `in the struggle for existence' led to structures which impossibly could have resulted 
from pure chance can we ask why birds sing. 
 It seems to me that such `Why?'-questions enlarge our scope enormously and enable 
us to place humans in their proper perspective (fig. 0.5). Even in epistemology and in the 
humanities only `Why?'-questions can enable us to shake off the intellectual laziness which 
seduces us to take phenomena, like the structure of the human larynx and the enormous 
human brain, for granted. In that sense simple questions like "Why do we need knowledge 
or theories?", "Why do scientists fight over theories?" may imply more than a small 
theoretical revolution. 
 From an evolutionary perspective, then, a whole new look arises on the `design 
features' that constitute the human mind. The traditional philosophical questions listed above 
collapse into one big question as to the `Why?' of the human mind, its symbol- and culture-
creating capacity, its tendency to fight over ideas, etc.. Instead of starting the philosophical 
enterprise by asking our list of philosophical questions a priori we will have to start with 
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acquainting ourselves to evolutionary biology and human evolution. First we have to know 
why knowledge evolved, why our ancestors increasingly became dependent on it and why 
culture arose. Only then, perhaps, can we start to answer those questions which were 
traditionally called `philosophical'. 
 
0.3 Overview 
A word about the structure of this book. Part I is concerned with central problems of modern 
philosophy: knowledge and consciousness. Instead of trying to start with an answer on the 
question `What is knowledge?' and `How does knowledge arise?' it focuses on the question 
`Why?', `Why has knowledge evolved' and `Why did consciousness evolve?'. I will try to 
show that this transition from transcendental analysis to evolutionary explanation has many 
advantages. It does not offer the ultimate foundation for knowledge that philosophers have 
dreamed about and it cannot be definitively `proven', but it is almost inevitable as a result of 
its superior explanatory power: It simply offers more than other theories. Only the theory of 
evolution can explain why we are in need of knowledge and why knowledge has the 
limitations it has. Only from the theory of evolution can we explain why science can be 
successful and what social mechanisms underlay the variation and selection of theories. 
 The same goes for the problem of consciousness (chapter 3). Traditional theories of 
consciousness were either remnants of traditional dualistic concepts in a sophisticated 
skeptical epistemological guise or byproducts of a critical epistemology. Before the theory 
of evolution came to rescue, philosophers simply had no idea how to approach the problem 
of consciousness properly. They were continually posing the wrong questions. Even some 
modern theories about consciousness are still one-sidedly concerned with either the 
phenomenal aspect of our subjective experience or with the `fact' that this subjective side is 
produced by a physical body. It seems to me that both these approaches still neglect the 
possibilities of a radical evolutionary approach. One can first better try to give a answer to 
the `Why'- question instead of starting with an investigation into the nature of 
consciousness, because an answer to the `Why?' - question may give indispensable clues for 
an answer to the question about the nature of consciousness. 
 Part II applies the same strategy to the foundations of the social sciences. Instead of 
starting with definitions of human uniqueness and culture, one can better start by analyzing 
why extreme social and cultural characteristics evolve and what keeps them in existence. 
This is the sociobiological approach and I will start with an introduction to sociobiology, 
because this discipline is often misunderstood. I will then try to show that the phenomenon 
of human culture should not be taken for granted, but that it is much more illuminating to 
ask why it evolved and what keeps it in existence. Instead of asking `What is human culture' 
I propose to ask `What drives human culture?'. By comparing (in chapter 5) different models 
of the genes-mind-culture triangle I will try to evaluate their respective explanatory power 
and try to find a proper model. There are good reasons to suppose that this is not a model in 
which `human nature' is a kind of tabula rasa that can be filled in by a particular culture. 
From an evolutionary perspective it is to be expected that human nature encloses specific 
sense organs, cognitive filters, processors, evaluating mechanisms, needs, learning modules, 
decision procedures etcetera. Yet, it would be a misunderstanding to think that this means 
that culture is purely `genetically determined'. It is at least part of the adaptive value of the 
human capacity to create culture that it enables humans to adapt to a spectrum of different 
environments. In chapter 6, I will present three case studies which hopefully will clarify the 
way in which cultures interact with the environment via conditional strategies that are 
inherent in human nature. Thus, the fact that cultures are often fundamentally different does 
not mean that humans are completely different, only that they have actualized different 
possibilities inherent in human nature. 
 Yet, just as phenomena like knowledge and 
consciousness are only properly understood from an 
evolutionary perspective, it is to be expected that we will 
only understand human culture if we know why and how 
humans evolved. It is in the words of G.C. Williams (1966) 
not unreasonable "to anticipate that our understanding of 
the human mind would be aided greatly by knowing the 
purpose for which it was designed".  Part III therefore 
finally asks "Why did humans evolve from a primordial 
stock of apes and why did they, that is we, become 
dependent on an extrasomatic `superorganic' realm of 
symbols called `culture'?". A correct answer to this 
question would resolve many problems in philosophy and 
the humanities. For that reason it can be considered to be 
the question that most deeply transforms our philosophical 
perspective. 
 
 
0.4 Evolution in five figures 
Philosophers are distrustful of cartoons. They prefer 
massive monuments of words. Yet, I believe that their 
distrust of figures sometimes masks the vagueness of their 
ideas. Figures are very risky as they reveal once's thinking errors without mercy. Thus, it is 
with some trepidation that I present the general theoretical background of this book as a 
`cartoon' in seven figures. These figures are simply meant to give an idea of some of its 
presuppositions and orientations. They are not meant as a summary or as a substitute for 
more extensive discussions. 
Fig. 0-1. The mechanism 
of evolution by natural selection 
(see text). 
 Figure 0-1. This figure was originally designed by Wallace (Strickberger, 1990). I 
have modified it to show that evolution is always interaction. Evolution can even be defined 
as the ongoing result of the interaction between genotypes and a continually changing 
environment via the various more and less successful phenotypes. The differential 
reproduction of phenotypes was called natural selection by Darwin. Natural selection can be 
viewed as a kind of sieve. Only those phenotypes are able to reproduce that `fit' a particular 
way of live in a particular environment. Variations that happen to improve the `fit' between 
an organism, its survival strategy and its environment are cumulatively favored. The result is 
called adaptation. Thus the bills of both ducks and hawks are adapted both to the specific 
`niches' (roughly, food specialisms, specific roles 
 
 
 
 in an ecosystem) that they occupy in particular environments. 
 Of course, very few agree that the mechanism of natural selection alone can explain 
all aspects of living phenomena. Even Darwin himself thought that many phenomena in 
nature can only be explained with the assistance of an additional mechanism, sexual 
selection, that sometimes works contrariwise (I will further discuss this topic in chapter 4 
and in part III). 
 In the time of Darwin there was only a very superficial knowledge of the continuous 
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climatological, tectonic and even astronomic influences on the biosphere (Darwin knew 
something about ice ages, however). Only a much more detailed knowledge about the 
history of the earth and life could reveal the way in which evolution is often driven by 
external forces (more about this in chapter 7). 
 Figure 0-2. The process of the natural selection of adaptive characteristics should not 
be seen as a goal-directed process (Slurink, 
1991). This is because something can only 
be called adaptive given the particular niche 
that an organism occupies and given a 
particular environment. Because there are 
many possible niches in any ecosystem and 
because environments are continually 
changing, evolution is not a road to one 
`finish', but a bush with many branches, 
some of which may even lead to more 
`primitive' forms (for example, the ancestors 
of fleas had wings, the ancestors of many 
wind pollinated plants were pollinated by 
insects). 
 If we start to study evolution in the 
field, simply by starting to study the 
enormous diversity of plants, fungi, insects 
or whatever, what strikes us is the tendency 
of related organisms to adapt to specific 
niches. Apparently it often pays (in terms of 
reproductive success) to specialize: one can then become `good at' one's specific survival 
strategy and one can, at the same time, avoid competition. The resulting phenomenon is 
called adaptive radiation. More than anything else it shows that evolution is not a goal-
directed process. Rather, natural selection working on isolated populations creates diversity, 
because for each characteristic of a given lineage each environment may have another 
adaptive optimum1. 
 
Fig. 0-2. As a result of variation and 
selection organisms tend to diversify, different 
lineages adapting themselves to particular 
niches. 
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1 Some Dutch philosophers are convinced that evolution should be seen as a goal-directed 
process. They defend this idea, however, by de-anthropomorfizing the concept of goals to such 
extent that it is hardly clear what they mean (Hulswitt, 1998). For me the concept of a goal either 
includes an element of predetermination or of premeditation. For a discussion of these issues, see 
Slurink (1991). 
 Figure 0-3. This was originally 
inspired by a figure in the book of 
Looijen (1998) about reductionism 
and holism in biology and ecology, but 
I changed it drastically. It shows how 
properties of organisms can and must 
be explained on different levels at the 
same time. `Reductionistic' 
explanations may refer to genes that 
code for particular proteins which 
cause a trait x to be expressed in a 
particular organism. A complete 
evolutionary explanation is not 
reductionistic, however, or is 
reductionistic in a completely different 
way (evolutionary reductionism, 
Alexander, 1987). It has to refer to the 
causes that a particular mutation is 
able to gain foothold in a particular 
population in an particular 
environment: to explain that it has to 
refer to the survival value, function or fitness effects of x. Property x will increase in the 
population if it increases the adaptive fit between the organism and its environment. 
Individuals possessing the relevant gene or genes have more reproductive success and will 
consequently help to spread it/them through the population. Despite the fact that x may 
result from one single gene its adaptive value is tested as part of the whole organism. The 
function or adaptive value of x is therefore a holistic property. Particularly in ethology, 
evolutionary explanations are often called `ultimate' and contrasted with `proximate' 
explanations, which simply refer to the chemical, physiological or psychological causes of 
some behavior or trait. 
 
Fig. 0-3. Proximate explanations refer to a 
limited number of generations while ultimate 
explanations refer to a large number of generations 
in which particular adaptive traits did confer 
increased reproductive success. 
 Figure 0-4. Although itself not working 
towards a specific goal, natural selection does 
produce goal-directed systems. Goal-directed 
systems are systems that remain directed at a 
particular goal, independent of their current 
position (e.g., Ruse, 1981). Often they can 
adapt their course, to some extent, depending 
on their current position. This makes them very 
flexible. For example, in figure 0-4 (a), it 
requires a long series of precise instructions to 
get an organism with a precisely genetically 
instructed course to get a piece of food: "go 
straight on x meters, then turn to the right, go 
straight on for y meters, then turn left, go 
straight on for z meters, etc.". Still, a relatively 
small obstacle (`stop') can bring the system to a 
stop. In figure b the system is oriented towards 
a goal, but is not programmed with precise 
 
Fig. 0-4. (a) An organism following a 
precisely genetically instructed course may 
be hindered by small obstacles (`stop'), (b) 
which a more flexible goal-directed and 
information-gathering organism is able to 
evade. 
  
 
xiii
instructions to follow a particular route. The system creates its own route on the basis of at 
least some incoming information and on the basis of its directedness towards a series of 
goals. As a result it is able to avoid obstacles in a flexible way. 
 Biological goal-directedness or teleonomy does not, of course, always imply 
complex information-processing. Ultimately, it is determined by a simple subtraction sum. 
Goals that somehow lead to extinction are `rejected' by natural selection; goals that promote 
reproductive success tend to spread their own genetic base. As a result, goals that are 
produced by evolution tend to be coupled to crude biological `necessities' like survival and 
reproduction. Yet, in many mobile species much information has to be processed before 
even these goals can be attained. 
 Again, even in the minds of such mobile organisms, and even in complex mobile 
organisms, all this does not imply that the `ultimate' goals produced by natural selection are 
represented in the mind of an organism that happens to process all this information. Even 
consciousness did probably not evolve to promote self-knowledge, but only to solve specific 
problems. The goals of which an organism is conscious are likely to be `proximate' goals. 
Such goals are only intermediate direction signs that guide the organism through the 
problems of a specific sex-age class. 
 Figure 0-5. This figure is based on a figure by Wilson, which was also used by 
Barash (1986). It is an attempt to visualize the differences in focus among ethologists (a), 
primatologists (b) and students of human 
behavior (c). Ethologists study the 
behavioral repertoire of many species and 
subsequently place human behavior in a 
very wide context. Primatologists gain a 
more detailed insight in human life by 
comparing humans to the other apes. 
Students of human behavior study humans 
even more closely. Often they take the range 
of human behavioral variation for granted, 
however, forgetting that it represents only a 
small subset of the real variation in animal 
behavior. According to Wilson and Barash 
in going from (a) through (c) "we gain 
greater resolution but lose perspective, and 
vice versa". 
 
 Obviously (a), (b) and (c) are not 
incompatible; all three approaches are 
perfectly legitimate scientific enterprises. In 
principle, the whole scientific enterprise 
would be hopeless if one would see from 
perspective (a) things that are not true from 
the perspective (c). It would be a good 
heuristic principle, therefore, to discuss 
theories about human cognition, motivation 
and behavior on all three levels and to keep 
them compatible with results of 
investigations at all three levels. 
Fig. 0-5. Differences in focus among 
ethologists (a), primatologists (b) and 
students of human behavior (c). In going 
from (a) through (c) "we gain greater 
resolution but lose perspective, and vice 
versa" (Barash, 1986). 
 In all, these five figure suggest a 
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theoretical frame-work from which we can work on our `Why?'-questions. I hope to show 
that the mechanism of evolution, visualized in figures 0.1-0.3, can be used to explain a wide 
range of phenomena, including knowledge, consciousness and culture. While explaining 
these phenomena, we have to keep in mind figure 0.2 constantly to remind us of the fact that 
evolution is not a linear process. If there would be only one lineage and only one 
environment, evolution could in principle be a linear process. One trip into the field or into 
the forest reminds us of the fact, however, that all organisms have their specific survival 
strategies coupled to a very specific part of the environment. Even the so-called non-
specialists often need specialized skills to be able to be unspecialized: one only needs to 
look at the multifunctional bills of corvids, gulls and starlings to understand their 
opportunism. 
 In explaining behavior, specifically, we have to keep in mind figure 0.4. In no way 
does evolution imply that behavior is always rigidly preprogrammed. Of course, flexibility 
and learning have their price: for many relatively simple organisms they would simply cost 
too much time. Hence, a wasp will simply fly in the direction of the light, even if this 
implies bumping into windows. Only if this maladaptive behavior would cause the death of 
extremely large numbers of wasps during thousands of years would there be a chance that 
some wasps would evolve with the ability to overrule and correct their tendency to fly in the 
direction of light. 
 In many birds and mammals, the balance seems to have shifted in another direction 
and learning has apparently started to pay. That does not imply infinite flexibility, however, 
which would be incompatible with the concept of teleonomy. Often learning simply means 
that a particular behavioral programme can be improved by exercise and can be adapted to a 
particular environment. But even if the behavior of an animal would be extremely flexible, it 
would still need a general orientation to a series of goals which would assure that it wouldn't 
go extinct. The simple reason is that organisms which lack at least a general goal-
directedness and do not somehow propel their own kind have been going extinct and are 
going extinct all the time. 
 All this does not imply that I am defending a kind of `biological determinism' if 
biological determinism implies that the behavior of organisms is always preprogrammed in a 
robot-like fashion. If biological determinism implies that the behavior of all organisms, 
including humans, results from a series of physiological and psychological mechanisms that 
have been selected to ensure survival and reproduction, I am happy to be called a biological 
determinist. 
 Finally, figure 0-5 reminds us off the specific angle of the evolutionary approach. It 
does not simply see humans as `just animals' or `just apes'. This would not make much sense 
because `the' animal and `the' ape does not exists. All animals and apes are products of 
unique evolutionary trajectories, and so are humans. As figure 0-5 shows, humans could be 
unique because they display an extraordinary range of cognitive, behavioral and cultural 
possibilities. That does not imply, however, that we could not learn a lot by comparing 
human behavior to that of other animals, and especially to that of other primates. Such an 
approach is not incompatible with a more detailed study of human behavior in specific 
contexts, but simply has another resolution. There will be things which we can only see by 
watching humans closely or even `from the inside' and there will be things which we can 
only see by keeping some distance. If you want to see that the tower of Pisa does not stand 
entirely straight, you shouldn't study its interiors only or study it through a microscope. On 
the other hand, a study under the microscope of some of its materials may well be 
worthwhile to study the chances that it breaks at some point. Perhaps figure 0-5 can remind 
us of the necessity to switch back and forth between several perspectives. This flexibility of 
perspective and this attempt to integrate several perspectives is what defines naturalism. 
 
 
0.5 Naturalism versus Transcendentalism 
Finally, an attempt to visualize two different approaches to philosophy: the naturalism 
defended here and transcendentalism. (Again, figures should not be taken as a substitute for 
more extensive discussions.) By transcendentalism I do not only mean the type of 
philosophy exemplified by Kant and Husserl, but also other philosophies that take the 
concepts with which we understand our position in the world as somehow absolute, a priori, 
uninfluenced by other knowledge. Transcendentalists are those who believe in a priori 
conceptual analysis, who continually demand definitions before a particular ontological 
realm is discussed. Many `transcendental' philosophers are critical minds, who sincerely 
believe that one can analyze concepts or presuppositions without having to delve into the 
progress made by science. Often they value consistently and conceptual clarity high, but 
sometimes they overrate intuitive plausibility. They often forget that meanings, too, are 
theory-laden and that long chains of deductions are easily contaminated with extra 
presuppositions. The idea that meanings are somehow absolute or `given' has been called 
`meaning realism' by Ruth Millikan (1984). It seems to me that meaning realism 
presupposes a kind of transcendental or platonic 
realm in which the meanings of concepts are stored 
and kept pure, apart from the rest of our knowledge. 
 Naturalists do not believe in such a 
`transcendental dictionary'. There is no collection of 
presuppositions apart from our knowledge about the 
world, rather presuppositions come and go while we 
are continually molding new hypotheses. While 
consistency and strictness are to be valued highly 
(apparently the world is to some extent structured and 
intelligible), the intellect of man is far too limited to 
be able to understand itself and its position on the 
basis of deductive reasoning alone. Attempts at 
building philosophies on the basis of `self-evident' 
truths and strict deductions fail, because they start 
already with apparently `pure' concepts that 
nevertheless contain fragments of old hypotheses and because they contain deductions 
contaminated by inconspicuous presuppositions. The safest way to free your thinking of 
false presuppositions is to realize the dynamic nature of all concepts and the hypothetical 
nature of all thinking, while at the same time keeping contact with many different realms of 
reality in which specific hypotheses are continually tested and corrected. For the naturalists, 
science is a way of enlarging the `field' of ordinary experience by means of new instruments 
and new mathematical techniques. Often it reveals the limited nature of ordinary experience 
and therefore it is often able to correct the hypotheses which arise out the naïveté of this 
context. Even more sensational is the potential of science to actually solve philosophical 
problems of the past, of which I hope to give some examples in this book. 
 
Fig. 0-6. The naturalistic 
philosopher as a spider in its web. 
 But can we trust science? While a scientific theory which is able to predict and 
explain many phenomena is not necessarily true, a history of success can hardly be an 
accident. Especially when a theory is confirmed in different fields, on the basis of different 
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methodologies and different sets of data, it should be taken seriously to the extent of its 
`robustness' (multiple derivability, Wimsatt, 1981). Thus, good theories should not only 
exhibit consistency, conceptual clarity, verifiability, predictive and explanatory power, in 
the end robustness and convergence are the best signs that one is heading in the right 
direction. If theories would be untrue, despite their having all those virtues, including 
robustness, this world would in the end proof to be unintelligible and we would be toys of 
Descartes' demon: we would not stand the ghost of a chance against him. The world is a 
risky place and whoever is curious or yearns for wisdom has to take as many  chances as 
whoever wants to live in it. Wisdom is not the fruit of fear and prudence only, but it results 
from a mixture of curiosity, experimentation, folly and learning by experience. 
 I have depicted the transcendental 
and naturalistic approaches in Figure 0-6 
and 0-7. The idea is that we are in the 
midst of a web of meanings, which 
connects us to the world. Just like a web 
spider is almost blind, we have eight 
sensitive paws with which we feel all 
minute chances in our web and in the 
world around us. We are continually 
obliged to spin and weave new conceptual 
connections and to restore old 
indispensable ones. Perhaps our eight 
paws can be called consistency, simplicity, 
conceptual clarity, verifiability, predictive 
power, explanatory power, robustness and 
plausibility. There is no way in which we 
can leave our web or in which we can 
secure the threads that we weave apart 
from a small collection of affixtures 
outside. Figure 0-6 thus shows the naturalistic philosopher as a spider in its web. 
 
 
Fig. 0-7. The transcendental philosopher as a 
spider with a magnifying glass leaving his web 
of meaning to inspect it from above. 
 In figure 0-7 something strange has happened. The spider thinks he can leave his 
web and can inspect its quality from the outside. Even stranger, he thinks his web is all that 
matters and he forgets that it is connected to the outside world and that it has a purpose. In 
his imagination he is hovering above his web, which he considers to be a universe apart, and 
he is endlessly correcting threads and connections. Of course, he has a magnifying glass at 
his disposal which is as big as his web and much bigger than his own modest physical 
appearance. Sometimes the spider in the midst of this web thinks it needs only one thread 
connecting it to one branch. It will be clear that this is a caricature of the transcendental 
philosopher, who thinks that concepts can be analyzed apart from their connections to the 
world of experience and that of science or who thinks he needs only one connection. 
 
 
 
 
 
 In contrast to transcendentalism, naturalism is an attempt at multidisciplinary 
conceptual integration which is directed at minimizing the risk of error by spreading the 
weight given to different chains of reasoning. As long as knowledge originating from 
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different realms of reality reinforces each other the web is safe: it will probably survive even 
if one or two of its threads break. 
 It will be clear that I do not conceive myself as a transcendentalist. Yet, although it is 
based on dubious assumptions, although it contributes hardly to progress and sometimes 
even frustrates progress, transcendentalism often is functional in reminding us of the fact 
that human knowledge is still very limited. Transcendentalists are good in finding weak 
points within the naturalistic frame-work and with that they point to issues which need 
further work. To phrase it in a somewhat biblical way, transcendentalistic philosophers often 
see the mote in one's brother's eye but do not see the beam in their own eyes (Math. 7, 3). 
Let us be thankful for that, continually, because without their help we might not be able to 
remove that mote. 
 
 
  I  
 
 
1 
  * Why knowledge & 
consciousness evolved *  
 
At least since Socrates and Plato naturalistic and materialistic philosophies have been 
judged epistemologically naive by many philosophers. Idealistic, rationalistic, 
transcendental and phenomenological philosophers claimed that scientific theories are in 
need of a `foundation' beyond science: their `presuppositions' and concepts had to be 
proved valid `a priori', independent of specific theories. Without such a foundation and 
justification scientific theories were supposed to be circular: scientists would essentially be 
finding what they expected to find and would be unable to discover realities that did not fit 
their conceptual frame-work. The discovery that knowledge does not arise directly and 
exclusively from the senses often seduced philosophers to neglect the testimony of the senses 
as if interpretations of the world which explain many observations are not superior to 
interpretations without such `empirical' support. 
 The rise of evolutionary epistemology marks a stage in the history of both 
materialism and naturalism in which the reproach of naivité is no longer justified. Not that 
evolutionary epistemology claims to offer the kind of extra-theoretical foundation that 
`foundationalistic' philosophers are looking and asking for. Evolutionary epistemology 
shows, however, that circularity can be very fruitful if it leads to theories that integrate 
more and more facts. In that case, circularity is a property of an upward spiral of progress, 
a feedback loop in which new concepts and presuppositions on the one hand and new facts 
and discoveries on the other hand mutually clarify and fertilize each other. If knowledge is 
viewed as based on pattern-matching (Masters, 1993), it is clear that it grows with the 
sheer quantity of observations which have given rise to the recognition of particular 
patterns, despite the fact that it can never completely transcend its conjectural origin. 
 Chapter 1 introduces evolutionary epistemology as a model which explains the 
possibility of knowledge as a correspondence or `fit' between objects and representations. 
This correspondence or fit is explained as a product of natural selection: our cognitive 
apparatus has evolved to guide us through the world by means of representations, ideas and 
concepts. We are capable of knowledge of the world, because we are like all animals in 
need of orientation. Our internal representation of the world is not designed to be 
ontologically adequate, however, but to ensure decisions that promote survival. Our `innate 
structures of experience' constitute an evaluative perspective in which information 
concerning the world is sieved and transformed in a way that enables us to reach 
evolutionary optimal decisions. This way, evolutionary epistemology explains the contrasts 
between science and our natural experience of the world. 
 This version of evolutionary epistemology gives a plausible perspectivistic model 
about the relationship between ideas and things and it enables us to see both the scope and 
limitations of the human knowledge apparatus, which originally evolved both to orient and 
to guide: orientation presupposes a minimum of adequate representation, guidance and 
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motivation sometimes may require simplification, bias, misrepresentation and self-deceit. 
Certainly, truth is not a self-evident ingredient of our destiny. 
 Chapter 2 tries to give a systematic treatment of the diverse properties of our 
cognitive ability. The evolutionary epistemological approach to the various properties is 
compared to other approaches, especially the transcendental philosophy of Kant (the 
sequence of subjects of whose KRITIK DER REINEN VERNUNFT was used in this chapter in a 
creative way). Kant tried to criticize the human capacity for knowledge by giving an 
analysis of its strengths and weaknesses A PRIORI - before its actual use. 
 However, any A PRIORI analysis of the human cognitive faculty and the 
transcendental veil in which it casts the world is bound to be speculative. It would be an 
illusion to think that such an analysis could be uninfluenced by the advancement of 
knowledge in a particular age (Kant's analysis, for example, is clearly inspired by the 
success of Newton's physics and by its felt inadequacy as a final interpretation of the 
world). The only way to discover the limits and possibilities of our knowledge apparatus is 
by integrating all research in its function and range. A naturalistic `criticism of pure 
reason' (KRITIK DER REINEN VERNUNFT) starts therefore with the assumption that not all our 
knowledge is deceptive. From there it tries to sort out what we currently know about all the 
processes that constitute or underlay knowledge between `sensory input' and `intelligent, 
informed output'. On the basis of this knowledge A POSTERIORI it can explain phenomena 
like the `theory-ladenness' of observation, the `value-ladenness' and `social construction' of 
scientific models without (mis-) using them as a starting-point for a relativistic 
epistemology. It was already accepted that this procedure implies some kind of circle, but 
this circle has the character of a spiral in which the phenomenon of knowledge is explained 
backwards by means of a process of `bootstrapping' during the gradual accumulation of 
knowledge about the world of which our knowledge capacity forms a part. 
 Such an analysis of knowledge has the advantage of being able to profit from 
advances in many disciplines without being overly distrustful or trustful. Chapter 2 is an 
attempt to indicate what kind of knowledge has implications for epistemology. I aim to show 
that the new evolutionary and naturalistic approach throws another light on traditional 
subjects and also points to a series of properties of the cognitive apparatus that were mostly 
neglected in the past. For example, Kant wrote on the senses (§ 2.1), on the stereometric 
frame-work of observation (§ 2.2), on innate/A PRIORI cognitive expectations (§ 2.4) and on 
the tendency to transcend experience (§ 2.6); but NOT on the value-ladenness of experience 
(§ 2.3), the social construction of reality (§ 2.5) and the trial and error character of all 
knowledge (§ 2.7). Although this has been proclaimed by other philosophers before, for me 
the most important insight from evolutionary epistemology is that knowledge does not exist 
for the sake of knowledge and consciousness does not exist for the sake of consciousness. As 
one of the `fathers of sociobiology', C.G. Williams wrote, only by asking for its function, can 
we hope to understand the human mind. 
 This brings us to chapter 3. Traditionally, epistemology has always been an 
applied philosophy of mind, mobilized to combat skepticism and to give a foundation for a 
philosopher's attitude towards science. This has had the effect that both epistemologies and 
philosophies of mind often concentrated one-sidedly on the information-aspect of 
knowledge. From an evolutionary perspective the other side of knowledge becomes more 
important, the one that has to do with decision-making. Consequently, in chapter 3 
consciousness is not only viewed as a focus of perspectivated information about the world, 
but above all as a locus at which an organism is MOVED by properties of the world which 
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are relevant with respect to its well-being, prospects and possibilities. Consciousness is the 
radical subjective side of knowledge which enables organisms to access the relevance of 
information with respect to decisions that have to be taken - which FORCES them to take 
information seriously. 
 In chapter 3 sociobiology and evolutionary psychology (more extensively defended 
in chapter 4) are cross-fertilized with value-driven decision-system theory as developed by 
G.E. Pugh. Sociobiology and evolutionary psychology are used to defend that 
consciousness is thoroughly perspectivistic and related to the interests of the individual or 
even of its genes. Value-driven decision-system theory explains the necessity of a decision 
system in which different behavioral options can be compared and `weighed'. It is proposed 
that consciousness constitutes a cognitive and motivational straitjacket which `subjectively 
forces' animals to act in an adaptive - inclusive fitness maximizing - way. `Innate structures 
of experience' are needed to supply values that enable animals to weigh different behavioral 
options: they supply heuristic approximations of the survival values of different 
experimental behavioral strategies (which may be explored during play). They may 
constitute something like Melzack's `genetically prewired neuromatrix'. 
 In all, the results of this evolutionary approach to mind are somewhat more 
critical than German-Austrian evolutionary epistemology: it stresses the way in which 
information is transformed into subjectivity to narrow down the list of behavioral priorities 
for the organism. The model thus suggests a functional (and realistic) interpretation of 
qualia: they guide organisms through a wood of behavioral options in a plurality of 
possible situations. This view of consciousness has also consequences with respect to the 
`question of animal awareness'. Play behavior is viewed as behavior in which animals not 
only improve their motor skills, but in which they also train their general level of control 
and improve their skills in decision-taking. Dreaming is interpretated as a result of the 
ability to form scenarios and to weigh and compare virtual situation-specific behavioral 
sequences, using the experiential `values' which qualia are supposed to be. Therefore both 
play behavior and dreaming could provide diagnostic criteria for the ability to experience 
and to suffer. Animals that can play and dream are to be viewed as conscious beings that 
deserve special treatment. (Within this view, consciousness is also not dependent on a 
capacity for language, although language certainly must have enormously expanded the 
horizon within which organisms experience and thus evaluate their world with its promises 
and possibilities.) 
 The general upshot of part I is that knowledge is a through and through 
`biological' phenomenon. This does not mean, of course, that it is a purely `genetical' 
phenomenon and that learning does not play a role. It means that knowledge and even 
learning are ADAPTIVE phenomena, `designed' by variation and selection to enable 
organisms to interact efficiently with their environment. As an adaptive phenomenon, 
knowledge is at the same time a holistic property, tested as a whole by natural selection. 
Thus an evolutionary approach does not turn us into reductionists. 
 One of the nice properties of evolutionary epistemology is that it makes us more 
aware of the relationship between animals and humans. A series of questions becomes 
important, which is entirely beyond the scope of epistemology. Are humans just other 
animals? If animals and humans are so similar to each other, can we still view humans as 
animals with a series of unique characteristics, for example those that cause us to create 
culture? Such questions are addressed in part II and III.
   
  1 
  * To know in order to survive: 
explaining knowledge and its 
limits from an evolutionary 
perspective \ 
 
  Wie weit auch unser Intellekt ein Folge von Existenzbedingungen ist -; wir hätten ihn nicht, wenn 
wir ihn nich nötig hätten, und hätten ihn nicht so, wenn wir ihn nicht so nötig hätten, wenn wir auch 
anders leben könnten. 
Friedrich Nietzsche (1940: II, 258)  
 
          Wohl kann man die Formen, also gewissermassen den leer ablaufenden Mechanismus der 
Erkenntnisleistungen, zum Gegenstand der Untersuchung machen, `reine' Erkenntnistheorie treiben. 
Man würde dabei so verfahren, als ob man etwa die Mechanismen eine Photokamera, sagen wir 
eine Leica, in ihren inneren Gesetzmäßigkeiten untersuchte, ohne dabei in Betracht zu ziehen, daß 
der ganze Apparat zum Photographieren da ist und von der Firma Leitz/Wetzlar im Dienst dieser 
Funktion aus einfacheren, früheren Typen entwickelt worden ist. Vor allem aber wird man bei 
einem solchen Vorgehen weder über die Leistung noch über die Leistungsgrenzen des untersuchten 
Apparates dasjenige erfahren, was zu wissen nötig ist, will man die Leistung verstehen und 
verbessern lernen, um jene Grenzen zu erweitern.  
      Konrad Lorenz (1959) 
 
  ... in spite of its triviality, the proposition that animals can know something completely 
revolutionizes the theory of knowledge as it is still widely taught. 
 
      Karl Popper (1990) 
 
1.1 EVOLUTIONARY EPISTEMOLOGY: ITS NATURE AND LIMITS 
Scientific progress is often the result of integrating independent facts or models in new 
explanatory frame-works (Kitcher, 1981; Wimsatt, 1981). Newton combined the idea of a 
falling apple with that of rotating planets and Darwin combined insights into the breeding of 
different races of domestic animals with knowledge of geology, fossils and the variety of 
species. Although such connections of ideas may seem almost inevitable in retrospect, they 
were undoubtedly very hazardous and highly speculative at the time that they were first 
made. The same goes for the first scientific theory explaining the nature and scope of 
knowledge, evolutionary epistemology, which has been developed independently by many 
thinkers on the basis of evolutionary theory (Roy Wood Sellars, 1922; Lorenz, 1973; 
Campbell, 1974, 1990, Vollmer, [1975] 1983; Riedl, 1981; Millikan, 1984, 1993; see also 
Giere, 1985, Ruse, 1986, Bradie, 1986; Rescher (ed.), 1990; Radnitzky & Bartley III (eds.), 
1987; Hahlweg & Hooker (eds.), 1989, Rescher (ed.), 1990; Goldman, 1990; Popper, 1990; 
Callebaut, 1993). 
 Evolutionary epistemology connects two concerns that traditional philosophers are 
inclined to see as belonging to different categories: the biological process of adaptation 
through natural selection and the traditional philosophical problem of the possibility of 
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knowledge. It addresses the same question which inspired Plato to his doctrine of a pre-
existential contemplation of the eternal ideas, Leibniz to his doctrine of a God-given 
harmonie préétablie between ideas and things, and Hegel to his belief in the ultimate 
spiritual nature of all reality: how can ideas `in our minds' ever `correspond' or `refer' to 
objects and relations `in the world'? Evolutionary epistemology answers this question by 
postulating that not all of our knowledge is deceptive and by explaining the partial adequacy 
of our cognitive faculties as the product of variation and selection. Some of the ways in 
which we structure our experiences and some of the ways in which we acquire knowledge 
are adequate, because they have already enabled our ancestors to become our ancestors 
(Vollmer, 1983: 102) - it is supposed that a long series of their relatives became extinct as a 
result of their lack of an adequate representation of their environment. Knowledge is 
explained as a sensitivity to particular physical characteristics of the environment which are 
processed into an internal representation that helps the organism to orient itself and to attain 
its goals in that environment. 
 Of course, evolutionary epistemology - which is presented by Gerhard Vollmer as a 
`Copernican turn' in epistemology - has problems which originate with the very concepts it 
unifies. Some of these problems come with the notion of adaptation - to understand 
evolutionary epistemology it is absolutely essential that one has to accept that adaptations 
are always accidental and imperfect evolutionary improvisations which are often 
compromises between different requirements. Other problems originate with the concept of 
knowledge, which, of course, is not a self-evident empirical `phenomenon' like a falling 
apple or the moon. Philosophers have quarreled for already twenty-five centuries about what 
knowledge really is and how it is possible. The idea that evolutionary biology is going to 
solve this problem immediately, at first encountered knitted eyebrows and venomous 
mockery (e.g. Putnam, 1982; Nagel, 1986: 78-81). In this chapter I will defend the idea that 
evolutionary epistemology is simply an inevitable consequence of developments within our 
current world view and that this epistemology has far-reaching implications for our 
philosophical meditations on the nature of knowledge. It is not claimed that all 
epistemological problems are solved in one stroke: a more detailed analysis of the origin of 
the more specific human knowledge-forms is essential. 
 As some of the most important originators of evolutionary epistemology have indicated, 
evolutionary epistemology is a scientific theory based upon presuppositions that it shares 
with other scientific theories: one of them being the `postulate of reality' (Monod, 1971; 
Lorenz, 1973; Vollmer, 1983; Meyers, 1990)1. It is neither an a priori analysis of the 
possibility of knowledge, nor an absolute justification of our knowledge-forms. It does not 
have decisive arguments to defeat the antirealistic skeptic and it can't function as a 
demarcation between theories that are scientific or not. Above all it has to be stated that it 
has only conditional normative implications. In that sense it cannot satisfy the criteria which 
traditional epistemologies wanted to satisfy. 
 In the following I will indicate why evolutionary epistemology is nevertheless of such 
importance. My starting-point will be that evolutionary epistemology is, above anything 
else, a scientific theory about our natural daily experience of the world. It is precisely from 
an analysis of this normal experience that light is thrown on the different properties of 
 
1. To be honest, it has to be admitted that there exist anti-realistic versions of evolutionary epistemology, 
which however seem to be born more from an (over-) reaction to naive realism than to the critical or 
hypothetical realism defended here. 
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knowledge which have confused philosophers for centuries. To those properties belong, 
among other things, the perspectivistic and subjective nature of knowledge, the 
underdetermination of our models of the world by sensory data and the both social and 
competitive nature of science - all aspects of knowledge which have been exaggerated by 
one philosophical school or another and which have been seen as a reason to abandon the 
belief in the `objectivity' or the `realistic referential' character of knowledge-claims. Indeed, 
all these properties do not make it easy to transcend our primary experience of the world and 
the intuitions which it engenders - as a result of which it becomes difficult to maintain the 
ideal of knowledge as something beyond subjectivity, speculation, and social construction. 
Yet, as a result of the scientific study of the evolution of knowledge and its limitations, it 
sometimes is possible to overcome them. It is via this maneuver that evolutionary 
epistemology as the evolutionary justification and critique of our inherited knowledge 
capacities has important normative implications. 
 In the last decades evolutionary epistemology has become increasingly popular. The 
reason for this popularity is simply that it promises a more complete and integrated picture 
of knowledge than the more traditional epistemologies were able to offer. Evolutionary 
epistemology can explain, for example, in what respect traditional models and foundations 
of knowledge like empiricism and rationalism were right and to what extent they were 
exaggerated and one-sided. No doubt its biggest virtue is, however, that, contrary to 
traditional epistemologies, it can explain what knowledge is, why it is so difficult to achieve 
and its `foundations'  remain hypotheses within a web of hypotheses. 
 Inevitably the popularity of evolutionary epistemology also meant that many different 
versions of it were proposed, some of which could more adequately be called `evolutionary 
information theory', the `evolutionary account of science' (`Evolutionäre 
Wissensschaftstheorie', Oeser, 1987; Callebaut, 1993) or `universal selection theory' 
(Campbell, 1974; Plotkin, 1994; Cziko, 1995; Buskes, 1998). In this chapter I will stress the 
importance of `orthodox' Lorenz-Vollmerian evolutionary epistemology, sometimes called 
`bio-epistemology' (Hahlweg & Hooker, 1989; Callebaut, 1993), because only this version 
can explain why organisms have an interest in adequate representations of their 
surroundings. The orthodox version is rendered by Vollmer thus: 
 
 Our knowledge-apparatus is a product of evolution. The subject structures of knowledge are 
matching with the world, because they have been adapted to this real world during the course of 
evolution. And they correspond (partly) to real structures, because such a correspondence made 
life possible2 (Vollmer, 1983: 102). 
 
Because this version stresses the adaptedness of our evolved knowledge structures, it 
explains on the one hand why there is a partial `fit' between our ideas and the world and, on 
the other hand, why there is such a discrepancy between ordinary experience and scientific 
insight. 
 
 
2. Unser Erkenntnisapparat ist ein Ergebnis der Evolution. Die subjectiven Erkenntnisstrukturen passen auf 
die Welt, weil sie sich im Laufe der Evolution in Anpassung an diese reale Welt herausgebildet haben. Und 
sie stimmen mit den realen Strukturen (teilweise) überein, weil nur eine solche Übereinstimmung das 
Überleben ermöglichte. 
 Fig. 1-1. The gap between the subjective a priori and the world is bridged by the natural 
selection of knowledge structures. Changed after Vollmer [1975] 1983: 120. 
Figure 1-1 has been adapted from the work of Vollmer ([1975] 1983: 120) to visualize the 
idea. Within the traditional Kantian perspective there is a dualism between the subject with 
its sense structures, its subjective interpretative framework for ordering experience (the 
categories), its ideas etc. on the one hand - and the objective, outside world of Dinge an sich 
on the other hand. In evolutionary epistemology this bridge between subject and object is 
crossed, because the subject is no longer viewed as an unworldly `transcendental' monad, but 
as the descendant of a long series of monadic structures that were more or less successful to 
the extent that their subjective a priori structures offered them some grip on the outside 
world in which they had to survive. The result is a partial `fit': the Kantian a priori is 
phylogenetically a posteriori. Of course, it does not have direct access to the real world, but 
its senses, categories, ideas, all have been selected on their ability to orient and to guide. I 
have further stressed the transition to a postkantian realism by placing the dualism between 
subject and object as viewed by Kant and other traditional epistemologists in a larger frame-
work (dotted lines) in which a plurality of knowledge-structures are tested over millennia by 
means of variation and selection. Our subject is part of a series which continually emerges 
from nature's assembly lines. Introspection may sometimes yield the idea that we are at the 
transcendental edges of our universes, but in fact even the ways in which we think have 
already been prefabricated long ago and in that respect we are even as subjects fully 
embedded in the stream of life. Thus, transcendentalism and philosophical solipsism are 
simply products of a too limited point of view. There is a natural link between this kind of 
evolutionary epistemology and some kind of realism - the question is which. 
 
 
8 
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1.2 WHAT EVOLUTIONARY EPISTEMOLOGY IS NOT 
a.A naturalistic equivalent of a `transcendental deduction' 
First, however, it is important to make clear what evolutionary epistemology is not (Vollmer, 
1987; 1988). However strange it may appear, it is apparently allowed to accuse evolutionary 
epistemology without references of visions that its representatives do not hold. For example, 
Hilary Putnam in his article Why Reason Can't Be Naturalized (Putnam, 1982; compare also 
Nagel, 1986) claims that evolutionary epistemology should enable us to separate true and 
false statements or to justify certain methodologies or opinions. Evolutionary epistemology 
is supposed to claim that a belief is rational if it aids survival. Naturally it is easy to ridicule 
such a self-created strawman: as Putnam himself indicates, there is no contradiction in the 
idea that very irrational beliefs help people to survive or that rational beliefs lead to the 
extinction of those who cherish them (Putnam, 1982: 6). 
 Evolutionary epistemology, thus, does not equate rationality with fitness or survival. 
This would, of course, not be compatible with modern evolutionary theory. Sociobiologists 
have stressed, for example, that self deception about one's own altruism, that is to say a false 
representation of the own altruistic investments, can be very functional in reciprocal 
altruistic relationships, because it allows the individual to deceive the other more 
convincingly (Trivers, 1985). According to Trivers it would be naive to suppose that the 
complexity of the nervous system correlates with its ability to reconstruct the world 
accurately (Trivers, 1976). According to his ideas, self deception and repression are 
expected to be common among individuals of our species who are completely dependent on 
reciprocal altruism (more on these issues in chapter 4). 
 In other contexts a lack of knowledge rather than knowledge, and a misrepresentation of 
reality could be adaptive. Flohr (1987) shows, for example, referring to Lorenz and Vollmer 
amongst others, that a combination of properties of our cognitive apparatus - the tendency to 
reduce uncertainty, the tendency to think in opposites and the desire to belong to a group - 
can easily lead to political prejudices. No doubt there would be less prejudice and fewer 
extremist opinions in the world if there had never been certain advantages to having a clear 
and simple world-view, the correctness of which would not be the absolute priority. As Flohr 
remarks, our thinking has evolved to solve practical matters and not to approximate the truth 
optimally. 
 All in all, evolutionary epistemology is not a naturalistic equivalent or replacement of 
the `transcendental deduction' or justification of our categories that, among others, Kant 
envisioned (see § 1.4). The program of `justification and critique' that follows from 
evolutionary epistemology is not based on the hope of constructing a rigid system of 
deductions which guarantees an absolutely certain foundation for all knowledge, but is more 
comparable to a snowball in which a multitude of plausibilities is gradually pushed firm into 
a practical certainty. 
 
b.A naive version of the correspondence theory of truth 
Evolutionary epistemology is not founded on some naive `metaphysical' realism, as Putnam 
and in his wake Ruse (1986: 197) hold. According to Putnam and Ruse evolutionary 
epistemology would imply that we could compare contents of knowledge with objects as if 
we still had another route to the `thing in itself' than that of our ultimately perspectivistic 
knowledge. Ruse especially delights in a caricatural discussion of Lorenz' essay of 1941, 
which is a classic of `orthodox' evolutionary epistemology. In this essay Lorenz is indeed 
reacting to the Kantian dogma of the unknowable Ding an sich and he speaks somewhat 
rashly about the `fit' between our categories and the structures of the world. At the same 
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time, however, he calls our categories evolutionary `working hypotheses' 
(`Arbeitshypothesen') which often prove to be true in normal life, but which in science 
sometimes prove to be inadequate (Lorenz, 1941; Riedl, 1981). 
 Therefore, the question is whether Lorenz' model really implies such a naive version of 
the correspondence theory of truth. The `fitting' of categories and reality about which he 
speaks is not the same as the `similarity' between the two to which Locke refers3. The fit 
between categories and reality can be experienced by the knowing organism from within the 
feedback loop between knowledge apparatus and reality. An external point of view is not 
necessary. Goldman is therefore justified in his claim that the metaphor of a mirror which is 
rejected by many - Putnam and Rorty among others - can be better replaced by the metaphor 
of clothing. An article of clothing also has to fit, but need not resemble the person wearing 
it: it is even unclear what resembling would mean here. Different parts of the body can be 
dressed with different garments, just as different categories and theories can `cover' the same 
part of the world at the same time (Goldman, 1986: 151). Goldman christens his version of 
the correspondence theory `correspondence2'. Correspondence1 presupposes that the real 
world independent of our knowledge is already structured according to categories and 
concepts and that `true' knowledge reflects this structure into language. Correspondence2 
leaves the possibility open, however, for different systems of categories: from each 
viewpoint a slightly different net of categories may be thrown out over the world (see 
Goldman, 1990, for his version of evolutionary epistemology). 
 All in all, Ruse is unfair in disposing of the whole European evolutionary epistemology 
with a couple of misleading citations of Lorenz' essay of 1941 which might be interpreted as 
referring to Goldman's `correspondence1'; the more so since he is evidently doing this to be 
able to claim more originality for his own version of evolutionary epistemology - 
`Darwinian epistemology' - than it deserves and to safeguard it against philosophical critics 
like Putnam and Nagel. For that matter, in more recent essay Ruse is simply using the 
concept of evolutionary epistemology again and there he sometimes openly admits to being 
a realist (Ruse, 1987), albeit a `common-sense realist' (like Putnam in his most recent cloak; 
Ruse, 1990). 
 That evolutionary epistemology is not a naive realism comes out in the emphasis on the 
perspectivist nature of knowledge4. When Lorenz reacts against the doctrine of the 
 
3. On the one hand Locke cuts the direct referential relation between ideas and things: the object of 
knowledge is not the thing but the idea. Next, he tries to re-establish the connection by introducing a 
mysterious kind of `resemblance' between ideas and primary qualities. "The ideas of primary qualities of 
bodies are resemblances of them, and their patterns do really exist in the bodies themselves, but the ideas 
produced in us by these secundary qualities have no resemblance of them at all" (Locke, 1690). This way he 
creates the problem of correspondence which was characterized by R.W. Sellars as the `Lockian impasse', 
dominating epistemology for centuries. "Ideas were taken to be the primary objects of knowledge and yet 
there was the belief in a material world beyond, which some ideas copied" (Sellars, 1959: 717-722). See 
chapter 3. 
4. Lorenz explicitly denies that he identifies Erscheinung and Ding an sich,  "die empirische Realität für das 
absolut Existente". "Die Beziehung zwischen der Erscheinungswelt und dem An-Sich der Dinge ist ... nicht 
durch ideale, das heißt außernatürliche Formgesetze in grundsätzlich unerforschbarer Weise ein für allemal 
festgelegt, noch weniger kommt den aufgrund dieser `Denknotwendigkeiten' gefällten Urteilen eine 
selbständige und absolute Gültigkeit zu... Die Aussage, daß [die Gesetze der `reinen Vernunft'] absolute 
Gültigkeit zukomme, ja daß jedes überhaupt denkbare vernünftige Wesen, und sei es ein Engel, den gleichen 
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unknowable Ding an sich he does not claim he can compare Ding an sich and Erscheinung. 
This would presuppose a point of view in which reality is not caught within a net of 
categories, which for Kant apparently would be possible for God and the angels alone5. The 
only thing that he needs to maintain is that the way in which the world appears to us has 
been determined by categories which have helped our ancestors to orient themselves for 
millennia and which as a result are very likely to be adequate ways of structuring and 
integrating sensory input. 
  In the interpretation of evolutionary epistemology the Kantian `Erscheinung' is 
therefore a perspective on the `an Sich' from a particular a priori-structure, which is 
certainly not the only one possible. Evolutionary epistemology is in fact claiming to be able 
to study the relationship between particular perspectives and the survival program of which 
they form a part: this I take to be the message of Lorenz in the text cited by Ruse. Again, 
this does not imply a triadic relationship of categories - world - (transcendental) 
epistemological point of view, as Ruse interprets Lorenz. It does not imply that we are 
Kantian, `transcendental acrobats' hovering beyond all particular perspectives and inspecting 
the ontological limitations and adequacy of our own senses, categories and ideas in a kind of 
analytic vacuum. Rather, it implies that from our perspective we are able to know with our 
categories to obtain knowledge about the relationships that other perspectives and cognitive 
structures have with the world - as a result of which we are able, subsequently, to learn 
things in general about knowledge, truth and deception, the ways in which they are part of 
different survival strategies, and the qualities of our own cognitive apparatus. 
 The presupposition that we are able to know (at least to some extent) how others know 
is also necessary for the skeptic, as long as he wants to convince others. Writing down one's 
opinion does not make much sense if one does not believe that the person who is going to 
read it has a relationship to the same world. In the same way our interaction with animals 
often presupposes a certain degree of knowledge about a shared world on the part of the 
animal. The moment a pheasant flies up in front of me I have to assume that the bird 
somehow has a representation of me, the nature of which is another matter. The fact that it 
starts flying before I even spotted it, means something about its different cognitive abilities 
and the way these help it in the world that it has to share with me. The different 
representations of the world of birds and people need not correspond `better' or `worse' with 
the world, but they are different perspectives on the same world. 
 
c.A proof for the existence of an `outside world' 
Evolutionary epistemology does not claim to prove the outside world as Ruse seems to 
impute to Lorenz. The only thing Lorenz claims is that the function of the knowledge 
apparatus only becomes clear from realistic premisses: only if there is an environment can 
 
 
 
 
 
Denkgesetzen gehorchen müsse, erscheint uns als anthropozentrische Vermessenheit" (Lorenz, 1941: 102-
103). 
5. Intellektuelle Anschauung scheint allein dem Urwesen, niemals aber einem abhängigen Wesen 
zuzukommen. KRV A 123. 
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 the knowledge apparatus be adapted to that environment. Evolutionary epistemology does 
not therefore give a justification for realism, but is itself founded on realism (Meyers, 
1990)6. It is not so much a foundation for hypotheses on reality, but rather a keystone for the 
building of hypotheses which form the scientific world-view: a hypothesis woven into the 
web of other hypotheses which tries to explain why a knowledge apparatus arose in the first 
place and why it has the peculiarities that we often take for granted. Contrary to many other 
philosophical hypotheses evolutionary epistemology is therefore a very `robust' hypothesis 
(Wimsatt, 1981) - one that can be reached by following several independent lines of 
reasoning and one that is reinforced by several independent scientific disciplines. It not only 
stresses the limits of our cognitive faculties, but tries to explain them from an encompassing 
theory about our position in a real world in which our cognitive faculties arose as small 
lights to guide our ancestors along the paths they took through the jungle. 
 What kind of realism, then, is compatible with - but not proved by - evolutionary 
epistemology? In spite of the apparent disagreement between people like Ruse and Vollmer, 
I think a closer look reveals an area of agreement. Ruse claims that an evolutionary approach 
to cognition is only compatible with `common sense' realism (Ruse, 1986; 1990). Lorenz 
and Vollmer claim that evolutionary epistemology shows that our innate categories have 
evolved to cope with the `mesocosmos' - the realm between micro- and macrocosmos. They 
are probably inadequate to some extent to form a proper conception of both micro- and 
macrocosmos. As Ruse seems to forget that the theory of evolution presupposes realism at 
some level (Meyers, 1990), the best position seems to be a kind of inferential, conditional 
and hypothetical realism, which starts from the assumption that our cognitive faculties have 
indeed evolved to cope with mesocosmic objects like bananas, trees and stones - rather than 
with superstrings, quarks, black holes and supernovas - and that it includes a disposition to 
makes inductive inferences (Goldman, 19907) which, if applied properly, can yield 
hypothetical truths even outside the narrow domain for which it has evolved. From this then 
follows the program of an `evolutionary justification and critique of our inherited 
information processing algorithms' (Chapter 2). 
 
d.A circle? 
From the perspective of traditional epistemology evolutionary epistemology is a circle: 
epistemology should give an ultimate justification, and evolutionary epistemology is itself 
founded on an - uncertain - scientific hypothesis and is therefore in no way able to give a 
foundation for all other scientific hypotheses. From the perspective of evolutionary  
 
 
6. From the foregoing it should be clear that evolutionary epistemology does not give an absolute foundation 
for our knowledge at all, but instead starts from a certain amount of knowledge (organized in the theory of 
evolution) and from there tries to explain knowledge, its possibility and very essence. 
7. "It is plausible that the human brain was selected in part because of its capacity for and disposition to such 
inference [inference to the best explanation], and that the survival value of this disposition lies in part in the 
fact that such inference tends to produce or preserve truth in belief." (Goldman, 1990: 40). 
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epistemology, however, the demand for such an absolute justification is absurd: the only 
certainty which can accompany a set of scientific hypotheses is their mutual consistency and 
their empirical success. What other indications for the reliability of knowledge could we 
imagine for an evolved mass of cells? 
 The fact that we already start from the theory of evolution implies that for the naturalist 
a theory that offers the best explanations of many independent areas is worth the inherent 
risk of a gamble8. The naturalist knows that even the skeptic needs a theory on which his 
skepticism is based, but that this theory is probably unable to free him of his most 
elementary prejudices. The skeptic who demands absolute proof and ultimate justifications 
should realize that his choice of skepticism is not justified better than the road chosen by the 
naturalist - and that it offers fewer possibilities of viewing the world from a somewhat 
different perspective that enables us to discover new dimensions of it. Those wanting 
absolute certainty get no further than a simple repetition of their skeptical starting-points. On 
the other hand, those starting from principles that have proved to be fruitful in scientific 
practice may run some risk of falling or slipping down on the road towards insight, but may 
end up close to the top of a philosophical mountain from which they see their skeptical 
fellow-philosophers struggling behind, hopelessly lost down in the valley. 
 In this context evolutionary epistemologists have repeatedly argued for the necessity to 
discriminate between virtuous and vicious circles. Gerhard Vollmer even gives a long list of 
circles in which knowledge can be increased using a kind of bootstrapping (Vollmer, [1983] 
1988). Thus, we can define a virtuous circle as a circle which helps us to increase our 
knowledge as a result of a feedback mechanism in which assumptions lead to new insights 
and hypotheses which lead to correct predictions and observations. We are in a virtuous 
circle as long as our inferences are consistent with inferences from other contexts or deeper 
levels (Goldman, 1990: 45). Assumptions are thus never completely `proven', but 
nevertheless confirmed continually as long as we are on the right track. There is nothing 
wrong with assumptions, as long as you have the right ones. Vollmer points to the fact that 
even traditional epistemologists need some assumptions, `for example, the existence of 
knowledge and the possibility to communicate' (Vollmer, 1988: 236). 
 To some extent, then, the rise of evolutionary epistemology marks the transition from a 
foundational epistemology based on some version of the correspondence theory of truth to a 
cumulative knowledge-integrating epistemology in which the correspondence2 theory of 
truth is married to a coherence2 theory of truth stating that "coherence between explanations 
can be a sign of correspondence2 to reality". As is shown by Lorenz' essay about 
 
8. Of course an inference to the best explanation could also prove to be wrong: the tricky thing is that no one 
knows for sure how to recognize the best, let alone the right explanation. In this context William Whewells 
idea of a `consilience of inductions', recently referred to as `triangulation' and `robustness' (Wimsatt), could 
help. The more independent successful models support a particular integrating super-theory the less it seems 
likely that this is `just a coincidence'. Of course, logically, it could, but logically the world could also be five 
minutes old of which the first one was used for the nightmare we call history. Regarding Whewell and the 
way in which he inspired Darwin, see Ruse (1986); regarding the inference to the best explanation see de 
Regt (1994). Recently, an example of the `consilience of inductions' in the form of the `triangulation-
argument' came to public attention as a result of a letter from the Pope to the Papal Academy of Sciences in 
which Pope John Paul II admits that the theory of evolution is supported by the study of independent 
phenomena (Oostveen, 1996). 
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`Gestaltwahrnehmung als Quelle wissenschaflicher Erkenntnis' (Lorenz, 1959) science 
would be impossible without some kind of pattern recognition - that is, an empirical 
dimension -, but it would not be able to offer insight without a theoretical explanatory 
framework that has to be continually adapted to fit all observations and experiences. 
Traditional epistemology was probably inspired by the success of the deductive method in 
Euclid and in the natural sciences, but apparently this deductive method cannot as easily be 
used to give a foundation for knowledge in general (Ortega y Gasset, 1971). According to 
Wimsatt any theory becomes stronger as long as it can be derived from a plurality of 
independent facts. "Fallible thinkers should avoid long serial chains of reasoning" he claims, 
because chains of reasoning are, contrary to ordinary chains, weaker than their weakest link. 
Contrary to ordinary chains, a failure of one link in a chain of reasoning does not cause a 
release in tension on other links and contrary to ordinary chains what matters is not actual 
failure but the probability of any failure. As a result "small probabilities of error in even very 
reliable components may cumulatively add up to almost inevitable failure" (Wimsatt, 1981: 
132). 
 He sees a corrective medicine for this cumulative effect on the probability of error in 
`multiple derivability' or `robustness', a principle he traces back to Peirce and Whewell. 
"With independent alternative ways of deriving a result, the result is always surer than its 
weakest derivation" (id.: 132). Of course, evolutionary epistemology is a very good example 
of the way in which knowledge from different domains can be brought together in a new 
integrating hypothesis which reinforces the different theories that have been swallowed up 
by it and which may have consequences for all separate domains (what Whewell called a 
`consilience of inductions'). 
 
e.An alternative demarcation criterion or guidelines for scientific `evolution' 
A number of philosophers, including Putnam, think that the specialization of philosophy lies 
partially in its normative mission. At a particular moment in the debate such philosophers 
will admit that the naturalist is right in most of his claims, but although his theory is 
scientifically interesting, they will argue next, it is philosophically without any worth, 
because it is not possible to deduce norms from it (Putnam, 1982, Siegel, 1989). 
 First, it should be noted that the idea that the normative dimension is the proper 
`specialism' for the philosopher is relatively new. Traditional epistemologists from Bacon to 
Kant were both trying to give models of how our minds are and how they should be 
working. Only after that the new discipline of psychology started to take over the more 
descriptive and explanatory parts of this enterprise, did the philosophers start to retreat on 
the more normative domain (Nisbet & Ross, 1980). The question, however, is whether this 
division of labor is fruitful and whether the study of the normative dimension can ever 
become a separate specialism. Norms are not created separately from facts: they arise as a 
result of the application of knowledge in function of particular goals9. Even those goals are 
 
9. The idea that morality ultimately derives from desires can be found in Taylor (1984). Very clear 
expositions on the ways in which scientific knowledge can be used to achieve `independently arrived at, 
predetermined goals' are given by Beckstrom (1985, 1989, 1993). His message is that science does not 
create the goals it may help us to achieve. In my opinion, however, science will not only influence the ways 
in which we achieve our goals, but will inevitably transform those goals to some extent. Theoretically, in the 
long run the goals that somehow promote the fitness of their defenders will win, but, of course, one cannot 
base a morality on its probable fitness-results. "The promise that evolutionary biology holds for social 
planners rests in looking backward, once goals have been selected, to natural history for facilitative guides 
and not in working forward from natural history to establish the goals" (Beckstrom, 1989: 36). 
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not given completely independent of particular knowledge, because it would not make much 
sense to strive for goals which are unattainable. "As in the ethical sphere, `ought' implies 
`can'"(Goldman, 1978). 
 The most important way in which actual knowledge about the way in which the mind 
works has a normative value concerns an understanding of its limits and inherent biases. An 
inventory and explanation of the many possible sources of error resulting from these limits 
and biases can enable us to avoid them or to be aware of them. Evolutionary epistemology 
shows that our knowledge originally evolved within a specific context and that this natural 
context imposes certain limitations. For example, both Lorenz and Vollmer point to the fact 
that our imaginative powers have been adapted to the proportions of the mesocosmos, the 
scale between micro- and macrocosmos. Yet, it is clear that we will also need this limited 
imagination to understand both micro- and macrocosmos: as a result of evolutionary 
epistemology we will probably be better aware of the problems involved. 
   By showing what knowledge really is, evolutionary epistemology can also prevent the 
excessive requirements that follow from definitions of knowledge in terms of `justified true 
belief' - a problematic definition going back to Plato's Theaetetus (201c), which relatively 
recently was discovered to involve the `Gettier problem' (cf. Gettier, 1963). It may point to 
the degree in which our knowledge about the world is underdetermined by sheer sensory 
stimuli, for example, and to what degree organisms are guided by evolutionary successful 
`working hypotheses' (Riedl, 1981). When even the processing of visual stimuli on our 
retina, in our laterate geniculate nucleus and in our visual cortex has a `hypothetical-
constructive' character, it would be absurd to demand an absolute foundation in sense-data 
for the whole of our knowledge. 
 From all this it may be clear that evolutionary epistemology is not able to provide a 
priori principles for the achievement of reliable knowledge. It does not point to a complete 
series of signposts on the route towards truth, but rather tries to learn from past crashes. It is 
not possible to devise categorical norms preceding actual science. All norms that we are 
striving for are hypotheses themselves and are deduced from the goals of reliable knowledge 
in combination with experiences gained from the feedback relationship between knowledge 
and world about the many ways in which misconceptions can arise. Because our knowledge 
about the way in which we may err is continually in motion, the norms which lead us 
towards the ideal of reliable knowledge are continually in motion, too10. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1.3T WO ALTERNATIVE APPROACHES 
To avoid any misunderstanding it is important to distinguish between evolutionary 
epistemology proper and two other models which currently enjoy increasing popularity and 
which we could call evolutionary information-theory (Engels, 1985: 143; Vollmer, 1987) 
 
10. Comparable remarks are made by R. Giere in his reaction to Siegel (Giere, 1989: 377-384). He claims 
that norms connect research strategies with the goals of the research which may differ by research domain 
and may be sometimes more `instrumental' and sometimes more `realistic'. The best goals cannot always be 
fixed a priori. 
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and the evolutionary account of science (Callebaut, 1993: 287; Buskes, 1998). Although 
both models are extremely promising and enlightening, it is important to note that they are 
not identical to, nor necessarily included in, the kind of evolutionary epistemology I am 
defending here. Apart from that, I aim to show that they may be misleading in some respects, 
especially if they are not properly founded in evolutionary epistemology proper and in a 
complete model of the interaction between different levels on which we may find variation 
and selection in nature. 
 
a.Evolutionary information-theory: adaptation as knowledge 
First, we often read, even in Lorenz, that not only is the cognitive ability a product of 
evolution, but that the whole process of evolution can be considered a process of knowledge 
acquisition (Wuketits, 1986; Popper, 1990). Since adaptation is always adaptation in 
response to a given environment one could say that know-how with respect to its natural 
environment is stored in the organism. Evolution by natural selection is learning by trial and 
error. The adaptedness of an organism is the product of `experience' which is deposited in 
DNA. Recently Plotkin (1994) has claimed that "all adaptations are knowledge" (Plotkin, 
1994: 116). 
 Vollmer rightly observes that the concept `knowledge' has broadened here in a 
confusing way (Vollmer, 1987: 85-90). Knowledge as internal representation - which is a 
somewhat less pretentious definition than `justified true belief' - is replaced by knowledge as 
causal track. By this definition we should, strictly speaking, ascribe to worn shoes a 
knowledge of their owner or to a bolt knowledge of the matching nut. 
 There are good reasons, however, to remain closer to the everyday use of the concept of 
`knowledge'. First, by calling all information `knowledge' we ignore an important difference 
between knowledge and information: knowledge is the deposition of an active interaction 
between an information-gathering capacity and the world in a memory which actively tries 
to categorize its input. A knowing subject recognizes the object as x (Vollmer, 1987; 
consider also Plato's anamnesis). A continual comparison between incoming and already 
processed information takes place. In later chapters I will discuss the connectionistic 
interpretation of this process. 
 Second, knowledge is always an interaction with the world and as a result of that it is 
always up to date, contrary to `information' in DNA. DNA always lags behind changes in 
the environment and the resulting changes in behavior. If an organism has been adapted to 
certain temperatures over millennia and an ice age starts suddenly - as we will see, this is 
what happened to our ancestors - its DNA `knows' nothing and it will cost at least several 
generations before the number of those individuals that are better adapted to colder 
temperatures start to increase. Their adaptedness, of course, does not mean that their DNA 
`knows' anything, but it codes for a somewhat more adequate portion of certain proteins or 
for completely new proteins which have proved to improve the overall functioning of the 
organism. 
 Knowledge as the product of a capacity to learn in the course of one generation has 
precisely evolved to enable an organism to adapt itself to circumstances which could not be 
predicted by DNA. The genetic program of a digger wasp simply cannot be designed to 
contain information about the exact location of its hole: therefore the wasp needs to  
 
 
acquire a kind of `map' of its environment. In my opinion the concept of knowledge could 
well be used to refer to this map, because the digger wasp is able to correct it in interaction 
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with its environment (Tinbergen, 1958; this volume, chapter 2.5). Therefore, there are good 
reasons to reserve the concept of `knowledge' for internal representations of discernable 
entities or structures and thus to use it to refer to information stored in some actively 
working neural network rather than for `information' as it is contained in a sequence of bases 
in a coiled-up super-acid. 
 The big advantage of thus separating information theory from epistemology proper is 
that it reminds us of the fact that knowledge has evolved in only some lineages: it is one of 
the many survival strategies and one that has only blossomed relatively late in the history of 
life (let us say, since the evolution of multicellular organisms, the last 600 million years). 
 
 
b. The evolutionary account of science and theoretical virology: is all knowledge 
adaptive? 
The second program which is often presented as evolutionary epistemology is the 
evolutionary account of science (Callebaut, 1993; Buskes, 1998). The basic idea is that 
Darwinism is a universal principle and that variation-selection-retention processes not only 
happen `between' organisms, but also `within' organisms (Campbell in Callebaut, 1993: 
296). According to Plotkin there is a universal `g-t-r heuristic' which returns on the level of 
genes, individual learning and culture: on all these levels variants are generated, tested and 
differentially regenerated (Plotkin, 1994). 
 Many trial and error processes take place on the level of individual development. For 
example, our immune system is based on an enormous diversity of lymphocytes of which 
only those which `fit' with particular antigens are clonally reproduced and then used as 
antibodies. Our genes probably do not work as complete predetermining programs either, but 
perhaps only determine the growth and death of cells in particular parts of tissue. For 
example, we start our lives with many more brain cells than we will use during our lives. 
Cells that are not used simply die and cells that are used develop all kind of connections: 
clearly an example of the g-t-r heuristic at work. As a result, neurobiologists are starting to 
see the brain as a `Darwin machine' (Calvin, 1990; see also Edelman, 1992). 
 On the level of culture, many theorists have also started to use the g-t-r heuristic as an 
explanatory frame-work. The inheritable cultural traits can be called `memes' (Dawkins, 
1976) or `culture-genes' (Lumsden & Wilson, 1981). Because theories are also memes, this 
kind of reasoning can lead one to interpret the evolution of science as the result of a process 
of variation and selection (e.g. Hull 1988a, b, but see also Kuhn, 1964: 172 and Popper, 
199011). Bradie (1986) makes a clear distinction between this kind of evolutionary 
epistemology as it refers to theories (EET) and the evolutionary epistemology which refers 
to mechanisms (EEM). The first (EET) can be called the `evolutionary philosophy of 
science' (Oeser, 1987), the `evolutionary account of science' (Callebaut) or `theoretical 
virology' (because according to this paradigm memes behave like viruses and spread 
themselves as infectuous diseases, particular cultures being a kind of epidemics). 
                                                 
11. Kuhn writes "The analogy that relates the evolution of organisms to the evolution of scientific ideas can 
easily be pushed too far. But with respect to the issues of this closing section it is very nearly perfect. The 
process described in Section XII as the resolution of revolution is the selection by conflict within the 
scientific community of the fittest way to practice future science. The net result of a sequence of such 
revolutionary selections, separated by periods of normal research, is the wonderfully adapted set of 
instruments we call modern scientific knowledge" (Kuhn, 1973: 172). 
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 To some extent, the models about the variation and selection of scientific models have 
the same defect as many others about the variation and selection of inheritible cultural traits. 
Just like these, they fail to give a precise account of the many ways in which the evolution of 
ideas is determined by the specific structure of the human mind as it is already a product of 
evolution (Bonner, 1980). The mind is not a tabula rasa which can in principle entertain 
whatever ideas arise as a result of chance in it. Neiter is it a passive recipient of whatever 
ideas or traditions it is immersed in while it is raised (Cronk, 1993). Individuals are very 
selective in inheriting those ideas, paradigms and traditions that they find useful in dealing 
with the problems and questions that they encounter in their lives. They sometimes publicly 
entertain ideas in which they do not really believe, but which enable them to manipulate 
other people's behavior and thoughts. Creativity, in fact, must have evolved because it 
enabled individuals to mould their own ideas, traditions and life styles in spite of the 
traditions in which they were raised. 
 Therefore, despite the fact that there are many analogies between the evolution of ideas 
and organic evolution (e.g. see Buskus, 1998), there is one important difference: organic 
evolution has no goal and moves in all directions, whereas the evolution of ideas and 
hypotheses is at least partly driven by curiosity and a conscious desire to know how the 
world is structured. Although many ideas can be described as kinds of mental parasites or 
mind viruses, which simply owe their success to properties that stimulate humans to pass 
them on (Goodenough & Dawkins, 1994; Szpir, 1995), it is exactly in the realm of science 
that we can often see how ideas are continually changed and manipulated to form a coherent 
picture. One may compare scientific ideas or theories with genes, but one should not forget 
that they are not passed on in the field, but in the laboratory, in which they are continually 
`genetically' manipulated intentionally, not just to improve their capacity to make copies of 
themselves but to unveil aspects of the world. 
 
c.Universal selection theory and the ultimate level of testing 
Apparently the intentionality of the individual scientist does matter somehow. If we call all 
adaptations knowledge, we well might forget that knowledge is one adaptation amongst 
others, and a special one at that; and if we suppose that scientific evolution is analogous to 
organic evolution, we might forget that a theoretical virology would predict not only memes 
or ideas that refer to the world but also many purely parasitic memes. (That is why I prefer 
the term theoretical virology above other terms). If science should be defined from an 
evolutionary perspective we should, therefore, pay attention to the specialized `selection 
rules' working within the scientific community, telling the scientists, for example,"`Take 
nothing from traditional authority!', `Feel free to disagree, even with scientific authority!' 
and `Limit your persuasion of fellow scientists to what you can demonstrate visually and 
what you can show by simple logic!'" (Campbell in Callebaut, 1993: 300). In other words: 
we should pay attention to the ways in which scientific ideas are bred in contrast with, for 
example, religious ideas. Apparently the values and selection rules within the scientific 
community are designed to separate non-referential mind-viruses from ideas that uncover 
aspects of the world (more about that in § 2.6). 
 How are these values and selection rules derived? Of course, they are partly a result of 
cultural evolution, but a process of cultural evolution in which competition in `truth catching 
ability' led to the variation and selection of values and rules giving scientists a critical use of 
their own evolved inferential capacities. If scientists could not fall back on their `common 
sense' and their `realistic instincts' they would never be able to "cut nature at its joints", and 
neither would they be able to acquire such rules so quickly. Therefore, the individual 
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scientist should not be viewed as a tabula rasa on which all kinds of ideas can be imprinted 
and scientific evolution should not be interpreted as just `blind variation and selective 
retention' (even Campbell does not do this, see Callebaut, 1993, for an overview). The 
individual scientist enters the world of science with his innate structures of experience which 
have proved their worth over the millennia. As an already accomplished observer and 
puzzle-solver he critically starts sorting out the scientific ideas that he can use and fit 
together to fulfil his innate curiosity and sense of wonder from the mental garbage and mind 
viruses that he has acquired culturally. Of course, this is a long-term process of trial and 
error, but the important point is that it does not start from scratch. The very possibility of 
science is based on certain evolved properties of the human brain (Ruse, 1986) and if 
scientists really had to start from scratch they would probably never get off the ground. 
Science is not just one possible process of the variation and selection of ideas, but it is the 
collective effort to find, select and integrate those ideas that together may reveal structures 
of the real world. The success of scientific ideas depends partly on the ease with which they 
can be understood, on their appeal to our need to give meaning to our lives, on their 
stimulating power, etc., but most scientists realize that it should only depend on their 
predictive, explanatory and integrative power, because they feel that only these virtues may 
guarantee referential qualities - and that is what science is all about. 
 All in all, the truth of both evolutionary information theory and the evolutionary account 
of science lies in their appeal to a universal selection theory, that is to the g-t-r heuristic, but 
this appeal may be misleading, because there is such a difference between the variation and 
selection of different forms of DNA, of different individuals and different ideas. Nature has 
only equipped individuals with a need to know, and only individuals can discern the truth of 
certain ideas. Of course, that is not incompatible with the idea that within individuals and 
their ontogenies a considerable amount of trial and error takes place. It is within the 
individual that many ideas are tested in order to select those that together orient it in the real 
world. 
 I will return to the variation and selection of ideas and mind viruses in part II. At the 
present moment it suffices to say that traditional evolutionary epistemology is not an attempt 
to apply principles derived from genetics to the history of ideas, but simply a discipline 
which studies the evolution of our cognitive abilities in the hope of finding out whether, 
when, to what extent, and why we can trust them. 
 
 
 
 
1.4 TRANSCENDENTAL PHILOSOPHY AND THE ECOLOGICAL CONTEXT OF 
KNOWLEDGE 
From all this it should be clear that the methodology of evolutionary epistemology is quite 
different from all attempts at transcendental epistemology. Evolutionary epistemology starts 
completely a posteriori with a biological approach to our knowledge capacity and does not 
try to separate the questions relating to the origin and the justification of knowledge. For 
evolutionary epistemology knowledge is not merely knowledge about the world, but also 
knowledge within the world: knowledge can be studied like other natural processes. Some 
will ask whether this approach is a step backwards - back to a naive realistic approach in 
which the subject is treated as one of many objects. 
 The attempt to separate epistemology from the rest of the scientific world view is, 
however, doomed to fail. The origin of this `transcendental deadlock', the uncoupling of 
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ideas and things, lies in the Cartesian quest for absolute certainty, and in the case of the 
rationalists and transcendentalists, in the belief in a `transcendental ego', a self the identity of 
which is not gradually constituted as a result of a body, but separated from it. In the 
seventeenth and eighteenth century people could not imagine why our subjective 
experiences would fit real objects, particularly because physics had just showed that some of 
our subjective experiences - e.g. of secondary qualities - were deceptive. Descartes and 
Leibniz invoked God as an invisible guarantee: for them it was the question why the 
transcendental ego, the thinking `monad', would have ideas corresponding to the physical 
world in which it was `thrown'. Empiricists, like Locke and Hume tried to use sensory 
stimuli and had to drop the transcendental ego, but it became increasingly clear that it is 
impossible to conceive the contents of our minds as a proof for that what they seem to reveal 
and Hume ended up with a mind which was just a `bundle of perceptions', a cinematic 
succession of impressions without any certainty with respect to their reference to a real 
world. 
 In my opinion the epistemology of Kant was an attempt to solve the mystery of the 
relationship between the contents of consciousness and reality in a situation in which such 
an answer just was not available. Like Locke, Kant started by accepting Newton's kinematics 
as true, he concluded that empiricism was not able to give an adequate foundation to it and 
thought a natural or God-given harmonie préétablie unsatisfactory, because it would rob 
concepts of their necessity, and absolute validity and `a priori' meaning: 
 
If someone would propose a middle road `3' between the two routes mentioned, namely, 
that they are (1) nor transcendental first principles a priori of our knowledge, (2) nor a 
creation from experience, but (3) subjective, with our very existence implanted talents 
to think, which have been arranged by our Creator in such a way that their use 
corresponds exactly with the laws of nature, according to which experience runs (a kind 
of system of preformation of pure reason), then against this middle road it would be 
decisive that in that case the categories would lack necessity, which belongs to their 
essence (Kant [1877] 1924, henceforth KrV: 228-229 [B 168], numbers added)12. 
 
Therefore he separated the `fact' of knowledge from its `justification', `empirical realism' 
from `transcendental idealism'. His so-called transcendental justification really only implies 
that we - to paraphrase Nietzsche - are only able to understand a world that we have 
constructed ourselves (Kant, ibid.: 216 [A 126]; Nietzsche 1977, henceforth UaW: 620 [3: 
618]). The world of experience and that of mechanics, die Erscheinung, is already a product 
of `the frame-works of observation' and our categories which are the only ways for a finite 
subject to structure the chaos of sensory impressions. Our cognitive ability is not directed 
towards the objects, but the objects are represented according to our knowledge, the activity 
of a transcendental subject which can only know the world by uniting the multitude of 
 
12 Wollte jemand zwischen den zwei genannten einzigen Wegen [the categories arise from 
experience or they `produce' experience] noch einen Mittelweg vorschlagen, nämlich, daß sie weder 
selbstgedachte erste Principien a priori unseres Erkenntnis, noch auch aus der Erfahrung geschöpft, sondern 
subjective, uns mit unserer Existenz zugleich eingepflanzte Anlagen zum Denken wären, die von unserm 
Urheber so eingerichtet worden, daß ihr Gebrauch mit den Gesetzen der Natur, an welchen die Erfahrung 
fortläuft, genau stimmte, (ein Art von Präformationssystem der reinen Vernunft) so würde ... das wider 
gedachten Middelweg entscheidend sein: daß in solchem Falle den Kategorien die Notwendigkeit mangeln 
würde, die ihrem Begriffe wesentlich angehört (Kant [1877] 1924, henceforth KrV: 228-229 [B 168]). 
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impressions according to its own logical principles (the `transcendental apperception'). 
Strictly speaking, this is not a justification of knowledge, but rather a `transcendental' 
relativization (of course, Kant would not agree): 
 
 The particularity of our faculty of reason, that it creates a unity of a priori pre-sensory 
perception only by means of categories and precisely by means of this kind and number, 
is just as impossible to explain as why we have precisely these faculties of judgement or 
why time and space are the only frame-works of our possible experience (KrV, B145-
146)13. 
 
In the end, this analysis rests on the presupposition that the transcendental subject has some 
kind of existence apart from the multitude of impressions which it has to order. Without its 
ordering activities the world would be a chaos. 
 
 The organization and regularity in the appearances which we call nature would not be 
found in it, had it not be brought it in by ourselves or by the nature of our minds (KrV, 
A 125)14. 
 
With respect to our cognitive ability Kant evades conclusions which he could have reached 
by interpreting it as a part of the world. While he places our knowledge apparatus outside the 
realm of the Erscheinung, however, he at the same time actually makes a model of it - on the 
basis of the supposed properties of the world of the Erscheinung which are products of its 
transcendental activities. Because he is unable to explain why the knowledge apparatus 
would be able to describe space without consultation of the senses, he concludes that it 
places the `chaos' of incoming sensory stimuli in a frame-work of `forms of observation' 
(space and time). Because he is unable to explain why the knowledge apparatus is able to 
discern entities, units, sequences, causal relationships, etc., he concludes that they are 
imposed on the world by itself. In other words, he constructs a model of a knowledge 
capacity which enables us to practice geometry and physics; in short `synthetic knowledge a 
priori' about a phenomenal world without the necessity of a real world which is unlocked by 
these disciplines. His presupposition is the lack of a `harmonie préétablie' between 
knowledge and real world (Ding an sich). His inevitable conclusion is a very specific model 
of a very creative knowledge ability which secretes phenomenal worlds which may be 
objects of Euclidean geometry and Newtonian physics. 
 The presupposition behind his whole analysis is the idea that the self and its (absolutely 
valid) categories are somehow prior to the world and do not gradually arise as a result of our 
cognitive activity within the world. This is also the reason that Kant put so much emphasis 
on the `synthetic unity of consciousness' as a prerequisite of knowledge. Without this 
 
13 Von der Eigentümlichkeit unseres Verstandes aber, nur vermittels der Kategorien und nur gerade 
durch diese Art und Zahl derselben Einheid der Apperzeption a priori zustande zu bringen, läßt sich 
ebensowenig ferner ein Grund angeben, als warum wir gerade diese und keine andere Funktionen zu urteilen 
haben, oder warum Zeit und Raum die einzigen Formen unserer möglichen Anschauung sind (KrV, B145-
146). 
14 Die Ordnung und Regelmässigkeit also an den Erscheinungen, die wir Natur nennen, bringen wir 
selbst hinein, und würden sie auch nicht darin find können, hätten wir sie nicht, oder die Natur unseres 
Gemüts ursprünglich hineingelegt (KrV, A 125). 
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`synthetic unity' he is afraid that both the self and the world would evaporate into a mere 
succession of chimeras, Hume's `bundle of perceptions' visiting the empiricist madhouse of 
impressions, which is exactly what happens in the philosophy of Nietzsche in which Kant's 
transcendental ego and das Ding an sich are both deleted. Kant did not seriously consider 
the possibility that there is also an option of viewing a dynamic self which gradually 
emerges in a body during its cognitive, reconstructive interaction with the world in which its 
structures and relations can at least be partially represented adequately. He was too afraid 
that, if the categories were not somehow `necessary', they would loose their absolute 
validity, that all our knowledge would be just hypothetical and that the self would just be 
discovered to be a dynamic and transitory natural phenomenon - which would have all kinds 
of unpleasant consequences for his cherished notions of God, freedom and immortality. 
 One of the most important philosophers who understood that the Kantian approach 
presupposed a dualism between a disembodied, transcendental subject and the world was 
Friedrich Nietzsche. Nietzsche, however, just abolished the Kantian Ding an sich and 
concluded that there is really nothing more than Erscheinung, the floating world of the 
senses. Just like Kant he criticized a naive belief in the presuppositions of the natural 
sciences, but unlike Kant he did this from a semi-biological point of view: 
 
 Natural science is becoming conscious of one's own inheritance, registration of fixed 
and rigid laws of experience (UaW, II: 277)15. 
 
It is a pity, however, that he didn't take the one extra necessary step to become an 
evolutionary epistemologist: avoiding to become a self-refuting relativist by finding a frame-
work from which one can study (via hypotheses, anomalies and new hypotheses) the way in 
which both the possibilities and limits of our experience is determined by the conditions 
under which we were `designed'. He was not able to do so, because he was still to 
preoccupied with absolute, transcendental (`a priori') foundations and `proof' to be able just 
to start from within a particularly successful scientific paradigm: 
 
 The most popularly believed a priori `truths' are for me provisional assumptions, for 
example the law of causality, very well trained habits of belief, so incarnated that not 
believing them would ruin the species. But are they truths as a consequence of that? 
What a conclusion! As if truth is proved by the fact that man continues to exist! (UaW, 
II: 295)16. 
 
 
 
While this citation shows that Nietzsche tries to give categories like causality a pragmatic 
meaning, instead of an absolute, transcendental one, it shows at the same time that he is still 
requiring some kind of proof or absolute foundation. For him, the fact that our categories are 
 
15 Naturwissenschaft is Sich-bewußt-werden, was man alles als Erbgut besitzt, Registratur der festen 
und starren Empfindungsgesetze (UaW, II: 277). 
16 Die bestgeglaubte apriorische `Wahrheiten' sind für mich - Annahmen bis auf weiteres, z.b. das 
Gesetz der Kausalität, sehr gut eingeübte Gewöhnungen des Glaubens, so einverleibt, daß nicht daran 
glauben das Geslecht zugrunde richten würde. Aber sind es deswegen Wahrheiten? Welcher Schluß! Als ob 
die Wahrheit damit bewiesen würde, daß der Mensch bestehen bleibt! (UaW, II: 295) 
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`hypotheses' (`Arbeitshypothesen' with Lorenz) implies a radical skepticism, not just the 
ordinary uncertainty that is part of all science. The same ambiguity can be pointed out in 
many passages in the work of Nietzsche, in which we can often find both a pragmatic and a 
platonic meaning of `knowledge' and `truth' in one and the same sentence (Danto, 1964; 
Slurink, 1992): 
 
 Knowledge is the forgery in which the manifold and countless is changed into the same, 
similar and quantifiable. As a result, life is only possible thanks to such a device to 
deceive. To think is to forge and to change, to feel is to forge and to change, to will is to 
forge and to change -: in all lies to force to assimilate: which implies the will to make 
things the same (UaW, III: 280)17. 
 
 The whole knowledge machinery is a device for abstracting and simplifying - not 
designed for knowledge, but for the power over things (UaW, I: 165)18. 
 
 There are many kinds of eyes. Even the Sphinx has eyes -: as a consequence there are 
many kinds of `truths', and as a consequence truth does not exist (UaW, I: 171)19. 
 
 Truth is that kind of mistake without which certain kinds of living beings could not live. 
Its value for life is what is decisive in the end (UaW, II: 301)20. 
 
Evolutionary epistemology is able to unravel these paradoxes by just sticking to the 
pragmatic, hypothetical meaning of knowledge and by realizing the perspectivistic nature of 
all knowledge-claims (by means of the label `truth'). It does not offer the absolute validity of 
categories, nor an absolute foundation of knowledge, but it does offer an, albeit hypothetical, 
frame-work for a critical investigation of knowledge. As we will see in chapter 2 it does not 
prove that we are right in expecting causal relations in the world. What it does, however, is 
showing that apparently such an expectation was adaptive in the past: it enabled our 
ancestors to predict and control part of their environment. In that environment one could 
become sick as a result of eating spoiled meat, but no one ever spoke about cyclotrons and 
quantum jumps. The best evolutionary epistemology can do is simply explaining why we are 
so stubborn in our expectation of causality and why we even sometimes expect causal 
relations in cases were they are absent. 
 
17 Erkentniss ist Fälschung der Vielartigen und Unzählbaren zum Gleichen, Ähnlichen, 
Abzählbaren. Also ist Leben nur vermöge eines solchen Fälschungsapparates möglich. Denken ist ein 
fälschendes Umgestalten, Fühlen ist ein fälschendes Umgestalten, Wollen ist ein fälschendes Umgestalten -: 
in dem allen liegt der Kraft der Assimilation: welche einen Willen voraussetzt, etwas uns gleich zu machen 
(UaW, III: 280) 
18 Der ganze Erkenntnis-Apparat ist ein Abstraktions- und Simplifications-Apparat - nicht auf 
Erkenntnis gerichtet, sondern auf Bemächtigung der Dinge (UaW, I: 165) 
19 Es gibt vielerlei Augen. Auch die Sphinx hat Augen -: und folglich gibt es vielerlei `Wahrheiten', 
und folglich gibt es keine Wahrheit (UaW, I: 171). 
20 Wahrheit is die Art von Irrtum, ohnen welche eine bestimmte Art von lebendigern Wesen nich 
leben könnte. Der Wert für das Leben enscheidet zuletzt (UaW, II: 301). 
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 Kant's and Nietzsche's epistemologies are, of course, only two of the many positions 
that one can take if one keeps separating epistemological models from other theories about 
the world. First, in such models, again and again errors slip in, because their 
presuppositions about our knowledge capacity are not corrected using knowledge about 
knowledge capacities in general (an example is the empiricist idea that knowledge 
necessarily is the product of simple constituents, like sense-data; or the rationalistic idea that 
the meaning of concepts somehow precedes the actual cognitive interaction in which they 
are constituted). Second, again and again an inevitable aporia arises, because the world is 
only given to us in the form of contents of consciousness and because these are to some 
extent `bloße Gedankenformen' (cause of the persistent return of forms of idealism, named 
the `Lockian impasse' by R.W. Sellars, because according to him Locke started to make 
ideas instead of things the objects of knowledge; Slurink, 1996). As long as the knowledge 
capacity is not seen as part of the world, as an organ that helps to orient particular organisms 
in particular ecological environments, it will always be possible to place the world behind its 
representations `between brackets' and to speculate wildly about the `transcendental horizon' 
in which the world befalls us. As long as we lack the proper frame-work which enables us to 
realize that mobile goal-directed organisms simply need to some extent adequate orientating 
knowledge about their environment, we are able to delight in almost infinite epistemological 
reflections about the absence or presence of a mysterious relationship between the contents 
of our consciousness and the represented, presented or perspectivized world. As long as we 
lack a model of the ways in which neural networks gradually acquire generalized concepts as 
a result of `vector-coding' and the emergence of `prototypes' (Churchland, 1989), we will 
always fall back on models in which the `meanings' of concepts are somehow absolutely 
given apart from the population of objects to which they refer and the population of subjects 
which need them to classify and discuss them (called `meaning rationalism' by Millikan, 
1984). 
 However, a theory about needs and neural networks is no longer a priori. Such a theory 
is based on other theories, theories which it would rather try to justify. With that, the 
program of an independent epistemology which justifies all other theories is abandoned. The 
philosophical tree of Descartes with its roots firmly placed in metaphysics, giving support to 
the stem of physics and which feeds the many branches of the special and applied sciences, 
is discovered to be dependent on photosynthesis in its leaves, can die as a result of the poor 
soil and can be replaced by better trees with better roots21. There is no foundation of the 
edifice of knowledge, certainly not a `transcendental ego' which encompasses it all, only a 
network woven of interconnected theories which are only able to float together (perhaps the 
arrogant metaphor of a tree should be dropped altogether and be replaced by that of a 
floating water plant, a Frog-bit or a Water Soldier, for example, plants that forms net of 
offshoots and roots searching for the bottom, but also can be blown away easily). Certainty 
can no longer be reached by trying to support them all from one Archimedean point, but by 
always supporting the whole set of theories on those theories that reinforce each other most, 
that is, it is replaced by `robustness' (Wimsatt, 1981). The risk of error is lessened by 
 
21. "Ainsi toute la philosophie est comme un arbre, dont les racines sont la métaphysique, le tronc est la 
physique, et les branches qui sortent de ce tronc sont toutes les autres sciences ..." Lettre de l'autheur a celuy 
qui traduit le livre (les principes), 1647, edition Tannery, IX-2, 1971, xxxx From the description of 
Descartes it follows that metaphysics especially encompasses epistemology and knowledge of clear concepts 
(like God) and that knowledge about man only comes after metaphysics and physics. 
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creating models about the circumstances in which errors might easily arise or are to be 
expected. The demand for an absolute sound foundation - which is implicit in the definition 
of knowledge as `justified true belief' - is replaced by sophisticated gambling and a subtle 
calculation of probabilities. 
 This implies anything but a return to a naive realism without justification, but searching 
for absolute certainty while everything points to the impossibility of such a program, would 
be naive in the extreme. The choice of the theory of evolution as a frame-work that allows 
for predictions about knowledge makes such a return to a naive direct realism simply 
impossible: it forces us to explain why an organic ability to orient has enabled us to attain 
apparent evolutionary luxuries, like self-knowledge and science. The realism of evolutionary 
epistemology shows vague similarities to the problematic realism of Leibniz' monadology, in 
which individual monads on the one hand have no `windows', yet on the other hand reflect 
the universe in their hyperindividual way. However, in this case a God-given harmonie 
préétablie between the contents of consciousness and reality is out of the question (Vollmer, 
19833, talks about a `harmonie postétablie', but he might as well have dropped the notion of 
harmony also). Only the organic need for orientation and information creates a link between 
`representation' and reality - and this link can only be risky. 
 With that we see that within this approach a separation between the question relating to 
the justification of knowledge and the question relating to its origin is artificial. Kant's 
attempt at a `transcendental justification' simply presupposed a transcendental self as the 
source of order. This hypothesis, however, doesn't sound plausible for anyone who takes the 
embodied self, often coping with an unmanageable, harsh world, seriously. Only the 
ecological context in which knowledge has evolved, and the need of the organism to orient 
itself in this context, guarantees the adequacy of knowledge. There is only one explanation 
for the fact that we do not err continuously: erring is, literally, perilous. 
 
1.5.  KNOWLEDGE AS A WAY OF COPING WITH INCREASINGLY COMPLEX 
ENVIRONMENTS 
Instead of trying to sort out the transcendental requirements for knowledge simply by 
abstracting from the actual way in which it is acquired, evolutionary epistemology tries to 
find out how knowledge as a process of `organismic orientation' arises using a genealogical 
analysis. Because the theory of evolution enables us to generalize about processes of 
variation and selection in every suitable corner of the universe, the perspective of 
evolutionary epistemology can be described as genealogical and exobiological (studying 
knowledge as a phenomenon that evolves under some cosmic or planetary conditions; Ruse, 
1989). The central question is no longer only "How is knowledge possible" in the sense of 
"What are the requirements of knowledge on the side of the subject?", but "Why does 
knowledge sometimes evolve (on some planets, in some organisms), what is it and what is 
its function?". Instead of viewing knowledge as a monolithic, indivisible ability which is 
supposed to be unique to the human species, the evolutionary approach predicts that there 
exist many types of specialized intelligence, and that mobile organisms in whatever corner 
of the universe will exhibit those cognitive skills that they need to accomplish their survival 
strategy. 
 From an evolutionary point of view, human intelligence is only one example of a whole 
range of cognitive possibilities which should not be viewed as a succession of 
improvements, but as branches of the `tree of life' (a point often stressed by Gould; Gould, 
1996). It is not advisable to study this type of intelligence in isolation, because it is a 
complicated integration of a large number of independent capacities which one can better 
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study individually in much simpler organisms. To find out what knowledge presupposes, the 
best one can do is to study how knowledge arose during evolution. 
 
a.Goal-directed systems 
First, if one starts to think about the evolutionary origin of knowledge, one soon realizes that 
knowledge always has to be a capacity of a goal-directed system. The essence of knowledge 
is selective representation of aspects of an environment into an information processing 
system and it is unclear why something like that would arise if it were not in the interest of 
the organism that had to invest the energy to build that system. Therefore, knowledge has to 
serve a goal. 
 How did goal-directedness arise? Most philosophers of biology agree that living 
organisms owe their goal-directedness to the genetic `program' which is coded in the 
sequence of bases in their DNA (Mayr, 1988; Slurink, 1991). The notion of a program as the 
information required to give structure to a causal process closes the gap between physics and 
biology (one is reminded of R.W. Sellars' notion of `guided causality'; Slurink, 1996). Such 
programs are replicated generation after generation and change as a result of the differential 
replication success of the different variants which accidentally arise as a result of mutation 
and recombination. Variants that generate organisms that behave adaptively in a particular 
environment, will increase in that environment: the g-t-r heuristic in its most elementary 
form. Life is thought to have arisen as a result of the variation and selection of much simpler 
self-replicating molecules or `autocatalytic sets' which only evolved into the program-
bearing molecule DNA - which is able to code for all kinds of proteins - much later. Present-
day organisms therefore can be seen as `survival machines' which help the descendants of 
these primeval replicators to spread (Dawkins, 1976, 1982; chapter 4). The genetic program 
that somehow orchestrates the complex process of growth is the product of past selective 
forces and is tested again and again in entirely new and unpredictable circumstances. In that 
sense, living organisms are biological guided `missiles' with, as their only goal, the 
spreading of their internal guiding program, which as a result of trial and error has been 
shaped in such a way that it has a good chance of hitting the mark. 
 
b.Guided mobile parasites 
Modern classifications of organisms, based on genetic analyses, class them into three main 
groups, archebacteria, eubacteria and the eukaryotes, which evolved much later. Within this 
classification plants and animals are just two branches of the eukaryotes, the organisms with 
a nucleus in their cells which also include microsporidia, flagellates, ciliates and fungi (Edey 
& Johanson, 1989). Yet, nothing prevents us from making a division which looks like the 
common-sense division in plants and animals and which distinguishes between organisms 
that "directly extract their energy from their environment or from radiation of the nearest 
star" and organisms that live "parasitically, by eating other organisms". Mobile animals are 
part of the `parasitic' group, because their mobility on the one hand costs, and on the other 
hand furnishes much energy. It is this mobility which gives rise to the need for up-to-date 
information with respect to the environment. 
 If organisms are biological missiles, the most simple mobile forms are similar to 
ballistic missiles, like the Russian-Iraqi Scud rocket bombs which were used in the last Gulf 
war. Their course is completely preprogrammed. Even if they are able to react to their 
environment this reaction is purely automatic: a midcourse correction is impossible. The 
more an organism has to perform complicated tasks, like locating sources of energy or 
sexual partners, the more the risk increases that such preprogrammed reactions are 
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inadequate. Midcourse corrections become increasingly necessary and with that an internal 
recognition system that enables the missile to recognize its goals: compare guided missiles 
such as Cruise missiles and Patriots, which are able to change their course at the last minute. 
 Of course, even Cruise missiles and Patriots are still too simple to offer an analog of the 
behavior of most animals. In many cases the `internal recognition system' has to be flexible 
and adaptable within the lifetime of one generation, because the animal has to learn to cope 
with new food sources and new enemies. Despite that, even relatively complicated animals 
are often equipped with a series of inflexible standard reaction circuits which ensure the 
successful accomplishment of their fundamental survival tasks. Vision in frogs offers a good 
example: the frog seems to be designed in such a way that its reactions are already more or 
less determined by the ways in which its sensory input is processed. For example, there are 
special fibers called bug-detectors between the retina of a frog and its optic tectum, that react 
only to small moving objects and which will stimulate the frog to jump forward or to extend 
its tongue (McFarland, 1994: 237). Other fibers respond to either the onset or the end of 
illumination and still others are called `moving-edge detectors', because they respond to the 
movement of a linear shape. As well as this, frogs show a tendency to start jumping towards 
blue areas, something which can easily be tested in the laboratory and which is thought to 
stimulate them to jump into the water in nature (Muntz, 1964). Together, a series of such 
sensi-motor circuits probably determines most frog behavior, although it is still possible that 
learning processes can refine some of its standard reactions, to some degree. 
 
c. Learning 
The moment an organism is no longer dependent on one source of food, standard 
preprogramming becomes increasingly inadequate. A framework is needed which enables 
the organism to develop preferences and to learn from experience. Perhaps a good example  
is offered here by insect-eating birds. The existence of warning colors and mimicry in the 
insects that are eaten by those birds, points to the ability of such birds to associate a bad taste 
with a particular color pattern. It seems that such a bird need not taste a bad-tasting 
caterpillar very often in order to learn to avoid it, otherwise mimicry (imitation) of its 
warning colors by other non-poisonous species would not pay (Wickler, 1968). On the part 
of the birds, this system requires at the very least an extensive memory and an inborn value 
system on the basis of which an ontogenetic development of taste is possible. 
 With respect to the natural sources of danger the same contrast between relatively fixed 
action patterns and more flexible reaction systems can be noticed. A cockroach has two cerci 
on its abdomen which are directly connected to its leg muscles via one big neuron. It does 
not need a brain to flee - the smallest touch of its cerci makes it dart away in a split second 
(Evans, 1966). The longer an organism lives and the longer it needs to be protected against a 
diversity of potential threats, the more an increasingly extended and accurate warning 
system is worth the metabolic investment. By finetuning this warning system with 
habituation and learning processes it can prevent that the alarm from going off continually 
and ensure that the organism has the time to feed and rest. This explains, for example, why 
many animals are able to accustom themselves to human observers. 
 To optimize the course of the organic missile it should be possible to consult and 
`weigh' at any moment the most up-to-date information with respect to a diversity of 
different possible sources of food and danger. For example, the organism can be provided 
with an ability to form an internal map of its environment on which a number of food 
sources can be indicated and on which at the same time the risks can be noted that are 
connected with feeding in this area (plus the chances of meeting a sexual partner there, etc.). 
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The relationship between the food source and the current position can be represented by an 
arrow or vector and the thickness of that vector may correspond with the organism's hunger 
divided by the risks of feeding at that spot. The sum of all these vectors can produce the 
`vector of the will' which determines the actual course of the organism in the here and now. 
Of course this `vector of the will' may be corrected at any moment as a result of new, 
incoming information. 
 The more complex the possibilities and demands of a particular environment, the larger 
the need for learning processes that continually update an extensive internal representation 
of all these possibilities and demands. No wonder that the relatively smart primates have 
evolved in the tropics, in forests with an enormous variation in sources of food and danger. It 
is important to note, however, that learning processes are not possible for a tabula rasa: 
very specific sensory structures are needed that scan the environment for particular 
information; innate values and selective systems are needed which direct the attention and 
isolate important aspects. If one wants to learn anything, one cannot start by trying to learn 
everything. Learning is not a luxurious pastime, but fills the gap between innate talents and 
factual skills that have to be mastered. Learning is only possible if a framework is given 
which directs the attention and shows the organism what to learn. Because organisms with 
the wrong framework become extinct, those that survive will probably have a framework 
which causes them `not to forget' goals such as survival and reproduction. 
 
d.Subjectivity 
The resulting internal representation of the environment should not be `neutral' or 
`objective'. In the first instance the information that the organism gathers is purely for its 
own use: if it is convenient to attach labels to it which improve a hyperindividual decision, 
so be it. Things have continually to be judged positively or negatively to allow a calculation 
of the vector of the will (even scientists sometimes still divide the world into pests and 
useful organisms). 
 With that we come to, in my opinion, one of the most important consequences of 
evolutionary epistemology. Animals are not primarily information-processing systems, but 
decision systems. Knowledge is not acquired for the cause of knowledge, but to enable the 
`right' decisions. Truth, and its non-social predecessor, adequacy of representation, have 
survival value. That means at the same time that knowledge is always perspectivistic and 
strategic22. Knowledge is acquired from the perspective of a being with interests, which 
values the world according to those interests. Knowledge has to enable the organic missile to 
maneuver, which increases the chances of it hitting its target (the explosion results in a new 
generation of missiles). 
 In his impressive study The Biological Origin of Human Values G.E. Pugh (1978) 
shows how decisions can be optimized in both artificial and organic decision systems by 
attaching values to the entities represented in it. A decision system so designed is no longer 
 
22. This does not imply relativism or anti-realism. J. Ortega y Gasset had already criticized Nietzsche's 
premature conclusion about perspectivism and showed that a perspectivistic `ratiovitalism' actually 
presupposes a world shared by all perspectives (Ortega y Gasset, 1923). Similar conclusions can also be 
found in Meyer's essay `Evolution as a Ground for Realism' in which he claims that the theory of evolution 
"makes humans and their abilities the result of a prior world and so precludes interpreting the world as 
dependent on human cognition. The world seems to be prior to mind from the explanatory point of view 
rather than the other way around" (Meyer, 1990: 114). 
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dependent on a preprogrammed set of standard reactions, but is able to devise completely 
new and optimal solutions to each new situation it encounters. Pugh discovered the 
flexibility of what he calls the value driven decision system when he was working for the 
American Defence Ministry to develop a computer program that could generate optimal 
bomber flightplans. In a value-driven decision program values were attached to the 
destruction of targets, to the bombers and to the crew. For each flight route the value of the 
target could be multiplied by the chance of successful destruction and the value of the 
bomber and its crew could be multiplied by the risk that they would be lost. The program 
could then automatically select the route with an optimal balance between these variables. 
Pugh realized that in organisms all kinds of variables are not expressed in numbers, but 
claims that subjective qualitative representations (feelings) guide the behavior of the 
organism. The difference between "epithelium fourth finger left, 150° C" and something 
expressed as `Ouch' is that the latter does not give much chance for contemplative detours. 
This could be at the same time an indication that animals feel something like `Ouch' if they 
seem to express it (in chapter 3 much more on Pugh). 
 It becomes clear, now, why at the moment an animal can no longer trust a set of fixed 
action patterns its learning ability has to develop together with a symphony of subjective 
experiences (feelings). In a relatively flexible decision system they guarantee that all aspects 
of a problem are weighed carefully from the perspective of the interests in the function of 
which the system has to decide. As `innate structures of experience' (Slurink, 1989: 23; this 
volume, chapter 3) they display the strategic aspect of the internal representation which the 
animal has of its environment. At the same time they may serve as a signal for conspecifics, 
whether expressed by sound, color, scent, posture or by using tail or face. 
 
e.The social transmission of information and the social function of intelligence 
An evolutionary approach may open our eyes to yet another aspect of knowledge. It is 
striking that although not all social species are intelligent, many intelligent species are 
social. Apparently a social environment creates unprecedented possibilities for the 
development of cognitive capacities (Byrne & Whiten, 1988). The moment a relatively 
clever species is forced by predators to live in groups, a situation may arise in which 
information relevant to survival may become the subject of new forms of interaction. 
Information can have an exchange-value and as a result social learning and culture may 
arise: social learning as opposed to individual learning refers to learning from other 
individuals, and culture is here defined as the non-genetic transmission of information via 
behavior, especially learning (Bonner, 1980). 
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 Bossou, 
Guinea 
Taï Forest, 
Ivory Coast 
Gombe, 
Tanzania 
Mahale, 
Tanzania, 
M-group 
Mahale, 
Tanzania, 
K-group 
Kibale, 
Uganda 
Budongo, 
Uganda 
Hammering nuts XX XX -- -- --   
Pounding with pestle XX -- --     
Fishing for termites --  XX -- XX   
Wiping ants off stick manually + -- XX -- -- -- -- 
Eating ants directly off stick XX XX + -- -- -- -- 
Removing bone marrow -- XX -- -- -- -- -- 
Sitting on leaves + X -- -- -- + -- 
Fanning flies -- X + -- -- -- X 
Tickling self -- -- X -- -- -- -- 
Throwing XX XX XX XX -- + + 
Inspecting wounds -- + + -- -- X
X 
-- 
Clipping leaves XX XX -- XX XX X XX 
Squashing parasites on leaves -- -- X   -- -- 
Inspecting parasites -- -- +   -- XX 
Squashing parasites with fingers -- XX + -- -- -- -- 
Clasping arms overhead -- X -- XX XX X
X 
-- 
Knocking knuckles + XX X XX XX -- -- 
Rain dancing - X XX XX XX X
X 
X 
Table 1.1. 18 Examples of cultural variations that occur in some groups of chimpanzees, but not in others. Taï Forest and Bossou are in West Africa; 
all other locations in Central Africa. XX = customary; X = habitual; + = present; -- = absent. Habits that are absent for ecological reasons or about 
which no information exists are unmarked. Hammering nuts : To crack open nutritious coula nuts, chimpanzees use stones as rudimentary hammers 
and anvils. Pounding with pestle: With the stalks of palm trees acting as makeshift pestles, chimpanzees can pound and deepen holes in trees. Fishing 
for termites: Chimpanzees insert thin, flexible strips of bark into termite mounds to extract the insects, which they then eat. Wiping ants off stick 
manually: Once the ants have swarmed almost halfway up sticks dipped into the insects' nests, chimpanzees pull the sticks through their fists and 
sweep the ants into their mouths. Eating ants directly off stick: After a few ants climb onto sticks inserted into the nest, chimpanzees bring the sticks 
directly to their mouths and eat the ants. Removing bone marrow: With the help of small sticks, chimpanzees eat the marrow found inside the long 
bones of monkey they have killed and eaten. Sitting on leaves: A few large leaves apparently serve as protection when chimpanzees sit on wet ground. 
Fanning flies: To keep flies away, chimpanzees utilize leafy twigs as a kind of fan. Tickling self: A large stone or stick can be used to probe 
especially ticklish areas on a chimpanzee's own body. Throwing: Chimpanzees can throw objects such as stones and sticks with clear - though often 
inaccurate - aim. Inspecting wounds: When injured, chimpanzees touch wounds with leaves, then examine the leaves. In some instances, chimpanzees 
chew the leaves first. Clipping leaves: To attract the attention of playmates or fertile females, male chimpanzees noisily tear leaf blades into pieces 
without eating them. Inspecting parasites: Parasites removed during grooming are placed on leaf in the chimpanzee's palm; the animal inspects the 
insect, then eats or discards it. Squashing parasites with fingers: Chimpanzees remove parasites from their grooming partners and place the tiny 
insects on their forearms. They then hit the bugs repeatedly before eating them. Clasping arms overhead: Two chimpanzees clasp hands above their 
heads while grooming each other with the opposite hand. Knocking knuckles: To attract attention during courtship, chimpanzees rap their knuckles 
on trees or on other hard surfaces. Rain dancing: At the start of heavy rain, adult males perform charging displays accompanied by dragging branches, 
slapping the ground, beating buttress roots, and pant hooting. From Whiten & Boesch, 2001, 52-53. 
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 As examples of culture Bonner cites the `discovery' by blue tits that they can obtain 
cream by pecking through the foil of milk bottles delivered to the front door step of 
millions of British homes and the hysterical anxiety engendered by people in a 
particular group of African elephants as a result of the activities of a hunter who was 
hired to exterminate that group several generations ago, but who only killed one 
elephant at a time, often in the presence of conspecifics. Other examples include the 
acquisition of two different styles of opening mussels by oystercatchers which proved 
not to be genetically transmitted, the transmission of song dialects in birds, migration 
routes in a variety of birds (Ehrlich et al, 1994) and possibly also in the monarch 
butterfly, the acquisition of knowledge referring to particular predators via mobbing in 
blackbirds (experimentally proved, see Bonner, 1980 for references), the instinctive 
imitation of the pecking behavior of the hen by the chickens by which they seem to 
`inherit' her experience with respect to the `meaning' of different spots at which she is 
pecking (Suboski, 1994), the spread of the habits of potato-washing, wheat-washing, 
potato-seasoning and fishing in a colony of Japanese Macaques on the island Koshima 
(e.g. Watanabe, 1994; De Waal, 2001), the social acquisition of specific predator-related 
alarm calls in vervet monkeys (Cheney & Seyfarth, 1990), the social learning of feeding 
habits in house mice (Valsecchi et all, 1994), mother-pup transmission of feeding 
techniques in golden hamsters (Prato Previde, 1992), mother-pup transmission of 
feeding and toilet habits in domestic cats, the transmission of information with respect 
to rich feeding areas by starlings and ravens at sleeping places and the existence of 
completely different cultures relating to gestures and tools in chimpanzees (McGrew, 
1992; Gardner & Gardner, 1994). In the chimpanzee at least 39 rituals have been 
documented that vary across cultures and of which the variance cannot be explained 
exclusively as a result of different ecological factors (Whiten & Boesch, 2000; table 1-
1). 
 Apparently, the social transmission of information, especially among animals which 
live in groups consisting of different generations, is not uncommon in a variety of 
animal species, because in such groups young animals can involuntarily pick up 
geographical knowledge or knowledge relating to food or predators or acquire certain 
patterns of behavior (bird song, foraging techniques) by imitation. The importance of 
such knowledge should not be underestimated: very often individuals that are deprived 
of such knowledge stand no chance of surviving in the wild. As a result, much extra 
training is needed if one wants to bring animals that have raised in captivity into the 
wilderness (De Waal, 2001; recent experiences include a variety of species, even 
vultures and condors). 
 Of course, all this has enormous consequences with respect to social structures. 
Sometimes the social structure of a species even seems designed exclusively to promote 
learning: in the South-American long-tail pipra, Chiroxiphia linearis, for example, 
`masters' and `pupils' together `perform' their sound-and-color shows for females. While 
only the `masters' are rewarded for such performances, every `master' once had to start 
as a `pupil'. It may take as long as eight years to become a master (Perrins, 1991; 
Attenborough, 1991). Of course, such a system could only evolve, because females for 
some reason consistently have preferred masters over pupils in the past (more on sexual 
selection, see chapter 4). 
 Living in groups not only enables animals to learn from each other, but also forces 
them to outsmart each other. The tension between cooperation and competition within a 
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group of mutually dependent animals poses unprecedented new demands on the ability 
to make subtle social maneuvers, which presupposes an internal representation of the 
ranks of the various group members, including the self. The ability to form such internal 
representations of one's own rank seem to be present in some insects, including crickets 
and bumble-bees, who will become psychologically `down' and timid as a result of 
repeated defeats during a series of conflicts (Wilson, [1975] 1980: 123). In many 
vertebrates blood serotonin seems to be an indication of a relatively  `dominant' self-
image and monkeys can be made more dominant just by giving them Prozac, which 
increases their serotonin (McGuire, 1994; Masters & McGuire, 1994). Apes, especially 
most chimpanzees and orang-utans (and only one gorilla) have been taught to recognize 
themselves in mirrors and this ability could probably be explained as an effect of the 
social need for a self-image (Gallup 1994; Parker et al., 1994), although others explain 
it as the result of the evolution of large body size in an arboreal ancestor of the great 
ape-human clade (Povinelli, 1994)23. If the social-origin theory is true, the image that we 
have of ourselves would originally have functioned as a means of understanding and 
manipulating the image that others have of us. Self-knowledge may have co-evolved 
with a series of human characteristics from the white of the eye to a desire for body 
ornamentation, which increase the clarity with which our internal states and intentions 
are communicated to conspecifics24. One is reminded here of an idea already expressed 
by many philosophers, even non-naturalists like Sartre, that our self-image is closely 
related to the image that others have of us. 
 
f.Object manipulation and tool use 
An alternative and probably complementary model relating to the evolution of 
intelligence concerns the need for sophisticated object manipulation, which is 
quintessentially expressed in tool use. The category of `one-ness', about which Kant 
concluded that it is necessary to integrate a collection of sensory impressions into a 
representation of one object, is at least as old as the cuttlefish. The cuttlefish shows what 
Piaget calls `object permanence', because it is able to follow a prawn around a corner. If, 
however, its vertical lobe is removed, it is no longer able to do so (Boycott, 1965). 
Many insects and spiders show an ability to `remember' and manipulate objects, too. 
Female spider wasps, for example, `remember' where they have left their spider prey 
while re-opening their burrow. Female sand wasps use small pebbles and clods of earth 
as a `door' to lock and re-open its burrow. Sometimes, such small objects are even used 
to pound the closure in order to shut the opening better (Vauclair, 1996). Various birds 
 
23. Frans de Waal supposes that other primates may also have self-consciousness and relates the ability 
of self-recognition in chimpanzees to their narcissism or `chimpocentrism' (de Waal, 1988). 
24 The white of the eye reveals the direction in which one is looking and - with that - one's 
intentions clearly; contrarily, body ornamentation increases one's level of control over the way in which 
one's internal states and one's social ambitions are communicated. As a result, the white of the eye has 
perhaps to explained with reference to Zahavi's `handicap theory' (Zahavi & Zahavi, 1996): it 
demonstrates that one has nothing to hide by giving conspecifics easy access to one's mind. Together 
with the desire for body ornamentation it should perhaps be placed in the context of an arms race of 
information and deception about oneself between conspecifics (see § i and part II of this book) in which 
some signals simply cannot be faked. 
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and mammals use some kind of tool to get to their food: famous examples are the 
woodpecker finch and the sea otter, the former using a twig as extension of its bill, 
sometimes trimming it to the proper dimension, the latter swimming on its back with a 
stone on its belly used as an anvil to open shells and mussels. An example of a relatively 
simple form of `tool use' that can be observed in Dutch forests is the `anvil' which is 
used by the great spotted woodpecker (Dendrocopus major) during winter to get to the 
inside of the fir-cones of pine trees. The woodpecker will look for a natural crack in a 
tree or chisel itself one, will get a fir-cone, hanging upside-down cutting its stem and fly 
it to the tree with the `anvil'. Next it will put the cone in the `anvil' and remove its seeds. 
One can often find piles of `used' cones under trees with such `anvils', used by 
woodpeckers. 
 An even more remarkable example of tool use is offered in the use of bait by green-
backed herons, a species which can be seen both in Japan and the United States. A 
Japanese observer has discovered that it uses bait as diverse as live insects, berries and 
twigs with which it lures hungry or curious fish. Like the woodpecker finch it has been 
observed trimming oversized twigs to the proper dimensions (Ehrlich et al., 1994). 
 Mammals are certainly the most intelligent tool users, however. Elephants, both in 
the wild and in captivity, use various objects to clean their bodies or to chase away 
insects (Rensch, 1957). At Shark Bay, Western Australia, a series of female solitary 
dolphins consistently wear a sponge on their snout. It is presumed that it protects the 
wearer from rough encounters with rocks, sand, or the spines of poisonous fish as she 
probes at the bottom of the sea for food (Connor, 1994). Among the many primate 
species that show some level of tool use, capuchin monkeys are especially skilful in 
getting food out of containers or tubes by using sticks (Byrne, 1995). Chimpanzees in a 
variety of African populations have been observed to use up to 11 different kinds of 
tools per area (this number is reported from Gombe; McGrew, 1992). In West Africa 
chimpanzees use hammers and anvils to crack nuts. Often they will look around for the 
most suitable tools to do the job (Boesch & Boesch, 1992). The authorities agree, 
however, that as tool users orang-utans have even more insight than chimpanzees, 
perhaps as a result of their arboreal life-style. They selectively collect leaves and use 
them to ward off the sun or rain, in the same way that we use parasols. They use sticks 
as probes, rakes and levers and sometimes bend, break or chew on them to manufacture 
more efficient and specialized utensils (Gilbert, 1996). Recently, it was also found that 
they engage in honey-dipping, using a stick, in the wild. All this indicates that human 
technological skills have not come completely out of the blue. As orang-utans are 
currently thought to be less related to us than either gorillas or chimpanzees, it is at least 
possible that orang-utan dexterity has evolved independently from ours, although on the 
basis of the same anatomical and mental preadaptations (e.g. form of the hand). 
 
g.Communication and language 
Similar remarks can be made about the evolution of language. While it is certainly true 
that the peculiarities of human language are unique and that "a language instinct unique 
to modern humans poses no more of a paradox than a trunk unique to modern elephants" 
(Pinker, 1994: 342), evolutionary theory leads us to expect that nothing, at least nothing 
with complex design features, arises out of nothing or purely accidentally. Many 
animals display various abilities that are probably preconditions for the evolution of 
language, like complicated communication systems and an enormous ability to learn. 
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For example, many bird species have a whole series of different calls of which it is 
sometimes possible to decipher the meaning. As an amateur bird observer, I once made 
a list of the various calls and sounds of black woodpeckers (Dryocopus martius) and I 
ended up with a list of at least twelve distinct calls. According to researchers of the 
University of Wageningen, domestic chickens have a `vocabulary' of about twenty-
seven different calls (Koene, 1995). Some mammals, including wolves, seem to have 
even more communicative abilities. 
 Often birds and mammals do not simply have alarm calls, but display different 
alarm calls that refer to quite specific dangers. The blue tit, for example, uses two alarm 
calls, one for distant predators and the other for nearby predators (Klump & Curio, 
1983). Again, domestic chickens are well known in this respect. The barnyard bantam is 
said to emit a high-pitched "Kuk kuk kuk" if a weasel invades the yard, but a single, 
long call if a hawk circles above it. These different calls can also be generated simply by 
showing them either a ground or a flying predator on television (Evans, Evans & 
Marler, 1993). Vervet monkeys have different alarm-calls for leopards, snakes and 
eagles and also four different calls for various social situations (Cheney and Seyfarth, 
1990; Vauclair, 1996). Primates are not necessarily the champions, however. The 
Australian miner, a bird, seems to display ten different alarm calls, each for a different 
type of predator (Short, 1993). 
 As a result of such `protolinguistic' abilities, many animals can been trained to obey 
human commands or even to communicate with them. Of course, such abilities had 
already been noted by such `amateurs' as the horse-breeder Henry Blake, author of the 
book Talking with horses and the elephant-trainer J.H. Williams, author of the book 
Elephant Bill, but most of these stories did not convince the scientific community (Crail, 
1981). Bernard Rensch of the University of Münster's Zoological Institute was one of 
first scientists who tried to check some of these stories. He travelled to India to study the 
communication between working Indian elephants and their human companions. 
According to Rensch the elephants were able to discern 21 to 24 different commands, 
given in Urdu. Characteristically, these commands are taught by tying the new 
apprentice between two already trained elephants (Rensch, 1957). Some of the 
commands were as similar as "Lie down on your belly" and "Lie down on your side". 
 The report by Rensch inspired among others the pet-loving youngest daughter of 
Thomas Mann, Elisabeth Mann Borghese, to teach one of her dogs, the English setter 
Arli to type about sixty different words on a specially designed typewriter (Crail, 1981). 
The problem, again, seemed to be that Elisabeth Mann had few scientific credentials, 
although she is reported to have been relatively self-critical (Crail, 1981). In the 
meantime, however, a couple of scientists have started experiments which are so well 
designed that no one can claim they arise from uncritical amateurism: one of those 
scientists is Irene Pepperberg of Northwestern University. In a lengthy experiment Irene 
Pepperberg taught an African Grey Parrot named Alex more than 100 words by enabling 
the bird to share the interaction between a human trainer and a human trainee, who both 
worked as a model for the bird's responses and as its rival for the trainer's attention (the 
model/rival approach, Pepperberg, 1990). Alex appeared able to count to six and also to 
master the concepts of `same' and `different' in quite complicated tests. 
  Of course, the linguistic abilities shown by dolphins and apes are much better 
known, although they are still often down-played by neo-behaviorists and linguists (e.g. 
Pinker, 1994: 334-342) and although not all researchers have been careful in their 
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methodology (Rivas, 2002). It is certainly not true that the experiments by the Gardners 
c.s. show that chimpanzees are able to learn American Sign Language as fast and as 
fluently as a child, but only that they seem at least to display a rudimentary ability to 
understand, remember and creatively combine a series of symbols (Gardner & Gardner, 
1994) and to learn at least some symbols from each other (Fouts, 1994). Typical 
examples of creative new combinations that the Gardners claimed to observe in their 
chimpanzees are `drink-fruit' for lemon, `water-bird' for swan, `open food drink' for 
refrigerator and `dirty good' for toilet. Critics such as my friend Esteban Rivas suggest 
that the evidence for such combinations is largely anecdotical and that they might well 
be purely accidents by animals prepared to do anything to get food. But there is also a 
report about the chimpanzee Lana which is claimed to have called a cumcumber a 
`banana which-is green', an overly ripe banana, a banana which-is black', and a citrus 
orange, an `apple which is orange' (Rumbaugh, Savage-Rumbaugh & Sevcik, 1994). I 
find it hard to believe that all these observations are only accidents or chimarae in the 
heads of researchers (see Rivas, 2002). 
 If one requires chimpanzees to learn language in the same way and as fast as 
human children, one will probably be disappointed, but the only thing we expect from 
evolutionary theory is some continuity from apes to humans. Linguists have often 
repeated that the utterances of apes do not show any understanding of significant word-
order, that is `grammar' (e.g. Bickerton, 1990), but the experiments of Savage-
Rumbaugh with the bonobo Kanzi do clearly show some ability to connect different 
meanings to sentences with a different word-order. For example, Kanzi was able to 
discriminate between the sentences "Go to the colony room and get the orange" and 
"Get the orange that's in the colony room" if an orange was placed in front of him: only 
in the case of the latter sentence did he go directly to the colony room to fetch the 
orange that was placed there (Lewin, 1991). 
 Remarkable achievements in `grammatical understanding' are also reported from 
dolphins (Herman et al. 1984; Connor & Peterson, 1994). Louis Herman taught two 
dolphins, Ake and Phoenix, simple languages, one derived from American Sign 
Language, the other a self-created system in which objects and actions were represented 
by whistle-like computer-generated sounds. In both languages word-order mattered and 
both dolphins succeeded in grasping differences in similar sentences with different 
word-order. For example, Ake would understand the difference between person 
surfboard fetch (take a surfboard to a person) and surfboard person fetch (take the 
person to the surfboard). Both dolphins were also able to understand sentences that 
required them to use their imagination to creatively change the existing situation. 
Phoenix, for example, interpretated bottom hoop through by diving to the bottom of the 
tank and by lifting the hoop in such a way that she was able to swim through it. Both 
dolphins interpretated water toss by swimming towards the stream of water flowing into 
the pool and `tossing' it in the same manner in which they used to toss frisbees, balls and 
other things (Conner & Peterson, 1994: 194). 
 
h.Adaptations required for speech 
Of course, no other species is as able to use language as we, but even here this is not the 
result of a mysterious ability to transcend biology. We are adapted to use spoken 
language, as most linguists agree. We are able to speak as a result of the position of our 
larynx, the shortness of our jaws (Lieberman, 1984; 1991) and the semi-voluntary 
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control over our respiration (Walker & Shipman, 1996) and our tongue. The pattern in 
which these changes took place points to strong selection pressures which forced our 
ancestors to share information with each other and to influence each other more and 
more by means of language. In part III I will investigate the forces that could be 
responsible for such a change with special emphasis on the model of Richard Alexander, 
who stresses that our ancestors at the time that they became `ecologically dominant' 
were increasingly forced to compete with conspecifics and thus to more intra-group 
cooperation. Recently, the ethologist-psychologist Robin Dunbar (Dunbar, 1993; 1996; 
Aiello & Dunbar, 1993) has shown that in primates group size often correlates with 
relative brain size and that our human relative brain size correlates with a group size of 
about 150 individuals that may have forced individuals in the past to find new ways of 
maintaining their multitude of contacts. Language could well have evolved as a 
replacement of grooming which plays a role in coalition-forming in primates. By means 
of language it is possible to `groom' more than one individual at the same time and to 
maintain mutual trust and solidarity in a relatively big group. It is no accident that 
standard human groupings of people `knowing each other' and human brains are about 
three times the size of chimpanzee groups and brains (Dunbar, 1996). It is can be no 
accident that humans are both intensely social and intensely linguistic animals. 
 At any rate, from an evolutionary approach one would not expect the properties of 
linguistic expressions to be solely determined by the possibilities of the oral cavity, the 
larynx and brain centers like those named after Wernicke and Broca (and their vicinity) 
to catch any matter of fact in easily transmittable codes. Our natural language often 
appears completely inadequate to express physical and chemical processes or 
relationships, apparently because it is not `designed' for such matters (Vollmer, 1983, 
153-157). Language is much more than a medium for a transfer of information relating 
to purely objective facts. The shared world of experiences of those who communicate by 
means of language determine what is conceived or even construed as `facts', what such 
facts mean and how they should be evaluated: a point exaggerated by the social 
constructivists, but something that one would expect from a completely realistic 
evolutionary perspective. Our brains are not designed for a detached study of the 
universe and linguistic expressions are primarily social events (Dunbar, 1996). In this 
respect there is no fundamental difference between what we do with our mouth, tongue 
and larynx, what squid do with their body colors and wolves with their tails (Hart, 
1996). 
 Our language is at the same time a superior medium for cooperation and for 
maintaining social networks and a superior means of manipulating and deceiving each 
other. Linguistic expressions are usually soaked with evaluations and manipulative 
representations. As Trivers remarks, the difference in costs between true and false 
statements is trivial, "at least as measured by energy expended in speaking" and as a 
result of that "verbal reality is likely to be a poor guide to social behavior (Trivers, 
1985: 4)". 
 
i.Why truth matters 
This brings us to the subject of deception. As any amateur ethologist or commercial 
psychologist knows, deception looms everywhere. Information and deception go hand in 
hand at almost all levels of nature. The moment you have caterpillars, butterflies and 
wasps with warning colors, defensive mimicry by non-dangerous or non-distasteful 
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species can evolve. Wasps are often imitated by beetles, hover-flies and even butterflies 
and sometimes the mimes are more abundant than their models. A nice example of the 
complexity to which a system of deception can develop is offered by some American 
fireflies. Here a system of originally sexual signals is `misused' by predators that mimic 
the mating signals of other species for the purpose of preying on them. Because the 
mimics are often females, males of the mimicking species (Photuris) may mimic the 
prey (Photinus) in order to find their own females. On the other hand, males of one of 
the prey species, Photinus macdermotti, sometimes mimic female Photuris signals while 
approaching a female, in order to chase away sexual rivals (Lloy, 1986). 
 Of course, there is a big difference between deception simply by giving wrong 
signals, deception by hiding one's intentions and deception based on a `theory of other 
minds' (Mitchel & Thomson, 1986). It is often unclear what kind of deception is 
involved, for example, in birds giving false alarm calls (e.g. Munn, 1986). At any rate, 
in chimpanzees and in the organ-utan there is an enormous variation in the way in which 
deception is used which suggests that it is based on an understanding of the standard 
reactions of their victims (De Waal, 1986). The sheer ubiquity of deception in 
chimpanzees probably gives us a clue to the complexity of human communication and 
the enormous importance given to sincerity, integrity and honesty in human affairs as 
well as to the weight attached to the concept of truth. 
 The problem with human language is that it is not only an ideal device for giving 
information, but that it is also ideal to deceive and manipulate. Of course, there are ways 
of discriminating utterances that are deceptive from those based on a shared interest in 
certain information, but a subtle manipulator can also use this knowledge. It is therefore 
to be expected that a kind of arms race between deceptive and deception-unmasking 
strategies will evolve and that almost all parties will at least pay lip-service to the ideal 
of truth. Ultimately, all parties have to take into account the real order of things; in that 
sense it is adaptive to have an internal representation of the real world. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1.6  CONCLUSION: ANIMAL REASON, OUR ULTIMATE GUIDE 
What would be the central message of evolutionary epistemology for contemporary 
philosophy? Traditional epistemology has been the victim of a misconception for 
centuries. For a long time philosophers have thought that human uniqueness can be 
defined in opposition to the properties of other animals. Opposite man and his mind 
stood a series of mindless automatons, the animals according to Descartes c.s.. As a 
result of this simplistic dichotomy most traditional epistemologies have ignored the 
possibility that our knowledge and subjectivity are continuous with the animal need for 
orientation and guidance. Attempts at founding the edifice of knowledge were 
continually based on unverifiable presuppositions concerning the origin of reliable 
knowledge like empiricism and rationalism and therefore resulted again and again in 
what I called a transcendental deadlock (§ 1.4). Because knowledge was not placed 
within the ecological context in which it arose, and because one was often fixed more on 
an ideal of perfect knowledge than on the limits and perspectivity of real knowledge, 
time and again one was confronted with the impossibility of reducing all knowledge to 
indubitable foundations. Sometimes this resulted in a healthy skepticism, but more often 
it resulted in a relativism or idealism in which the possibility no longer existed to correct 
prejudices on the basis of the best available knowledge. 
 Modern cognitive ethology was needed to put an end to the simplistic dichotomy 
between animal and human cognition (table 1-2.). Although a series of philosophers 
showed some interest in animals, only a small minority took them seriously enough to 
give them impact on their epistemology. 
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Table 1-2. Modern (cognitive) ethology puts an end to simplistic dichotomies between 
animals and man and reveals a new kind of scala naturae in which many 
cognitive abilities are spread throughout the animal kingdom. 
 
Hume is an example of a philosopher who explicitly refers to the possibility that it is our 
resemblance to other animals rather than our difference from them which guarantees to 
some extent the adequacy of our knowledge. In An Enquiry Concerning Human 
Understanding there is a section entitled `Of the reason of animals' in which he analyzes 
the inductive habits we share with animals as a result of instincts (Hume [1748] 1974). 
Yet, even Hume is so fixed on the ideal of certainty and non-perspectivity, that he does 
not realize the importance of his remarks and interprets himself as a skeptic. 
 From this we can learn that a non-discriminatory skepsis with reference to all 
knowledge may actually foster misconceptions. The best remedy for error may consist 
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of simply trusting the oldest and most solid preconceptions which encompass and clarify 
the broadest realm of experiences - from direct everyday experience to sophisticated 
knowledge derived from well-designed experiments. In the last analysis, the knowledge 
apparatus which underlies our everyday experience has been tested in real life situations 
for countless generations. Looking for a better foundation for human knowledge is 
simply a manifestation of recklessness, because it implies that only man, above all other 
animals, could step outside the feedback relationship between knowledge ability and 
reality (it was R.W. Sellars who took knowledge as a feedback relationship, e.g. Sellars 
[1932] 1966). Only man was supposed to be able to transcend reality and to compare his 
internal `picture' of the world with it, which is, of course, impossible. 
 Paradoxically and ironically it is not our difference from, but our resemblance to 
other animals which guarantees the partial adequacy of our knowledge. Reason, which 
has been placed by many philosophers in opposition to nature, has arisen as a capacity 
that enabled animals to make decisions which were favorable for the survival of their 
genes. Reliable information about the environment is a first requirement for such 
decisions. For that reason we may expect that the sense-organs and brains of animals 
together construct a representation of the environment which partially corresponds to its 
actual physical properties. At the same time, this correspondence has to enable the 
`right' decisions: therefore, we may expect the knowledge apparatus to paint a world in 
the colors of the interests of the animal for which it is designed. 
 Only after people started to look beyond their immediate animal horizon by means 
of the scientific construction of models, did the epistemological conflicts of the last four 
centuries arise. Essentially these are constituted by a conflict between two different 
evolutionary legacies: on the one hand the unreflected and uncritical sense of reality 
which always seduces us to take our picture of reality for reality itself, and on the other 
hand our ability to integrate information from different sources into a coherent 
reconstruction of non-observable facts. Empiricism and rationalism can be viewed as 
attempts to reconstruct our knowledge on the basis of one of these principles: one trying 
to start with the sense-organs, the other with our reasoning powers, both of which are 
aspects of our natural and fallible knowledge system. 
 Science can be seen as the challenge posed to our natural imagination by our ability 
to reason on the basis of unusual observations. Science gave rise to doubts concerning 
the credibility of our natural world experience and forced consistent thinkers to doubt it. 
The moment one starts to doubt whether it is the sun that sets or whether it is really just 
the earth that spins round or whether some qualities of objects, like colors, are simply 
products of our sense-organs while others, like extension, are supposed to be real, one 
might as well start to doubt the rest of one's beliefs. Almost any other intelligent animal 
which had been raised above its natural experiential horizon as a result of new 
measuring-instruments and mathematical models would include a few desperate 
individuals which would creep into a corner to secrete epistemological webs and get 
into a chronic transcendental deadlock. 
 After a couple of centuries of futile attempts at giving knowledge an absolute 
foundation, it is time to accept that such foundations do not exist. The skeptic is simply 
right: every proof is based on presuppositions to which everyone agrees and which one 
may always doubt. The skeptic forgets however that he too cherishes certain 
presuppositions and that it is for that reason very risky to cherish presuppositions that 
cannot be corrected by scientific progress. Starting from the best knowledge we have at 
  
40 
this moment, there is no reason to believe that there are any fundamental certainties to 
which a special warranty is attached which excludes further doubt. Errors always remain 
possible for a finite brain and the only assurance that our brain is able to make the 
correct inferences is constituted by the fact that our ancestors have until now succeeded 
in finding each other on the surface of this planet, contrary to many of their brothers and 
sisters. That implies that truth and error are related, in the same way that success and 
failure, life and death are two sides of the same coin. There is no a priori warranty 
against error and we will always have to come up against more dead ends before finally 
finding the right path. No science exists without the courage of gambling. 
 Starting from the insight that our knowledge ability is an animal orientation-organ 
evolutionary epistemology solves a series of problems which were ignored by other 
epistemologies. 
 First, it throws light on the gap between `natural' and `scientific' world experience, 
a problem which recurs in such completely different philosophies as those of Husserl 
and Wilfrid Sellars. In the interpretation of evolutionary epistemology the first kind of 
experience - resulting in what Sellars calls `the manifest image' - offers us the world as 
we have needed it for the largest part of our evolution; the second kind of experience - 
resulting in `the scientific image' - is the result of attempts to construct models which 
are less bound to a specific subjective perspective and which may orient us in an ever 
wider environment. (One is also reminded of Locke's distinction between primary and 
secondary qualities which ultimately led to Berkeley's idealism, because no one could 
explain and therefore `justify' the strange dichotomy between physics and ordinary 
experience.) 
 Second, evolutionary epistemology is the only epistemology explaining why 
knowledge exists. Mobile organisms just need information from their environment to 
guide and orient them. It is the only epistemology capable of offering a non-circular 
definition of knowledge. Knowledge is, according to this definition, the use of 
properties of the environment for the construction and continual adjustment of an 
internal model which enables a self-steering being to act in a goal-directed way. 
 This definition implies that knowledge refers on the one hand to real structures of 
the world, but that it has, on the other hand, a subjective steering side. The tension 
between the necessity of orientation (the correspondence to real structures) and that of 
`steering' (the subjective evaluating of information in order to be stimulated to make 
fitness enhancing choices) results in the perspectivity of knowledge, which makes 
philosophers time and again waver between realism and idealism or skepticism. In this 
way evolutionary epistemology can combine a certain relativism and perspectivism with 
respect to the structures of our knowledge (our categories are perhaps not the only way 
of `cutting nature at its joints') with realism. The force of an evolutionary approach thus 
lies in the possibility of a naturalistic `justification' and `critique' of the structures and 
strategies of our knowledge - even as different evolutionary epistemologists, like 
Vollmer and Ruse, have tried one-sidedly to place one of those complementary aspects 
central. 
 With that evolutionary epistemology also breaks with the contemplative and 
individualistic image of knowledge entertained by most traditional philosophers. As 
Nietzsche started to realize in his later years, knowledge is essentially a simplifying 
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schematization of our environment to enable us to act25. Knowledge is never only the 
achievement of one individual, because a long evolutionary and biocultural evolution 
was needed to achieve the epistemic feedback between the individual brain and the 
world. 
 Because knowledge is an orienting schematization of structures of the world in a 
subject, it is essentially incomplete. Each schematization is only a summary of those 
structures as it is produced from a particular viewpoint in function of particular needs. 
Science is an attempt to come to less perspectivistic knowledge by trying to document 
ever more encompassing regular patterns in the world around us and by making 
explanatory models of the causal interactions involved, but science, too, can only make 
the world to some extent understandable by simplifying and abstracting from the real 
complexity of natural processes (which goes also for chaos-theory, `sandpile theory' and 
other theories on complexity). While trying to understand, we remain only a part of the 
world and we cannot understand it `from the outside', as if we could compare it with 
another universe in which different conditions apply. Knowledge is not only knowledge 
about the world, but it will always remain knowledge in the world. 
 Thus the gap between our natural experience and the scientific world view becomes 
less absolute than was sometimes supposed. The schematizations of cosmic connections 
which are made by science do indeed reach further over our immediate horizon than our 
natural world experience, but they remain schematizations from an organic perspective 
which can only understand by actively to abstracting and ordering its experiences. As 
the English word `to grasp', the Dutch and German words `begrijpen' and `begreifen' 
and the French `comprendre' reveal, the archetype of understanding remains the primate 
hand which isolates an object in its field of vision and grasps it (Lorenz, 1973). 
Knowledge is not passive receiving or reflecting, but an active attempt at gaining 
control over structures of the world. As parts of the world, however, we are unable to 
grasp the whole and we can only indirectly grasp our own `hand'. The inevitable 
conclusion is that, despite our measuring instruments, we can never grasp more of the 
world than fits into a primate hand or brain. 
 Therefore, knowledge will always remain reconstruction and model making from a 
particular perspective. Even if our categories grow in interaction with the world, it is 
plausible that there remains an element of arbitrariness in them. Perhaps we could 
discover the degree to which our categories are arbitrary by discussing our world 
experience with intelligent beings from other planets, who happen to have other 
categories. The only hope that communication with these beings is possible would be 
that they have evolved in the same world (Ruse, 1989). 
 Evolutionary epistemology thus makes an end to the illusion of an epistemology 
based on indubitable certainties and at the same time to the illusion that our most 
elementary concepts are the only ones possible and have fixed meanings independent of 
the rest of our knowledge (Millikan, 1984). There is no knowledge without perspective, 
 
25. Alas, as said already, Nietzsche talks about `knowledge' in two different ways: first in the sense of a 
platonic grasping of essences, secondly in the sense of a pragmatic schematization - often both 
meanings occur in one sentence: "Der ganze Erkenntnis-Apparat ist ein Abstraktions- und 
Simplifikations-Apparat - nicht auf Erkenntnis gerichtet, sondern auf Bemächtigung der Dinge" 
(Nietzsche [1940] 1977: I: 165). Regarding Nietzsche's paradoxical position see Danto, 1964; Slurink, 
1992. 
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there are no privileged truths from which other truths are deducible, there is no a priori 
means of discerning adequate from less adequate representations. Only in an actual 
interaction with the environment can a living being discover that its representations or 
concepts have to be corrected - if it is lucky it has not to pay for its error by dying. 
Epistemology is no longer the first scientific discipline, the one preceding all others, but 
in some sense the final one. We need all scientific knowledge to understand what 
scientific knowledge is. Epistemology is knowledge about the world, applied to man and 
his knowledge about the world. The scientific world view is an immense circle starting 
with hypotheses about non-organic and extra-human nature and from there also 
gradually understanding man and his ability to form scientific hypotheses. Evolutionary 
epistemology is the point at which the circle is closed and the dragon eats its own tail.  
 2 ------------------------------------------- 
 * A critique of evolved reason: seven 
peculiarities of human reason \\ 
 
     Er is unwahrscheinlich daß unser `Erkennen' weiter reichen 
sollte, als es knapp zur Erhaltung des Lebens ausreicht 
 Friedrich Nietzsche 
 
A. STUDYING THEORY-LADENNESS, VALUE-LADENNESS AND THE SOCIAL 
CONSTRUCTION OF REALITY 
Every now and then in the history of philosophy, the fact that knowledge transcends the 
mere `collection' of sensory data is rediscovered. Again and again, that discovery is 
overinterpreted, however, sometimes in the direction of relativism, sometimes in the 
direction of a model on the evolution of ideas in which these `unfold' more or less 
autonomously, not guided by a real interaction with the world. In antiquity Plato's doctrine 
of ideas can be seen as a reaction to (amongst others) Cratylus' `empiristic skepticism' and 
Protagoras' doctrine about man as the `measure of everything'. Plato's doctrines, however, 
gave rise to all kinds of dualistic and idealistic worldviews which have perhaps led to as 
much confusion - albeit perhaps not to as much moral disorientation - as the philosophies to 
which Plato reacted in the first place. In modern times rationalism and the philosophy of 
Kant arose partially in a discussion with empiricism, but they resulted in the idealistic and 
systems of Hegel and Fichte in which the baby of a critical epistemology is thrown away 
with the bathwater of empiricism. 
 In the philosophy of science these oscillations around the concept of knowledge are 
also repeated. As a reaction to the logical positivists the `theory-ladenness of observation' 
was stressed by Popper, but his attempt to save the `rationality' of knowledge by an appeal 
to the possibility to falsify theories that are really `scientific' failed. The critics pointed out 
that even in a clear falsification, it is not always clear what part of a theory is really 
falsified. As a result of that, falsification can seldom be a sufficient reason to reject a whole 
theory. Consequently, "the logical asymmetry between falsification and verification 
disappears. It may be true, as Popper claims, that we cannot conclusively verify a 
hypothesis, but we cannot conclusively falsify it either" (Woodward & Goodstein, 1996; see 
also the discussion of Kuipers, 1994, and Derksen, 1994). 
 Again, skeptics, relativists and constructivists emerged. For them, the discovery of 
the `theory-ladenness of observation' is often a kind of starting-point. The `value-ladenness' 
of much scientific knowledge as well as `the social construction of reality' became extra 
arguments to question the objectivity of scientific knowledge. 
 Evolutionary naturalism can offer a somewhat more balanced approach and could 
thus avoid following the zigzag-movement which seems to be characteristic of much 
epistemology. In this chapter I will try to show how the `theory-ladenness of observation', 
the `value-ladenness of theories' and the `social construction of reality' need not result in our 
being completely `locked up' in our theories. The `theory-ladenness of experience' and the 
`social construction of reality' can itself actually be thematized and studied scientifically and 
the models used in doing that can be gradually improved in a completely rational way, 
precisely because they are `theory-laden' in a heavy way. For example, an evolutionary 
account of observations actually makes us expect that observation is never completely 
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reliable, while at the same time making it reasonable to believe that, at least in the sphere of 
`normal, everyday use', observation functions well in guiding us through the world of 
mesocosmic objects. Similarly, an evolutionary account of science makes us expect that 
scientists will compete with each other by launching opposing theories, but at the same time 
can make plausible that theories with more adequate representations of the world are at least 
sometimes better weapons in this scientific `struggle for life'. In this way neither the 
`theory-ladenness of experience' nor the `social construction of reality' need be detrimental 
to the cause of science and can be perfectly well integrated in a naturalistic, not scientistic, 
`scientific world-view'. 
 One of the most important things that can be showed from the evolutionary 
perspective is that the concept of `theory-ladenness' is really a collective noun covering a 
whole range of phenomena which often pose quite different challenges to the pursuit of 
knowledge. A short analysis of some of the different evolved `biases' of our `knowledge-
apparatus' is well worth the trouble, because it will enable us to discover to what extent the 
`design-features' of our mind allow it to discover objective structures and properties of the 
world. In this chapter I will try to give such an `evolutionary justification and critique' of 
our evolved knowledge capacity. I will start from four provisional theses or presuppositions 
(some would say, dogmas) which are gradually made more plausible in the course of this 
and other chapters: 
- First (a), our mind is not a tabula rasa which can observe anything or learn anything 
with the same ease and speed, but rather a specialized learning device suitable for 
some tasks rather than others - it is a `knowledge-apparatus' with specific `design 
features' (e.g. Lorenz, 1973; `thesis of innate biases and learning mechanisms'). 
- Second (b), during each stage of its evolution our `knowledge-apparatus' has been 
tested on its ability to process information in order to survive: as a result it should 
primarily be viewed as a biological `decision system', "designed by DNA to 
perpetuate DNA" (Wilson, 1975; Pugh, 1978; `thesis of the adaptive nature of 
knowledge'). 
- Third (c), much of the `design features' of our `knowledge-apparatus' can be 
understood as a result of its evolution from much simpler neural networks which at 
each stage of their evolution must have functioned in their own right: new properties 
always emerge from a gradual rearrangement of older ones, which of course does 
not exclude relatively rapid, dramatic `innovations' (`thesis of step by step 
emergence'). 
- Fourth (d), in order to study the possibilities and limits of our `knowledge-
apparatus' we should transcend transcendentalism and base our `criticism of 
reason' on its scientific study. Like the baron Münchhausen we can pull ourselves up 
from the marsh by our own hair (this kind of bootstrapping is called the 
Münchhausen-operation by Derksen, 1985).  Science is able to transcend to some 
extent the limits posed by the specific `design features' of our minds and posed also 
by the narrow natural purpose of knowledge as a result of the particular way in 
which knowledge is culturally transmitted, selected, recombined and cumulated in 
our species. By observing and understanding our own selective observation and 
biased processing of information, we are able to overcome this selectivity and bias 
to some extent and make a judgement about the margins which are left for  
 
 adequate representations of the world (thesis of scientific self-justification and -
critique). 
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Let me defend and explain these four `dogmas' (§§ a to d). 
 
a.Not a tabula rasa 
The first `dogma' follows directly from evolutionary theory: it would be implausible for our 
mind to be a kind of blank slate which could be inscribed with almost anything. Creatures 
with such minds would not know what to watch for or where to start to learn. They would 
probably die as a result of starvation or been caught and eaten by predators during their first 
day of independence, or else end up paralyzed by indecisiveness during the next couple of 
days. Even if we are, as a result of our unique evolutionary trajectory, relatively 
unspecialized apes, we would need a collection of specialized modules to ensure our most 
urgent needs for food and safety. Without an urge for social recognition and status and 
without a `sexual imperative', our genes would still become extinct within one generation. 
 It is an implausible presupposition, however, that we are an unspecialized species. 
Even ecological and cultural flexibility does not stand in opposition to specialization. Or 
much celebrated capacity for culture is partly based on our capacity to learn language which 
requires, as we saw in chapter one, a series of highly specialized organs and neural 
networks. It is also based on our extended phase of playing and learning and on our social 
talents, more specifically, our talent for forming relatively large kin groups and extended 
systems of `reciprocal altruism' (see part II). All this requires a specialized power of 
perception and attention and a highly selective memory. 
 If we compare minds with computers, it becomes clear that the evolution of an 
unspecialized type of intelligence presupposes a series of highly specialized modules. If we 
use serial computers as an analogue to nervous systems - an approach recently criticized as 
unrealistic (e.g. Churchland, 1989, 1995) - it is already obvious that a program with a lot of 
possibilities requires much more programming than a program with which one can do only 
one or two things. The more realistic analogue with computers which use parallel 
distributed processing (PDP computers) shows the same thing. In connectionistic language: 
a completely unbiased neural network will learn anything very slowly, but the moment 
certain synaptic weights are given specific values or the moment certain `recurrent 
connections' are installed, the learning capacity of that network can be enhanced 
enormously (see here-after § c; figures 1-3). 
 The fact that evolution always starts with more specialized types of intelligence, 
before building more flexibility or `openness' into a system, makes it more plausible that 
this flexibility and `openness' (i.e. being less determined by a limited set of prefixed 
options) is simply based on a specific combination of specialized functions. For example, 
the famous creativity of our species is at least partly based on the versatility of the human 
hand, and the much-vaunted variety of social structures in our species is at least partly based 
on the expressivity of the human face. It is perhaps no accident that earthworms and cows 
are not as creative and erratic as we are. 
 The idea that learning presupposes specialized `innate learning mechanisms' was 
already familiar to biologists and ethologists as far back as Darwin and Lorenz. It entered 
the behavioristic study of animal learning in laboratories with studies that showed that rats 
could only learn to associate sickness with the flavor of a food they had eaten, while 
pigeons could only learn to associate sickness with visual clues (Marler, 1970). Perhaps it 
finally invaded the human sciences as a result of the problems faced by linguists who had to 
explain the speed with which children are able to infer the meaning of their parents' 
utterances simply by hearing a limited collection of them in association with particular 
circumstances. During his career Chomsky was forced to postulate some kind of innate 
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learning device, and other linguists followed. From there it entered the philosophy of mind 
via Fodor's thesis on the specialized learning modules that together constitute the frame-
work of the mind (Fodor, 1983). Many social scientists are not yet familiar with the idea, 
however, as a result of the legacy of Freud, the behaviorists, Piaget, cultural anthropology, 
sociology and probably as a result of the general spirit of an age of progress, or rapid 
change, in which there is a strong cultural pressure to stress the malleability of the human 
spirit. 
 Despite this legacy, nowadays even developmental psychologists see the necessity 
of combining both the idea of innate dispositions (nativism) and that of ontogenetic 
development (constructivism). Many abilities that were within the doctrines of Piaget 
supposed to be characteristic only of children of particular ages proved to be present much 
earlier (Karmiloff-Smith, 1992). As I will demonstrate in later chapters, the comparative 
study of animals and man and the sociobiological models explaining their behavior, point in 
the direction of the inheritance of conditional psychological mechanisms. These are turned 
off and on depending on ecological and social circumstances and direct also the sequence of 
learning processes. All in all, nature and nurture should no longer be considered to be 
opposites: only in some cases, nature has resorted to the help of nurture, because it was 
unable to predict in advance all details of the situations that an organism would have to cope 
with. 
 
b.The adaptive nature of knowledge 
After this preliminary defence of `dogma 1', I will give a preliminary explanation of `dogma 
2', which will be defended more extensively in part II. `Dogma 2' is really only one step 
further than `dogma 1'. Why would an organism need information? As was seen in chapter 
1, evolution would not have bothered building `costly' neuronal tissue if this tissue did not 
enable organisms to react more appropriately to their environment or to weigh their 
behavioral options more wisely. Information, in the final analysis, is not acquired for the 
sake of information, but only for the sake of adequate decisions. That means that our brains 
are only `information-processing', because they are `biological decision systems' which do 
become extinct if they make the wrong decisions. Only those decision systems survive that 
leave a copy of their inherited building program.  
 Such a decision system, however, is in need of information on the basis of which it 
can make `right' decisions - that is, decisions which perpetuate the DNA coding for that 
system. For that purpose it is equipped with sense-organs of which can be expected to 
particularly sift out information from their environment which promotes their genetic 
survival. Of course, the problem is in discriminating potentially important information from 
`noise' in an essentially unpredictable environment: one never knows beforehand what may 
become important. On top of that, ecological flexible species - rats, sparrows, starlings, 
crows and humans - need relatively large amounts of information, because they continually 
need to adapt to new food sources, new ways of living and new dangers or predators. This is 
the reason that such species can display singularly high levels of apparently superfluous 
curiosity which enables them to collect information about their environment that they may 
need at some point in the future (in mammals this seems to be enabled by the association 
areas on the cortex; in birds it has evolved independently as the hyperstriatum; Savage, 
1995). 
  
 
 Information needs to enter the decision system in such a way that it is thereby 
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enabled to survey relevant possibilities and make priorities among them. All kinds of 
physical characteristics of the environment can be used as clues to potential dangers and 
opportunities. Of course, those characteristics are not chosen on the basis of a comparison of 
their advantages or disadvantages, but simply by an almost infinite (i.e. half a billion of 
years) process of variation and selection of tissues with particular properties. If certain 
characteristics of the environment are predictive of particular threats or possibilities for an 
organism, a mutation which makes one of its tissues sensitive to this characteristic may be 
advantageous. This means that this sensitivity is from the very first moment based on the 
interests of the organism in question. Sense-organs are not expected to offer disinterested 
information; it is rather to be expected that the organism is programmed with a particular 
interest-determined interpretation of its sensory input: it will be shown how this can lead to 
particular forms of `theory-ladenness' or `value-ladenness'. Sensory information may be 
transformed, colored and schematized as long as it is `adequate enough for survival' with 
respect to the environment in which the organism has to perpetuate its genes 
(Überlebungsadequät; Vollmer [1975] 1983). The moment this is no longer the case, the 
organism in question risks extinction or genetic death. 
 If we see the genetic code as a `program' orchestrating the growth of an organism in 
interaction with its environment, we could interpret the process of genetic variation and 
subsequent selection as a kind of `evolutionary programming'. The fact that humans are very 
complicated products of a gene-environment interaction displaying a, to some extent, 
completely autonomous nervous system, does not implicate that the properties of this 
nervous system are not largely the product of such a process of `genetic preprogramming'. If 
this is true (which, of course, still has to be proved) and we are preprogrammed too, it is to 
be expected that the world which we experience consciously is a product of our brains on 
the basis of a selective measurement of relevant physical properties of the environment. As 
was seen in chapter 1, as far as our knowledge-structures `fit' to real-world structures this 
could be interpreted as an adaptation, obtained by natural selection, and this adaption is at 
most `adequate for survival': this is exactly the thesis of the adaptive nature of knowledge. 
 
c.Descended from much simpler minds 
But how should such genetic preprogramming be envisioned? Of course, DNA shows some 
resemblance to a `program', because its sequences of bases contain `codes' for proteins, but 
there is still an enormous gap between DNA and actual neural tissue as it interacts with the 
world. In fact, referring to `genetic preprogramming' may be misleading, because it suggests 
a dichotomy between `preprogramming' and `learning' where one actually finds learning 
processes taking place within a frame-work of evolved biases. `Genetic preprogramming' 
could suggest to some an inflexibility which does not correspond to our experiences with 
humans and other animals. In addition, it suggest a dichotomy between `hardware' and 
`software' as if evolution is making a multi-purpose machine suitable for specific purposes. 
The theory of evolution suggests, however, that we have not evolved from multi-purpose 
machines, but from `survival machines' (Dawkins, 1976). 
 At this point it is important to realize that our minds have descended from life forms 
with much simpler neural networks which must have functioned at each stage of their 
evolution in a competitive world. If we have unique properties, these must have emerged 
from an accumulation and integration of properties which served our ancestors in their 
unique survival strategies. The study of such much simpler neural nets is therefore a more 
adequate starting point for studying intelligence generally than studying specialized symbol 
manipulating devices which are able to produce language-like sentences. 
 If we are looking for ways to simulate and study intelligence with computers, there 
are several reasons to expect more from the analogy with parallel distributed processing 
(connectionism) than from the analogy with serial processing (classical artificial 
intelligence): 
- First, preconceptual 
integration of information is 
(in some lineages) a 
consequence of evolution, 
not its starting-point. The 
first multicellular organisms 
that evolved sensors or even 
specialized neural networks 
were not necessarily 
equipped with the means to 
integrate all the information 
they offered: in various parts 
of their bodies different 
processes could go on, as 
long as they remained to 
some extent adaptive to the 
whole. Parallel distributed 
processing thus seems much 
more likely to correspond to 
the processes within real 
neural networks than serial 
processing. 
- Second, in the 
`struggle for life' speed is 
essential, insight is at best a 
side effect. As was seen with the example of the cerci of the cockroach which are directly 
linked to its leg muscles (chapter 1), reaction speed is not always served by consultation 
with the brain. Even in complex organisms with a lot of central information processing a lot 
of autonomous subcircuits and automatic reflexes can be found which ensure that life goes 
on whatever is ordered from `above'. 
 
Fig. 2-1. As a crab grows into a skillful hunter, the 
weights of the hidden units between its sensory input and its 
motor output are gradually adapted (redrawn after 
Churchland, 1995). 
- Third, neural networks are much more resistent to damage than devices which 
depend on serial computing, because the former are characterized by a multitude of input-
output connections while the latter are characterized by only one long string which can 
break at any point (Churchland, 1989; 1995). 
- Fourth, and most important, parallel distributed processing offers a realistic 
analogue for types of learning and biased learning within neural networks which are entirely 
independent of mathematical and linguistic symbols. These may be based on very simple 
`algorithms' like trial and error, but can nevertheless result in an almost infinite variation of 
input-output relations. 
 Very briefly, the principles are as follows: 
1. A neural network is characterized by adjustable `synaptic weights' on its layer(s) of 
`hidden units' between the input and output layers. Animal brains can be seen as neural 
networks that have to adjust their synaptic weights in such a way that perceptions lead to the 
`right' actions: a crab, for example has to coordinate its observations of an edible object and 
48 
 
 
its subsequent attempt at seizing it. In figure 1 these are represented by the eye-angles at 
which the crab sees an edible target and the arm-angle at which it is able to seize it 
successfully at its observed location. 
2. Any pattern of inputs can be related to any 
pattern of outputs by varying the synaptic weights 
until the `error rate' drops to a global error 
minimum (figure 2; the learning process often 
sticks, however, to a mere local minimum). Of 
course, different `learning algorithms' have a 
different success in successfully adapting the 
weights of a given hidden unit. Ultimately, 
variation and selection has not only `designed' the 
most successful learning algorithms, but is also the 
principle used by the most successful ones. 
3. Conceptual distinctions can also be seen as 
output. Sensory input, for example a series of 
echoes as perceived by a bat, has to be classified in 
order to be used in an adaptive way: the bat has to 
distinguish echoes of edible objects from those of 
non-edible ones, for example (figure 3). In this view, conceptual distinctions derive 
ultimately from behavioral distinctions. 
 
Fig. 2-2. Learning as it takes place in 
one hidden unit. As a result of a 
specific algorithm the synaptic weights 
are gradually given the right values 
(after Churchland, 1989). 
4. A neural network can be biased into learning this rather than that by adding extra 
connections between the output layer and the hidden units (see the `bias units' in figure 1). 
The resulting network has a lot of extra qualities which correspond to the qualities of real 
nervous systems in which one 
can also find recurrent 
pathways. 
 It should be noted that 
much of the current literature 
on  neural networks 
(Churchland, 1989; 1995; 
Aleksander, 1996) stresses the 
ability to implement almost any 
input-output relation in a neural 
network by training it 
sufficiently. Although it may be 
important to stress this to 
convince everyone of the 
enormous possibilities of 
parallel distributed processing 
(and the ability of PDP 
computers to pass the `Turing 
test'), it should be stressed that 
most experiments in nature are 
immediately followed by a 
death penalty. The necessity of 
very specific input-output 
relations makes the evolution 
 
Fig. 2-3 In order to be able to eat, a bat has to distinguish 
moth echoes from leaf echoes. If properly trained its neural 
network produces the right `conceptual' outputs from a variety 
of acoustical inputs. 
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of `multi-purpose' machines implausible and it is therefore to be expected that neural 
networks of living organisms are biased in many ways by the preprogrammed growth of 
particular recurrent pathways which bias the training processes in particular directions. As 
Pugh has shown with respect to the `value-driven decision system' (on which more in the 
next chapter) the adequacy of decisions is proportional to the amount of pre-installed values 
and the extent of relevant representation (Pugh, 1978). 
 
d.Critique and justification 
The remainder of this chapter is needed to defend and elaborate `dogma 4', the thesis of 
scientific self-justification and -critique. The claim is that the process of cultural 
transmission which enables us to take part in scientific knowledge creates enough elbow-
room to judge the reliability of our evolved knowledge-forms and strategies. By actually 
studying the prerequisites for knowledge and the ways in which animals and humans 
acquire knowledge, it should be possible to demonstrate a number of seductions and pitfalls, 
the awareness of which could actually improve our scientific success. The `evolutionary 
justification and critique' that is here envisioned is partly inspired by Kant's Kritik der 
reinen Vernunft (Kant, [1877] 1924), but - as will already be clear from chapter 1 - it differs 
completely from it in at least three respects: 
- First, while Kant talks about a Kritik, what he really does is create a very bold and 
speculative model about the constructive force of reason and the transcendental subject 
which cannot really be corrected by new scientific research, because it claims to be a priori 
and thus beyond empirical research. (This same point can also be used in discussion with 
`neo-' or `crypto-transcendentalists' like Heidegger with his speculative distinction between 
`Vor-handenheit' and `Zuhandenheit' which are supposed to be two `modes' that 
predetermine the kind of knowledge that they generate and which Heidegger apparently 
claims to understand a priori (Heidegger [1927] 1979). As we will see, the Kantian notion 
of a priori is slightly ambiguous in that it refers on the one hand to aspects of knowledge 
which are not given in experience and, on the other hand, to rules which are universal and 
which necessarily apply to all experience: this makes us doubt whether the Kantian a priori 
is purely `logical' or to some extent merely `anthropological'. 
- Second, while Kant seems to know quite a lot about the way in which the 
transcendental subject structures our world with its categories and forms of sensitivity, die 
Erscheinung, much of the Kritik der reinen Vernunft seems to be based on the 
presupposition that knowledge of the world, das Ding an sich, is impossible, even via our 
perspectivated, subjectively colored knowledge: in this context it is useful to refer once 
more to the passage in B 168 of the KrV (cited in § 1.4) in which he explicitly denies the 
possibility of a `harmonie préétablie' between our knowledge structures and the world. 
Instead of becoming a relativist, however, Kant uses his critique of human reason only to 
relativize physics and metaphysics. By denying the possibility of knowledge of the world - 
knowledge via Erscheinungen about Dinge an sich -, he also blocks all roads to the 
improvement of reason via the feedback of gradually improved models about the world. He 
shows too great a tendency to take Euclidean geometry and Newtonian physics as 
necessarily applying to the world of human experience, purely because they emerge from 
human Anschauungsformen and categories. 
- Third, while Kant thus claims to give a Kritik he only asserts that "such-and-such are 
our forms of observation and categories and thus-and-thus does the world that we 
experience emerge from them" (see KrV b145-146 cited above). In fact despite his belief in 
the transparency of the act of the `transcendental apperception', he lacks an Archimedean 
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point to really start a critical investigation into the way human reason works. The only way 
in which you could partially criticize your own reasoning powers is by having good reasons 
to trust them in some respects as well: thus a good critique should start with at least a partial 
justification. 
 On all these three points the evolutionary justification and critique of our evolved 
knowledge structures differs from Kant's Kritik der reinen Vernunft: 
- First, what I will do in this chapter is not meant to be an a priori analysis, but it has 
of course implications for the way in which we view our evolved `a priori', the categorical 
frame-work in which we experience the world, which precedes experience. The idea is that 
it is simply impossible to analyze the universal and necessary `formal' presuppositions of 
knowledge apart from actual `contents': the Kantian dichotomy between form and content is, 
once more, misleading. Actual knowledge about our mental functioning and the ecological 
context in which our mind evolved may strengthen or weaken our belief in our categorical 
biases via a feedback relation. 
- Second, the analysis which is given here is completely based on our current models 
about the world. These are not claimed to be the ultimate ones, but only the best currently 
available. Trying to improve on them is as risky as rebuilding a ship in the open sea - to re-
use Neurath's metaphor. A theory of knowledge based on a scientific theory - e.g. the theory 
of evolution - is, of course, fruitful or worthless depending on the truth or falsity of that 
theory. 
- Third, an evolutionary `justification and critique' of our evolved knowledge capacity 
can only point to some limits and pitfalls of human knowledge, because it trusts other 
aspects of it. 
 In the following, I give a short inventory of the properties of our knowledge-
apparatus in the hope of throwing light on its strengths and weaknesses with respect to its 
ability to acquire objective knowledge of the world. I will especially focus on seven 
peculiarities of our cognitive equipment: 1. the specialized nature of the senses; 2. our 
limited sense of space and time; 3. the value-ladenness of our experience; 4. our innate 
cognitive biases and expectations; 5. the social construction of reality; 6. the way in which 
language and its compulsive systematism transforms our knowledge; and 7. the 
impossibility of transcending the conjectural nature of knowledge. For each, I investigate 
whether such a peculiarity should be seen as a handicap or offers a unique opportunity to 
attain true knowledge of the world. 
 
B.SEVEN PECULIARITIES OF HUMAN REASON 
1.THE SENSES: THEIR FUNCTION AND ECOLOGY 
Our senses have evolved during particular phylogenetic phases to guide us through 
particular environments. Although we are an ecologically flexible species descending from 
a genus which has gone through spectacular changes over the last million years, they still 
reflect to some extent the `survival strategies' and `niches' of our ancestors. The way in 
which they filter, transform and color information shows that they have evolved in the 
function of (genetic) survival. 
As a result of variation and selection, the sensory equipment of animals is designed in such 
a way that it mostly collects information that is needed in their specific ecological niche. 
This information is apparently conceived such that it predetermines them to particular 
behaviors. A good example is offered by the ears of noctuid moths which are adapted to the 
sonar system of their predators, bats (Roeder, 1970; McFarland, 1994). Noctuid moths have 
tympanic membranes on two sides of their body which are connected to two types of 
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sensory neurons. One of these is sensitive to low-intensity sounds and to cries from bats that 
are relatively far away. With these cells it can detect whether a bat is approaching and from 
what direction; they enable the moth to fly away before the bat has even detected it. The 
other type of receptor, however, is sensitive to the loud sounds of a bat which is very close. 
Its impulses disrupt the flight control mechanisms of the central nervous system of the moth, 
causing it to fly erratically and to drop toward the ground. This behavior, or the lack of it, 
makes the flight of the moth unpredictable for the bat and will often enable the moth to 
escape at the very last moment. 
 The ways in which sensory stimuli give rise to particular action patterns is revealed 
most obviously in situations in which those stimuli occur outside their original ecological 
context. For example, sometimes we can observe that flying water insects, like water bugs 
and water beetles, are attracted to reflecting surfaces of metal which glimmer in the dark. 
Apparently, their sense organs are particularly sensitive to such shining surfaces (emitting 
polarized light) which in nature represent the surface of ponds and lakes in most cases. 
Kittens are particularly attracted to small glimmering objects, like pellets of silver-paper, 
with which they can play fanatically, `hunting' them down, catching and `devouring' them, 
but without actually swallowing them. Apparently, small glimmering and fast-moving 
objects, which in nature are most often represented by insects, already have a particular 
`meaning' to them. (At one point, when I entered the room with a big sheet of rustling and 
glimmering silver paper my cat Loris looked terrified at it and sneaked out of the room as 
soon as possible, apparently afraid of such a huge insect.) 
 If we want to understand why we experience the world the way we do, we also have 
to understand the world in which our sense-organs evolved, sometimes called the 
`environment of evolutionary adaptedness' (EEA; Bowlby, 1969). Our sense-organs have 
evolved to suit our ancestors maximally. But which ancestors, where and when did they 
live? Most of the time, at least during the Miocene, our ancestors were living in tropical 
forests, and only in the last two-and-a-half million years (Pleistocene) did they finally 
completely abandon the trees. Of course, those last million years left their traces in our 
sensory equipment. At the same time, it is to be expected that the fundamental structure of 
our sensory system had been laid down long before that. Are there any indications for this? 
 First, it should be noted that we are to some extent typical primates with respect to 
the role of the different senses. Traditionally it is assumed that primates are predominantly 
more visual and tactile than olfactory and auditory: 
 
 The great primate specialization has been to elevate sight and touch to 
leading senses at the expense of smell and hearing which, while maintaining 
their importance in the life-style of the animal, play subservient roles (Napier 
& Napier, 1985: 34). 
 
a. Hearing 
The Napiers try to prove their claim by comparing the mobile ears of most mammals with 
those of the primates. In most primates, including humans, the ears are largely immobile, 
while we can often observe that the ears of many other mammals, like those of cats and 
deer, can scan the environment like radar saucers independent of the direction of the head. 
 While hearing in primates has undoubtedly become less important as a means of 
orientation and of detecting both prey and predators, it has remained important as a means 
of communication, which can be observed in many species of monkeys and apes. For 
example, indri's, howler monkeys and gibbons all use howling and singing as a way of 
advertising their presence and defending their territories. Male orang-utans keep in contact 
by means of impressive calls and chimpanzees display at least thirteen different categories 
of calls, some of which reflect their frame of mind. Our enormous sensitivity to rapid 
successions of sounds of different loudness and pitch did not, of course, come completely 
out of nowhere. The tendency to attribute emotional meanings to different sounds and their 
loudness was probably part of the basis on which language could evolve and it certainly is a 
prerequisite for our sensitivity to music or the art in which the possibilities of the sense of 
hearing are explored (Pugh, 1978). (In chapter 5, I discuss the hypothesis that the arts are a 
kind of social status display, which is inspired by the fact that they often prove the artist's 
skill or fluency in a particular sensory domain apart from his general vitality, sensitivity and 
power of perception.) 
 While we are undoubtedly very sensitive to sounds, our `acoustical window' to the 
world is adapted to hearing within particular distances and frequencies. At best, we are able 
to hear sounds between 20 and 20,000 Hertz and there are whole worlds of sound which we 
miss. The echo-location 
system of bats is based on 
sounds of about 50,000 
Hertz; dolphins hear sounds 
well over 100 kHz (Conner, 
1994). On the other hand, 
alligators, whales and 
elephants use infrasonic 
sounds to communicate. 
Elephants make loud 
infrasonic sounds with their 
intestines with a loudness 
of about 85 to 90 dB and 
with a frequency of 14 to 24 
Hertz. The sounds can carry 
as much as ten kilometers 
and the researcher Joyce 
Pool has discriminated 
around twenty-five 
different signals at this 
frequency (Lariviere, 1991). The song of whales can carry much farther through the ocean 
and are loud enough to be heard through the bottom of small boats. 
 
Fig. 2-4. The human `acoustical window' and the frequencies at 
which other species communicate or orient themselves. 
 All this means that our acoustical system is designed for specific purposes and that 
the acoustical systems of other species have other purposes, like echo-location and 
communication over large distances. The reason that it is so difficult to decipher the 
communications systems of elephants and whales is that we not only need sophisticated 
equipment to register their sounds, but that they are phylogenetically so distant that it 
becomes hard to imagine what emotional states they communicate about and for what 
purpose. 
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b. Vision 
With respect to the rest of the senses, we are typically diurnal primates with a strongly 
developed sense of stereoscopic vision, including color vision, which is absent in nocturnal 
primates. Our eye-sight, together with that of apes and only some monkeys, is further 
enhanced by our possession of a fovea, a small depression toward the center of the retina in 
which a large concentration of cones can be found. (Cones are the photoreceptors that 
provide the basis for color vision in opposition to rods which function better in twilight, but 
which are not so discriminatory and do not allow for color vision.) It has proved to be a 
prejudice, however, to suppose that color vision is a privilege of primates. Color vision 
seems to be `widespread throughout the animal kingdom' (McFarland, 1987: 77), although it 
is not always based on three types of cones with three types of sensitivities (trichromatic 
vision), but sometimes on only two (grey squirrel) and sometimes on more than three (some 
reptiles, birds; pigeons have six chromatically distinct types of cones; Shepard, 1992). 
 Although in the sixties it was still sometimes assumed that color-terms were largely 
culturally determined (Whorf, 1965), the idea that they are not has grown more likely since 
the studies of Berlin and Kay (1969). Berlin and Kay asked native speakers of twenty 
languages to classify a series of colored chips within their own language. It appeared that 
there exists an evolutionary continuum in which languages gradually refine their 
distinctions between colors in a universal order: white/black → red → green/yellow → blue 
→ brown → purple/pink/orange/grey. This sequence matches the order of acquisition of 
color terms in children (Lumsden & Wilson, 1981). Additionally, in most cultures colors 
were clustered in four principal groups, corresponding largely with what we call red, green, 
yellow and blue. The same four colors are also already recognized by four-month-old 
infants (Bornstein et al., 1976). 
 If we study the actual way in which vision 
is embodied in the eyes and the brain, the 
impression that our brain is a tabula rasa 
disappears quickly. Rather, what we find is a 
series of specialized centers which are already 
interconnected in such a way that a particular 
processing of information is much more likely 
than another (Harth, 1995; Crick, 1994). The 
retina is structured in such a way that contrasts 
are enhanced as a result of `lateral inhibition'. If 
cells on the sensitive layer that are firing to the 
next layer give a negative signal to the cells 
surrounding their primary targets, the effect is 
that fuzzy patterns may be sharpened (figure 5; 
Harth, 1993: 59). 
 
Fig. 2-5. Lateral inhibition. A fuzzy 
pattern (input) is sharpened into a clear  
contour (output) as a result of sideway 
connections (a and b) that inhibit rather 
than excite (After Harth, 1993). 
 Half-way between the retina and the visual 
cortex we find the lateral geniculate nucleus (LGN; corpus geniculatum laterale) which is 
also connected by descending pathways from and to the visual cortex. Such descending 
pathways can be conceived as neural connections which are specially designed to `bias' the 
way in which input is partitioned into `prototypes' (Churchland, 1995). If the descending 
pathways to the LGN are conceived as `positive feedback loops' they could amplify minimal 
fluctuations in the input so that features not initially present may be generated in a bootstrap 
fashion. This has brought Harth (1995: 71) to the suggestion that the LGN works as a kind 
of `sketchpad on which the cortex expresses its fancy by drawing and erasing': 
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 "I envision the mechanism involved in the control of the LGN to act like a 
positive feedback. Suppose you are looking for a coin you dropped on a 
beach. Assume that, to aid you in the search, the cortex instructs the LGN to 
suppress the images of pebbles, leaves, shells, and so on, and to enhance 
anything small, round, flat, and metallic, in short, anything that looks like a 
coin. In this selective positive feedback, a mere suggestion of a coin would 
be made to look even more coinlike to call attention to itself, until closer 
scrunity reveals that the search has been successful or that what you are 
looking at was not a coin after all"... (Harth, 1995)  
 
This passage reminds one of the common experience of birdwatchers who will often see 
protruding side-branches as birds. Many visual illusions illustrate the same process. "We 
may think of what goes on in the LGN as a competition between the reality that is conveyed 
from the eyes and the fancy that comes down from the cortex" (Harth, 1995: 68). (This 
interpretation of the function of the visual cortex is, of course, still speculative; according to 
Hubel it "has the function of increasing the disparity - already present in retinal ganglion 
cells - between responses to a small, centered spot and to diffuse light"; Hubel, 1963). 
  Finally, in the visual cortex itself, we can find many specialized cells which are 
only sensitive to lines of a particular orientation (Hubel, 1963), to edges or boundaries of 
particular shapes, sizes, positions or to movements of particular velocities (Hubel, 1963; 
Thompson, 1975). These specialized cells are responsible for many of the effects which are 
known from visual illusions. For example, it has 
been found that some neurons react specifically to 
movements relative to a particular background. 
Such specialized neurons seem to be responsible 
for the strange illusion which one sometimes has 
when viewing a passing train from a train that 
itself is not moving: one thinks first that the one's 
own train moves, and, after the train has passed, 
one thinks that the opposite platform is moving in 
the opposite direction. 
 I do not want to suggest that these 
specialized functions are completely innate. One 
can actually study the extent to which they are 
innate by comparing patients with different forms 
of blindness or by studying the temporal sequence in which the diverse connections arise 
during ontogeny. It has been found that there is a critical period in which particular areas 
have to be stimulated in order to acquire their functions. If one closes one eye of a cat at 
birth for one week this can result in partial blindness as a result of underdeveloped 
projections into the visual cortex. Studies of the temporal sequence in which connections 
arise seem to indicate that the growth of the brain is to some extent genetically orchestrated, 
but that it is also a trial and error process, in which many wrong connections have to be 
weeded out if they do not synchronize with neighboring cells (Shatz, 1992). 
 
Fig. 2-6. The visual pathways: the LGN is 
both `informed' by the cortex and the 
retina (and by the brainstem). 
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 The innateness of 
particular organization of 
the visual system does, of 
course, only make sense 
with reference to the 
ecological context in 
which it arose. Our 
retinas are sensitive only 
to one small bandwidth of 
electromagnetic waves, 
those which pass easily 
through the atmosphere 
and which are relatively 
low in energy: 
wavelengths between 380 
and 760 nm. Bees 
(another trichromatic 
species) are sensitive to 
wavelengths between 300 
and 650 nm as a result of 
which they build a 
completely different 
visual world, without red 
but with ultraviolet which 
is barely visible to us. 
 Even with respect 
to the wavelengths of light, vision is not a passive reproduction of the environment, 
however. Within our specific `optical window' we `translate' the quantitative succession of 
wavelengths into a qualitative circle of colors (Newton's color circle) by viewing waves 
longer than 700 and shorter than 380 both as red or purple. Thus, whereas we are able to 
make subtle discriminations within our optical windows our power of discernment decreases 
towards its borders. 
 
Fig. 2-7. The wavelenghts of visible light are those that 
maximally penetrate the atmosphere. A linear sequence of 
quantitatively different wavelengths is `translated' into a circle of 
qualitative different colors (after Vollmer). 
 All this means that the phenomenological quality of `redness' is the product of the 
adaptive way in which electromagnetic radiation of two particular series of wave-lengths is 
lumped and `phenomenologically labelled' within our trichromatic neural network. 
Qualitative distinctions between quantitatively distinctive types of electromagnetic radiation 
apparently enabled our ancestors to distinguish between materials as a result of their 
distinctive way of reflecting light. The electromagnetic waves with wavelengths between 
380 and 760 nm were particularly useful, because these waves are not so short that they can 
damage valuable tissue (like gamma, röntgen, and UV radiation) and not so long that they 
do not allow for precise measurements (like radio waves). Most importantly, however, these 
waves are the ones which, together with radio waves, pass through our atmosphere: röntgen 
and UV radiation, for example, are absorbed high above the earth. That means that our eyes 
are particularly sensitive to those wave-lengths of which most radiation is really available in 
our biosphere (Vollmer, 1983: 98). Our visual system is most sensitive to colors between 
yellow and green of which most light is available. Perhaps it is not an accident that bananas 
advertise their ripeness in yellow and perhaps our ancestors evolved their color vision most 
by distinguishing ripe from unripe bananas. 
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 In his recent analysis about the adaptedness of color vision Shepard (1992) not only 
looks at the color circle, which represents only one dimension (hue) of the three-
dimensional `color space', but also at lightness and saturation. He proposes that the three-
dimensionality of human color vision (hue, lightness and saturation) may represent an 
evolutionary accommodation to the "essentially three degrees of freedom of terrestrial 
transformation of the solar wavelengths passed by the earth's atmosphere": light-dark 
variation, yellow-blue variation and red-green variation. According to him, trichromacy 
should be seen as a more or less optimal system of analyzing light along these three 
dimensions and that is the reason that it has developed independently in, for example, bees 
and humans. It has evolved from a more primitive form of dichromacy which is still latent 
in the population and occurs in approximately 8% of the population, primarily in males, 
which has enabled researchers to identify and localize the responsible genes (Nathans, 
Thomas & Hogness, 1986). 
 According to Shepard there are reasons to believe that it is not only trichromacy that 
is innate, but that the cortical qualitative representations of colors are also innate. Shepard 
and Cooper (1982) compared the way in which normally sighted, color-blind and totally 
blind individuals represent colors. They found that red-green color blind individuals are 
often able to imagine the differences between red and green although they had never been 
able to actually see the differences. "One particular articulate protan [refers to protanopia, 
this form of color blindness, P.S.] insisted that although he could not distinguish the (highly 
saturated) red and green we showed him, neither of these papers came anywhere near 
matching up to the vivid red and green he could imagine" (Shepard, 1992: 517). 
 Whether or not Shepard is right, the evidence points in the direction of the 
hypothesis that color-terms are certainly not platonic ideas, but neither are they purely 
subjective and arbitrary names. They are to some extent universal and represent the ways in 
which speakers of different languages try to cope with the innate qualitative different 
experiences with which they register radiation of different wave-lengths and intensity. One 
could claim that they represent a laborious `translation' of our qualitative, physiological and 
subjective `translation' of the `messages' inherent in the reflection and refraction of light on 
different terrestrial surfaces in the approximately 5000 different cultural systems of 
languages. If we chose this terminology there proves to be at least two levels of `translation' 
between the physics of light and color terms, but this need not to be fatal for some rough 
version of `correspondence'. (In his `critical realism' Roy Wood Sellars used the metaphor 
of `translation into another medium', see Sellars, 1922; 1959; 1966; and also Slurink, 
1996a). 
 This example shows that we are able - contrary to what Kant thought - to study the 
process of knowledge both on the side of the object - different materials reflect or emit 
different types of electromagnetic radiation - and on the side of the subject - studying the 
neurological basis of vision, the unique phenomenological experiences that we have as a 
result of them, and their interaction with a system of culturally inherited knowledge. Most 
importantly, it shows that we are able to study their interaction, which constitutes 
knowledge as a subjective-objective process which takes off perspectivistically, but in 
which information accumulates as a result of a feedback relationship via external structures. 
 The dominant role of vision and touch which was pointed out by the Napiers has had 
its consequence for the history of Western ontology. As Heidegger points out, the history of 
philosophy is from the beginning primarily oriented on vision as the route to both `being' 
and `beings' (between which he makes a platonic distinction; Heidegger, [1927] 1979: 147; 
Stegmüller, 1978). In many languages, including Greek and German, words which refer to 
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insight and theory refer also to vision: cf. the Greek `theoria', Germanic words such as 
`insight', `inspection' and `Einsicht' and the phenomenological `Wesenschau'. As a result of 
the phenomenon of hallucination, dreaming and the possibility of visualizing abstract 
phenomena, which have been used by writers since Homer and Plato to strengthen the belief 
in some kind of dualism, materialistic philosophers often had to require that `real objects' 
were not only visually observable, but were `tangible' as well. Apparently, vision is slightly 
mistrusted, at least by some philosophers, as a relatively new sense-organ, which sometimes 
ignores the official enquiry procedures to convince the ontological jury in our heads. It is 
only reasonable to require the testimony of more than one sense-organ if one wants to bring 
in an ontological verdict. It is perhaps no coincidence that materialistic philosophers have 
from the very start invoked the sense of touch as the sense that should supplement vision as 
the criterion of objectivity, as lovers who not only want to see their beloved but touch her as 
well. Bat and dolphin philosophers would perhaps also require the `objective' testimony of 
their sonars. 
 
c. Taste 
The adapted nature of our sensory apparatus is even more apparent in our most atavistic 
senses, taste and smell. In contrast to vision, touch and hearing, taste and smell are often 
narrowly linked to particular types of behavior and often work unconsciously, which 
perhaps betrays their respectable age. They often exert their influence in the traditionally 
profoundly important domains of food and sex. Both are relatively simple senses which 
represent the world by means of a relatively limited number of sensors. We have four or five 
types of taste sensors on the taste-buds of our tongues, which may be called the sweet, salt, 
sour and bitter receptors. The sweet sensors seem to be concentrated on the tip of the 
tongue, the salt sensors on the sides towards the front, the sour sensors on the sides towards 
the back and the bitter sensors on the extreme back. Perhaps this order is caused by the 
degree to which these tastes exclude each other. The sweet sensors are perhaps concentrated 
on the tip of the tongue, because they allow for a first rough assessment of the amount of 
carbo-hydrates in a piece of food and because this assessment ought not to be disturbed by 
the assessment of other qualities. The bitter sensors are probably in the extreme back, 
because the bitter taste of poisonous food easily drowns out other tastes. 
 What do taste sensors perceive? As I have already suggested the phenomenological 
qualities of different foods correspond to some extent with the amount of specific nutrients 
or poisons in the tasted substance. The nature of these phenomenological qualities, however, 
is dictated by our specific survival strategy. One could even claim that these 
phenomonological qualities are the ways in which nature `dictates' our food choice. We call 
sugar sweet, because our ancestors needed the carbohydrates in ripe berries and fruits. We 
even project adjectives like `delicious' back onto those fruits, as if everyone should like 
them. Cats, however, probably find those same fruits horrible. Compared to them, both 
humans and dogs are omnivores. That sweet substances are repugnant to cats demonstrates 
most clearly that they are carnivores. The world that we taste with our taste sensors is thus 
clearly the world of an omnivorous primate which is largely vegetarian but likes to 
supplement its food with meat. 
 
 
 
d. Smell 
With respect to odors much less is known, but one theory postulates seven basic types of 
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receptors which are presumed to correspond with the shapes of the molecules involved 
(Amoore, 1963). 
 
 "When a molecule of the right shape happens along, it fits into its neuron 
niche and then triggers a nerve impulse to the brain. Musky odors have disc-
shaped molecules that fit into an elliptical, bowl-like site on the neuron. 
Pepperminty odors have a wedge-shaped molecule that fits into a V-shaped 
site. Camphoraceous odors have a spherical molecule that fits an elliptical 
site, but is smaller than that of musk. Ethereal odors have a rod-shaped 
molecule that fits a trough-shaped site. Floral odors have a disc-shaped 
molecule with a tail, which fits a bowl-and-trough site. Putrid odors have a 
negative charge that is attracted to a positively charged site. And pungent 
odors have a positive charge that fits a negatively charged site. Some odors 
fit a couple of sites at once and give a bouquet or blend effect" (Ackerman, 
1991). 
 
The total number of specialized olfactory receptor types could, however, be much larger and 
is still an area of wild speculations. 
 It can easily be shown that even a relatively small amount of receptor types can 
nevertheless lead to an enormous discriminatory power (Churchland, 1995). If we assume 
that each receptor type is able to discriminate five distinct levels of activation and if we 
assume that there are four taste receptors and seven smell receptors, we are able to 
discriminate at least 5 x 5 x 5 x 5 = 625 (54) different `patterns' of taste and 57 = 78,125 
different distinct aromas. If we realize that the flavor of foods depends upon both taste and 
smell, as a result of which thousands of different aromas can be combined with hundreds of 
different tastes with each morsel on our tongues, it becomes a mystery immediately why the 
noble art of gastronomy is excluded so often from the list of other arts, including painting, 
literature and music. 
 Of course, empirical data are somewhat more difficult to find, but they also suggest 
that the sense of smell is underestimated in the above citation of the Napiers as well as in 
many epistemological treatises in which the senses are discussed. Empirically it has been 
found that human subjects can discern at least 60 different categories of odors if they have 
some training and if the odors are sufficiently complex (which makes them, strangely 
enough, more easy to discriminate). It is sometimes even claimed that experiments show 
that the human sense of smell is not much worse than that of other animals: it would in 
some cases be even better than that of rats (Kirk-Smith, 1994). The truth is that humans and 
other animals all have their own range of scents to which they are sensitive. According to 
Morris (1986) dogs are about as sensitive to the scent of flowers as we are, but they are 
about a million times more sensitive to the scent of butyric acid (a component of sweat) than 
we are. Bloodhounds can follow the four day old track of a human person over a distance of 
150 kilometers. Sometimes dogs start to bark in the presence of a cat owner, because they 
will simply smell the scent of the cats on that person. Whereas humans have about five 
million olfactory cells, a dog has 220 million cells (Morris, 1986). 
 In spite of that, the number and sizes of the glands that are responsible for odor 
production in humans suggest that we have some kind of pheromone system, too, although 
we are largely unaware of it as a result of the lack of projections to the neocortex via the 
thalamus, which is characteristic of both vision and hearing (about 1,000,000 and 28,000 
fibers respectively; Hubel, 1963; Thompson, 1975). The olfactory bulb is, however, 
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connected to many centers in the limbic system, including the amygdala and hypothalamus. 
The limbic system determines many aspects of our emotional lives and memory and this 
could explain why odor experiences can be very strong and long lasting (A la Recherce du 
Temps Perdu was inspired by the memory of the smell of a madeleine dipped in tea during 
the youth of the author). 
 The presence of a largely unconscious olfactory communication system is also 
suggested by specific anosmias, in which certain individuals are unable to perceive 
particular odors as a result of a genetically determined absence of particular receptor types 
(one could translate it as `scent-blindness'). Most specific anosmias which have been found 
so far relate to particular odors produced by the human body. "Musk (alpha-
pentadecalactone), isovaleric acid in vaginal secretions and stale axillary sweat, 1-pyrroline 
in semen and male pubic sweat, trimethylamine in menstrual sweat and androstenone in 
male axillary sweat and stale urine" (Kirk-Smith, 1994). 
 One of the reasons for the underestimation of the role of smell in human behavior 
was the apparent absence of the so-called vomeronasal organ (Jacobson's organ) in adult 
humans. This organ can be found in many mammals, for example cats, and is designed for 
the detection of pheromones. Uncastrated cats, like my cat Loris, who comes across the 
smell of a conspecific on some shrub, will sometimes start sniffing at it as in religious 
ecstasy, looking somewhat stupid, with an opened mouth. Because in cats the vomeronasal 
organ is also connected to the palate, cats use both mouth and nose to review an odor and 
assess its composition and source. Although most of us are clearly not as obsessed with 
odors as cats, recent studies have found that almost all adults do still have a vomeronasal 
organ, and one that is functional. It consists of a small pit in the nasal septum and its 
sensitivity to specific odors has been found to be dependent on one's sex (Miller, 1996). 
 In recent years several researchers have tried to `decipher' the human olfactory 
communication system and also tried to explain the paradox of our lack of self-
understanding in this respect. Odors seem both to play a role in mate acquisition and in the 
subsequent bonding process. Much research has centered on the effects of adrostenone 
(smelling like urine) and androstenol (musk-scented). Kirk-Smith (1994) discovered that 
women were attracted to sit on an androstenone treated seat in a dentist's waiting room, 
whereas men avoided it. More often, androstenol is viewed as a possible candidate for a 
male pheromone. Women exposed to androstenol for a month (placed on their upper lips 
each morning) rated themselves as more submissive than a placebo group in the middle of 
their menstrual cycle (Benton, 1982). At the same time men were discovered to avoid toilets 
treated with androstenol, suggesting that it could function as a male `spacing pheromone'. 
 Androstenol is unlikely to be simply a male pheromone, however. The reason for 
this is that it oxidizes to androstenone within 20 minutes and that most women rate 
androstenone as highly unattractive (despite Kirk-Smith's research at the dentist). The 
Austrian ethologist Karl Grammer discovered that this evaluation changes to a more neutral 
one at mid-cycle in women who take no hormonal contraceptives (Grammer, 1991; 1993a 
and b; 1995). He interprets this finding in the context of the research of Bellis and Baker 
(1991), who found that extra-pair-copulations (e.p.c.'s) in humans peak at mid-cycle. 
 If we realize that one of the most striking differences between human and other apes 
is that females of our species do not display their estrus and have almost no way of knowing 
when they ovulate (a subject which will be addressed further in chapters 5 and 8), these 
findings become of enormous importance. While hidden estrus is thought to enable women 
in our species to entice men into forming enduring pair bonds -giving them the impression 
of paternal certainty -, odor-induced mood-changes could help them to add the luxury of 
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choosing superior genes to the certainty of male investment. The decrease in emotional 
repugnance with respect to adrostenone in ovulating women could thus function as a way to 
counter-balance the non-adaptive effects of hidden estrus and pair-bonding with respect to 
the conquest of `good genes'. This could also explain why such processes work largely 
subconsciously. 
 From the perspective of the male the female resistance to androstenone could be 
adaptive as well. If only ovulating women are not repelled by a strong male odor, it might 
be adaptive to emit a lot of androstenone and observe who is interested, despite that. 
`Stinking' could work as an ideal means of chasing off non-fertile, uninterested women. 
 Strong male odor seems to function within the pair-bonding process as well. There is 
evidence that female fertility is higher in the presence of a man. The menstrual cycle 
becomes more regular and the luteal stage, the stage in which the uterus is prepared and 
thickened to support a pregnancy, becomes longer (Cutler, 1991). The researcher Cutler and 
her associates have even requested and obtained a patent on the `essence of male' to 
regularize the female cycle (US patent No. 5,155,045 issued Oct. 13, 1992). Miller (1996) 
has speculated that the increased fertility of females as a result of male odors could explain 
a whole range of phenomena, including the human desire to cuddle and the male tendency 
to sleep after intercourse. 
 Finally it should be remarked that women also emit odors that influence male 
behavior. Some of these seem to have the effect of equalizing male ratings of female 
attractiveness (Grammer, 1996). Others, including estratetranol, seem to `tame the savage 
beast' and seem to make men less aggressive and more responsible (Miller, 1996). Miller 
(1996) speculates that the pair-bonding process has the character of a mutual chemical 
addiction in which men want to be exposed to estratetranol and women to androstradienone 
or related male pheromones. Of course, it is to be expected that both partners are addicted to 
the particular, unique mixture of smells and pheromones that only their partners can 
produce. Such addictions to particular odors sometimes also play a role in religious 
ceremonies and the relationship between cats and people. (It should be noted that the 
difference between love and fetishism, of course, is that in the case of love tactile and 
olfactory stimuli only form part of the whole `meaningful pattern' on the basis of which the 
object is adored.) 
 
e. Conclusions 
What can be concluded from all this with respect to the `referential' character of the senses? 
First, I have to conclude that traditional philosophy has concentrated somewhat one-sidedly 
on vision and its role in cognition. The role of smell has often been underestimated and this 
is a pity, because smell shows us a much more direct link from sensory input to behavior. 
Whereas vision, together with hearing, play a big role in `orientating' us, the sense of smell 
also offers us direct incentives for particular behaviors. Whereas vision and hearing enable 
us to construct an internal map of our environment which seems to give us an almost infinite 
freedom, the sense of smell gives us a minimum of `objective' information and a maximum 
of `subjective' guidance. 
 Of course, I am exaggerating here somewhat. There are also visual and auditive 
clues which are directly linked to very specific behavioral outputs, as will be seen in chapter 
5. The purport of what I am saying is, however, that vision offers us a much larger `space of 
behavioral options' than smell and in function of these options it gives a much more 
extensive conscious representation of our external environment. If vision alone is studied, 
there is a strong tendency to stress the relation between sensory input and internal 
representations of the environment, while a study of 
olfaction suggests a more direct link to behavioral 
output (figure 8). 
 Strange as it may seem, naturalism seems to fall 
in at this point with a doctrine of the hermeneutical 
philosopher Heidegger. Heidegger criticizes western 
ontology for being one-sidedly focused on 
`Vorhandenheit' or the `objectivity' resulting from 
having an object in one's hands in front of one's eyes 
(enabling one to study it closely). Heidegger contrasts 
this with `Zuhandenheit', the knowledge one has about 
the tools one uses. One could, however, also explain our 
obsession with `Vorhandenheit' as a result of the fact 
that we are stereoscopic primates with hands and that we 
have a strong tendency to grasp everything with our 
hands in order to control it. This preoccupation with 
vision and tangibility has certainly resulted in a one-sided ontology. It remains to be seen, 
however, what the best cure is for this one-sidedness: Heidegger's crypto-transcendentalism 
or a naturalistic justification and critique of our evolved frame-works of experience. 
 
Fig. 2-8. Smell seems to be much 
more directly linked to behavioral 
output than vision. 
 A second preliminary conclusion that can be made on the basis of this analysis is 
that constructivism does not necessarily entail relativism. Yes, contours of objects are 
already sharpened on the retina and the LGN certainly is not only informed by the eyes, but 
biased as well by cortical expectations. Does this mean, however, that everything we 
observe is only construction? Could this not simply mean that we, as every intelligent 
species, make an interactive `image' of our surroundings in which those aspects of this 
environment are singled out, stressed and `colored' that deserve our special attention, given 
their relevance within the survival plan of our species? Of course, this image is a 
construction of our brains, but characteristics of the environment may be `projected' or 
`translated' in it in a useful - informative - way. On the one hand the image is a creation - on 
the basis of particular sensors and from a particular position and perspective -, on the other 
hand it must contain relevant information as it is designed to guide the organism through its 
environment.  
 Both current views about the way in which a linear succession of electromagnetic 
waves with different lengths is `translated' into a color circle and Amoore's stereochemical 
theory of odor perception (according to which molecules of specific forms fit into particular 
receptors) show that there is a lot of arbitrariness in the way in which physical properties of 
the environment are used for orientation. Could it be otherwise? Given the fact that in 
evolution the first thing that matters is behavior that is adequate to particular situations, it is 
to be expected that all kinds of clues are used to bring this behavior in agreement with the 
circumstances. The clues that are used are `chosen' on purely pragmatic grounds by 
variation and selection in particular circumstances. There are a lot of circumstances which 
in our evolutionary past simply did not occur. We do not perceive carbon monoxide, 
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apparently because it was not a serious threat to 
our ancestors. We do not possess a biological 
equivalent of a Geiger counter, apparently 
because radio-activity was not a serious threat to 
our ancestors. In our daily observations we do 
not even take into account the difference 
between the velocity of light and sound, 
apparently because most of the relevant objects 
that our ancestors encountered stayed within 300 
meters and did not approach faster than 300 
meters a second. 
 This last example also shows that the 
mechanisms developed as a result of variation 
and selection are not perfect. Perhaps it would 
have been useful for our ancestors to have been 
able to calculate the distance of the lightning on 
the basis of the relative slowness of sound. In the neighborhood of Hiroshima and 
Chernobyl it would certainly have been useful to possess a biological Geiger counter. Not 
everything that is useful is produced by evolution, however. Only if the process of variation 
and selection happens to stumble across particular improvements can they be implemented. 
Evolution does not look forward, it is a `blind watchmaker' (Dawkins, 1986). 
 
Fig. 2-9. Vollmer's analogy 
between projection and knowledge, 
`Projective epistemology' (after 
Vollmer, 1983). 
 A final remark can be made on 
the basis of Harth's model about the 
function of the LGN. If the LGN 
functions as a kind of `sketchbook' 
which draws its information both from 
the retina and cortex (and even from the 
brainstem) a simple `projective realism' 
as proposed by Vollmer (1983: 123; see 
figure 9) is perhaps too simplistic. 
Vision is at least a feedback loop in 
which background knowledge and 
expectations determine what we see at 
least as much as sensory input from the 
retina (figure 10). Not only within the 
organism do we find a feedback loop, 
however: another feedback loop is at 
work between organism and 
environment. An observing organism 
behaves on the basis of its observations 
and learns not only from its 
environment directly, but also from the 
way in which this environment is 
affected by its own behavior. As a 
moving perspective it must learn a lot 
from the temporal sequence of its 
observations in a stereometric world in 
which all kinds of objects continually 
 
Fig. 2-10. Knowledge (in this case visual 
knowledge) is characterized by feedback loops on 
many levels. 
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recede or come nearer depending on its own direction. At the very least an interactive 
ecological realism is needed to account for that phenomenon. 
 
2.THE STEREOMETRIC FRAME-WORK OF OBSERVATION 
The way in which we reconstruct space and time and in which we `map' and `rewrite' our 
environment is determined by our evolutionary past. 
Kant discovered that there is an element of `synthetic knowledge a priori' in Euclidean 
geometry and in the Newtonian physics that was based on it. Euclidean geometry is not 
derived from experience. Because Kant and his contemporaries thought that this geometry 
described real space (which was apparently confirmed by Newton's successful use of it), a 
problem arose that eighteenth century empiricism could not solve: how is a description of 
space possible, without actually measuring space? How is mathematical and even physical 
knowledge a priori possible? Kant's solution was, as always, extremely radical: the real 
world, das Ding an sich, is unknowable. Space and time as we experience it and the 
physicist describes it are not given in our experience, but they constitute a frame-work in 
which we experience: they are Anschauungsformen or forms of possible experience. As long 
as we are humans, we are caught in the human frame-work of experience and, with that, we 
are captured in geometrical space. 
 Non-Euclidean geometries and relativistic physics have accustomed us to the idea 
that there are other geometries and that in fact non-Euclidean geometries are sometimes 
necessary to describe the real world. That means that there are realms of experience in 
which we can actually discover that the concepts of Euclidean geometry do not work. 
According to Kant this should not be possible, because those concepts are a priori, before 
and beyond experience. 
 Does this mean that Kant was wrong? One can also be somewhat milder. First, Kant 
was right in pointing to the fact that geometry (as we now know, that also includes non-
Euclidean geometries) is not based on experience. It is a creative construction of the human 
mind that can be used in physical hypotheses, but these hypotheses need not be correct. The 
application of a particular geometry to a particular theory in physics is a hypothesis itself. 
Second, Kant was right in pointing out that the ordinary world of our experiences and the 
world as we can imagine it is (almost perfectly) a Euclidean world in which the shortest 
connection between two points is a straight line. The way in which space `curves' as a result 
of gravitational fields is really difficult to imagine and one can only actually measure it on 
astronomic scales. Phenomena like `gravitation lenses' in which, for example, a quasar 
behind a galaxy is seen as through a lens which distorts the original image, have accustomed 
us to the idea that space really curves, but it still eludes our imagination. Who can really 
imagine a finite universe without borders? If we use our imagination the universe is either 
infinite or it has borders (an argument going back to Lucretius). 
 Evolutionary epistemology may help us to explain our limited imagination. It 
interpretes our ontogenetic `a priori' as phylogenetic `a posteriori'. Of course Kantians will 
protest, because they correctly see this as contrary to the spirit of Kant. For Kant (and other 
transcendentalists, like Husserl) research into the a priori structures of human cognition has 
to stay a priori itself. The world as we experience it has already been structured by our a 
priori structures and we cannot, therefore, find the sources of those structures in it. Above 
all, according to Kant, the a priori has a universal and necessary character: we simply 
cannot find anything in the world of experience that does not obey its `rules', because this 
world is already structured according to those rules. 
 This approach has proved to lead to dogmatism, however, as in the presupposition 
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that Euclidean space is the space of all possible experience. In addition, it is dogmatic itself: 
if one can discover that one's mind is influenced by prejudices, delusions, alcohol, sophisms 
and logical errors, one can also discover that one's a priori expectations about the world are 
wrong. In fact, physicists have successively tried to demolish Kantian `forms of experience' 
like Euclidean space, and Kantian categories like causality and one-ness. 
 Perhaps Kant's position is so confusing because it is slightly ambiguous and 
gradually changed over the years. In the first edition of the Kritik der reinen Vernunft the a 
priori referred simply to the forms of experience and the categories - everything not given 
in experience itself, whether it consisted of innate ideas or logical presuppositions of 
knowledge. In the second edition he tried to radicalize the importance of synthetic 
knowledge a priori, its necessary and universal character, and he tried to separate the 
logical presuppositions of empirical knowledge from all contingent knowledge, including 
innate ideas. Many writers about Kant try to read the second `logico-transcendental' Kant 
back into the first `anthropo-transcendental' Kant (Engels, 1987; Prauss, 1971). With respect 
to evolutionary epistemology Vollmer correctly asserts: 
 
Wenn sie `a priori' als `angeboren' deutet, so liegt darin nich eine mißglückte (von 
ihm sogar ausdrücklich abgelehnte) Interpretation von Kant, sondern eine 
Problemlösung, die sich auf eine Teilbedeutung des Begriffs `a 
priori'(`unabhängig von aller individuellen Erfahrung') stützt und beschränkt. 
Diese Lösung wurde zwar von Kant selbst vorbereitet, indem er doch den 
`Grund' für die Ausbildung von Kategorien für angeboren erklärt; sie steht zu 
ihm aber auch in ausdrücklicher Konkurrenz, da sie die 
Bedeutungskomponenten `notwendig' und `allgemeingültig' mit guten 
Gründen verwirft und dadurch den eigentliche Kantische Begriff des Apriori 
`zerstört' (Lorenz) (Vollmer, 1988: 304) 
 
Research into the `logico-transcendental' preconceptions of knowledge leads to a completely 
arbitrary list of these, as proved by the completely different analyses of, for example, Kant, 
Husserl and Heidegger. In addition, it is based on the illusion of the transparency of reason 
for itself. There seems more reason to believe that we can only understand reason after we 
have understood much simpler natural phenomena. 
 Therefore, we should concentrate on what we know about the `anthropo-
transcendental' aspects of the a priori. Instead of repeating the hypothesis of a purely logical 
a priori without an origin, we should try to discover the innate biases which govern our 
experience - including our `instinctive preference for an Euclidean geometry' - and the 
limited contexts in which those biases apparently helped our ancestors. 
 Are there any indications that we are in possession of a stereometric a priori, an 
innate frame-work in which sensory information is `interpreted' in a spatial and temporal 
way? To me it seems that the evidence is overwhelming. First, spatial imagination is closely 
linked to vision. As has already been shown, the visual cortex does not simply passively 
record the stimuli it receives from the LGN and retina, but it actively interprets its input, 
while sending its interpretations back to the LGN. If we can show that the visual cortex is 
also actively `adding' stereometric elements, we have discovered at least part of the physical 
basis of Kant's Anschauungsformen. 
 Second, as a result of studies of brain injured people it has been known for some 
time that, while the ability to speak `resides' in the left hand part of the brain, the proper 
execution of spatial tasks requires an uninjured right hand part of the brain. If we can show 
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somehow that actual brains occasionally specialize in performing some spatial tasks better 
than others depending on the strategic problems with which their possessors have to cope, 
we may infer that `space' as far as the brain is concerned is not an abstract monolithic entity, 
but an adaptive stereometric frame-work which the brain uses to map the environments in 
which specific tasks have to be accomplished. 
 
a. Innate forms of space perception 
Let us first review the stereometric activities of the visual cortex. In frogs much of the 
`interpretation' of visual data takes place in the retina. It is there that researchers found the 
`bug detectors' mentioned earlier and also fibers that respond exclusively to light, dark or 
moving edges (Thompson, 1975). The studies of Hubel and Wiesel on cats (luckily, they 
seem to have conducted them on anesthetized cats) show that in these mammals much of the 
more complicated interpretation tasks have moved to the visual cortex. It is there that Hubel 
and Wiesel found vertical columns of cells which respond to different stimulus orientations. 
Individual cells within those columns are sometimes completely specialized in detecting one 
characteristic of an object, for example a downward moving horizontal bar or a right angle. 
(The existence of such cells also throws a lot of light on cat behavior, as it is striking that 
cats are always interested in chinks and particularly in fast moving objects disappearing into 
them, as can be tested at home, early in the morning, by withdrawing your toes quickly 
under the blanket while your cat is watching you.) 
 Experiments on monkeys show that the neuronal activity across the surface of the 
visual cortex is a projection of the neuronal activity across the retina. If one marks glucose 
using a radioactive form of it and then fixates the monkey's eyes on a black and white 
pattern one can actually make a photograph of this pattern as it reappears on the visual 
cortex of the monkey using an X-ray film. (One can only hope that the researchers in these 
kinds of experiments have cared for the animal's well-being. It seems that one can do all this 
while the animal is anesthetized.) All this points to an `interpretative rebuilding' of the 
retinal image in the visual cortex in which all kinds of instinctively interesting features of 
the environment, like contours of objects, clues for the possible location of prey or 
predators, etc. are spotlighted. Whether Harth is right and this interpretation is projected 
back to the LGN where it is the object of our visual attention, is not clear at the moment, but 
everything points to a fusion of both a projection of patterns from the outside world and an 
interpretative enhancement of certain detected features in those patterns in a complicated 
feedback loop.  
 Up to now we have learned nothing about the internal construction or reconstruction 
of space. If we want to understand how animals and humans orient themselves, tracing the 
projection of one stimulus through the brain is not enough. The minimum amount of stimuli 
required for the most primitive form of geometric orientation is two, as in Euclid's line 
which forms the connection between two points. This minimum is embodied in the tongues 
of snakes which have two tips. The comparison of the measurement of certain chemical 
substances from those two tips are enough to give an indication of the direction in which its 
prey has to be searched (Schwenk, 1994). Although spiders often have eight eyes and 
insects often have three extra eyes apart from  their compound eyes, this explains perhaps 
why many animals have both two ears and two eyes: it enables them to compare two stimuli 
which have emanated from the same object and deduce its position on the basis of this 
comparison. 
  
 With respect to auditory localization this process has been investigated in cats 
(Rosenzweig, 1961). It appears that auditory input from both ears is increasingly merged in 
successively higher levels of the auditory system. The auditory cortex on both sides of the 
brain receives input from both ears, but the left 
side receives more stimuli from the right ear and 
vice versa. Although it takes 10 milliseconds for 
a neural message to travel from the ear to the 
cerebral cortex and the differences in time at 
which sounds arrive at the ears are maximally 
about half a millisecond, it appears that those 
tiny differences do indeed serve to locate the 
sources of sound. Time differences of 0.0002 
second between two sounds arriving at the two 
ears independently lead to reinforcement of the 
first stimulus in the brain of the cat, apparently 
enabling it to notice at which ear it first arrived.  
 Of course, as a result of the speed of 
light, localization on the basis of visual clues 
cannot result from tiny differences in the arrival 
time of the stimuli at the retina. One can 
imagine a lot of clues by which visual stimuli 
betray their spatial origin, like perspective and 
movement relative to the observing subject, but 
it is striking that a couple of predators (owls, 
birds of prey, cats, primates) have developed 
binocular vision independently, giving the 
impression that the ability to see one object with 
two eyes at the same time is a reliable method 
for assessing its distance. (As there exists a trade-off between binocular and panoramic 
vision and as the latter organization helps one to scan one's environment for possible 
sources of danger, it is to be expected that prey animals are served more by panoramic 
vision.) The moment an object or situation is seen by both eyes at the same time, the input 
of both eyes can be compared in the visual cortex. Specialized `fixation cells' fire at the 
moment that the input from both eyes is the same, `near cells' and `far cells' fire if the input 
from both fixated eyes is different (Churchland & Sejnowski, 1992; Churchland, 1995). Of 
course, fixation is a more or less voluntary process in which the two lines of sight cross each 
other at a particular distance, the focus of our attention. On the basis of the angle between 
the two lines of sight (the binocular parallax) at the fixation point which results in two more 
or less identical images and as a result of the differences between the retinal and cortical 
images of the objects before and behind it (the binocular disparity) the brain can reconstruct 
(`translate') a three-dimensional world out of two two-dimensional images (figs. 11, 12 and 
13). The astonishing fact, however, is that we experience our world as a completely three-
dimensional (or even four-dimensional) world. Despite the fact that there are a few illusions 
in which the brain does not know how to decide what is `near' and what `far' (as the one 
created by the Necker cube, fig. 2-14), the trick is done almost automatically and we take 
the adequacy of our visual information processing system for granted, forgetting that it took 
half a billion years (500,000,000 years) to create and refine it. 
 
Fig. 2-11. If we focus on an object 
nearby, both eyes give completely 
different views of everything behind this 
level, producing a sensation of depth. 
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 Why do we have such a relatively 
sophisticated system of spatial 
reconstruction? Because we are apes which 
have descended from the trees. Related 
species, e.g. the gibbons and orang-utans 
spend most of their time in trees and while 
chimpanzees and gorillas have partly 
descended from the trees, our more related 
ancestor Australopithecus was clearly still 
adapted to living in trees. Only two and a 
half million years ago did we descend from 
the trees for good and for all. But at that 
point we became increasingly dependent 
on meat and could use our stereoscopy 
quite well (see chapter 7). In all stages a 
three-dimensional record of the world was 
no luxury: individuals with somewhat 
better depth vision were somewhat less 
likely to go extinct and to spread their 
geometrical talents into the population. (In 
addition, Churchland shows in his 1995 
that stereoscopy is the best way to break 
camouflage). 
 
Fig. 2-12. The brain constructs a three-
dimensional world out of two two-
dimensional images by identifying objects 
before and behind the fixation point on the 
basis of the different ways they are 
perceived by both eyes. 
 What does this teach us about Kant's Anschauungsformen? First, it seems that Kant 
was relativizing space and time too much. For Kant space and time were purely frameworks 
of our perception. From an evolutionary perspective it is implausible that we would place 
our experiences in an stereometric hallucination if this did not increase our hold on the 
world. The idea that space and time are real and that we simply reconstruct it is much more 
elegant, has much more explanatory power and creates less problems. We are the product of 
a long line of ancestors who did relatively well, compared to some of their less successful 
conspecifics who fell from the trees and broke arms or legs. 
 Second, Kant was right in seeing that spatial knowledge requires an active 
construction and interpretation of incoming sense-data. This 
active construction is, however, directly guided by the 
interaction of the subject, who itself is the center of the space 
that it reconstructs. Kant's epistemology seems too much based 
on the idea of a more or less contemplative detached self, 
standing opposite to the world that it has to understand 
(Heidegger's Vorhandenheit).  
 All in all, it seems plausible to assume that our ability 
to reconstruct three-dimensional space is to some extent 
innate. Such innateness should not be confused with rigid 
preprogramming, however, which is implausible given the interactive way in which both 
embryos and neural networks develop. Rather, stereoscopy plus the presence of certain 
recurrent connections in areas that are predisposed to process spatial information force the 
brain to choose one ontogenetic direction rather than another. However, to assess the degree 
to which such developmental processes can be influenced by genes, more information is 
 
Fig. 2-14. Necker cube. 
68 
 
 
needed. 
  
69 
 
 
 
b. The adaptive nature of specialized spatial 
skills 
I also promised to show that there is a variation within 
the population with respect to the ability to perform 
particular spatial tasks. This is important, because it 
shows that the actual a priori (what precedes 
individual experience) does not have a universal 
character, but is adapted to particular environmental 
challenges. As a result of different ecological 
problems with which they have to cope, individuals - 
especially those belonging to different species, but 
also those within the species - have different 
transcendental frame-works to order their experience. 
With respect to space, it can even be said that different 
individuals live in completely different `spaces'. 
(Perhaps von Uexkülls concept of an `Umwelt' rings a 
bell here.) There are dramatic differences between the 
`spaces' (`Umwelten') in which dragon-flies, honey 
bees, swallows, whales, naked mole rats, bats and humans live. These differences emerge as 
a result of different habitats and feeding strategies and also as a result of different social 
structures. 
 
 
Fig. 2-13. The configuration of two 
objects is projected differently into 
each eye, on the basis of which the 
brain can compute their three-
dimensional position. 
 It is interesting, too, that even within the human species different individuals live in 
essentially different spaces. A striking example is offered by the world in which 
agoraphobics live. It has recently been postulated that Darwin, after his travel around the 
world in the `Beagle', had to retreat to a remote country-house, as a result of agoraphobia. 
Many of the symptoms about which he speaks in his letters and autobiography seem to fit 
this diagnosis. But what is agoraphobia? It is a completely irrational phenomenon which 
forces an individual to become something similar to a hermit. If the person in question 
leaves his `safe' home and wanders off too far, he is `punished' by feeling tremendous 
anxiety, dizziness, nausea and a tendency to flee back home. 
 Of course, agoraphobia is a disease, but diseases are sometimes only extremes 
within the normal variation. Humans are a species with a home base, a small territory of 
their own within a much larger group territory which also represents their feeding area. If 
we are hurt somehow our instincts tells us to retreat to the homebase. Agoraphobia could be 
a sickly, enlarged variant of this impulse. Of course, this is only a hypothesis, but it could be 
worked out and lead to falsifiable predictions. 
 At this moment, the most important point is, however, that agoraphobia has 
something to do with the internal representation of space within the agoraphobe. Wide 
spaces are experienced as threatening. The world is represented as a large threatening space 
around a small, safe home base. (Many cats are agoraphobics, too, at least while they are 
young. A cat that is gradually discovering its new home will always look for safe places in 
each room to fly to, if necessary.) 
 The case for agoraphobia as a disturbance of an adaptive system of space 
representation is, however, not as convincing as the next example. Within a species, the two 
sexes almost always represent two different behavioral strategies (see chapter 4). As a 
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result, it is not surprising to find that there are sexual differences in spatial abilities, in 
humans as well as in other species. There are several reasons to assume that these 
differences in humans are not purely culturally acquired. First, they are also shown in other 
species. Second, and more important, they are clearly influenced by hormones, which has 
been demonstrated both by experiments on rats and by a comparison of individuals with 
different hormonal abnormalities (Gaulin & Hoffman, 1988; Geary, 1996). 
 In 1986 Gaulin and Hofman hypothesized that spatial abilities in males would have 
been selected for in polygynous species, because, in such species, males would have to 
maintain larger home ranges than females to be able to spot or attract more than one of 
them. (Cat owners will remember that normally, tom-cats have larger home ranges than 
queens). To test this prediction they compared two related American rodent species with 
slightly different mating systems: meadow voles, which are polygynous, and pine voles, 
which are monogamous. As predicted, male meadow voles showed both larger home ranges 
and better spatial abilities than females, whereas pine voles showed no such differences 
between the sexes (Gaulin & Fitzgerald, 1986). In a later study they showed that male 
meadow voles have proportionally larger hippocampi than females, which had been 
anticipated based on the role of the hippocampus in mediating spatial functions (Silverman 
& Eals, 1992). 
 On the basis of these types of considerations Gaulin and Hofman theoretized that, in 
humans, males are also to be expected to have most talents for spatial orientation. It was not 
difficult to find psychological literature confirming this idea. With particular respect to 
mental rotation tasks, males outperform females dramatically in our species. Such tasks 
typically depict a three-dimensional object (e.g. a construction of blocks) and require the 
subject to imagine what the stimulus would look like from another perspective. A talent for 
performing such tasks is very useful in reading maps and as a result perhaps also in 
orientation within a relatively large home range. It is not difficult to show that man is a 
slightly polygynous species in which males need larger home ranges than females. Male 
superiority in spatial ability seemed to be explained before it was necessary to be 
demonstrated. 
 Male superiority? A Canadian Ph.D. student did not feel at ease with this concept 
and gave the matter more thought. Together with her supervisor, she designed a series of 
experiments in which some unconventional spatial abilities were measured (Silverman & 
Eals, 1992). In one experiment, subjects were confronted with a picture with a collection of 
drawings of familiar objects (an umbrella, a bear, binoculars, a chair, etc.). After a minute, 
they were shown a similar picture with a series of objects added. They were asked to put a 
cross through all of the items that were not in the original array. This was meant as a test of 
the subjects' memory for objects, independent of location (object memory). 
 After this test, they were shown a picture with the same objects as the original 
`stimulus array', but some of them were moved to a different location on the paper. The test 
subjects were then asked to circle the objects that still were in the same place and to put a 
cross through those that had been moved. This was meant as a test of the subjects' memory 
for the location of objects (location memory). 
 The result were striking. Females scored significantly higher on both tasks; they 
more accurately recalled which items were in the array and where they were located. 
 In another experiment subjects were left alone in a graduate student office, thinking 
they had to wait for the beginning of the experiment. After two minutes they were escorted 
back to the laboratory and asked to recall as many as possible of the objects that they had 
noticed in the graduate student office. In this experiment females remembered up to 70% 
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more objects than males did. 
 Another experiment was designed to separate incidental and directed learning. This 
study showed that females outperformed males both in object and location memory, 
independent of the way in which they learned. Silverman and Eals finally investigated the 
ontogeny of the female lead in object and location memory by studying different age 
classes. The data suggested that female superiority in location memory begins with puberty. 
 While Gaulin and Hoffman (1988) proposed that the differences between the sexes 
result exclusively from the tendency of males to have larger ranges in order to increase their 
access to potential mates, the studies of Silverman and Eals point to a divergent selection 
pressure for two different sex-related food strategies during human evolution, gathering and 
hunting. The male advantage in mental rotation could have evolved as a result of the need 
for males to hunt in unfamiliar territory, to encircle prey animals, to throw accurately and to 
find the way back home. The female advantage in object and location memory could have 
evolved as a result of a long history of foraging, in which it was necessary to find the same 
plants in different seasons and even to remember the fruits that were not ripe enough last 
week. Peripheral perception and incidental memory would have been particularly adaptive 
in this context, because it enabled ancestral females to remember all kinds of plants and 
their locations, while walking about or carrying out other tasks. Whereas hunting is often 
served by the ability to concentrate on one target, the effectiveness of foraging can be 
increased by remembering more than one possible food plant at the same time. 
 Instead of viewing male spatial abilities as just a male advantage, the studies of 
Silverman and Eals show that they are male specializations and that females have their own 
specializations. Instead of viewing the a priori as a monolithic, universal characteristics of 
our species, it turns out that the a priori as that part of knowledge which is not derived from 
experience is not universal, but is subject to individual variation and is different for different 
sex-age classes. Whereas Kant and Husserl view the a priori as an indication that the mind 
is an independent reality which is prior to the material world that it perceives and 
constitutes, this indicates that the mind is an adapted entity that helps to orient a material 
organism in a world that is already structured, independent of whoever perceives or 
reconstructs it. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3.THE VALUE-LADENNESS OF EXPERIENCE 
Our knowledge of the world is colored as a result of subjective experiences and values. 
We have seen that the senses do not simply register physical characteristics of the world in 
an objective fashion. Essentially the same physical characteristics can `mean' different 
things to different organisms. For example, what an arctic fox and a fennec, a fox living in 
the Sahara, perceive as `hot' and `cold' is entirely different. Both the air molecules above 
Greenland and those above the Sahara have a certain amount of kinetic energy which is 
measured as `temperature', but different fox species have evolved to attach completely 
different values to the same temperatures. The experience of temperature has, therefore, 
both an objective and subjective dimension. The same can be said about other senses, 
although the senses are slightly different in the amount of `objective content' they pass on. 
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 Species-specific values are not only attached to incoming information at the level of 
sensory input, however. From an evolutionary point of view it is highly unlikely that the 
brain can afford itself the luxury of simply reconstructing states of affairs in the world, 
without directly noticing possible sources of danger. Certain environments and situations 
have to be `recognized' as dangerous (dark corners in dark woods), conspecifics and other 
species of certain sizes have to be avoided. If everything in this respect had to be learned by 
our ancestors from their parents, the risks during their childhood would be much too high. It 
is much more likely that learning involves a refinement of certain innate values than a start 
from scratch. 
 
a.Innate reactions to light and dark 
Are there any indications that we have such innate values that influence our behavior? A 
good first example might be our largely unconscious reactions to dark and light. This is a 
good example to start with, because something is actually already known of its 
neurochemical basis. Melatonin is known to be a chemical that both induces sleep and is 
produced during darkness. It is successfully used to relieve the effects of jet-lag. It seems 
reasonable to assume that it forms part of the neurochemical feedback system that drives our 
day-night rhythm, the `circadian' rhythm (derived from circa diem, about a day). (This is 
only one example of a biological rhythm. Coastal organisms often undergo circalunar 
cycles, which correspond to the position of the moon. Many bird species undergo circannual 
cycles which control features such as molting, breeding and migrating.) That means that this 
system is not entirely driven by experience and culture, but by certain innate factors which 
can be refined by learning processes. 
 A further clue can perhaps be derived from the effects of light-therapy on patients 
suffering from Seasonal Affective Disorders (S.A.D.; `winter blues'). In 1992, at the Clarke 
Institute of Psychiatry in Toronto, a special baseball cap was designed with two small green 
lights on its brim which shine directly into the wearer's eyes. It has been found that wearing 
the cap for 30 minutes to an hour a day helps about 60 to 70 per cent of patients within two 
weeks. This cannot be explained with reference to the placebo effect, because the success 
rate is double the usual effect with a placebo and because the effectiveness over time does 
not drop, as with placebos (Bochove, 1992). All this indicates that, somehow, the amount of 
sunshine is registered and `evaluated' in our minds. Such evaluation must be species-
specific and our evaluations can be explained from the fact that we have descended from 
diurnal tropical primates. Cats, owls and bats clearly react differently to daylight and 
animals, like dogs, that have descended from nordic or arctic species, would not be helped 
much if suffering from winter blues. 
 
b.Innate esthetic preferences 
From an evolutionary perspective we would expect that we have certain innate species-
specific preferences for particular landscapes and scenic values, too. Investigations in 
hospitals have shown, for example, that patients in hospital rooms with windows will 
recover faster than patients in hospital rooms without windows. Also, patients whose 
windows looked out upon a small grove of deciduous trees recovered faster than a matched 
control group of patients whose windows looked out on a building (Ulrich, 1984). The 
presence of flowers in a hospital room seems to have a very positive effect on the patients, 
too, and has led to the establishment in the U.S.A. of a National Council for Therapy and 
Rehabilitation through Horticulture (Orians & Heerwagen, 1992). 
 Psychologists have found a number of other, slightly surprising, preferences with 
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respect to landscapes. People seem to prefer environments that have water, large trees, a 
focal point, changes in elevation, semi-open space, some ground cover, distant views to the 
horizon, and moderate degrees of complexity (Ulrich, 1986). People like to have surveyable 
landscapes, which still display enough `mystery' to invite further exploration (Kaplan, 
1992). In an American study in which subjects rated five natural environments shown in 
slide format, young children (8-year-old) in particular were found to prefer savanna-like 
environments which they had never seen before. From age 15 on, savanna, deciduous forest 
and coniferous forest were liked equally well, and all three environments were preferred 
over rain forest and desert (Balling & Falk, 1982). The authors postulate a developmental 
pattern, in which innately programmed responses are modified by experience in particular 
settings (eastern U.S. forests). They propose that our preferences have evolved in savanna-
like environments, but can be adjusted to some extent. Humans are supposed to originate in 
the tropical savanna, which is also relatively rich in resources. A limitation of this study was 
that the material did not include water or animals, because these were supposed to confuse 
the results. Proponents of the `aquatic ape theory' (who suppose that we evolved at least in 
the neighborhood of water, chapter 7) would protest, of course, because it is for them easy 
to show that humans almost always prefer landscapes with at least some water. 
 The human preference for landscapes with at least a couple of trees has been quite 
well documented. Orians and Heerwagen (1992) report their cross-cultural study of esthetic 
responses to trees with subjects from the U.S.A., Argentina, and Australia. They used black 
and white photographs of Acacia-trees from different savanna areas in Kenya. The trees 
rated as most attractive by all three groups proved to be those in which canopies were 
moderately dense and trunks bifurcate near the ground, a variety of Acacia tortilis which is 
characteristic of high-quality savanna. In wetter savannas, the Acacias are much taller and 
in dryer savannas they are denser and look like shrubs. 
 From this perspective, the popularity of Acacias in parks is striking (the Acacias I 
can view from my window are characteristic of a Dutch, relatively wet and poor crypto-
savanna). One can see parks as places in which humans create an environment which 
pleases them maximally. If there are innate preferences for certain landscapes, they should 
express themselves to some degree in park designs. Many parks contain elements which 
remind us of a relatively rich savanna, including ponds, flowers, animals and isolated 
collections of trees (everyone raised in a Christian context will be reminded  of the `tree of 
knowledge' standing central in Paradise). 
 Perhaps even closer to deep human esthetic wishes are some landscape paintings. 
Dutch landscape paintings of the seventeenth and eighteenth century certainly show that 
people like wide horizons, animals and trees. The problem with art is, however, that it is a 
medium with which humans often try to distinguish themselves from others. As a result, 
competition within an élite of artists and art-lovers can lead to something which Ortega y 
Gasset called the dehumanization of art. The need for representations which please the 
spectator is counter-balanced by the need to impress and even shock the public by being 
realistic or by expressing all kinds of mixed feelings, or by returning to supposedly 
`elementary' forms. It is sometimes revealing what kind of landscapes painters use to give a 
sense of alienation or to express despair. To find traces of original human preferences one 
should not rely on modern art history, however, but look to the paintings and portraits that 
humans use to embellish their houses or to gardening magazines. Or one should do research 
like that of Ulrich (1986) and try to find out how people react to slides with different scenes: 
he found that people in stressful situations show lower distress responses after viewing 
slides of natural scenes as compared to scenes of buildings. 
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c.The emotions: a frame-work for flexible decisions 
Of course, esthetic responses to landscapes are only one example of a very broad 
kaleidoscope of values. From an evolutionary perspective there is no reason to assume that 
the human value structure is simple. Again, as in § 1.5d above and as I will be doing in the 
next chapter, I have to point to the work of Pugh (1978). As a designer of `artificial decision 
systems' Pugh found that the accuracy of decisions was served both by a relatively elaborate 
system of values and a ditto map of the relevant environment. Pugh proposes that the 
emotions form our system of innate values and he distinguishes primary values, which are 
innate, and secondary values, which are adaptations to particular environments. As I will 
elaborate in chapter 3, Pugh's theories in `The biological origin of human values' can be 
used to develop a theory of consciousness. The idea is that the contents of consciousness are 
not solely formed by `objective' information, but by subjectively evaluated information 
which enables organisms to weigh heterogeneous sorts of information and come to creative 
decisions. In contrast to stimulus-response and conditioned-response models, in this model 
sensations do not function only as rewards or punishments, but enable the weighing of many 
aspects of complex situations or even the anticipation of situations which might arise. 
 How would such a system of values work? An example is offered by birds. It has 
been found that woodland birds use patterns of tree density and vertical arrangement of 
branches as settling clues (Cody, 1985). The birds do not first investigate whether a 
particular grove contains enough insects or berries, but instinctively choose particular `nice' 
groves. On the other hand this instinctive evaluation is not so rigid that it cannot be weighed 
against other parameters. There can be a much `nicer looking' grove in the distance, the bird 
may be tired, it can become darker, conspecifics may be heard from the grove. The bird has 
to evaluate a whole situation and consciousness could be interpreted as an active integration 
of whole fields of subjectively evaluated information in order to reach a decision in which 
all factors are weighed. 
 Of course, the same goes for the evaluation of landscapes by humans. In contrast to 
the closely related chimpanzees and gorillas, humans live in a variety of habitats and have 
done for at least a million years. There are certain landscape elements we like to see, for 
example, wide vistas, water, animals and trees, but these preferences can be overruled by 
other considerations. Perhaps our innate tendencies express themselves most naturally in 
children and we gradually learn to bend them in the direction of a particular culture and 
particular preferences in later years, as Balling and Falk propose. That would mean that we 
are very flexible indeed, but does not mean a lack of something that has to be flexed into a 
particular direction in the first place. 
 The idea that our knowledge of the world is colored by subjective experiences and 
values will not come as a surprise to many people. However strange it may appear, in the 
tradition of epistemology not much attention was paid to it. Values are often seen as 
something that belong to ethics and this suggests a clear division of labor, which may avert 
a lot of problems. Such divisions of labor are sometimes very contraproductive, however, 
and are too often dictated by a timorous defence of existing academic territories. If 
knowledge was completely separated from evaluations it would have been difficult to 
imagine how it could lead to decisions. From an evolutionary perspective it is unlikely that 
an organism would evolve an elaborate cognitive apparatus that leaves it a complete 
freedom of choice with respect to what it does with the resulting knowledge. It is much 
more likely that new information is immediately interpreted within an valuative frame-work 
which allows the individual to assess its relevance with respect to upcoming decisions. Such 
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a valuative frame-work could take the form of a `phenomenological cage' in which an 
organism is forced to evaluate certain phenomena as painful and negative and others as 
desirable and positive. 
 
4.INNATE COGNITIVE EXPECTATIONS 
We are equipped with a series of innate `expectations' which enable us to build, on the basis 
of relatively little information, a picture of the world which has a good chance of fitting 
some aspects of the real world. 
Plato says in Phaedo that our `necessary ideas' arise from the preexistence of the soul, are not derivable from 
experience. - read monkeys for preexistence. 
Darwin, 1838, M Notebook 
 
The world in which we live is to some extent regular and predictable. If this was not the 
case, we would not be able to live in it. It would not make much sense having lungs in a 
world without oxygen: apparently our body `expects' at least some oxygen to be there. It 
would not make much sense having bones in a world without gravity: their strength is 
adapted to both our body mass and the size of our planet. Many characteristics of our bodies 
are designed for a particular world with particular constants and regularities - most 
characteristics simply presuppose a world with such constants and regularities. How could 
life have evolved if our planet did not rotate with such regularity around its own axis and 
around the sun? How could life have evolved if the properties of carbon and water at 
particular temperatures were not constant, but changed in a completely unpredictable 
fashion? At least since the Sumerians, the predictability and regularity of nature has been 
compared to the rules and laws without which no society could exist - which define, for 
example, the meaning of traffic lights and enable us to predict when post offices are open: 
hence the word `natural laws'. The metaphor is inadequate, however, since natural laws 
cannot be offended against and since they are not the product of minds. 
 Of course, there is the Kantian position that we are the creators of the order and 
regularity that we experience ourselves (see citation in § 1.4; KrV, A 125). Just like any 
`creationism' this model begs the question. If we, or God, create order and regularity, these 
are apparently products of minds. But minds themselves are already so complicated and 
organized that it is much more reasonable to believe that they presuppose order and 
regularity rather than create it from scratch. The `mind-first' movement - to which, we 
should not forget, Kant belonged - has very little evidence to build its case on. It is much 
more plausible that the regularities of this world are simply effects of the inherent properties 
of matter and that matter came first, cells and bodies next, and mind - only as a result of a 
snowball of coincidences - last. 
 In that case, one would expect not only bodies, but minds as well to be adapted to 
the particular regularities that they encounter in the world they come across. If brains 
evolved to reckon with particular possibilities in the environment, it would be a waste of 
time to force them to learn all regularities and constants from scratch each generation. The 
speed at which an organism learns to orient itself in its environment can be heightened 
enormously by not burdening it with unnecessary information about situations that it 
probably never will encounter and by preprogramming it with a series of plausible 
assumptions. Most birds need not to reckon with the relativistic effects that could occur 
when they would be flying almost with the speed of light, but they must somehow learn to 
cope with different speeds of the wind, with up- and downcurrents, with rains and blizzards, 
etc.. Most animals are equipped with a more or less task-specific learning programme rather 
than with a generalized learning attitude, as this is propelled by curiosity in a handful of 
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species, including rats, cats, crows and humans. 
 A nice example of such a task-specific learning programme is offered by the nest-
orientation of the bee-killer wasp Philanthus, a beautiful species which can be easily 
observed in the eastern parts of the Netherlands. As a result, it was also found by Nico 
Tinbergen at Hulshorst and it did even contribute to the creation of ethology (Tinbergen, 
1958). Tinbergen and his students discovered that one can fool bee-killers by first 
accustoming them to a circle of fir-cones around their nests and then replacing this circle: 
the wasp would start looking for its nest in the middle of the cones. Subsequent experiments 
led them to conclude that the wasp is orienting itself purely on the basis of visual clues, 
preferably a pattern of relatively big objects protruding from the sand. The moment the bee-
killer starts hunting, however, odor starts to play a crucial role, because it allows the wasp to 
control the identity of its prey, honey-bees. All this shows that the ability of the wasp to 
learn something (the place of its nest) is completely embedded in a more or less rigid, innate 
behavioral routine in which only some behavioral sequences have to be `filled in' or refined 
by learning processes. The mind of the wasp is, so to say, not a blank slate, but a form on 
which very specific questions are posed or on which one can sometimes only answer `yes' or 
`no'. The only reason that the behavior of the wasp is not completely preprogrammed is that 
its genes cannot `know' exactly in what kind of environment it is going to live. Learning 
should therefore be viewed, in the case of the bee-killer, as a task-specific information-
gathering activity, directed at very specific variables of the environment. It is essentially 
based on a whole list of innate expectations: the wasp `expects' honey-bees to fly around 
with a particular scent, it `expects' a soil in which it can dig its elaborate tunnels, it `expects' 
at least some protruding objects around to be on the soil in particular patterns to enable it to 
locate its nest. 
 Of course, most philosophers, at least those belonging to the class of mammals and 
the family of primates, will immediately raise the chauvinistic possibility that those beings 
show a much more flexible and `open' learning ability. This is certainly true, but it also 
remains true that even curious beings with the possibility of gathering all kinds of 
information purely because it could sometime become useful - the elite of curiosers 
mentioned above -, need not be prepared for non-existent worlds. Even those beings are 
well served if they can concentrate only on the variables that really matter in the world in 
which they will have to survive. Even those beings are served well if their safety and 
reproductive success does not depend exclusively on skills that have to be acquired and 
knowledge that has to be obtained from scratch. Their `cognitive survival kit' is therefore 
expected to contain a lot of semi-automatic subroutines and `ontological expectations', just 
like those of insects and other invertebrates. Sometimes such `ontological expectations' are 
simply embodied in the very structure of their neural networks; sometimes special `recurrent 
connections' have been `installed' by means of variation and selection to ensure that the 
organism does not lose too much time and does not run unnecessary risks by having to learn 
the relevant properties of the mesocosmos which remain constant over generations. 
 Such properties, however, do not necessarily also pertain to the micro- or 
macrocosmos. The process of variation and selection is based on a limited, albeit enormous, 
sample of possible environments. It has to be compared with induction (generalization), not 
with deduction. As its effects are strongest in small, isolated populations its samples are 
essentially non-random and completely biased, otherwise speciation would not even be 
possible. That means that an evolutionary `justification and critique' of our innate cognitive 
expectations differs essentially from Kant's by being, on the one hand, much more aware of 
the essentially limited anthropomorfic nature of those expectations, and, on the other hand, 
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by being aware of the possibilities of transcending those limits to some extent by 
understanding their origin from a limited sample of environments. Let us see whether we 
can make sense of some of the expectations on which our `instinctive ontology' is based. 
 
a. We expect a `logical order' in nature 
An old discussion in philosophy concerns the status of the so-called `laws of logic', such as 
the `principle of identity', `the principle of non-contradiction', `the principle of the excluded 
middle' and `the principle of sufficient reason'. The rationalists, like Leibniz, thought these 
`logical laws' were the most general natural laws. Empiricists, like Mill, thought they were 
simply psychological laws, `Denkgesetze', which simply expressed the way in which our 
minds work. Does the idea that we have certain innate, global expectations about the world 
enable us to transcend and integrate both positions? 
  Certainly our minds need not expect a world in which a tree may turn into a witch at 
any moment. The principle of identity is, therefore, a very sound starting-point for an 
organism which is not so much concerned about winning philosophical debates as it is about 
surviving in a dangerous environment. Whether it is always true, even on a microcosmical 
level, that things are always identical to themselves, one cannot, of course, decide on the 
basis of our natural tendency to expect so. The principle of identity is a principle which has 
proved its validity, which may be necessary to think ( = create an internal model of) the 
world in which we evolved and which may even be necessary to think at all, but which 
proves nothing about the `logical' behavior of the ultimate constituents of the world. 
 To be able to think the world it is apparently necessary in most cases to fix the 
identities of objects and to expect that those identities will not change without a cause, but 
this thinking habit may also prove to be inadequate in some cases. While in the mesocosmos 
an individual, animal or human, which neglects the law of identity is simply unable to 
discipline its thoughts into representing possible objects and states of affairs in the world as 
we know it - it is simply dreaming or hallucinating - it could be necessary to understand the 
microcosmos by seeing one and the same object as a particle one moment and a wave the 
next. 
 So, what is the status of those `laws of logic'? Apparently, they are normative 
principles derived from our natural expectations, expectations which were and are adaptive, 
but which may sometimes hamper scientific thought if taken too absolutely. First, the 
principle of identity assures us that sheep will not suddenly change into wolves. What 
mattered to our ancestors was establishing the identities of the objects they encountered. In 
science, however, we may discover that the world is not simply a collection of objects with 
fixed identities. What we sometimes identify as waves, must sometimes be identified as 
particles. The principle of identity is a guiding principle that teaches us how to order and 
think the world in so far as it can be understood and imagined by the human mind at all. Its 
presupposition is that the world is to some extent ordered and, obviously, we need this 
presupposition to be able to think about the world and talk about it. 
 Second, the principle of non-contradiction and excluded middle reflect our 
expectation that wolves are dangerous or not, fruits poisonous or not, partners trustworthy 
or not and that this sentence is true or not. We continually have to decide where to go, what 
to eat and with whom to share and cooperate and what to accept as true. Of course, our 
predicates and their negations do not fit the real world enough to be always exactly mutually 
exclusive. Even if the world were fundamentally ambiguous, we would still need an 
unambiguous language to think and speak. Probably, thinking and speaking are possible and 
successful only, because labelling and predication is an effective way of creating an order 
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that at least reflects some aspects of its real structure or that at least reflects some constants 
in our interactions with it. At the level of the microcosmos many of our predicates start to 
appear inadequate, however, and that gives us a clue about their real nature. The principle of 
non-contradiction is neither purely ontological, nor purely logical. It tells us something 
about the conditions which have to be fulfilled by meaningful thoughts and utterances, 
thoughts and utterances that refer to the world. 
 Finally, the principle of sufficient reason reflects the conditions under which we are 
able to understand something. We are only able to understand a process by dissecting it into 
a series of causes and effects. Understanding thus sometimes comes close to being able to 
manipulate it. I have noted many synonyms of `understanding' which refer to hands 
(grasping, begreifen, begrijpen, comprendre). Noticing a cause enables you to produce the 
effect yourself at the moment that you wish. 
 The idea that these most fundamental `laws of logic' are extensions of innate 
expectations means nothing less than that we are born with a particular ontology. Normally, 
a child does not have to worry that its mother could turn into a witch at any moment or that 
her nice odor could stop signalling her protective presence. Actually, the child seems to be 
born with a lot of more specific expectations about both its mother and the natural world 
(Karmiloff-Smith, 1994), many of which seem to be justified by the structure of the world, 
some of which may lead to disillusionment in the long run. As I hope to show, without such 
expectations life would simply be impossible. 
 
b.We expect objects and other stable elements in our environment 
One of our innate expectations is the expectation that our environment is not in constant 
flux, indefatigable changing like Heraclitus' river which cannot be stepped into twice. We 
expect stable elements in our environment, things that one can grasp and that remain the 
same over time. D.T. Campbell has dubbed this the expectation of `entativity' (Cziko, 1995). 
As will be seen, without the expectation of `entativity' learning and language acquisition in 
particular would be impossible. Like Gorgias, the Heraclitean teacher of Plato, we would 
have to stay silent if we could not trust things to stay the same and we would not understand 
to what ontological categories our language teachers would be referring. Even more 
generally, we would be unable to learn anything if we could not connect a series of 
experiences with a particular object. Of course, even our bodies, especially our hands, are 
incarnations of the expectation of entativity. The success of the human hand proves that our 
expectation of a world in which at least some objects can be caught or grasped is at least 
partially true. 
 
 
 
 
 
c. We expect regularity and repetition 
The very structure and success of neural networks is based on the many regularities in 
nature. Conditioned reflexes, habituation and other elementary principles which underlie 
animal behavior would not be possible without them. Many animals are able to make 
unconscious calculations of probabilities and to apply an unconscious differential calculus, 
which is however based on completely different principles than the ones we learn in high 
school. 
  Animals in real-life situations cannot afford themselves the luxury of calculating 
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probabilities by thinking over all kinds of logical possibilities. They also cannot afford 
themselves the luxury of first experiencing all the possible situations they could come 
across. Their `calculations' are, therefore, often based on a mixture of innate values 
representing particular dangers (the fear of the dark, fear of heights, instinctive fear of 
certain predators and parasites, etc.) and possibilities (attractivity of certain landscapes or 
certain conspecifics), which are reinforced and corrected by experience. 
 Psychologists studying inferential processes have been surprised to find that most 
people in everyday life are unable to apply the normative principles and inferential tools 
characteristic of formal scientific inquiry. People often tend towards a skimmed `availability 
heuristic' (Tversky & Kahneman, 1973; Nisbett & Ross, 1980): that is, they make inferences 
on the basis of an initial sampling which is far too small. This is the same bias to which is 
referred in Samuel Johnson's dictum that the opinions that most men have about women tell 
us much more about the particular women in their lives (their friends and wives) and their 
relationship with these women than about women in general. People also tend to apply a 
distorted `representativeness heuristic' (Tversky & Kahneman, 1974; Nisbett & Ross, 1980): 
they expect objects that they encounter to be representative of the features presumed to be 
characteristic of a category or of the generating process that produced it. This heuristic 
accounts, for example, for the `gamblers' fallacy' which makes people expect `black' after a 
long run of `red' on a roulette wheel, despite the fact that the chances of black and red 
remain equal all the time. 
 From the perspective of evolutionary psychology such biases are not completely 
surprising. An Australopithecus does not need to report to some scientific forum how many 
leopards and sabertooths a particular part of the forest contains. It may be very helpful to 
him if he is very cautious in all places in which he ever found evidence of any of these 
predators and in all places which bear particular resemblance to them. Every clue may be 
useful and in a band of Australopithecines it would make sense if particular individuals 
were obsessive about their personal experiences, although these were not based on a random 
sample. 
 Also, it would not make much sense to be scientifically accurate with respect to the 
danger posed by various animals and situations. Even if leopards and sabertooths only pose 
a real danger if they are really hungry, it would make much sense to avoid the risk and to 
simplify one's view about predators. 
 All this demonstrates that natural selection is essentially an `inductive' process, 
essentially producing networks which are trained by way of induction. Deductive certainty 
is neither attainable, nor necessary. Our natural talent for induction is simply the only way 
of filtering out all kinds of regularities and patterns in nature that may be relevant to our 
survival. It seems to be based simply on the nature of neural networks in general which 
work by `generalizing' particular input patterns into partitions of synaptic weights1. 
 
 
 
 Does this mean that induction is also justified as a scientific way of collecting 
 
1Another, closely related, kind of inference to which the evolutionary process bears resemblence, is 
Peirce's abduction or `inference to the most likely cause/to the best explanation'. Abductive 
reasoning is characterized by postulating certain causal relationships where induction is 
characterized by postulating generalizations. Because abduction is as much opposed to deduction as 
induction, I will concentrate on induction here. 
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knowledge? Not automatically. Many kinds of knowledge can only be attained by induction, 
but this does not make induction unconditionally reliable. The way in which a child acquires 
language is also based on induction, but that does not mean that languages are not full of 
exceptions. In particular phases in which a child acquires language it makes characteristic 
and to some extent predictable mistakes based on premature conclusions with respect to 
regularities. Likewise, the world is full of regularities which make natural selection and 
induction such good strategies, but this does not mean that there are not a lot of patterns in 
nature which are irregular or purely coincidental. 
 Therefore, the tendency to make inductive inferences has always to be counter-
balanced by a readiness to notice and correct precipitated generalizations. In science the 
need to draw fast conclusions is not as urgent as in everyday life, and the need for reliability 
is inversely proportional. No wonder that scientists have every reason to be more cautious 
than lay people, despite the fact that induction is as indispensable to them as it is to 
everyone. As there is no way of establishing the optimal mixture of inductive enthusiasm 
and critical prudence, one would expect scientists to disagree about all kinds of inferences 
and this is exactly what one finds in almost all disciplines. 
 
d. We expect patterns and specific forms 
We have seen that connectionism can clarify the way in which neural networks can be 
trained to connect specific input patterns with specific output patterns. Neural networks can 
be partly trained as a result of variation and selection over many generations, and partly 
during one lifetime. Because genes can never completely predict the environment in which 
the organisms they are building will find themselves, it is to be expected that both will play 
a role. Recurrent connections could bias the learning process in such a way that it is prone to 
absorb one kind of information rather than another. Dependent on the precision with which 
such recurrent connections control the training process the behavior that subsequently arises 
may appear more or less `innate'. 
 In some cases recurrent connections have the effect of strictly predetermining the 
reaction to certain input patterns, making them completely `innate'. In other cases the input 
pattern seems not to be completely predetermined and individual or social learning may 
direct a particular behavior to a more specific input pattern. An ethologically oriented 
learning theorist, Milton Suboski, has christened the type of learning involved `releaser-
induced recognition learning' (Suboski, 1990, 1994) and has even tried to prove that this 
type of learning can explain many behavioral phenomena that cannot be explained by 
classical learning theories (instrumental and Pavlovian conditioning). This means that 
instead of a dichotomy of `innate' and `learned' we have a gradual transition from relatively 
rigid stimulus-response systems to systems in which the gap between input and output is 
widened as a result of specialized learning mechanisms. Such learning mechanisms should 
be seen as specific ways in which particular input- and output-variables can be adapted to 
specific circumstances. Instead of placing learning in opposition to heredity it should be 
seen as an inherited way of shaping a flexible part of the innate behavioral programme of an 
individual to unpredictable aspects of its environment. Let us explore a series of domains in 
which different degrees of behavioral and cognitive flexibility are adaptive. 
 
1. Recognition of predators and brood-parasites. 
Little flexibility is to be expected with respect to the recognition of predators and brood-
parasites who have posed a threat to a particular species over millennia. On the one hand 
there has been a strong selection pressure that could shape a recognition system for an 
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archetypical predator or brood-parasite, on the other hand flexibility with respect to such 
threats could be dangerous. As a result of that one can easily find several examples of 
`innate recognition' with respect to predators and brood parasites. Sheep seem to have an 
innate fear for wolves, many bird species seem to be suspicious of cuckoos and their eggs, 
and spider-hunting wasps become nervous in the vicinity of the cuckoo-wasp Cerophales. 
 As a result of the ability of many species to detect brood parasites a kind of 
evolutionary arms race will often arise in which both the instinctive detection mechanism of 
the prey species and the innocent appearance of the brood parasite are gradually refined. 
This may result in spectacular forms of mimicry as, for example, in the hover fly Volucella 
bombylans (not uncommon in the Netherlands) which comes in different varieties that all 
resemble specific species of humble-bees. This mimicry enables it to pass the guards of the 
bumble-bee colonies and to lay its eggs in their nests. (Similar mimicry can be found in a 
dozen species of ant-imitating beetles, wasps and beetles.) 
 Another example is offered by the cuckoo: different `races' or `gentes' of it have 
evolved the ability to lay eggs similar to those of their respective hosts. Most European 
birds with nests that are attainable for the cuckoo and that eat insects have already won their 
arms-race with it and will often recognize and remove the cuckoo's egg or an egg painted by 
an experimental ornithologist. Gentes of cuckoos that specialize in these species (e.g. the 
great reed warbler) have to lay very sophisticated imitations eggs to get them accepted. The 
cuckoo is continually forced to start parasitizing fresh `naive' species or to improve the 
similarity of its eggs to that of its host. At present cuckoos mostly parasitize meadow pipits, 
reed warblers, pied wagtails and dunnocks. Because Northern Europe was mostly covered 
with wood before Caesar's attempts to spread civilization and because dunnocks are not 
particularly common in woods, dunnocks seem to be the only species of host that did not 
evolve a discrimination of cuckoos' eggs. Dunnocks are still surprisingly naive with respect 
to cuckoos and will uncritically accept almost any egg which replaces one of their own 
(Davies & Brooke, 1991)2. 
 Recognition systems often have to be refined and supplemented by learning, as well. 
Again it was Tinbergen who designed a nice experiment which allowed him to study the 
range of a particular recognition system. In his Bird Life (1958a) he notes that many birds 
are particularly sensitive to the prototypical silhouette of birds of prey with a short head in 
front of the wings and a long tail behind. Tinbergen and one of his colleagues fastened a 
long wire between two trees above a lawn on which ducks, geese and chickens were kept. 
They tested their reactions on models with a variety of patterns, but the birds only started to 
alarm if the `head' was short and the `tail' long. When `head' and `tail' were reversed the 
model did not evoke a reaction: it would then resemble a duck with a long head and a short 
tail. This innate reaction sometimes proves to be imperfect, however, and in those cases it 
has to be corrected. Tinbergen noted, for example, that many birds initially start to alarm in 
the beginning of May if the swifts return, as a result of their resemblance to hobbies. Within 
a couple of days the birds have learned that swifts pose no threat and they stop alarming in 
reaction to them. 
 In many cases the recognition system is flexible enough to enable the organism to 
identify its own predators, either by individual or social learning. Lorenz discovered quite 
accidentally that jackdaws will learn to see as an enemy everybody that they see with a 
black object, similar to a black jackdaw, in its claws, hands or in its bill. One evening 
 
2On a trip to the U.S., I observed a young Brown-headed Cowbird being fed by a Chipping Sparrow. 
It would be interesting to know whether this brood parasite also has evolved into different `gentes'. 
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Lorenz returned, after bathing in the Donau, to his colony of tame jackdaws, and took his 
black swim suit out of his pocket. He was immediately attacked by a whole bunch of angry 
jackdaws and painful pecks hailed down on the hands which held his swim suit. Lorenz 
subsequently discovered that any black object, even a piece of black paper, will evoke the 
same reaction and that anything or anyone, even a jackdaw itself, who has been seen a 
couple of times with such a black object is attributed as an enemy for good and for all to all 
other jackdaws, who are informed via very infectious alarm calls (Lorenz, 1969: 45). 
 The social transmission of particular predator prototypes has been discovered in a 
wide range of species, including fish (Suboski, 1994), birds and primates. Such social 
learning need not be in opposition to innate prototype recognition, however. At the very 
least it presupposes an innate sensitivity to particular alarm signals, but it often also 
presupposes an innate recognition system which enables the warning individuals to expose 
specific predators in the first place (e.g. by observing them with a black `conspecific' in 
their possession). 
 Probably the best way to ensure that an organism learns to identify the many 
possible sources of danger in its environment is to equip it with a series of innate prototypes 
and to enable it to refine these by individual and social learning. Cheney and Seyfarth 
(1990) show how juvenile vervet monkeys gradually acquire knowledge of their 
environment on the basis of instinctive fears, coupled to social learning. Infants initially 
give `eagle alarm calls' in reaction to birds and other flying objects. The adults that are near 
to them only give a second alarm call if the flying object really poses a threat. As a result of 
this training the juveniles gradually refine their recognition system and learn to distinguish a 
whole range of flying objects, birds and birds of prey of which only two species are 
confirmed predators of vervets, martial and crowned eagles. 
 All this means that even an innate prototype recognition system can be adjusted to 
some extent by experience and learning. It is to be expected, however, that this flexibility 
declines to the extent that particular predators were a constant threat to one's ancestors. It 
would be interesting to know to what extent humans display relatively rigidly predetermined 
sensitivities to particular prototypical predators which have posed a continued danger to 
their ancestors. 
 According to E.O. Wilson (1996) the fear of snakes might be a good example. First, 
we share this innate fear with many primates, including guenons, vervet monkies, rhesus 
macaques and the living species that is most related to us, the chimpanzee. Even 
chimpanzees raised in laboratories that have never before seen snakes are very fearful about 
them. The only primates that are not fearful of snakes are the lemurs from Madagascar, 
where poisonous snakes do not occur (Lumsden & Wilson, 1981: 83). Second, in humans 
the fear of snakes follows the same developmental sequence as in chimpanzees. At an early 
age snakes have little or no impact, but later on children grow increasingly wary. As a result 
of reinforcement by experience and/or training it can then be suppressed or grow into a 
pathological state or anything between those two extremes. It is highly unlikely, however, 
that one will ever be completely indifferent to snakes. Even in those few countries where 
there are no snakes at all, like Ireland, the fear of snakes is preserved in a cultural way and 
serpents are used as symbols in art and literature. Experiments with rhesus macaques make 
it likely that the key stimuli which determine the reactions of the macaques to snakes relate 
to the snakes' sinuous limbless bodies, their ability to remain hidden and the undulation with 
which they move through the vegetation. 
 
2. Recognition of food types. 
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Food choice is a domain in which one may expect `innate' pre-specified pattern recognition 
to be much more flexible. Changes in the environment may sometimes force animals to 
change their diet. Of course, the relatively flexible species are best at adapting to new 
environments, as proved by house sparrows, starlings, rats, jackdaws, black-headed gulls 
and humans. It is in those species that we expect predetermined food recognition to be more 
based on direct nutrient-evaluation rather than on completely genetically-prespecified food 
prototypes. 
 Of course, even in species in which food choice is genetically preprogrammed, 
learning is still necessary. As is to be expected in species with an elaborate nervous system, 
innate releasers guide a learning process, rather than directly determine behavior. A chicken 
that has just hatched will start pecking at dark spots and will start imitating the pecking 
behavior of its mother (Suboski, 1994). The specific items that it will peck at are therefore 
partially innate (the innate `releasers' are spots, especially pecked at by conspecifics), 
partially acquired by learning: only some spots prove to be edible. It is this combination of 
an innate `releaser' and subsequent learning that led Suboski to his description of `releaser 
induced recognition learning'. 
 The phenomenon of warning-colors and mimicry allows us to study the ways in 
which birds recognize distasteful, poisonous or dangerous insects. Wasps, for example, have 
a clear yellow-black pattern which is apparently very easily associated with their venomous 
stings - most probably as a result of some kind of evolutionary programmed prototype. A 
great number of completely harmless insects has evolved that profits from this fear of 
yellow-black patterns by imitating it. Only in the Netherlands you can find a whole series of 
hover flies (Syrphus, Xantogramma, Heliophilus and especially Chrysotoxum), thick-headed 
flies (Conops), beetles (different species of Longhorn beetles, like Clytus and Plagionotus) 
and even butterflies (the Hornet clearwing, Sesia apiformis) that at least superficially 
resemble wasps. As a result of a kind of arms-race between insect-eating birds and wasp-
imitators, some of these imitations are not that superficial anymore, however. A 
Chrysotoxum hover fly flying restlessly through the shrubs looks very much like a wasp. 
(Similar arms-races as a result of mimicry can also be found in bee-imitating flies, beetles 
and butterflies.) 
 As has already been indicated, humans belong rather to the group of animals that 
directly assesses the value of particular food-items than those that rely on genetically-
predetermined food-prototypes. Obviously, our taste receptors predetermine to some extent 
our food choice. Our taste receptors are not autonomous, however, and their `evaluation' of 
food items varies as a result of proprioception. At the same time it is striking to what extent 
some of our meals reflect the quests and obsessions of our evolutionary past. If it is true that 
Australopithecus at some point in its history relied on roots and that early Homo 
increasingly turned to meat, the typically north European and American diner with its trinity 
of roots (potatoes), meat and vegetables simply reflects three stages of our evolutionary 
past. 
 
 
3. Imprinting and the individual recognition of conspecifics. 
Whereas one would expect recognition of the own species to be innate, because mating with 
non-conspecifics implies a waste of energy, one would expect the recognition of specific 
conspecifics (for example, parents and offspring) to be essentially a learning process, 
because the specific characteristics of those conspecifics cannot be genetically 
preprogrammed. A famous example is offered by the phenomenon of imprinting, which was 
discovered and demonstrated by Konrad Lorenz. Lorenz is famous for imprinting his own 
image into the minds of young goslings of the greylag goose (Anser anser). By being the 
first individual around at the moment that the geese he became the archetypical `Mother 
Goose' and the young goslings followed him everywhere. 
 The way in which the imprinting process works is often adapted to the specific 
circumstances of the species and again it should be noted that learning does not imply 
infinite flexibility. Mallard ducklings (Anas platyrhynchos) will only imprint on objects that 
make the appropriate duck-like noises and prefer yellow-green objects, while domestic 
chicks more readily follow blue or orange objects, and will even approach a flashing light. 
The dangers posed by a too-flexible system of imprinting can be manifold. Young corvids 
and parakeets that are imprinted onto humans - it is here that I remember one of my own 
pets, a jackdaw called Karel - will often direct their sexual behavior to humans, too. 
Sometimes they will try to mate with humans or try to drive their real partners away, 
sometimes they will court them by building nests for them. Lorenz tells us of a tame house 
sparrow that built a nest in the pocket of its beloved (Lorenz, 1969). 
 In many cases, wrong imprinting will lead to disasters at a much earlier age, 
however. A good example is offered by a domestic chick, Egbert, who hatched in a frying 
pan in the middle of the Syrian desert during British army tank maneuvers at the end of the 
second world war (Johnson & Morton, 1991). Egbert stole the heart of the soldiers and 
proved to be imprinted onto army boots, which he followed religiously. 
Egbert traveled several hundred miles in the tank and spent some happy 
days in the camp following army boots, but was finally - and tragically - 
crushed by the boots of the corporal during parade. Happily such tragedies 
do not happen often enough to have formed a selection pressure that 
designed chicks in such a way that they are instinctively wary of army 
boots. 
 Do humans display an equivalent of imprinting? A currently much-
discussed example of an innate sensitivity to particular patterns is face 
recognition (Johnson & Morton, 1991). This can be studied by presenting 
babies of different ages with face-like models in which eyes, eyebrows and 
mouth have sometimes been re-ordered (fig. 2-14a & b), and in which they 
have sometimes been replaced by black squares. At different ages children will react 
differently to these kind of stimuli. For example, newborns prefer face-like models over 
blank and `scrambled' models, but models in which the eyes and mouth are replaced by 
black squares still elicit a lot of curiosity at this age. Two month-old babies prefer realistic 
faces to those in which eyes and mouth are replaced by black squares. Strangely enough, 
one month-olds do not seem to prefer `scrambled' faces over normal ones and this could 
indicate that more than one mechanism is involved. 
 
Figure 2-15. 
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 Johnson and Morton draw parallels between the way 
chickens learn to recognize and follow their mothers and the 
way human children learn to recognize the faces of their 
parents. They postulate that in both species two separate 
mechanisms seem to be involved in the development of 
recognition of conspecifics: a device that directs their 
attention towards clusters of features possessed by 
conspecifics and a learning system engaged by objects to 
which the young individual attends. In humans the first 
device takes the form of a predisposition to pay attention to 
the characteristics of human faces which primarily seems to 
be mediated by subcortical structures. The second 
mechanism is concerned with imprinting and is supposed to 
work only if the cortex is already mature enough. It only starts working gradually during the 
months after birth. 
 
Fig. 2-16. Examples of stimuli 
presented to new-borns in 
various studies summarized in 
Johnson & Morton, 1991. 
 There are, of course, other candidates for innate `platonic, pure forms'. One that is 
closely related to face recognition concerns the criteria by which faces are judged. It seems 
that one can actually compose an `ideal face' for each sex and these ideal faces are not 
purely products of culture (instead, they betray fertility and fitness; Etcoff, 1999). One could 
also mention the Euclidean idea of a straight line as the shortest connection between two 
points. As has already been shown, there are specialized cells in the visual cortex firing 
exclusively in reaction to lines with particular characteristics and these cells could be the 
innate basis for our preference for Euclidean geometry. 
 
4. Abstraction, generalization and taxophily 
Given the almost universal necessity to recognize conspecifics, predators, brood-parasites, 
dangerous situations and poisonous food, it is not surprising that complex pattern-
recognition evolved in a series of species. It is easy to see that a general tendency to abstract 
and induce on the basis of limited experience could be adaptive as well. Of course, any 
tendency to abstract and generalize may also lead to error. A group of ducks flying from a 
bird-watcher with a telescope, may be wrong in thinking telescopes and shot-guns to be the 
same thing, but will probably fare well with its simplicity. This adaptive value of abstraction 
and generalization could well underlay the almost universal human tendency to think in 
stereotypes and to entertain all kinds of prejudices. 
 In the past much stress has been laid on inferential reasoning as the source of 
scientific knowledge. It was Lorenz who pointed in his essay Gestaltwahrnehmung als 
Quelle Wissenschaftlicher Erkenntnis ([1959] 1983) to the role of pattern recognition. 
Recently, Roger Masters has identified three modes of knowing which have traditionally 
been viewed as mutually exclusive - intuition, verification and pattern matching, which are 
based on the limbic system, left and right hemisphere respectively - and claimed that 
pattern-matching is the most fundamental and general of them. "Pattern matching and 
holistic assessment of form characterizes the functions of the right hemisphere and, more 
broadly, the global integration of the brain's parallel processing of multiple cues in the 
environment" (Masters, 1993: 64). Indeed, given the results of both modern neuroscience 
and the philosophy of science, it is no longer possible to deny the fundamental role of 
pattern matching in knowledge (Churchland, 1989). The idea of an absolute foundation of 
all knowledge in a deductive system based on propositions should perhaps be seen as an 
exaggeration of the role of the left hemisphere in cognition. Apparently, our talents for 
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science did not start with the origin of language and with its possibility of revealing, 
explicating and improving trains of thought. 
 Indeed, part of our enormous taxophily, our tendency to classify and identify all 
kinds of species, can be explained by our descent from tropical apes which have to know 
enormous numbers of plants and animals. We should not forget that even chimpanzees have 
to know a lot about plants and have to know exactly when certain fruit-trees will be ripe. 
Also the medical use of plants, both in the zoo (the Apenheul at Apeldoorn, the 
Netherlands) and in the wild has been documented. Probably the platonic doctrine of eternal 
ideas had not existed if it wouldn't have been necessary to recognize so many species - this, 
however, shows that Plato was not completely wrong. As Darwin saw, our pre-existential 
vision of those ideas took place when we were still only monkeys and apes. 
 
e.We expect causal connections between successive events in nature 
Hume and Nietzsche knew that we interpret continually linked events as necessarily 
connected. Hume still believed that this `instinct' corresponds to the real structure of nature, 
although he was unable to give a foundation for this belief (Hume [1848] 19703). Nietzsche 
believed that our `Ursachen-Trieb' implies a perspectivistic misrepresentation which allows 
us to control nature - although he remains at the same time a very strict determinist in his 
justification of his belief in an eternal return (Ewige Wiederkehr, e.g. Nietzsche [1940] 
1977). Both authors were unable to be consistent skeptics on the basis of their 
psychologistic analysis of causal knowledge and preferred, in the final analysis, the 
`doctrine of necessity' (Hume's formulation) over epistemological consistency. Thus the 
belief in universal causality poses a dilemma for critical epistemologists: on the one hand 
one always observes only a succession of events, never their causal connection - on the 
other hand, not even a madman can do without a belief in causality. 
 Nietzsche's attempt to be skeptical about causality is very instructive with respect to 
the consequences of such skepticism. In the end, such a skepticism would lead us to distrust 
even our own causal influence on the world. The world would become a succession of 
disconnected phantoms and understanding would become impossible. However, our ability 
to design tools for particular interferences in natural processes shows that our causal insight 
works very well. Would it not be unreasonable to prefer a theory which is unable to explain 
our enormous success in influencing and controlling natural processes over a theory that not 
only explains this success, but the connection between the rest of our experiences as well? 
 As shown in chapter 1, it is not only humans who are tool users. Tool use is 
widespread among the animal kingdom. Sand wasps close their nest holes with pebbles, 
woodpeckers use a crack in the bark of a tree as a vice-bench for fir cones and chimpanzees 
will carefully choose the right blade of grass to `fish' for ants. Some species, including the 
green-backed heron, even adapt their tools to their specific tasks. Of course, not all kinds of 
tool use prove real causal insight. The psychologist Visalberghi has explored the 
relationship between tool use and causal insight in capuchin monkeys (Visalberghi & 
 
3Here, ..., is a kind of pre-established harmony between the course of nature and the succession of 
our ideas ... 
As nature has taught us the use of our limbs, without giving us the knowledge of the muscles and 
nerves, by which they are actuated; so has she implanted in us an instinct, which carries forward the 
thought in a corresponding course to that which she has established among external objects; though 
we are ignorant of those powers and forces, on which this regular course and succession of objects 
totally depends. Hume [1748] 1970, V, 345-346. 
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Limongelli, 1994). She shows that the inventive ways in which the capuchin monkeys use 
tools for solving problems in the laboratory are not a result of insight, but simply of trial and 
error. Tool use by chimpanzees seems to be much more based on insight (Byrne, 1995). In 
some cases, chimpanzees will design tools for specific tasks and in many cases they will 
adapt their tools for particular tasks before they start working with them. Tool use by 
elephants and dolphins also seems to be the result of real causal insight. At least, dolphins 
know how to use their conspecifics as `social tools' which may assist in the attainment of 
specific goals, e.g. the abduction of females (Conner et al., 1992). 
 What distinguishes `real causal insight' from the simple use of causal laws? Perhaps 
Premack's distinction between natural and arbitrary causes is important here (Premack, 
1996). According to Premack, most animals can learn about `arbitrary causal relationships' 
simply as a result of learning by classical or instrumental conditioning. `Causal reasoning' is 
to some extent independent of direct observation and is based on the understanding that 
some events are necessary conditions for other events. The belief that such events simply 
require a causal explanation belongs to the very essence of causal reasoning. 
 
 Reasoning depends on a disposition to seek the causal origins of 
`unexplained' events. An individual who encounters a conspecific in a 
deflected state, highly positive or highly negative - will reason - or has the 
possibility of reasoning, only in so far as he is disposed to ask why is he 
deflected? What caused him to be in this state? Above all else, reasoning 
depends on recognizing the `unexplained' event, and being disposed to seek 
its causal origin. (Premack, 1996: 295-6). 
 
According to Premack, among non-human species only chimpanzees display the ability to 
reason. Certainly, Frans de Waal had already noted in his Chimpanzee Politics (1981: 183, 
187-190) that chimpanzees are able to think through a whole series of future consequences 
of their actions. Premack proposes that the ability to reason "may require a mind that can 
make copies of its own circuits". "Copies of circuits are not tied, as are the original circuits, 
to a fixed set of responses, and they may therefore allow for greater novelty and flexibility" 
(id.: 297). This flexibility can then be used, among other things, for postulating causes or 
speculating about consequences. 
 If this were true, causal understanding would require some form of self-awareness or 
at least a `distance to one-self'. On a simpler level, however, some causal understanding 
could already be based on an improved model or internal simulation of the external world. 
Many animals need to predict the behavior of objects and animals and the simple hypothesis 
that events have causes could help a lot in making the world predictable. A vervet monkey 
that hears a `snake alarm call' will start looking around on the ground to look for a snake: 
this is already `looking for a cause' (Cheney & Seyfarth, 1990). Closer to home one can test 
the intelligence of a cat by imitating a bird or mouse: often the cat will look surprised and 
sometimes it will even look around as if looking for a possible source of the noise. A cat 
that recognizes someone's voice on the answering machine will also look surprised and start 
look around as if looking for the person in question. 
 Thus, it seems to me that the distinction between `arbitrary' and `natural' causality 
(or, between an accidental and a necessary succession of events) can be made by animals 
without clear signs of self-awareness. More than self-awareness, a property like  
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imagination is required, because such an internal simulation of an external series of events 
could enable the animal to `fill in' parts of the series that are invisible, like a supposed 
`cause' or future consequences. Clearly, a squirrel which is jumping from branch to branch 
at enormous speed already needs such an internal simulation of what is likely to happen if it 
jumps to a particular branch: simply, to predict whether that branch is strong enough or not 
(at least some awareness of the self is presupposed in this prediction, too). A pride of 
lionesses that is trapping a prey animal should be able to predict to some extent what will 
happen at the moment the prey discovers one of them. 
 All in all, the `hypothesis of universal necessity' might well form a part of the neural 
networks of a large number of animal species. Its indispensability is probably increasing as 
animals become more like agents which actively change the world around them. Of course, 
tool use is the summit of the tendency to change the world in a specific, goal-directed way 
and therefore it is no accident that causal thinking is a human universal. To some extent 
understanding can even be said to be identical to the knowledge of the specific causes of a 
process, `underlying' it - the knowledge that one needs to manipulate the process. 
 As several proponents of evolutionary epistemology have independently remarked, 
the fact that our causal interpretations of the world are adaptive does not mean that they are 
necessarily adequate. Some evolutionary epistemologists - e.g. Riedl and Vollmer - even 
consider the indeterministic interpretation of quantum mechanics to be right and use 
evolutionary epistemology as an explanation of our stubborn determinism. Lorenz has tried 
to give an independent `justification' of our belief in causality by pointing to the law of the 
preservation of energy. 
 However, the fact that evolutionary epistemology is unable to prove the adequacy of 
causal thinking does not prove its inadequacy either. Certainly, the way in which we 
sometimes have to chip an ongoing process into pieces may be an artificial by-product of 
our causal thinking, which is too narrowly focused on linear causal chains. This linear 
causal thinking seems to be particularly inappropriate in the analysis of complex wholes. 
The fact that we have difficulty understanding quantum mechanics does not in the first place 
result from a dogmatic determinism, but does result from a dogmatic belief in `Einstein 
separability', the belief that objects that have been separated can only have causal influence 
on each other with a speed slower than or identical to the speed of light (d'Espagnat, 1979). 
It is clear that in the realm of quantum effects our innate expectations somehow delude us 
and stand in the way of a true understanding. If this lack of understanding were to correlate 
with Planck's constant it would, however, be very small indeed. Perhaps the size of our lack 
of understanding is more appropriately measured by adding up all those instances in which 
we claim to understand a process while we are taking the fact of its obedience to universal 
causal principles for granted. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
f.We look for useful objects and purpose 
As the experiments by Köhler and many observations in the wild (especially in West Africa) 
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have shown, chimpanzees both display insight in causal chains and the ability to devise 
technical solutions to problems. The advantage of technology exceeds the advantages of 
learning on which it is based: whereas learning enables an animal to adapt its instincts and 
behavior to particular circumstances, technology enables it to adapt even its organs to those 
circumstances and may even enable it to adjust its environment to its instincts and desires. 
The discovery of technology thus represents a major step in the liberation of the animal 
from the dictates of its immediate surroundings and the limits of its natural bodily 
equipment. No wonder that humans fancy themselves as beings which transcend nature. 
Technology did not arise at one go, however, nor does it allow us to change some of our 
most fundamental motives. 
 As we have seen, animals including woodpecker finches, green-backed herons and 
sea otters use various devices as substitutes for organs they lack for the attainment of their 
food sources. Elephants, dolphins, chimpanzees and orang-utangs seem to be very creative 
in finding the right tools for particular jobs. This not only presupposes some causal insight, 
but it seems to presuppose some imagination as well. A chimpanzee which is looking for a 
stone and an anvil for hammering some nuts that it has just found has to create an imaginary 
searching image, based on a virtual performance of its task. It has to know exactly what it is 
looking for. Of course, this searching image may be partly based on trial and error. By 
imagining how a particular tool might be used in function of a particular goal, this learning 
by trial and error can be speeded up many times, however, and this seems to explain the 
ease with which some of these animals devise new tools. 
 Certainly, our ancestors at some time needed this imagination and thinking in terms 
of purposes to devise their tools. Paranthropus (the robust Australopithecines) may have 
needed wooden tools to dig for roots and the earliest members of the genus Homo - Homo 
habilis or Homo ergaster - probably needed their stone tools for butchering carcasses and to 
open bones to eat the marrow inside. At some later stage tools were increasingly used as 
weapons and the endless arms races started, which seem to have characterized the latest 
stages of human evolution. All this presupposes not only handy hands, preferably with 
opposed thumbs, but certain cognitive abilities as well: an ability to look forward and to 
plan, to postpone the immediate satisfaction of desires, and an ability to make internal 
simulations of the functioning of particular designs. 
 To some extent one would not expect a tool-making animal to be a cognitive 
`generalist'. Even an ecologically flexible toolmaker like man has to be specialized in 
thinking in terms of efficiency and means-ends relationships. Perhaps this innate tendency 
to look for useful objects is the reason that some philosophers would like to impute 
purposefulness to the whole evolutionary process or even `design' to the whole universe. 
There is no reason to expect more `purpose' in living things, however, than that which arises 
as a result of the continual extinction of DNA which does not subscribe to DNA's universal 
`purpose', `more DNA' (Wilson, 1975) and as a result of the ongoing snowball of purposeful 
DNA. In the same way it is simply a superfluous hypothesis to postulate `design' apart from 
that which results from the inherent properties of matter and the creative and polishing work 
of natural selection. 
 
g.We look for `meaning' 
We have already seen that the information that an animal receives about its body and its 
surroundings is `colored' by certain innate values. The more information an animal has to 
process, the more values it needs to weigh this information in order to come to adaptive  
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choices. These values are part of an innate system of evaluation that reacts to all kinds of 
proprioceptive signals and that changes in reaction to internal physiological and 
psychological conditions, the whole system ultimately designed by natural selection. 
 The human cognitive apparatus, too, selects information on the basis of innate values 
and assigns values, in the form of emotions, to almost all information that it receives. Many 
philosophers and anthropologists have concluded from the fact that we are a very flexible 
species that we are able to acquire almost any habit and that we are able to learn to 
appreciate almost any kind of food or environment. Flexibility is not the same as looseness, 
however, just as freedom does not mean arbitrariness. Our innate (`primary') system of 
values guarantees that all lifestyles with which we experiment are judged on their 
appropriateness with respect to a series of innate needs and expectations. To the extent that 
we lose contact with these deep-felt needs and expectations we will feel alienated and 
unfulfilled. As a result we will end up with a kind of `second nature' that fits to some extent 
both our primary nature and the environment in which we have to live - or that at least 
represents the best attainable compromise. 
 The fact that humans live in a culture means, among other things, that we do not 
have to start from scratch with this process each generation, but that we inherit by way of 
social learning a lot of habits and practices - indeed a whole system of `secondary' or 
acquired values - that have proved to be useful in a particular environment. Often this kind 
of cultural wisdom is given authority by means of a particular world view which presents 
itself as a revelation of life's ultimate meaning. Indeed, such world views enable most 
individuals to find a personal way of living which is particularly suited to that environment 
and it is no wonder, therefore, that these individuals tend to equate their culturally inherited 
world view - and their specific culturally acquired or `secondary' (Pugh, 1978) values - with 
the `meaning of life'. 
 Ultimately, however, it is not to be expected that there can ever be a complete 
correspondence between any primary and secondary system of values. The simple reason is 
that environments tend to change and interests tend to be incompatible. Secondary or 
culturally acquired values only reflect strategies that were successful in the past and may 
also reflect only the interests of a limited group of people. Therefore, no individual can rely 
on culturally acquired knowledge about the `meaning of life' and to some extent each 
individual has to discover its own favorite `life style' for itself via a trial and error process 
guided by innate evaluations like alienation, boredom and fulfillment. The experience of 
fulfillment and `meaning' should therefore be ultimately interpreted as a biological signal 
that tells us that we are `on the right track' and that our current lifestyle is in accordance 
with some deep felt, biological needs (Slurink, 1994). 
 Ultimately, of course, even our primary system of values and conative expectations 
is a fallible guide. It is a product of variation and selection in a particular set of 
environments. If the primary systems of value were to be adaptive all the time, this would 
be more an argument for Providence than for evolution. The same can be said about our 
evolved cognitive expectations generally. If these expectations had been true all the time, 
they would not have been products of natural selection. They may tell us something about 
the environment in which our ancestors evolved - what Bowlby calls the `environment of 
evolutionary adaptedness' (Bowlby, 1969) - but they do not necessarily tell us something 
about the universe in general. 
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5.THE SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION OF REALITY 
We are social animals and the acquisition of knowledge is a social enterprise. 
Thus far I have only discussed what Bacon called the `idols of the tribe', arising from the 
nature of human understanding - the list of idols or false images which Bacon composed 
also includes `idols of the cave' - personal idiosyncrasies -, `idols of the market-place', 
resulting from the deception of words, and `idols of the theatre', resulting from the power of 
received philosophical systems (Hesse, 1964). In contrast to Bacon I hope to have shown 
that the `idols of the tribe' are not merely handicaps which impede the growth of knowledge, 
but that they constitute above all an indispensable frame-work of working hypotheses which 
enables us to start collecting knowledge in the first place. 
 Does this same ambivalence hold for the `idols of the market-place' and for the 
`idols of the theatre'? A large group of modern philosophers takes a much more radical 
view. Laughing at Bacon's (and the logical positivists') inductivism and about rationalistic 
attempts to justify knowledge with reference to the sound methodologies of reason, these 
thinkers have embraced the discoveries of a series of sociologists of knowledge with respect 
to the `social construction of reality' (Berger & Luckman, 1966) - and they often take them 
to the very heart of their philosophies (e.g. Bloor, 1976). If some of these `social 
constructivists' are right, scientific theories are purely products of social negotiation and the 
acceptance of particular theories reflects the social dominance of their supporters rather than 
a set of inherent qualities which guarantee at least some progress in the direction of truth. 
With respect to naturalism and Darwinism such thinkers will sometimes claim that these can 
better be viewed as theoretical by-products of the currently dominant ideology of neo-
liberalism and neo-capitalism than that they reflect break-throughs in our self-understanding 
and our understanding of the nature of life and the world. 
 Does the `social construction of reality' mean that we are locked up in socially 
created phantasmagoria and that we can never transcend the equation of social agreement 
and truth? Perhaps, but if this were true it would be a paradox at the same time: the truth of 
radical social constructivism would be itself `merely' socially determined. Can evolutionary 
epistemology help the social constructivist to step out this circle? 
 First, let me stress that evolutionary epistemology simply has to fall in with social 
constructivism on many points. We are social primates that have become completely 
dependent on social learning and the social transmission of information (King, 1994). 
Although some animals are individual learners and to some extent survey their habitats as 
individuals, unable to transmit their acquired maps of their environment and other 
knowledge to conspecifics, science as we know it is fundamentally based on language and 
on the social transmission of ideas based upon it. If each individual had to start from 
scratch, its knowledge of its environment would come no further than those mythological 
children raised by wolves - and even those children were helped by rather intelligent, 
cooperative group hunters with an extensive knowledge of their environment. 
 At the same time, it is clearly true that many ideas owe their success largely to social 
factors. To be successful or popular an idea has to be, for example, easy to understand, 
applicable to many situations (especially enlightening with respect to the current 
socioeconomic and political situation), status-enhancing (e.g. as a result of the high status of 
its originator), not too deviating, stimulating (or at least somehow reassuring), in agreement 
with the perceived interests and aspirations of the generation of its supporters (compare the 
advantages of political correctness) and sufficiently vague to allow for hermeneutical and 
ideological maneuvering within a wide range of personal and political situations. In many 
cases people have good strategic reasons to be in favor of a particular idea. Scientists do not 
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form an exception to this rule - on the contrary: they often have to choose between one or 
two, at best three, competing schools to be eligible for financial support. 
 All this cannot mean, however, that what we perceive as reality is entirely a social 
construct. If the truth of social constructivism itself were merely another social construct it 
would not deserve more serious consideration than other social constructs, like, for 
example, astrology, scientology or the belief that the aliens are already among us. To 
compete with other social constructs social constructivism has to give better explanations, 
better predictions and to show that it is compatible with more scientific theories than other 
theories of science. One of the social constructivists has even made this demand for 
`reflectivity' explicit (Bloor, 1976; Luyten, 1995). Social constructivism cannot, therefore, 
merely dogmatically state that theories are social constructs, it should also explain why such 
social constructs emerge and why they are needed in the first place. Like any theory of 
science it should attempt to defend its anthropological assumptions and it should show why 
its implicit anthropology is better than that of other models. 
 In Berger and Luckman's The Social Construction of Reality precisely this has been 
done. They try to give their social constructivism a foundation by explaining why man 
needs a socially constructed model of the world: 
 
 Man, unlike the other higher mammals, ... has no species-specific 
environment... There is no man-world in the sense that one may speak of a 
dog-world or a horse-world. (Berger & Luckman, 1966: 45). 
 
They even go so far as to claim that 
 
 Social order is not biologically given or derived from any biological data in 
its empirical manifestations... it is an ongoing human production... Social 
order exists only as a product of human activity. (Op. cit.). 
 
Thus their social constructivism seems to be based on an opposition between `social' and 
`human' on the one side and `biological' on the other side, as if animal societies do not exists 
and as if humans are not products of biological evolution. If this were the case, however, 
one would have to explain how such parabiological creatures could have evolved in the first 
place and why they would need a social order. Would they not be better off without a social 
order, making their hypotheses all for themselves without competition from other 
hypotheses? Why would a being with such `highly unspecialized and undirected drives' (op 
cit.) not live for itself and why would it bother, if it were really indifferent to social status, 
to get its theories accepted? 
 The problem with social constructivism is that it is not completely untrue, but not 
truly complete either. It has at least to be completed by something like the `social 
psychology of science' (Campbell, 1988; Shadisch & Fuller, 1994). What factors cause one 
theory to be accepted and another theory to be rejected? What motivates the proponents of a 
theory and what its opponents? Why would science, just like religion, need `central' and 
`peripheral cults' (Lewis, 1971) and why do major scientific revolutions (say, those 
instigated by Copernicus or Darwin) take at least three generations? Why do some scientists 
prefer revolutionary new paradigms while others tend to cling to traditional models, even if 
they show many anomalies (Sulloway, 1996)? Why would the scientific community be so 
hierarchical and why would it need so much rites de passage? Why would the success of 
scientific theories depend so much on the specific talents and charisma of its dominant 
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proponents and their ability to found a `school' for themselves (Campbell, 1988). Why 
would there be a tendency to develop esoteric vocabularies, even if these obscure matters 
more than they enlighten them? 
 For someone familiar with modern ethology it is difficult to resist the temptation to 
notice all kinds of parallels between the territory fights of animals and those of scientists 
defending their specific specialism. Such parallels may be suggested by phylogenetic 
affinity - which reminds us of the group territories, coalitions and traditions of chimpanzees 
- but they may also be based on the convergent evolution of species that have to defend 
some kind of territory - be it a spiritual or virtual one - or that have to display their feathers - 
their expertise - at some kind of communal arena or lek to assert their rank. The moment 
one starts to speculate about the psycho-evolutionary and ecological constraints which have 
given rise to this strange segment of modern society, the `scientific community', it becomes 
harder and harder to remain a social constructivist, however. The deeper one starts to reflect 
on science and its origin, the more one has to dive into primate evolution and the evolution 
of `social information transfer' (King, 1994) and the more one is forced to take the survival 
value of information and its transmission seriously. Thus one is forced to give an answer to 
a question that the social constructivists simply seem to neglect - why would science arise in 
the first place? 
 With this question the inadequacy of a simple relativism becomes apparent, too. If 
one assumes that one's hypothesis about the causal determinants of science is better than 
others, one has to assume at the same time that scientific hypotheses not only owe their 
differential success to the psychological and social weapons of their proponents, but that 
they also display differential ontological adequacy. What we perceive as `truth' may be 
determined by elaborate intellectual negotiations, but these negotiations might at the same 
time function as a decision process in which complex and contradictory evidence is weighed 
in such a way that at least some progress is made. The factors that determine the social 
acceptance and success of a particular theory need not be completely different from factors 
that may guarantee some degree of ontological adequacy. To suggest that only the `social 
factors' matter to the success of a scientific theory, is to underestimate the creativity, 
curiosity and critical abilities of at least some of the individuals that constitute the scientific 
community. At the same time it implies that one ignores the irreplaceable value of 
knowledge and orientation to animals in general and humans in particular. The fact that 
some scientists pretend to have knowledge and that their charisma and rhetoric virtuosity 
may attract a snowball of supporters, means only that there is a lot of deception and 
snobbery going on in the knowledge market - as in almost every market. 
  To show the differences and the correspondences between the causes of the 
popularity of a theory and the factors that may increase its likelihood of being true, one can 
make a table in which the various factors are listed (see table 2-1). Of course, one may differ 
in opinion with respect to some of the factors listed, but at least this table shows that the 
ease with which social constructivists uncouple success and truth is not justified. The gap 
between the causes of success and the ontological adequacy of a theory explains the 
necessity of a good set of scientific norms, which have to be based on a knowledge of the 
strong and weak points of the human knowledge apparatus and the scientific decision 
process. It is not unreasonable that those norms are sometimes distilled from those 
characteristics of theories that both promote their social acceptance and their likelihood to 
be true (marked with an asterisk). This should not tempt us, however, to forget the tension 
between the acceptance and the potential adequacy of theories. Many theories are true 
despite their lack of popularity - a fact which, perhaps, social constructivism should try to 
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explain. 
 
Ontological adequacy of a theory. 
Is there a 
conflict? 
 Factors that may 
be responsible 
for 
Social success and acceptance of a 
theory.  
Simplicity Yes, people like theories that they can 
easily understand. 
Yes, theories which are too complex 
often contain superfluous theoretical 
entities. 
Not 
always 
Coherence No, people often do not notice 
incoherences. 
Yes, if incoherent theories were 
ontologically adequate, science 
would be impossible. 
Yes 
Conceptual 
clarity 
No, people prefer theories that are 
sufficiently vague to allow for 
hermeneutical and ideological 
maneuvering within a wide range of 
personal and political situations. 
Yes, theories in which concepts are 
unclear may suggest that they offer 
more insight than they really do. 
Yes 
Verifiability Yes, in the long run people will be 
impressed by the evidence. 
Yes, whatever verification means, a 
theory without it is just a thought. 
No* 
Predictive power Yes, in the long run people will be 
impressed by the utility of the theory. 
Yes, despite the claims of the 
instrumentalists, the predictive 
power of a theory is seldomly a 
coincidence. 
No* 
Explanatory 
power 
Yes, people are interested in theories that 
throw light on their current 
socioeconomic and political situation.  
Yes, the more a theory explains, the 
more it becomes improbable that this 
is just a coincidence. 
No* 
Robustness or 
multiple 
derivability 
(Wimsatt, 1981) 
Yes, people are generally better at 
assessing the robustness of a hypothesis, 
than they are in following complex 
deductive arguments. 
Yes, if a theory is independently 
confirmed in different fields, it 
becomes improbable that this is just 
a coincidence. 
No* 
Intuitive 
plausibility 
Yes, this is often one of the reasons that 
people disagree with scientific theories. 
No, many scientific theories are 
contra-intuitive. 
Yes 
Stimulating 
power 
Yes, people prefer theories that give them 
hope and that assert their values. 
No, optimistic people are often bad 
realists. 
Yes 
Snob value Yes, people like theories which make 
them look relatively intellectual and 
sophisticated (which enhance their 
status). 
No, theories which look 
intellectually sophisticated are often 
simply based on an exaggeration of 
one aspect about which ordinary 
people are naive.  
Yes 
Conformistic 
appeal 
Yes, as judging the evidence oneself is 
difficult, one can sometimes better rely 
on the choice of others or on supposed 
authorities. 
Yes No, the fact that millions believe 
something or that a famous scientist 
or philosopher believes it, does not 
make it true. 
Conclusion Although the social success and acceptance of theories is partly based on factors that have 
nothing to do with the likelihood of their ontological adequacy, there are also factors that both 
promote the success and acceptance of a theory and its likelihood of ontological adequacy 
(marked with an asterisk). 
 
Table 2.1 Theoretical virtues that may be responsible for the social success and/or 
ontological adequacy of theories. 
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 One additional way of clarifying the thinking error of the radical social 
constructivists is by reflecting further on the parallel between theories and social displays. 
From the perspective of modern evolutionary psychology (part II of this book) one could 
compare the eagerness of young scientists and philosophers to present their new discoveries 
and theories as an attempt to win social recognition and status. One could even compare 
their articles, books and lectures to the bluff displays of chimpanzees by which these 
relatives of ours try to gain dominance (e.g. de Waal, 1981) or to the displays of feathers by 
male peacocks. Such a comparison is consistent with data that show that human males start 
to talk more about work and academic subjects in mixed groups (groups of both sexes), 
which brought Dunbar to the idea of talking about `vocal leks' (Dunbar, 1996). Often 
relatively successful scientists and philosophers are willing to admit in private that they owe 
part of their success to bluff and window-dressing, so this interpretation is not entirely in 
conflict with the phenomenological evidence. 
 Does this justify the conclusion, however, that the success of particular theories and 
their proponents is merely the result of bluff and window-dressing? As a result of the 
ethological analogy we can gain the critical distance required to answer such questions by 
watching and studying peacocks and chimpanzees more closely. Is their success merely 
determined by the attempt to impress rivals and females or are there more factors involved? 
In the case of peacocks and chimpanzees it is immediately obvious that displays, in order to 
be successful, have to be difficult to imitate. Only a healthy peacock can grow a train with 
many `eyes' and females consequently choose males with most `eyes' in their trains (Petrie, 
1994). For a not-too-healthy male it is simply not possible to fake a train with a lot of `eyes'. 
In chimpanzees the situation is slightly more complex. Most bluff displays are hard to 
imitate, because they presuppose a lot of agility, daring, command and force. Some 
chimpanzees seem to be intelligent enough to know that it is the impression that they leave 
on others that counts (as will be seen in chapter 4, sociobiologist even suspect that self-
consciousness arose as an ability to anticipate one's social impact). Jane Goodall tells us in 
one of her early books how the chimpanzee Mike used empty petrol cans in his bluff 
displays. By slamming them together and even by flinging them away, Mike succeeded in 
making so much noise that he won the respect of several important males and even 
conquered the dominant male at that time, Goliath (Van Lawick-Goodall, 1971: chapter 10). 
Even in such cases, however, such displays are hard to imitate. It would only be naive to 
assume that they reflect force, command and agility only - a lot of ingenuity, daring and 
`pure bluff' is also needed. 
 The analogy with the behavior of scientists and philosophers bears fruit now. Of 
course, such intellectuals defend their theoretical positions partly because they are building 
their careers on them. They will display their expertise at any place - their `vocal leks' may 
include coffee-tables, seminars, conferences and scientific journals - and they will do so 
especially when other intellectuals start to invade `their' intellectual territory. At the same 
time, however, their anxiety to find support for their `position' forces them to consider 
enormous collections of data. Their continual fights with other intellectuals force them to 
localize the strongest deductive links between those data. Their intellectual fighting power 
is, therefore, at least partly based on factors that also increase the likelihood of the truth of 
their theories. In most disciplines - philosophy and the humanities sometimes offer 
interesting exceptions - a recourse to pure rhetoric and a reference to authorities and dogmas 
will be seen through by their colleagues. As a result, it pays to look to the facts and 
arguments sincerely: the truth is simply the best weapon. Thus the individual curiosity that a 
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scientist drives and his public need for support may reinforce each other, despite the all too 
real temptation of resorting to rhetoric, window-dressing and even fraud. In a situation in 
which all parties concerned are committed to the truth, collective scientific progress is 
possible, even if science is partly driven by the private interests of a multitude of scientists. 
In fact, scientific progress is largely propelled by arm-races between scientists, scientific 
teams and scientific communities which have to prove their superiority by being the first to 
unearth bones of dinosaurs  or hominids, to reveal particular molecular structures, to 
synthesize new chemical compounds, to clone mice, to place astronauts on the moon and on 
Mars or to create new resistant crops. If such exploits are displays of ingenuity and power, 
at least part of their appeal lies in the fact that they are hard to imitate: in that respect they 
represent much more than `pure bluff' and window-dressing. 
 
6. PRELINGUISTIC THOUGHT, LANGUAGE AND THE TENDENCY TO 
TRANSCEND EXPERIENCE 
As a result of its constructive and `hypothetical' character, language enables us to 
transcend the horizon of our immediate experience and to train our imagination. As a 
result, we live in a world of fantasies and theories. 
a.Is the systematism of natural language ontologically arbitrary? 
Contrary to what was formerly often thought, the sounds of many animals not only express 
states of mind, but also refer to real structures of the world, for example to specific classes 
of predators (e.g. Cheney & Seyfarth, 1990; chapter 6). Many solitary animals without 
language have the same underlying capacity to discriminate different types of dangers and 
possibilities. Connectionism shows how prototypes might originate in neural networks 
which have been designed to connect particular input patterns to specific behavioral outputs, 
without the intervention of explicit language (Churchland, 1989, 1995). It is, therefore, 
reasonable to assume that language and thinking have evolved partly independently, 
language already presupposing some kind of `mentalese' (Fodor) and particularly evolving 
in extremely social animals which have to share information about the world. 
 Because many substantives seem to refer to specific classes of objects or `natural 
kinds', it is tempting to assume that the structure of language somehow reflects the structure 
of the real world. However, the idea that language evolved as a system of reference which 
had to map the world on a scale of one to one ignores the fact that a `translation into another 
medium' always results in transformations (chapter 6). The medium, in this case the mind, 
does not passively reflect but actively reconstructs the world in function of particular 
behavioral goals. On top of that, according to one recent theory, language did not primarily 
evolve to share knowledge about plants or animals or to transmit technological skills, but to 
enable individuals to entertain more contacts in larger groups (`vocal grooming'; Dunbar, 
1993; 1996; Aiello & Dunbar, 1993). Linguistic expressions often constitute social actions 
and description is therefore only one of the functions of language. Apparently language 
served more than one function during its evolution and as a result of that one might expect 
that its constitutes a compromise between: 
a. usefulness as an instrument to transmit (prototypical) information about danger, food 
and skills; 
b. usefulness as an instrument to attract, bind, entertain and manipulate conspecifics; 
c. manageability for the speaker; 
d. decodability for the listener. 
Consequently, it would be very unwise to extract an ontology from the way in which 
language (re-) structures the world. Grammar, even deep grammar, cannot be trusted as a 
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guide to the real structure of the world, because it is largely based on a very rough and 
largely arbitrary schematization of the world in terms of `subjects' and `actions'. For 
example, `it' can `rain' (verb) and one can walk in `the rain' (noun). The partial arbitrariness 
of natural language can be shown by speculating about the possibility of languages without 
nouns, as Borges does in his story Tlön, Uqbar, Orbis Tertius: according to Borges there is 
in the language of Tlön 
 
 no word corresponding to the word `moon', but there is a verb which in 
English would be `to moon' or `to moonate'. `The moon rose above the river' 
is hlör u fang axaxaxas mlö, or literally: `upward behind the onstreaming it 
mooned' (Borges, 1978). 
 
Several philosophers, including Nietzsche and Wittgenstein, have pointed to the ontological 
seductions of natural language. Nietzsche saw clearly that the tendency to think in terms of 
`subjects' and their `actions' was both deluding metaphysicians and physicists. Wittgenstein 
went so far as defining philosophy as the struggle to overcome the bewitchment of 
language. This would imply however, that we are able to overcome this bewitchment and 
that our thinking is not necessarily completely dominated by the deceiving systematism and 
schematism of natural language. 
 
b.The essentially constructive and hypothetical nature of words and language 
Despite the fact that there are clearly forms of thinking that are independent of language - 
one needs only to look at one's own dreams and semi-automatic actions - it cannot be denied 
that language is a superior means of training one's thoughts and expanding one's cognitive 
horizon. As every field naturalist knows the simple activity of naming or determining 
species of plants or animals will enormously enhance one's discriminatory power and one's 
attention for both detail and global form. From the perspective of connectionism, detailed 
linguistic categories can be seen as a diversification of output patterns that force the system 
into extracting a maximum number of prototypes out of the series of input patterns. 
Language also enables the borrowing of prototypes from other semantic domains into 
regions in which it is not easy to form prototypes. Such metaphors need not be completely 
adequate to catch at least some distinctions which would otherwise get lost. 
 Trial and error must play both an important role in language evolution and in 
language acquisition. This is already clear in the `language' acquisition of vervet monkeys to 
which I referred already. Infants and juveniles start giving eagle alarm calls at different 
birds and other things in the air, leopard alarm calls to all kinds of terrestrial mammals and 
snake alarms to long, snakelike objects. In reaction to such alarm calls, adults nearby will 
look up or down and only give a second alarm call if the object in question really poses a 
danger. This seems to work as a reinforcer and infants and juveniles gradually learn to give 
the alarm calls only in the appropriate context (Cheney & Seyfarth, 1990). 
 Language acquisition in human children often shows the same trial-and-error-
structure and perhaps this is why babbling and mother-baby and father-baby dialogues are 
important. Only a type of learning by trial and error can solve Quine's `Gavagai'-problem: 
the problem of a linguist visiting a country whose language he does not know and who hears 
everyone speaking about `gavagai' in the presence of rabbits. The problem is how such a 
linguist can ever be sure what `gavagai' means, `rabbit', `animal', `mammal', `head', `fur', 
`rabbit-like shape' or whatever (Quine, 1960). Of course, we are all such linguists and we 
have inferred the meanings of most words from specific contexts at an early age - we can 
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only use them because we hope and trust that others share our interpretation. Donald T. 
Campbell has suggested that our initial guesses have a more than random chance of being 
successful as a result of an innate expectation of `entativity': we have an innate tendency to 
suppose that words are most likely to refer to easily perceivable, stable aspects of the 
environment (see § 2.5.b above). Perhaps it is because we share a whole set of innate 
expectations with our conspecifics that we are able to step into the hermeneutical spiral 
which makes language learning possible. At the same time, trial and error learning 
processes are certainly necessary to pin some meanings down and the fact that they take 
place is continually proved by children who overgeneralize. 
 All this means that many words are by their very existence a kind of `hypothesis'. 
The word `horse' implies that there are a series of characteristics which hold a collection of 
quadruped entities together which may all neigh, trot and graze if they are not dumb, lame 
or dead. As Plato saw, the word `circle' refers to a transcendental similarity between a lot of 
quite dissimilar entities. Perhaps as a result of our tendency to postulate entativity with 
respect to the meaning of words we also tend to reify abstract terms and properties of 
systems. In most cases, this is exactly the tendency that Nietzsche and Wittgenstein tried to 
overcome. For example, there need not be postulated a distinct faculty like `free will' 
floating above the rest of our psyche to account for our ability to make decisions on the 
basis of the weighing of different scenarios instead of the weighing of different inclinations 
only. There need not be postulated a res cogitans to account for our ability to think and 
there need not be postulated `an idea of the Good' to account for the fact that the goals of a 
multitude of humans are not necessarily in conflict all the time. Each time, the creation of a 
word seems to imply a hypothesis about a new kind of entity: more than anything else this 
shows that language has an essentially constructive character. (Yet, at the same time it 
should be noted that we should beware not to throw away the baby with the bathwater when 
we are trying to overcome our tendency towards reification. While properties of systems are 
not things, they are still relevant. See for example fig. 4-9 to see how `a common good' may 
emerge when individuals have overlapping goals.) 
 
c. Our tendency to form hypotheses which transcend experience 
As has already been seen in chapter 1, one can teach grey parrots, apes, dolphins and sea 
lions elementary languages, too. This could mean that our difference from such species is 
not one of kind, but one of degree, to cite Darwin. On the other hand, the fact that we are 
specialized in language production (as proved by the form of our larynx and by specialized 
brain centers like those of Wernicke and Broca) points to the fact that our intellectual 
abilities have been co-evolving with language for a long time. This is probably the reason 
that we have such an exceptional imagination, compared to other species. Because of its 
constructive and hypothetical character, language is often able to lift us beyond our 
immediate horizon. Both the theory that language evolved to enable us to entertain contacts 
with larger groups and the theory that it evolved to transmit information about food or 
danger `beyond the horizon' are compatible with the idea that language stretches our minds 
into the otherwise unknown: it is a vehicle for the imagination, a tool with which the 
messenger-god Hermes lifts us beyond our narrow and transitory perspective. 
 At least since the upper paleolithic transition - very roughly, the period in which the 
Cro-Magnons arrived and the Neanderthals declined - humans have become increasingly 
dependent on stones, shells and other goods which had to be transported from afar: the 
amount of planning, deliberation and cooperation involved is hard to imagine without 
language, because only language is a system of reference which goes beyond the 
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immediately given. If this is true, language and the ability to expand our immediate horizon 
by devising scenarios of the `beyond' may be considered one of the characteristics that 
distinguish us as a species. A similar idea was expressed by the Spanish philosopher (who 
spent most of his life in exile) Ortega y Gasset: 
 
 Man is a fantastical animal, he was born of fantasy, he is the son of the `mad 
woman of the house'. And universal history is the gigantic and thousand-year 
effort to go on putting order into that huge, disorderly, anti-animal fantasy. 
What we call reason is no more than fantasy put into shape. Is there anything 
more fantastic than the mathematical point, and the infinite line, and, in 
general, all mathematics and all physics? Is there a more fantastic fancy than 
what we call `justice' and the other thing that we call `happiness'? (Ortega y 
Gasset, 1975: 248). 
 
Contrary to what Ortega y Gasset thinks, this idea is completely compatible with 
Darwinism, however. Imagination and fantasy need not be seen as sickly, non-adaptive 
`anti-animal' capacities. Since the upper paleolithic transition our species may have been 
successful in competing with other species, Homo neanderthalensis for example, exactly as 
a result of its innovative fantasy, which enabled our ancestors to become ecologically 
flexible. Since that period our species started to penetrate new habitats and to exploit new 
food sources. Often technology played an important role in opening such habitats: harpoons 
were devised, for example, to catch fish; animals were domesticated (the start of zoo-
technology); finally the plough was invented. It seems that man has a natural tendency to 
transcend the given, including the tradition, by means of the imagination and technology 
(which is the fruit of this imagination). Even religion could thus be explained: the moment 
people lose control over their destiny, their imagination is stimulated to do anything that 
could work, even if this implies begging virtual dominant individuals for help. This way 
they can keep hoping and stay ready to intervene immediately the situation changes for the 
better. 
 Therefore, paradoxically, the same excessive imagination gave rise to both religion 
and science. The advantage of this imagination is that one does not need to discover 
everything by means of trial and error: one can often rely on an internal simulation of what 
is likely to happen. As a result one no longer needs to make every stupid mistake to be able 
to learn. One can start with internal reconstructions of aspects of the world, models which 
one can test in artificially created circumstances in which most other aspects are kept 
constant. As a result of this ability to create, test, improve and integrate better and better 
models of the world, humans were able to transcend the limits of their natural world-
experience. 
 That does not mean that we have finally left this limited natural experience of the 
world, however. Although we may know that the sun does not set, but that we gradually turn 
into the shade of our rotating planet, we still may be unable to realize this continually. Most 
of the time we simply live in a world which is largely the product of our innate expectations 
and our innate categories. In most cases our fantasy is largely recruited to devise scenarios 
which are highly relevant to our own interests. That means that our cognitive faculty stays a 
vital `organ', which is continually evaluating and driven by values. If we are depressed it 
produces gloomy scenarios for the future of our genes and about the world in which they 
have to survive; in a more elated mood it explores opportunities to improve the world in 
general and our lives in particular. Only a small fraction of the population worries about 
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models about the world beyond a small horizon. The thought that the sun will burn away or 
that the universe contains enough dark matter to make it collapse does not alarm us most of 
the time - in contrast to the possibility that we will lose a member of the family: only 
something like that can really make our universe collapse.  
 
7.THE ART OF GAMBLING 
Our knowledge-capacity, itself a product of variation and selection, enables us to expand 
our knowledge by trial and error, but not to transcend the inherent uncertainty which 
results from this procedure. 
All living organisms with internal representations of the world are indeed monads, locked 
up in the world of their experience. In contrast to what Leibniz thought about monads, 
however, it is not God, but natural selection which has seen to it that our experiential worlds 
`fit' to some extent the real world. As `fantastic animals' we are, on top of that, monads 
locked up in our own fantasy worlds. Selection through falsification and/or selection as a 
result of differential theoretical and empirical progress guarantees to some extent the 
`fitting' between some of our disciplined fantasies and the world. Life is a product of 
chance, lucky circumstances and the preservation of successful formulas - and so is 
knowledge. 
 That means at the same time that all knowledge remains uncertain. The uncertainty 
with characterizes theoretical models is a late descendant of the same uncertainty with 
which life started. Once, about four billion years ago, self-replicating molecules arose as a 
result of the endless chemical reactions in the primeval atmosphere. Because successful 
replicators inherited their successful properties such properties could accumulate in their 
descendants and could `inherit the earth' (to use a biblical phrase). If it is true that Einstein, 
with respect to the uncertainty principle, said that God does not play dice, he was certainly 
not right with respect to the creation of life, because God or nature (which for Einstein, a 
follower of Spinoza, were the same) must have actually liked playing dice to find the 
successful formulas to start with. Playing dice is also a good metaphor to render the way in 
which life is able to adapt to changing geological and climatological circumstances. In fact, 
sexual reproduction can be explained as a system of increasing the variability of offspring, 
which increases the chances of variants which are successful in future circumstances. 
 The miracle of knowledge - the, to some extent, `adequate' internal representation of 
the world - is also best explained with reference to the art of playing dice. In contrast to the 
normal play of dice in which no progress is possible, however, an accumulation of lucky 
chance is possible in knowledge as it is in life generally. With respect to knowledge this 
means that progress never implies the erasure of uncertainty but rather the accumulation 
and convergence of plausibilities. As is shown by the phenomenon of the `Gestalt-switch', 
even our sophisticated perception still bears the traces of the necessity to gamble. As 
Grégory claimed, an observed object is a hypothesis which is proposed and verified on the 
basis of sensory data. The more observations we combine by means of categories, laws and 
models, the less brain power we have left to compare the resulting image with the image we 
would have produced if we had used different categories, laws and models. (We need 
theories, because our brains are too limited to contain all possible facts: theories are a means 
of regaining an overview by abstracting from details. The word derives from the greek 
θεωρíα = looking on, witnessing a spectacle). 
 Exactly for that reason a naturalistic, instead of a transcendental, justification of our 
innate forms of knowledge can never be more than cautious and pragmatic: induction, 
abstraction, the postulate of universal causality and the law of the preservation of energy 
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remain hazardous - in the last resort a series of successful and well-tried guesses. Despite 
the fact that we can criticize our own knowledge apparatus, can study its adaptedness and 
compare it to other biological and artificial systems, despite the fact that we can abstract to 
some extent from our own subjectivity by registering the same information using non-
biological measuring-instruments, we still remain in the last resort `frozen into a particular 
interpretation'. There are no decisive criteria to establish the adaptedness and adequacy of 
our knowledge forms, because we cannot step outside our cognitive relation to the world 
and compare it with all other possible cognitive relationships. At the same time, we can 
flatter ourselves with the idea that we have inherited some very successful knowledge forms 
and categories which are the result of several billion years of cognitive evolution. Although, 
strictly speaking, theories that work are not necessarily true as well, it is hard to imagine 
that the success of such inherited knowledge forms over billions of years of evolution is 
purely accidental. To some extent, perhaps, to live is to err, but the discovery of that fact 
would be impossible if we were not, at least sometimes, able to discover the truth. 
Evolutionary epistemology offers a frame-work for understanding the conditions under 
which we are likely to err and under which we are likely to conquer our errors. 
 However, it is wise to remember that all knowledge of the world derives from a 
snowball of unsupported, but successful guesses. It would be paradoxical if evolutionary 
epistemology were to claim to produce an absolute foundation of our knowledge. It can only 
claim that our technique of making informed guesses has enabled us to survive and that the 
scientific procedure of devising, testing and improving hypotheses may continue to improve 
our grip on the world (but not necessarily our grip on ourselves). At the same time it 
predicts that we, as parts of nature, will probably never be able to understand everything. 
Max Planck compares the uncertainty in the prediction of the behavior of elementary 
particles, which as a result of measurements is influenced in an immeasurable way, with the 
uncertainty in the prediction of our own behavior, which is influenced in an unpredictable 
way by this prediction, and sees both as results of the fact that we are parts of nature, unable 
to look at it `from outside' (Planck, 1947: 265). Evolutionary epistemology makes us 
suspect that we are probably `blind' to particular types of information and to particular laws 
or properties of nature and that our natural expectations probably prevent us from seeing 
particular connections. It could be possible that the discovery of the true structure of the 
universe, if something like that exists, requires a `Gestalt-switch' which is beyond the 
capacities of any evolved intelligence, at least beyond the capacities of the coarse hominoid 
apes of this planet. Let us not forget that a lack of cognitive resources also represents a 
certain survival value. When Odysseus leaves Calypso and returns home on a wobbly raft, 
the goddess warns him "that he, if he could only vaguely suspect what sorrows destiny 
disposed him to suffer before he were to arrive home, would certainly remain with her" 
(Odyssey, V, 206-210). 
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3.1 INTRODUCTION AND OVERVIEW 
The most central topic in epistemology, in the philosophy of mind and in the area of `animal 
philosophy' is the problem of consciousness. In recent years several attempts have been 
made to `explain' consciousness and although many of the resulting models explain 
important aspects of consciousness, other fundamental aspects of consciousness are still 
neglected. Sometimes this is a consequence of presuppositions which cannot be critically 
assessed within the discipline from which the model stems. In this chapter I will claim that 
the different approaches can best be integrated within an evolutionary framework. Although 
many philosophers, neurobiologists and cognitive scientists think of themselves as 
evolutionists, they are not always aware of the consequences of Darwinism. Because they 
are relatively unfamiliar with the way in which evolution works, they are often too 
optimistic about the chances that particular kinds of minds can arise as a result of natural 
selection processes. It seems to me that it is this `semi-evolutionism' (or demi-Darwinism) 
that leads to pitfalls such as: 
a. treating consciousness one-sidedly as a cognitive phenomenon (it could well be primarily 
a motivational phenomenon),  
b. focussing one-sidedly on the neurophysiological level (forgetting that adaptations are 
likely to be emergent properties),  
c.treating learning as the expression of the plasticity of the mind only (and forgetting that 
learning abilities are usually designed to acquire very specific skills and types of 
knowledge). 
All these misunderstandings derive from an inability to see consciousness as an adaptive 
phenomenon. Consciousness is a good candidate for an `adaptation', because complex 
properties of organisms that require very specific combinations of genes are more likely to 
be products of variation and selection than of pure chance. Of course, consciousness could 
be an accidental by-product of another adaptive trait. This is unlikely, however, because the 
subjective qualitative contents of our experiences (e.g. pleasure or pain) are an integral part 
of our behavior. Negative experiences are linked to injury and malfunctioning and stimulate 
withdrawal, caution and care for oneself, whereas positive experiences are linked to health, 
growth and reproduction and stimulate activity, territorial expansion and reproduction (an 
argument going back to William James and Roy Wood Sellars). Some organs, like the heart 
and the intestines, seem to work independent of conscious control (being coordinated by the 
autonomous nervous system), whilst other organs seem to require conscious control at least 
during the obtaining of different skills (Baars, 1997). On the other hand, several defects 
have been discovered, like blindsight and the amnesic syndrome, in which conscious control 
of - and conscious access to - specific functions is lost without erasing those functions 
completely. However, nowadays such defects are no longer used to nourish the 
`epiphenomenalist suspicion' (Flanagan, 1992), because it is exactly the study of these 
defects that has enabled neuroscientists to compare cognitive processes which are 
consciously controlled with those which are not (Weiskrantz, 1997). As a result, students of 
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brain and behavior are increasingly starting to consider the study of the evolutionary `Why?' 
of consciousness as a legitimate enterprise. 
 In this chapter I will defend the thesis that questions relating to the presence and 
nature of consciousness in animals and man can only be answered by interpreting 
consciousness as an adaptive phenomenon fully integrated into the behavioral repertoire 
with which a species has to cope within a particular environment. That implies that all 
theories which try to explain the neurophysiological `How?' question about consciousness 
should be integrated with the evolutionary `Why?' question, which should be asked from an 
all-encompassing evolutionary and ethological frame-work. I will try to show that in some 
current theories about consciousness the degree to which the brain is genetically prewired is 
still underestimated and I will propose that the phenomenon of radical subjectivity is best 
explained by cross-fertilizing evolutionary psychology with the theory of value-driven 
decision systems. Evolutionary psychology, building on selfish-gene theory, explains why 
consciousness is thoroughly perspectivistic and related to the interests of the individual or 
even of its genes. Value-driven decision-system theory, as developed by G.E. Pugh, 
explains the necessity of a decision system in which different behavioral options can be 
compared and `weighed'. I will try to show that consciousness constitutes a cognitive and 
motivational straitjacket which `subjectively forces' animals to act in an adaptive, and 
(inclusive) fitness maximizing, manner. `Innate structures of experience' are needed to 
supply values that enable animals to weigh different behavioral options: They supply 
heuristic approximations of the survival values of different experimental behavioral 
strategies (which may be explored during play). With a variation on a recent concept of 
Melzack, they may constitute a `genetically prewired neuromatrix for adaptive decisions'. 
The resulting evolutionary epistemology is somewhat more critical than German-Austrian 
evolutionary epistemology as it stresses the way in which information is subjectively 
transformed to narrow down the list of behavioral priorities for the organism. The model 
thus suggests a realistic and adaptive interpretation of qualia and stimulates the search for 
their behavioral correlates in animals other than man. At the end of the chapter, I will do an 
attempt to evaluate the evidence for animal awareness from this perspective. 
 
What is consciousness? 
Probably most readers would agree that consciousness can be viewed as a property of a 
living and working brain which enables the organism equipped with this brain to `live a life 
on its own', to experience its situation from its own perspective. Consciousness creates an 
unbridgeable gap between an individual that follows its own idiosyncratic course through its 
surroundings and all other organisms that can only guess at what the individual in question 
is intending. It thus constitutes a gap between inside and outside, between a domain of 
private and privileged access and a domain to which others may also have access. 
 Much philosophical confusion has arisen as a result of a tendency to reify both 
domains as different `substances', mind and body. On the one hand, a simplistic 
identification of those `substances' will not suffice, because much more activity goes on in 
our bodies and brains than we are consciously aware of. The phenomenon of death shows 
that consciousness is much more a property of specific bodies and brains than that it can be 
identified with those bodies/brains. On the other hand, most philosophers don't want to go 
back to an attempt to view the mind as a kind of transbiological phenomenon that `hovers' 
above the brain and makes contact with it via, for example, the pineal gland (as Descartes 
thought). I defend the view that consciousness is an adaptive function, embodied in a 
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particular brain organization, that enables certain organisms to interact effectively with 
their environments in such a way that they are able to `calculate' and pursue their own 
unique interests within that environment from their own unique perspective. Consciousness 
is in this view completely linked to making very complex adaptive choices. The problem is, 
of course, that we all know that many, many conscious choices are not adaptive. The 
argument that "nature is not perfect" and that man is probably not optimally adapted to its 
current environment sounds as a bad excuse, similar to the `justification of God' or 
theodicee within the theistic world-view , but may nevertheless offer the a better solution 
than throwing out the baby (of adaptation) with the bathwater (of perfectness). 
 Before I start defending the evolutionary approach, however, let us try to agree on a 
number of `phenomenological' issues that have to be dealt with within a complete theory of 
consciousness. Most readers will probably agree that an adequate theory of consciousness 
has to explain some of the following properties on which philosophers have dwelled for 
centuries: 
- Consciousness is characterized by qualia, the Latin word that was originally selected 
by Cicero to translate Plato's `poiotês', `of-what-kind-ness' (Barlow, cited in Baars, 
1997: 82). Originally the word referred to characteristics of objects, but it is used 
currently to refer to our unique subjective experiences of such characteristics. There 
is a difference between the different wavelengths of visible light and the way an 
organism experiences them. Additionally, one cannot describe one's pleasures and 
pains simply by `measuring' their values on some quantative scale. The problem is 
that qualia are only perceptible from a first-person perspective and that one cannot 
compare first-person perspectives objectively: Long conversations with much 
empathic projection are the only means of obtaining glimpses of the internal states of 
other persons. 
- Consciousness is often linked to intentionality. Intentionality derives from the Latin 
word intendere which seem to have arisen in the context of fighting with bow and 
arrow and means: stretching, aiming at, threatening with, etc.. One could translate it 
as `aboutness', claiming that we are always conscious `about' something (Brentano's 
thesis). Often objects or relations surrounding an organism are somehow 
`represented' in its mind. This `representation' should not be seen as a mind-copy of 
the object, but should be seen as the organism's cognitive gateway to that object, the 
`sign' or `access-code' which enables the organism to deal with the object and to 
learn more about it. 
- Consciousness seems, to some extent, linked to `control' and volition. In the 
cognitive realm that means that it may result in the control of attention; for the 
organism as a whole this means that consciousness seems to be linked to volition and 
action. Traditionally the so-called freedom of the will was often opposed to 
determinism, but within a naturalistic frame-work it should only be opposed to a 
narrow physical, chemical or genetic determinism and the will can be called free if it 
is determined by a weighing of the desirability of different scenarios (`soft 
determinism'). A transcendental free will, which does not somehow reside in the 
unique properties of some brains, cannot be the object of scientific thinking. 
- As shown by many writers, including Augustine, James, Joyce and Proust, 
consciousness has the character of a stream. In fact a lot of small brooks lead into it 
and it shifts its course continually, which makes its behavior hard to predict. It 
certainly does not have the character of a series of logical deductions from 
observations and it often enables us to be occupied with different problems at the 
same time, shifting our attention from one to the other continually. (If we are unable 
to retrieve a name, for example, it often ascends later unexpectedly, as if a search-
program had been working backstage all the time). 
- Consciousness, at least in human beings, seems to result in self-consciousness, an 
awareness of an own unique self which is different, and to some extent isolated, 
from the rest of the world. This self offers both the context of the series of decisions 
which emanate from it as it is, to some extent, changed and constructed by them. 
 
3.2 CONNECTIONISM, CORTICOTHALAMIC LOOPS AND FORTY-HERTZ 
OSCILLATIONS 
Consciousness is currently more intensively studied than ever before. Over the last ten years 
a series of new discoveries have been made which will probably have to be integrated in any 
mature theory about consciousness. As always, such discoveries will sometimes lead to 
enthusiastic and exaggerated theoretical claims. Before introducing the perspective taken in 
this chapter (3.3), I will briefly discuss some current perspectives on consciousness. I will 
look whether these theories, developed by people who mostly think of themselves as 
darwinians, really do take the lessons of the `second darwinian revolution' (Cziko, 1995) to 
their heart. In part 3.4 I will show, then, how the valuable elements of these perspectives can 
be integrated into the theoretical framework defended here. 
 
(Negative) feedback control theory. Already William James noted that organisms differ 
from other natural systems in that they produce consistent ends by variable means. In the 
twentieth century Norbert Wiener showed that certain neuromuscular `reflex arcs' are based 
on the principle of negative feedback. Gradually it was realized that his cybernetics could 
explain how organisms are able to maintain certain goal states independent of fluctuations 
in the environment. In that, they were like 
thermostats, but thermostats that continually 
have to work to stay balanced. 
 In recent years William Powers and the 
`Control Systems Group' have proposed that 
negative feedback theory in the end can 
explain most design features of the brain. The 
psyche is essentially seen as device that 
enables organisms to stay directed to their 
goals, independent from external influences. 
`A control system, properly organized for its 
environment, will produce whatever output is 
required in order to achieve a constant sensed 
result, even in the presence of unpredictable 
disturbances' (Powers, 1989: 77). 
 
 
 
106
  
 In the model of Powers (see figure 3-1) 
a disturbance of the environment affects an organism via a sensor signal which in a 
`comparator' is compared to a `reference signal' and leads via an `error signal' to behavior 
that restores or changes the environment in the direction that is desired. If there is a place 
for consciousness and qualia in this model they should probably be placed somewhere 
 
Figure 3-1. Control-system unit according to 
Powers. The system corrects differences 
between sensor signal and reference signal by 
producing an output which influences the 
input. 
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between the reference and the error signal. Apparently consciousness should be viewed as 
the way in which nature enables us stay in a `dynamic equilibrium' and to be faithful to 
ourselves in a changing environment. As the writers of the Control Group's `Introduction to 
Psychology put it: 
 
 'The `stream of consciousness' seems to be the play of perceptions in systems 
which are making adjustments, or, in other words, the focus of attention 
follows the largest-magnitude error signals anywhere in one's systems' 
(Robertson & Powers, 1990: 210). 
 
Thus, control theory interprets the brain as a complex `homeostatic' device which has to 
keep the organism in control of its environment. According to the Control Group `the 
overall purpose for which an organism controls its environment is to maintain and optimize 
its existence' (idem: 86). 
 Is this theory sophisticated enough to explain the nature and evolutionary necessity 
of consciousness? It is certainly an improvement compared to the behavioristic stimulus-
response models, but seems still much to simplistic to explain consciousness. Organisms do 
much more than maintaining and optimizing their existence by reacting to environmental 
disturbances. At least those that have to move and possess brains are actively pursuing a 
whole list of goals, including different types of food, safety, sleeping sites, sexual partners, 
the well-being of their brood, etc.. In order to be able to reach those goals, many intelligent 
organisms have to make choices, to look forward and to plan. This is much more than just 
`correcting error signals'. Despite its name the `Control View' seems only to be about 
`correction': real control also includes the ability to remain faithful to a set of goals in a 
completely unexpected situation. Real control implies the cognitive assessment of such a 
new situation and the ability to react appropriately, despite the complexity of the situation. 
The Control View is much too general to be particularly enlightening with respect to this 
ability and, therefore, to consciousness. 
 
Churchland and Connectionism. The study of the properties of neural networks is as old as 
cybernetics. In 1959 Rosenblatt proposed the idea of a perceptron, consisting of a series of 
input units linked to output units via adjustable connections (Harth, 1993: 55). During a 
series of instructional steps the strengths of the connecting signals could be adjusted so that 
the perceptron could be `trained' to link complex input patterns with specific outputs. As a 
result of the success of serial computers, the concept of neural networks was overtaken for 
some decades by the idea of software `computer programs' that can be run on any hardware 
digital computer. 
 However, during the eighties the concept of neural networks won new interest as a 
result of the discovery of new ways to improve the performances of the old `perceptron'. A 
layer of `hidden units' was inserted between the input and the output layers and new rules 
were introduced to make it possible for each unit to adjust its `synaptic weight' effectively to 
that of the adjacent units, if an undesired output was produced. As a result the new networks 
could be `trained' to make certain distinctions simply by instructing them to adjust their 
synaptic weights according to specially designed rules if they were  
 
giving the wrong output. 
 As we saw in chapter 2, the new networks proved very successful in `learning' to 
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`recognize' complex input patterns and to link them to particular distinctions and even 
decisions (Churchland, 1989; see figure 2.1 to 2.3). This was the more surprising as the only 
way in which the `information' was stored was a distribution of `synaptic weights' in a 
neural network. The particular distribution of `synaptic weights' that enables the 
recognition, or `activation', of particular patterns is called a prototypical `vector'. Parallel 
distributed processing showed very clearly how real neural networks could learn to make 
certain distinctions by trial, error and effective adjustment rules. (In nature, of course, these 
adjustment rules themselves have to have their origin as a result of natural variation and 
selection.) As such they show how conceptualization is possible within a material device. 
 Initially, Patricia and Paul Churchland, who have become the major philosophical 
defenders of connectionism, did not give an explanation of consciousness. They even tended 
to evade the problem and suggested that a first-person account is not characterized by 
specific unique contents, like qualia, but only by a specific and very inadequate 
conceptualization of the things that go on in a neural network: `folk psychology' (a concept 
showing the influence of Wilfrid Sellars who was one of the first to state clearly that even 
the way in which we observe ourselves is theory-laden; Sellars, 1963). In the end Paul 
Churchland hoped that we could learn to use a more appropriate language to reveal the 
idiosyncratic caprices of our neural networks to each other. 
 
Given a deep and practiced familiarity with the developing idioms of cognitive 
neurobiology, we might learn to discriminate by introspection the coding 
vectors in our internal axonal pathways, the activation patterns across salient 
neural populations, and myriad other things besides (1989: 75). 
 
From this sentence it is clear that Churchland does not see qualia as constituting an 
independent ontological level, as phenomena that are somehow part of the way in which our 
mind works. As a typical epiphenomenalist he tends to `quine qualia' (to quine means `to 
deny resolutely the existence of seemingly undeniable phenomena', Dennett, 1990; 
Flanagan, 1992). Qualia are perceived as merely inadequate descriptions of the complex 
neurocomputational processes that go on in our minds and `nothing more'. Churchland 
hopes that these inadequate descriptions can be replaced by descriptions in a more scientific 
terminology, just as water `really' is H2O and red is `really' electromagnetic radiation with a 
wavelength of somewhat less than 10-6 metres. At least until his 1989 work it seemed to be 
his hope that an adequate scientific terminology could completely replace the first-person 
perspective: We would be able to refer to our emotional states not in terms of such crude 
categories as `love', `pain', `hunger' and `hope', but in terms of specific neural fibers giving 
signals from one group of neurons to another group. This we could call the `Quine qualia' or 
QQ-thesis. As will be seen later in this paper, the hope that this thesis may be right results 
from both a misunderstanding about qualia and about introspection. 
 In a later work (1995), Churchland has placed his bets on `recurrent networks' in 
which `recurrent (descending) pathways' are projected back from the output level to 
intermediate levels. Such recurrent network display properties which one does not find in 
simple `feedforward networks'. For example, the `recurrent pathways' can bias the  
 
network in such a way that particular prototypes are activated instead of others. Recurrent 
networks are not continually dependent on new input: They can generate complex 
sequences of activation `vectors' all by themselves. Recurrent networks are also not only 
able to pattern recognition, as feedforward networks do, but they are also able to recognize 
and represent prototypical processes which are extended in time. They thus enable one to 
recognize causal sequences and even to predict the future to some extent. Thus, the 
dimension of time is added to the neural network as a result of descending pathways, which 
add information about the network's past activities to its current activities. 
 Following suggestions made by Francis Crick (1995; Crick & Koch, 1992) and 
others, Churchland proposes in his 1995-book that the phenomenon of consciousness should 
be explained as the result of the ascending and descending axonal pathways that connect the 
cerebral cortex with the intralaminar nucleus of the thalamus - in short, as a `network 
property' of a large-scale recurrent neural network. The difference between sleeping, 
dreaming and waking can be explained as a result of the ways in which the intralaminar 
nuclei (clumps of nerve cells inside the two thalami, a loss of which produces an irreversible 
coma) can stop initiating 40 Hertz oscillations (see below) and can shut down the recurrent 
pathways back to the cortex. The phenomenon of attention can be explained as the shifting 
pre-activations of particular neuronal layers in the cortex in such a way that particular 
prototypes have a bigger chance of becoming part of the global oscillations (if you are 
looking for your cat, all kinds of cat-features and cat-related associations are pre-activated). 
 
Figure 3-2. Because it communicates back and forth with the cerebral cortex, the 
intralaminar nucleus is supposed to `carry out' the function of consciousness (Adapted from 
Churchland and Llanás). 
 It remains to be seen, however, whether even this attempt at `reducing' 
consciousness (Churchland keeps flirting with eliminative materialism) is not somewhat too 
simplistic. Connectionism seems to be able to explain abstraction, pattern recognition and 
even cognitive biases, but is by itself unable to explain why organisms have internal goals, 
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subjective experiences, intentionality and self-consciousness. Given the fact that 
Churchland has committed himself to the defense of the almost infinite plasticity of the 
human mind, I do not see how he can bridge the gap between the collection of very general 
cognitive mechanisms that he is able to explain and the behavior of real organisms that have 
to pursue very specific goals in an often unfriendly environment. If Churchland continues to 
defend the plasticity of the human mind - and does not tone down on this point - he will also 
never come to understand why particular qualia are coupled to particular situations. If our 
evolutionary history had not `programmed' us otherwise, the act of eating could go hand in 
hand with nausea, sex could be horrible and drowning could feel absolutely fabulous, etc. 
The `meaning' of particular qualia, the specific connection between a phenomenological 
quality and the series of objective situations which it evokes, can only be understood in the 
light of their evolution. 
 
Edelman, Crick, creative loops and the forty-Hertz hypothesis. Churchland is not the only 
one to have come up with recurrent networks. Many different authors have proposed the 
idea that the essence of consciousness lies in some kind of loop. Harth has proposed that 
positive feedback loops (reinforcement) in the form of `creative loops' play an important 
role in some kind of cognitive `bootstrapping' which eventually leads to consciousness. The 
idea is that `particular fluctuations are amplified selectively so that features not initially 
present at the input may be generated in a bootstrap fashion' (Harth, 1995: 71; see also 
figure 2.5, 2.6, 2.10 which were all derived from or inspired by Harth). The resulting images 
may then be compared with the input again and so forth. `Consciousness, which arises in 
this self-referent process, not only unifies the immediate sensory messages but also becomes 
the joiner of everything around us, past, present, and future' (Harth, 1995: 144). 
 Loops in the form of `reentry' also play a significant role in the `theory of neural 
group selection' of Gerald Edelman (1992). Even on the level of what he calls `primary 
consciousness' (as distinguished from `higher-order consciousness') a `reentrant' loop is 
crucial. Edelman thinks that primary consciousness is already based on a residue of past 
interactions with the environment in which value-laden categories have arisen. Primary 
consciousness arises at the moment that these value-laden categories activate (re-enter) 
current information processing of new sensory input. Therefore Edelman speaks of primary 
consciousness as a `remembered present' based on a circuit that `allows for continual 
reentrant signaling between the value-category memory and the ongoing global mappings 
that are concerned with perceptual categorization in real time' (Edelman, 1992: 119). 
Physically he locates the `value-category memory' in the frontal, temporal and parietal 
cortex which interacts with deeper parts of the brain like the brain stem and hypothalamus 
via the hippocampus, amygdala and septum. The input of `world signals' is processed in the 
primary and secondary cortex. 
 According to Edelman, the circuit in which primary consciousness emerges also 
creates the possibility of `higher-order consciousness' in animals with language or language-
like abilities. Between the primary and secondary cortex in which sensory input is processed 
and the value-category memory, Broca's and Wernicke's areas are placed. These allow for a 
new kind of conceptual memory which can probably compress more data in a much more 
efficient way. This leads `via semantic bootstrapping' to a `conceptual explosion', as a result 
of which `the self, the past, and the future can be connected to primary consciousness'. The 
animal becomes aware of the fact that it is conscious: Consciousness of consciousness 
becomes possible. 
 Many different authors have observed that consciousness somehow seems to solve a 
`binding problem'. As Churchland repeatedly stresses, the brain is a massive parallel 
`computer' and somehow all lines of independent information processing have to be bound 
together to be coordinated. Both Rodolfo Llinás and Francis Crick (together with Koch) 
have developed the theory (already mentioned above), inspired by research and suggestions 
of many other neuroscientists, that consciousness emerges from the correlated firing of a 
large number of neurons at an oscillation of 40 cycles a second (40 Hertz) that has been 
found to be characteristic of the whole cortex and of the intralaminar nucleus during waking 
hours (Baars, 1997; Crick & Koch, 1992; Churchland, 1995). According to Crick (1995) 
spikes arriving simultaneously at a neuron will produce a larger effect than the same number 
of spikes arriving at different times. Consciousness thus plays the role of integrating 
information by forcing independent thoughts to `dance the same tango'. Crick points to the 
thalamus as the brain's `organ of attention' which directs its `spotlight' to neural areas where 
a lot of information has to be integrated by imposing its 40 Hertz `beat' upon them. 
 All this is certainly very interesting and might well be true. At the same time it does 
not yet explain why we need a private domain in which we are emotionally and cognitively 
isolated from the rest of the world. It remains to be seen whether neuropsychology can 
answer that question. 
 
Baars and his global workspace 
theory. The forty-Hertz hypothesis is 
based on a notion of consciousness as 
an integration of information that 
would otherwise be independent. The 
idea that it is the function of 
consciousness to coordinate the 
information processing that goes on in 
many different parts of the brain is far 
from new. Ten years ago Bernard 
Baars had already developed his 
`Global Workspace theory' in which 
consciousness is compared to a 
theater in which a lot happens behind 
the scenes, but in which everything is 
focused on what happens `on-stage'. 
Automatic processes and routines 
happen everywhere in the brain, but 
the moment new habits have to be 
learned and behavior has to be changed all relevant information has to be recruited from all 
of these dispersed brain regions. Consciousness should be seen as a field of heightened 
neuronal activity which enables problems to be solved which can only be solved by linking 
brain regions which lie far apart. In the words of Baars: 
 
Figure 3-3.  Baars' theater metaphor for 
conscious experience. Different inputs converge into 
conscious experience, yet diverge again to all kinds 
of intelligent unconscious mechanisms. 
 
 It seems that the single most prominent function of consciousness is to 
increase access between otherwise separate sources of information (Baars, 
1997: 162). 
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Baars himself thinks his `theater model' emerges naturally from all recent developments of 
neuroscience, including the discovery of the forty Hertz oscillations in the cortex and 
extralaminar nuclei. The theater metaphor, although very enlightening in some respects, also 
has some disadvantages, however. As Baars would probably be the first to admit, what 
happens `on-stage' will often result in action: A parliament metaphor would be better in that 
respect (a parliament being a theater in which the actors at least think they have some 
power). Only in this respect is Baars' theory still somewhat too much based on the 
presupposition of a purely cognitive function of consciousness. 
 
Interim conclusion. Various different theories about consciousness and the brain will 
probably prove to be mutually compatible as they are all portraits of the brain from different 
perspectives, on different scales and with a different degree of resolution. Connectionism 
explains how neural networks can store `concepts' and can even `learn' by continually 
readjusting their synaptic weights. Recurrent networks are probably the best technological 
parallel to simple systems of neurons. Loop theories refer more specifically to the possible 
physical properties of the brain that allow it to display consciousness: Consciousness is 
identified with the reverberation of an electronical tornado between thalamus and cortex. 
The forty Hertz hypothesis gives at least the beginning of a solution to the `binding problem' 
and is compatible with the Global Workspace theory which stresses the role of 
consciousness in integrating a great deal of information from different parts of the brain. 
 Some of the above mentioned properties of consciousness are explained by all these 
models. For example, the theory about recurrent networks can explain why the activities of 
the brain are to some extent independent of the environment. Connectionism can explain 
why concepts in our minds are not `defined' clearly and do not correspond exactly with an 
aggregate of `meaning atoms' within clear cut boundaries. Loop theories can explain why 
consciousness is more a `field' or `stream' than a calculator or a serial computer which 
essentially thinks in the way in which only a hyperintelligent mathematician or rationalistic 
philosopher can talk, occasionally. 
 Yet, something is still missing. To my mind, at least, all of these theories still do not 
explain the most essential property of consciousness: the radical private nature of 
consciousness and the way it creates a gap between `inside' and `outside' the organism's 
unique `point of view'. Workspace theory is, in principle, compatible with a more radical 
Darwinian approach, but a much more sophisticated theory about sensation is needed to 
account for its radical, unavoidable, qualitative and private nature. 
 
3.3 CONSCIOUSNESS AS AN ADAPTIVE PHENOMENON 
Sometimes it helps to step back a little to get a wider perspective (or to replace your close-
up lens with a wide-angle). It is by no means self-evident that consciousness is better 
understood by observing it as closely as possible, be it from the inside, as phenomenologists 
have done, or from the outside, as physiologists do. One way of stepping back from both 
perspectives is to see things within an evolutionary frame-work. Perhaps consciousness 
should be viewed as a biological phenomenon that we can understand better after we have 
understood more about evolution in general. 
Selfish gene theory and evolutionary psychology. In my view, it is especially the `selfish 
gene'- approach that is enlightening in this context. Because I will give a historical analysis 
of the sociobiological `bottom-up' perspective in chapter 4, I can be short about it here. At 
this point, I only want to stress that the view of the individual organism as `DNA's way of 
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making more DNA' (Wilson, [1975] 1980) or as the `survival machine' that is designed to 
help replicate the `selfish genes' that have built it (Dawkins, 1976) are to be understood as 
short and lively ways of stressing the `bottom-up' architecture of nature in which higher and 
more emergent entities like societies should be understood at their proper level. It is not 
always the smaller building block that makes the bigger entity of which it forms a part 
understandable, however. Rather, we should try to locate those building blocks that have 
been chiseled out by nature itself, in the form of natural selection or differential 
reproduction. Only if we understand the levels at which selection in nature really works can 
we understand the elements of `design' inherent in the features of living objects. Although 
selection may have worked on many levels, it is especially the individual as a fortress of an 
alliance of `selfish genes', which often forms an integrated building block of self-interest in 
nature. It seems to me that this view throws light on the phenomenon of consciousness. 
Why? 
 First, it explains why the knowledge-apparatus has evolved to serve individual 
organisms in the first place and why the information in consciousness is stored in a 
thoroughly perspectivistic way. As the cybernetic resources of information processing 
systems are always limited, only relevant information can be processed. Information is 
relevant insofar as it leads to survival (of genes and their temporary `survival machine' or 
`vehicle') and for this reason information concerning the direct environment is valued above 
anything else. This information does not need to be `objective', but should be 
perspectivistic, because it should also entail information about the current position of the 
organism (a lion is conceived quite differently by its fleas or by a candidate-prey, like a 
wildebeest). 
 Secondly, for this reason the way in which this information `touches' the organism 
should be `value laden' and relate directly to its interests: Only in this way can the organism 
perceive something as `threatening', `dangerous', `attractive', etc. So, perspectivistic, value-
laden information processing is to be expected according to a `bottom-up' selfish gene 
approach to organisms. Even in a hypersocial environment it is important that an individual 
keeps an eye on its own interests and, therefore, gathers information from its own 
perspective. Of course, even in this situation most of the information relevant to an 
organism concerns its own body, its position and the availability of dangers, food and 
potential partners in its direct environment. 
 Thirdly, talking about `survival machines' may help us to remember why minds are 
not in the first place `information processing tissues', but biological `decision centers' and 
why the information used by these `decision centers' need not be represented completely to 
the central parts of it. It is to be expected that a survey is somehow made of the information 
most relevant to the decisions that have to be made: The different options have to be clear, 
but it does not need to be clear how a process of data-compression led to these options. It is 
to be expected, therefore, that an individual survival machine somehow, somewhere, keeps 
an `overview' of the most crucial information relevant to the most necessary and inevitable 
decisions. Consciousness could serve this function. It integrates information relevant for 
behavioral options. So conceived, consciousness can be viewed as a way in which a survival 
machine is given an overview of information that is immediately relevant for its behavioral 
options (one notes here the affinity with Global Workspace theory; I will come with my 
own metaphor later). 
 Finally, the selfish gene approach may also help to explain why consciousness, at 
least in many mammals, is a private phenomenon, even though these species display a 
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relatively sophisticated level of mind-reading. Why would the information that is used to 
steer the organism be available primarily to the organism itself? This way of organizing 
things would be very awkward if individual organisms behaved for the good of the species 
or even for the good of the group. If it is the good of the group that matters, then not every 
individual needs to collect all necessary information for itself: Ant colonies, with a high 
degree of kinship, can also react collectively to new situations and even `learn' collectively 
(Gordon, 1995). 
 Even if it was necessary to integrate all information in each individual, individuals 
could be like open books to each other and inform one another continually about all new 
mutually relevant information. Clearly, this does not happen in many mammalian societies, 
including humankind. Our societies are not `superorganic', `top-down' superorganisms in 
which individuals almost always form cooperating `cells', but a kind of `bottom-up' 
emergent group-contract to which everyone agrees as long it is in his/her interest. The 
possibility of parasitism looms everywhere and all financial and informational systems have 
to be secured against fraud by elaborate procedures. Any personal information can be 
misused at any time and this is probably the reason why we keep many things secret, even 
from ourselves. 
 Thus the selfish gene approach may explain why the information in consciousness is 
always perspectivistic, up-to-date and related to the interests of the conscious individual and 
his/her genes, the `first-person' of consciousness. However, we do not know yet why - often 
- `survival machines' are not robotic automata and - often - seem to have been designed to 
experience the information that they have to process. 
 
Value-driven decision system-theory. Information in itself is neutral. Something is simply 
true or not true and by means of logic one can deduce other truths from it. A survival 
machine obviously does not need information for the sake of information and, as we have 
seen, it should therefore restrict itself to relevant information. How, then, should it select 
relevant information? Obviously one way is by not having unnecessary sense-organs. But 
probably even the most necessary sense-organs create a lot of noise. Above that, 
information that comes in from different senses somehow has to be matched together in a 
picture of the world on the basis of which the organism can `compute' its priorities, the 
`vector' of its will and/or its intended course through the outside world. 
 How should it compute such decisions? Selfish gene theory suggests that the central 
decision system within an organism will behave like a parliament of representatives, but that 
does not exclude one resulting teleonomic `vector'. In most cases this vector is directed to a 
maximum of offspring that can be raised successfully given the current circumstances (in 
albatrosses and chimpanzees this does not lead to a high number of offspring). However, the 
organism has to achieve this goal in a completely unpredictable environment. Of course, it 
is possible to instruct its DNA with an amount of potential strategies and with a series of 
routines that enables it to discover its environment and then to choose the most adequate 
behavioral strategy. Obviously, an enormous brain would be needed if it had to be 
programmed with all possible alternative strategies. The chances would also be high that the 
strategy triggered by a specific set of stimuli will be slightly inadequate in a new 
environment; the consequences of such small inadequacies could be disastrous. 
 Control or feedback theory gives one possible solution to this problem of an 
unpredictable environment. One specific control variable is specified that has to be kept 
constant at some specified control level. Compensating actions can be specified too, even in 
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complicated decision tables, so that the organism knows what to do when the variables 
move outside the specified control range (e.g. body temperature can be corrected by 
increasing metabolism). A whole hierarchy of control systems can together create a 
sophisticated control system in which several partly independent feedback loops are 
intertwined (Powers, 1989). 
 Within this approach the problem of the unpredictable environment is not 
completely solved, however. In many planning processes the series of decisions that have to 
be made sequentially is so complex that it cannot be derived simply from a series of control 
variables and a related decision table. Sometimes even the control variables can no longer 
be kept constant, and have to be adjusted. The only adequate decision table for such a 
system would consist of an almost infinite branching tree of decision tables in which the 
possible alternative consequences of certain decisions in certain environments would have 
to be anticipated and in which an adequate way of keeping the relevant control variable 
within an acceptable range would have to be specified in advance. If these decision tables 
had to be `installed' in actual organisms, they would need enormous brains. 
 George Edgin Pugh describes in his The Biological Origin of Human Values (1978) 
how he was working for the U.S. Defense Department in the late 1950s and the early 1960s 
to develop a computer system for the automatic development of bomber flight plans. It 
proved impossible to instruct the program simply with the series of rules of thumb that the 
military experts had provided, because they proved to be contradictory and inconsistent for 
numerous situations. This had not been a real problem for the military commanders in the 
past, because they could always fall back on their common sense if the rules proved to be in 
conflict or inapplicable. If the inconsistencies were removed enormous lists of exceptions 
and new rules emerged and the resulting decision process became even more complex 
without increasing effectiveness. 
 The only way in which it proved to be possible to enable a computer program to 
devise optimal bomber fighter flight routes and schedules was to enable the program to list a 
large number of alternatives and to score them by means of heuristic values assigned to both 
the aircraft and crew and the targets destroyed (multiplied both by the probability of 
recovery and destruction, respectively). The introduction of these heuristic values made it 
no longer necessary to think through every contingency in detail and the system could even 
devise new alternatives, the possibility of which the planners had not foreseen. Because the 
program would always note the possibility of disastrous consequences if the values were 
scaled appropriately it was possible to let it explore large numbers of alternatives and to find 
optimal solutions which would not otherwise have occurred to a human being. (Such a 
program can probably also be produced within a connectionistic architecture. One can `train' 
such a network by feeding it with a large number of prototypical input-output relationships; 
perhaps values arise the moment output is given in broad classes of behavior). 
 The importance of Pugh's work lies in his use of the concept of such so-called value-
driven decision systems to throw light on biological intelligence. He notes that there is an 
obvious parallel between the problems of too-simplistic artificial and organic `decision 
systems'. Light-seeking moths that fly into flames, light-seeking flies and wasps  
 
that keep bumping against windows and hedge-hogs that roll up in front of cars all show the 
limits of a too-limited collection of preprogrammed action patterns. Like a human designer, 
evolution or the virtual `evolutionary designer' (a concept used by Pugh to make it easier to 
speak about evolution's `design problems') is almost certainly unable to foresee all the 
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situations in which its designs will be put to the test. The only way in which flexibility can 
be built into a system is by giving up the idea of complete preprogramming and by 
introducing representations of the world into the system combined either with a notion of 
ultimate goals or with heuristic values. 
 However, building a notion of ultimate goals into a decision system will almost 
certainly lead to overcharging its cybernetic resources. An obvious parallel is offered by the 
game of chess. Ultimately, the only real objective in a game of chess is to win i.e. to achieve 
a checkmate. Yet, experienced chess-players and chess computers will assign values to 
specific pieces, like the queen, and to certain favorable or dangerous configurations. These 
values are a `surrogate' for the real goals. The perfect player would not need them: Such a 
player would `simply' compute every possible consequence of every individual move up to 
the last move of the game each time that it is his/her turn. Such a perfect player would need 
almost infinite cybernetic resources, however, because the amount of possible reactions on 
the part of the opponent multiplied by the amount of possible next moves multiplied by the 
amount of next reactions of the opponent multiplied by the amount of the amount of 
possibilities thereupon, etcetera, will be enormous. 
 Obviously the game of gene survival in a complex environment has still more 
possible moves and at least some players have more turns than in the game of chess. The 
ultimate goal can be described as the maximization of gene replication (Pugh himself still 
thinks in `survival of the species' terminology: op. cit. 73), but biological decision systems 
would need very large brains and these would be very slow if they had to calculate the 
consequences of each possible move in function of this goal each time they had to make a 
decision. In addition, it is not clear how a process of natural selection which has to lead to at 
least some adapted individuals in each generation, could result in the evolution of such 
decision systems. Such systems would obviously be outcompeted by systems that were less 
wise, but smaller and faster. In fact, in present-day warm-blooded animals the process of 
natural selection seems to have led mostly to relatively small, compact and very efficient 
decision systems in which the ultimate goals of gene survival are represented by a series of 
heuristic values assigned to such different topics as food, sex, predators, safety, comfort, 
good company, pleasurable and repulsive smells, hygiene, etc.. If evolution ever had a 
choice between the representation of ultimate goals and the adjudication of `surrogate' 
values, it is clear that it has made its choice for the latter. 
 How, then, are these `surrogate' values represented? In the case of the `human 
decision system', Pugh makes a distinction between primary or innate and secondary or 
derived values. The latter are the values of everyday conversation, the values that many 
people think to be `culturally determined', because they are slightly different in different 
cultures and in different times. According to Pugh the primary values correspond to the 
elementary valuative sensations of human consciousness, like discomfort/comfort, 
pain/pleasure, bad/good taste, bad/good smell, sorrow/joy, shame/pride, fear, anger, hunger, 
thirst, itch. They are to a large extent innate and they represent decision criteria built into 
our brains as a result of random mutations and the survival of the fittest. Pugh thinks of 
them as built-in valuative sensations that are `a result of physical linkages in the neurons of 
the brain, which are inherited in exactly the same way as other physical characteristics'. 
 Pugh's belief in the innateness of a collection of fundamental human values is not a 
result of dogmatism. His experience as a programmer using value-driven decision systems 
has taught him that a system begins to behave much more adequately if the number of 
preprogrammed heuristic values increases (Pugh, 1978: 66). His most important example in 
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this respect is the development of an automatic `student assignment system' which had to 
achieve a maximum of racial balance in public schools with a minimum of busing for 
individual students. (From his references we may conclude that he worked for two years, 
1971 and 1972, on this problem or its reconstruction.) The development of a value structure 
that could produce an optimum solution started with a simple concept of a value structure: A 
positive score was given according to the level of desegregation achieved and penalties 
were given for every child that had to ride more than thirty minutes. This simple value 
structure had to be refined, however, in six steps, before a more intuitively attractive 
distribution of students arose: small extra penalties had to be given for each student that had 
to use a bus, for each minute at the bus, a nonlinear travel penalty had to be introduced, 
travel penalties had to be increased and an extra penalty had to be introduced to discourage 
different school assignments for the same neighborhood area. Pugh concluded that the 
introduction of extra values, sometimes negative ones, is essential for the fine-tuning of a 
sophisticated decision-process in a complicated real-life situation. The parallel to the 
evolution of biological decision systems is obvious: Multicomponent value structures 
simply have to be expected given enough time and ecological variation for experimentation. 
This applies especially to species with a relatively small number of offspring living in 
relatively complicated ecological and social situations, because the value of each individual 
`vehicle' is relatively high in this case and it may well be worth the trouble to equip it with a 
talent for sensible decisions1.  
 One obvious advantage of an innate value system is that the organism that is 
equipped with it does not have to learn as much, or at least knows what it has to learn (it 
knows the value of particular information). However, there is another fundamental reason 
why the value structure has to be innate and irrational, and not subject to change on the 
basis of rational thought. The survival machine has to serve evolutionary objectives that it 
does not need to understand. If it were allowed to adjust its own primary values it might 
start to drop all kinds of penalties for which it does not understand the reason. It could even 
assign positive values to poisonous food, dangerous situations, and non-adaptive behavior. 
Narcissism, escapism and suicide could result. It is clear that the ability to change the own 
primary value structure is in contradiction with the very idea of a value-driven decision 
system which has to serve the objectives of a designer beyond the system itself. 
 That does not mean that in both artificial and biological decision systems there is no 
room for the adjustment of particular secondary decision criteria which might enable the 
system to learn from experience (Pugh, 1978: 32). In the case of humans these might be 
inherited culturally. However, such secondary values always have to be evaluated against 
the primary values. Perhaps the cultural success of particular secondary value systems in our 
species depends largely on their effectiveness in adapting characteristics of the primary 
value structure to a particular ecological and social niche and the life style required by the 
economic possibilities that it offers. 
 All this means that our minds are less plastic than philosophers such as the 
Churchlands suspect and that the information that ends up on our desk, the desk beneath our 
skull, is already censored and colored. On the one hand the primary values seem to be 
                     
1 Mammals are a group whose number of offspring is naturally limited as a result of their system of 
internal hatching and intensive parental care (they are relatively `K selected'; see chapter 6). 
Additionally, the size of their brains is not limited by their respiratory system, by an exoskeleton or by 
the necessity to fly. 
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innate, on the other hand they seem to be conscious. That means that consciousness is not as 
related to plasticity as is sometimes thought and that, to the contrary, consciousness is an 
inborn mechanism of weighing the survival value of incoming information. Consciousness 
enables us to be `plastic' only by having a particular structure. Consciousness represents an 
innate framework in which complex, flexible and adaptable biological decision systems are 
`allowed' or `forced' to adaptive self-government. The flow of experience is the flow of 
information that befalls a particular survival machine and that is `weighed' according to 
inborn values which represent the interests and perspective of its genes. Consciousness is 
the way in which information is thus `subjectivized' to make autonomy possible, within 
limits that guarantee that the organism remains dedicated to its genetic mission. 
 Pugh's model thus revolutionizes our way of understanding consciousness. 
According to Pugh `the cognitive decision process is intimately linked with our sense of 
awareness or consciousness' (Pugh, 1978: 154). Consciousness can be termed the way in 
which we are forced to use information to make decisions. Consciousness is the product of 
the `experiential values' which are programmed into the individual organism as a result of a 
long evolutionary history and which are orchestrated together in such a way that it is able to 
make decisions which are in its own interest or in that of its genes. 
 
3.4 CAPTURED WITHIN OUR COCKPITS, NAILED ONTO OUR DASHBOARDS: 
THE RELATION BETWEEN BODY AND SELF 
Despite the fact that they give, by definition, incomplete knowledge, metaphors can be very 
instructive. They often show  analogies across different realms of knowledge and enable one 
to give names to phenomena about which it would be otherwise very hard to talk. Of course, 
it is important to be aware of the limits of the metaphors one uses: One should leave one's 
ship the moment it grounds. 
 With respect to consciousness, we now have an interesting set of metaphors. If we 
combine Dawkins' metaphor of the survival machine and Pugh's analyses of value-driven 
decision systems a whole set of interesting new metaphors about the mind emerges (Slurink, 
1986). The organism can be seen as an organic missile, a smart bomb, that did not fire itself, 
but has been globally instructed with a set of selected values with which it takes its `own' 
course in a new environment. It does not know that the way in which it takes this `own' 
course is in fact, via these values, based on a long history of success and failure. Somewhere 
in the center of the missile, say in its cockpit, a decision center emerges from which `it' 
views the world and plans its course. Inside this cockpit a simplified map of the world helps 
`it' to orient itself, a series of bulbs, switches and monitors shows `it' the dangers, hopes and 
possibilities. 
 Where, then, is the person behind this organic dashboard of bulbs, monitors and 
switches? Who is it and can it leave its cockpit? No, if this were the case many survival 
machines would probably be deserted in the midst of the struggle for life and they would 
never accomplish their genetic mission. Even heart-attacks and suicides cannot be 
interpreted as desertion, but should be seen as accidents or the turning of a switch that exists 
only for emergencies. There is no metaphor for the relation of an organic dashboard and its 
pilot, because our artificial robots are still too primitive. The pilot or driver inside an 
organic robot, the `I' behind its dashboard, is in fact this dashboard itself which is curved 
and monitors its own monitor. In vain are we looking for an independent homunculus inside 
the cockpit: The only unique `homunculus' inside is a particular point of view, the source of 
a unique stream of experiences, another version of the world-movie as it can only be seen 
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from somewhere `within'. Physically this is probably an emergent property of the `recurrent 
networks' and `loops' between thalamus and cortex as noted by the connectionists and loop 
theorists. 
 What about self-consciousness? Should this not be seen as an extra dimension 
resulting from some sort of extra ability? Yes; as a result of our evolutionary history as 
highly social animals in very complicated societies we, as humans, develop a self-image 
during our lifetime. This self-image enables us to guess how our conspecifics judge us and 
is therefore often strongly linked to evaluations of merit and rank. However, even this self-
image should be seen as another lifelike phantom projected on the `monitor' at the inside of 
the organic cockpit which is the locus of our subjectivity. Maybe we should speak about a 
special extra monitor on which social relations are mapped and which gradually starts to 
represent its own host as a unique separate individual, an `I' in a world of `you's'. Anyway, 
we do not see ourselves from the point of view of an extraterrestrial, `objective' ethologist 
most of the time; we simply play a role in most of the movies on our own monitors. (Of 
course, this opens up the possibility of an infinite regression of reflective loops, but our 
neurocomputational systems do not break down as a result of such loops, they simply get 
bored and start to pay attention to other monitors). 
 Does this view of consciousness help us to resolve the classical philosophical topics 
relating to that subject? A philosophical question deserves a philosophical answer: yes and 
no. Yes: 
(a) -  It helps us to resolve the mind-body problem: The cause of the classical dualism is 
simply the reification of two points of view relating to the same body: the unique 
private view from `within' (the perspective from which a survival machine calculates 
its interests, the internal `dashboard' of subjectivity) and the much more public view 
from the outside. (Exit both simplistic dualism ànd monism.) 
(b) -  It helps us to explain why there is a gap between the world of experiences - die 
Erscheinung - and the unknowable world `itself' - das Ding an sich: Information 
relating to our world has to be `subjectivized', because only in this way does it help 
us to make adaptive decisions. (Exit naive realism and idealism.) 
(c) -  It helps us to explain why there is an unparalleled type of causality, agential 
causality (R.W. Sellars, 1973), which seems to be directed `downward' (`downward 
causation'; Campbell, 1974). This `top-down' type of causality is to be expected 
where a number of different input channels have to be integrated in some central 
locus of weighing, scenario-building and deciding. Of course, this `top-down' 
causality is intimately linked with a whole battery of `bottom-up' channels via which 
the input from the external world is gradually selected, interpreted and valued. 
Finally all this information arrives at the central `dashboard' to be weighed together 
with other generalized information to allow balanced decisions. Thus, bottom-up and 
top-down causality together enable the organism to cope with its environment and to 
remain faithful to its genetic mission at the same time. (Epiphenomenalism and the 
QQ-thesis are therefore implausible; exit both hard determinism and the 
indeterministic theory of free will.) 
(d) -  It shows us the origin and nature of values, which might ultimately be called 
`subjective', but which we share with our own conspecifics and which we also share, 
to some extent, with a series of other species and to which we therefore can refer as 
though they belong to an `objective' world. They do not have their origin in a 
platonic sphere beyond actual organisms, nor do they have their origin in some 
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rational contract between them. Nor do more `sophisticated' values, like curiosity or 
a sense of beauty, necessarily reduce to more `primitive' values, like pleasure and 
pain. The fact that values vary throughout different cultures and times (a subject to 
which we return in chapter 6) does not exclude the possibility of the existence of an 
innate human value structure which is, roughly speaking, universal to members of 
anatomically modern humans. Ethical relativism and voluntarism have to take into 
consideration both the effects of these semi-universal values, which derive from the 
innate `structures of experience', and the way in which they lead to a public 
`morality' as a result of particular ecological pressures and social `system 
requirements'. (Exit both moral objectivism and a too-simplistic relativism.) 
(e) -  It may help us to assess the question of animal awareness more realistically. Pugh's 
`value-driven decision system' view suggests a gradualism with respect to the level 
of consciousness displayed by various animals and by humans of different ages and 
talents. Just as there exist screw-drivers of all types and sizes, there probably exist 
different classes of intelligence which may fit into different structures of the world. 
As is to be expected with respect to a great variety of different vehicles with 
different purposes moving around in different terrains, each vehicle has its own type 
of dashboard which affords it an incomparable window on the world. (Exit 
anthropocentrism; more on this question in 3.6 and 3.7.) 
However, we should also pay attention to the `no' answer. No: 
(a) -  Of course, we can only answer such classical philosophical questions by changing 
them slightly, by consciously neglecting and transcending their implicit ontologies. 
Therefore the traditional philosopher can always retort that the naturalistic answer 
does not match his question. 
(b) -  At this point the answer to the `why'-question relating to consciousness is only 
schematic and largely intuitive. Perhaps it is true that consciousness evolved to force 
organic vehicles into making semi-autonomous adaptive decisions, but then, still, we 
do not know why pain, pleasure and related sensitivities were the only evolutionary 
option for such a compulsion and how neural networks have to be wired to get such 
results. 
(c) -  Finally, it is quite possible that our natural categories are simply inadequate to 
understand complex emergent properties. Our intelligence, which seems partly to 
have co-evolved with our technological skills, is often better at analytical reduction 
(bottom-up analysis) than in understanding a system as a whole and the way in 
which particular properties emerge as a result of its specific composition. 
A typical expression of the tendency to prefer analytical reduction to synthetic 
reconstruction is Churchland's claim that we can and should learn to describe our qualitative 
experiences in terms of neurophysiology. Our experiences are constituted both by the 
unique objective situations in which we find ourselves and by our unique subjective 
evaluations of them. Of course, they are embodied in a transient state of our neural network 
as it interacts with the world via a battery of sense organs. It is uncertain, however, whether 
it would be possible to describe them sufficiently by just isolating the neural network from 
the rest of the world and noting the configuration of its synaptic weights at one particular 
moment. The essence of those experiences probably lies in the dynamic brain-world 
interaction of which they form a part and in the way this interaction is represented `from 
within' our `phenomenological cockpit'. Introspection can never give us our qualitative 
experiences as they `really are' in neurophysiological terms, but only as they `really are' on 
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our `internal monitor', as it is designed by evolution to control our cognitive and evaluative 
interactions with the world. Qualia are not simply neurophysiological states, but the way in 
which we experience and evaluate a particular situation `from within' an ongoing series of 
those states. There is no need to `translate' them in neurophysiological terms, because we 
can already feel what they really are. One cannot describe a movie in terms of the workings 
of a television, although the television certainly is a factor in what a movie looks like; and, 
of course, we are not only watching a movie, but playing a role in one as well. 
 
Consciousness as the autoconnected dashboard of the mind. In all, there are good reasons to 
interpret consciousness as an emergent property, the product of variation and selection of 
`holistic' properties of whole organisms, embodiments of a history of successful behavior in 
a series of past environments. Its function or evolutionary raison d'être is probably that it 
enables organisms to cope with unique, unprecedented situations; as a result conscious 
states are probably as various as the brains of actual organisms and the situations in which 
they find themselves. I have proposed, in the spirit of George E. Pugh, that consciousness 
represents the way in which information is `weighed' in function of its survival value and 
have used the metaphor of a dashboard to show how it is linked to decision making and how 
it gives direction to the interaction of a particular survival machine and its environment via 
a simplified representation within a rigid, innate frame-work. This metaphor shows at the 
same time that consciousness is not a kind of accidental intrapsychological transparency, 
but that it is designed in a functional way to make adaptive decisions to new and unique 
situations possible. 
 Some characteristics of consciousness can thus be explained: 
- Qualia and qualitative distinctions arise, because sophisticated decisions in complex 
environments require a differentiated set of sometimes opposed values (as artificial 
decision systems show). The emotions seem to be orchestrated such that information 
has to reverberate inside the organism into adaptive decisions. Subjectivity thus 
constitutes a kind of sensitive interface between the genetic interests of a particular 
survival machine and its environment such that this survival machine is forced to 
take particular types of information seriously. From Pugh we learned that a value-
driven decision system that has to be programmed to perform certain tasks may not 
be allowed to change its own `primary' values. 
- Intentionality is an effect of the preprogrammed goal-directedness of an organic 
decision system as it guides the interaction with the environment from `within', from 
behind its `dashboard'. It constitutes the form in which the representations on the 
various monitors and dials refer to the real world outside and to the virtual targets 
and goals of the organic vehicle. The properties of the environment that are used for 
orientation have to be selected and valued to create a schematized mapping inside 
the neural network that enables it to build scenarios and to choose between them. 
Because the organism often needs specific information its sensors need the ability to 
focus on the outside world which is only possible via a feedback loop in which the 
representations `on the inside' guide the systems of information-gathering in the 
outside world. This is only possible, of course, if these representations link up 
somehow with the real world. The mysterious `aboutness' over which philosophers 
have pondered for several millennia, is a characteristic of this process of focussing, 
in which internal representations are gradually improved by manipulating the 
external sensors and feelers. 
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- Control in unprecedented circumstances is the primary function of consciousness. 
Control implies a cognitive assessment of a completely new situation in which one 
often has to take unprecedented steps to remain faithful to one's goals. As Pugh has 
shown a complex set of heuristic values can be an ideal device for estimating the 
consequences of various possible decisions in such a situation. This only confirms 
the idea that control and `freedom of the will' is not opposed to causal determination, 
but to the dogmatic activation of rigidly preprogrammed action patterns and to the 
inability to devise entirely novel solutions, plans and decisions. (Freedom is 
therefore a relative notion, entirely linked to one's elbow-room before one's drives). 
- Consciousness has the character of a stream, because an organism in its environment 
has to deal with a lot of independent problems, some more urgent than others, and at 
the same time still needs all its cybernetic resources in order to devise an optimal 
solution to the most important problems. Apparently this `concentration' of effort is 
needed to pre-activate all relevant prototype vectors and knowledge and to ensure 
that all relevant values are weighed in one shot (perhaps a shot in which a whole 
web of neurons begins oscillating in a 40 Hertz rhythm). Although all organisms 
have many problems, creative solutions require an answer which arises from the 
organism as a whole. Less urgent decisions can be postponed or delegated to 
subconscious processing. Often consciousness is only needed to initiate search 
procedures, so the stream-character of consciousness is not in opposition to a certain 
level of multi-tasking. In nature, an organism has to be continually watchful of any 
new dangers and possibilities that it may encounter. A whole battery of sensory 
canals has to be kept open all the time and urgent information from the external 
world should be able to overrule all current conscious activities. In that respect 
consciousness is similar to the changing field of attention of the pilot behind a 
dashboard, who will sometimes turn to his attention to one monitor, then to another, 
then to a flickering bulb, etc. The autoconnected dashboard is a place where 
different problems are continually fighting for attention and for the cybernetic 
resources that go with a centralized decision procedure. 
- Self-consciousness could be a more relative notion than is often thought, because the 
`self' which is represented on the internal monitor can be viewed from several 
viewpoints. A cat which is continually cleaning itself needs a representation of its 
own body contours and fur; a cat that has to decide whether to fight with the 
neighbor's cat has to make an estimation of its own strength and condition. A 
macaque that approaches a water hole, at which some group members are already 
quenching their thirst, needs to make a complex calculation in which its own sex, 
age and rank are compared to that of the other animals that are present. Humphrey, 
Trivers and Alexander, amongst others, have speculated that a sophisticated self-
consciousness is the result of adaptations that enabled our ancestors to cope with 
extremely complex social environments. It should probably be seen as the result of 
genetic instructions which guide the growth of the brain in such a way that 
cybernetic resources can be spent on the representation of complex social networks. 
At some point (perhaps in the Pongidae and Hominidae only), not only is there a 
representation of the self and of others, but at the same time a representation of the 
self as viewed by others. This social self-image can then be manipulated continually 
not only by others, but also by the self (thus the effectiveness of `positive thinking', 
self-hypnosis and some forms of psychotherapy). 
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3.5 THE ADEQUACY OF THE DASHBOARD METAPHOR: SOME LINKS TO THE 
EVIDENCE 
Recent new discoveries have strengthened the idea of an innate dashboard on which 
information from different canals and brain-regions is centralized to allow for optimal 
decision-making. In a discussion on phantom limbs, Ronald Melzack reports that even 
people born without a limb often perceive one from time to time. He tells us about an eight-
year-old boy, born with paralyzed legs and a right arm that ends at the elbow, who 
sometimes feels phantom fingers. Another example is a 32-year-old engineer, born without 
a leg below the knee, who often experiences a whole leg, including a foot. Sometimes the 
experience will disappear only to return, to his relief. Melzack proposes that the brain 
contains a neuromatrix, or network of neurons, that, in addition to responding to sensory 
stimulation, continuously generates a characteristic pattern of impulses indicating that the 
body is intact and unequivocally one's own, the `neurosignature'. If the neuromatrix operates 
in the absence of sensory inputs from the periphery of the body, it may create the impression 
of having a limb even after that limb has been removed. (Incidentally, temporary states of 
this neuromatrix could also explain the sensation of rising outside of the body and returning 
into it, P.S.). 
 Because phantom limbs are sometimes experienced by people who never had the 
original limbs or who lost them at an early age, Melzack proposes that the neuromatrix is 
largely genetically prewired, although it can also be sculpted by experience. He believes 
that the brain produces a natural `body image' which does not stop working the moment that 
external input stops (Melzack, 1992). Of course, the brain produces more than a body image 
alone. It also contains a natural `world image' which is normally constructed and corrected 
on the basis of sensory input. If input from the senses stops coming, however, the brain may 
simply create an image itself. This seems to be what happens when we dream, but this could 
also explain the phenomenon of phantom seeing and hearing about which Melzack also has 
something to tell us. Phantom seeing and hearing often occurs in partially blind or deaf 
people. A lack of input from eyes and ears causes the brain to generate very vivid images 
and sounds itself. One woman who is partially blind continues to see a phantom building, 
which will come and go unexpectedly. Another woman who was a musician before losing 
her hearing hears piano concertos and sonatas which she cannot turn off and which sound so 
real that she first thought them to come from a neighbor's radio. 
 Both the body image and the world image can be seen as projections on `internal 
screens' which have been erected by evolution to give us concise information on the basis of 
which we can make decisions. Several authors have proposed similar metaphors to account 
for consciousness and sometimes they even try to locate the transition to consciousness. 
With respect to vision, we have seen already in chapter 2 that Erich Harth points to the LGN 
as an `internal sketchpad' (Harth, 1995: 70). With respect to emotions and to qualia, Pugh 
tries to explain why they are qualitative rather than quantitative by pointing to the relative 
distinguishability of qualitative signals. According to him, the use of distinguishable 
different values makes it easier to associate specific value components with specific causal 
factors (Pugh, 1978: 110). Implicitly he is comparing the framework of our consciousness 
here with a kind of dashboard on which the different monitors, bulbs and measuring-
instruments have to be conveniently arranged and clearly indicated to make decisions 
possible. 
 The dashboard metaphor is also compatible with the distinction between conscious 
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and unconscious. There is a lot of activity in the organism that has to go on unconsciously 
and in which we have no say. If we could stop our own heart-beat, many would stop it if 
they found themselves in pitiful circumstances. If we could reprogram ourselves so that we 
would be happy under any circumstances in which we may find ourselves (with or without a 
particular partner, with or without a job, in absolute poverty, after a tragic loss, etc.), we 
would probably reprogram ourselves in such a way that we would not be able to feel pain 
and sadness anymore and that we would feel joy, satisfaction and ecstasy even in the midst 
of disaster - as a result of which we would probably become extinct within one generation. 
Therefore, most of the machinery behind our internal monitors and bulbs is completely 
sealed away from us and we can only fumble around with some of our wheels and switches. 
In that respect we are in a deep sense captured within our cockpits and nailed onto our 
dashboards. Yes, we are free, we make choices continually, but at the same time: no, our 
freedom is limited to the options as they are given emotional values by our partly innate 
value-system and as they are presented to us on our `internal monitors'. The degree to which 
we are free is largely dictated by the adjustability of our monitors and the options on our 
switchboard. We cannot change the way in which we are conscious about the world. 
 Finally, psychopathology brings out the strength of the dashboard metaphor. Patients 
with different psychological abnormalities can be viewed as persons without specific 
monitors or with monitors that give a distorted view of reality or that represent aspects of 
the world to which a normal person does not pay much attention. Autism is currently 
understood as an impairment of a specialized, largely innate module, situated in the left 
medial prefrontal cortex, which enables us to reconstruct mental states of other persons (e.g. 
Frith, 1993). Depression can be viewed as a state in which an overactive amygdala prompts 
the left prefrontal cortex to devise dark scenarios and gloomy or one-sided views about 
other people (Posner & Raichle, 1994). The dashboard metaphor shows very clearly that 
people suffering from such illnesses live in their own idiosyncratic worlds, resulting from 
lack of particular monitors, or from their oversized format, while at the same time stressing 
that the properties of such worlds can be studied and explained scientifically. 
 
3.6 CONSCIOUSNESS AND ITS ANATOMICAL AND BEHAVIORAL 
CORRELATES 
In spite of the fact that consciousness is a private property, it does not necessarily have to 
remain completely mysterious. I have suggested that it was designed to force animals to take 
into account multiple factors in flexible decisions. Qualia are necessary to reward and 
punish behavioral experiments in such a way that an organism can gradually acquire a series 
of behavioral patterns which are adequate both to its needs and to its environment. Play 
behavior may be a sign that this type of learning is present in a species. Intentionality is 
necessary as long as an organism has to be guided by temporary plans and goals, which 
have to be adjusted each time depending on its situation and its needs. Intentionality may be 
interpreted as a characteristic of an active mind, which does not simply react to stimuli, but 
that fulfills its mission via a series of temporary plans which are the product of its 
imagination. The ability to conceive such plans and to `write' such scenarios may manifest 
itself in idiosyncratic behavior, but it could also manifest itself in the ability to dream, 
dreaming being conceived here as the activity of a mind which is continually scanning 
possible scenarios in a situation in which the information from its sense-organs is not passed 
on. 
 Consciousness, therefore, according to this model, is linked to choice and values. As 
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our `innate structures of experience' are the product of variation and selection of a long 
series of past choices they can be considered as sediments of past experiences and past lives. 
Ancestral animals which tended to make adequate choices as a result of adequate sentiments 
simply contributed more to the design of the psyches of their modern descendants. 
Evolutionary `monadology' can be seen therefore, paradoxically, as a doctrine about 
selective `metempsychosis'! 
 One of the problems of the theory of metempsychosis was, however, that it remained 
unknown whether animals could reincarnate into humans or not. In later antiquity an 
increasing number of philosophers started to claim that only rational creatures could 
reincarnate into each other. Yet, consciousness could be something more fundamental than 
rationality, which can be claimed to depend at last partially on language. Perhaps all animals 
exhibit some degree of consciousness. At least the word animal derives from anima or soul. 
Do bumblebees, cuttle-fish, eels, salamanders, seven-months-old embryos, penguins, 
elephants and dolphins experience their lives to some extent consciously? 
 The problem of animal awareness is one of the hardest tests for each model of 
consciousness. The problem with animals is that they do not speak, or, at least, are unable to 
relate to us their inner experiences. Thus, if we want to answer the question of whether they 
are conscious and what kind of consciousness they do possess we have to look for the 
anatomical and behavioral correlates of specific types of consciousness. Can the above 
model help us find these? 
 Qualia. In the spirit of Pugh qualia constitute the heuristic values in the organic 
decision system. Why do they have to be experienced? Perhaps the simple reason is that 
they would otherwise be neglected. The intensity of experience therefore has to correlate to 
the urgency of the decisions that have to be made (in terms of selfish-gene interests) insofar 
as this urgency can be somehow assessed by the organism in question. 
 What animals do experience them and to what degree? As qualitative experiences 
seem to be designed to enable the organism to `measure' the adaptive value of a large 
number of behavioral alternatives, they are probably experienced by animals to the extent 
in which they display flexibility and creativity in their natural environment. Of course, it is 
not easy to assess the degree of this flexibility and creativity in the laboratory. Because the 
`primary' values have to be innate, it is to be expected that individuals that are unable to 
display their `creative potential' as a result of special circumstances are not falling short of 
the `experiential level' of their species. As the `primary' values are a product of evolution, 
we have to expect that they are at least as completely differently orchestrated in different 
species as they are already differently orchestrated in different individuals of our own 
species. Species that, even in their natural environment, do display a lot of rigid 
preprogrammed action patterns, which cannot be corrected by taking into account 
environmental novelties (a wasp that does not think about turning away if hitting a glass 
panel), probably do not use subjective experiences in the `decisions' that constitute those 
fixed action patterns. Species which have evolved to be more flexible, however, need not to 
have lost all of their more rigidly preprogrammed action patterns. Instead, we would expect 
a kind of hierarchy of psychological mechanisms: a., in which some reflexes guarantee a 
minimum security level, b., in which a series of preprogrammed stereotypical action 
patterns constitute the behavioral repertory which is typical for the species (which however 
in many cases has to be refined by training) and c., in which, in only some specific domains, 
more flexibility can be built in by learning which results in completely new patterns of 
behavior. 
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 These learning processes probably enclose conscious experiences with which the 
trials are rewarded and the errors punished. Of course, between the level of fixed action 
patterns and learning processes there is also a level of acquired habits which result from past 
learning processes and which allows for their semi-automatic execution. Apparently the 
procedure of conscious `weighing' integrated information and behavioral scenarios is 
followed only if fixed action patterns and habits are inadequate for the correct performance 
of the survival tasks of the organism. Often the results of such conscious learning processes 
are `stored' as semi-automatic action patterns or habits. 
 Thus, we would expect conscious experience especially in animals which display a 
lot of creativity in their natural environment and which are able to change their action 
patterns at the moment that these become unadaptive. Let us not forget, however, that even 
humans display a lot of unadaptive behavior, especially if this is reinforced by traditions 
which have been formed in other ecological circumstances. The hall-mark of consciousness, 
however, seems to be constituted by learning processes on the basis of the creative testing of 
new behavioral possibilities. It is probable that species which display play-behavior, at 
least in their juvenile phase, are conscious. Such behavior is demonstrated by many birds 
and mammals. 
 There are several reasons to expect consciousness especially in animals with 
parental care. One of them is purely economical: in these species individuals are more 
`valuable' (they are more `K selected') and any extra education would be a useful 
supplement to their expensive upbringing, increasing the likelihood of their success. 
Another reason is simply practical: in these species parents and offspring meet and 
therefore, at least the possibility exists of transmitting valuable non-hereditary information 
from one generation to another. As long as the parents are able to create an environment of 
relative safety, the juveniles of such species can practice a number of skills under the 
supervision of their parents. For example, in many species of birds and mammals hunting 
skills improve only gradually while parents gradually reduce their level of feeding and 
protection over an extended period (consider Trivers' `parent-offspring conflict', Trivers, 
1985, chapter 4.3). In these species a lot of behavioral experimentation can take place 
during this period of extended dependence. It is probably in these species in which we 
should expect to see the crucial role of play behavior in the gradual genesis of the adult 
behavioral repertory and in which we, therefore, should expect to see the crucial role of 
consciousness, too. 
 Intentionality. Apparently intentionality concerns the way in which objects or 
relations surrounding an organism are `represented' in its mind and in which it can 
manipulate both these objects or relations and itself to improve these representations. One 
can speculate whether this kind of `intentionality' presupposes consciousness. Many modern 
cameras are equipped with an auto-focus system which via a feedback loop guarantees that 
the object is projected sharply on the film. Of course, this kind of focussing can work 
entirely without consciousness. 
 Probably something else is meant by Brentano c.s.. Intentionality seems to refer to 
an orientation to goals: not to goals which are somehow fixed, but goals that can be fixed 
entirely anew at any moment. Intentionality seems to be an `open' goal-directedness. This is 
entirely compatible with the element of scenario-building in the value-driven decision 
system. Intentionality seems to be specifically attributable to organisms that are continually 
changing their internal goals and `weighing' the value of the goals they are imagining and 
striving for. 
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 How could we know which animals are such natural `scenario-builders'? One 
possibility is that we can simply observe the animal in question and see how it seems to 
change its goals in the middle of its activities. This procedure can be hazardous, however, 
because this change of behavior could also result from a clash of two fixed action patterns. 
Another possibility is that dreaming can be interpreted as the activity in which free course is 
given to the mind without feedback from the environment. Animals that dream are animals 
with a mind that is continually throwing up and going through possible scenarios as a result 
of which they can better anticipate changes in their environment. Whether an animal is 
dreaming or not can often be observed as a result of grunts and rapid eye movements while 
it is asleep (REM sleep). According to Winson (1990) placentals and marsupials do exhibit 
REM sleep, whereas more `primitive' mammals, including the echidna, do not. 
 Volition. Many animals do experience conflicting impulses, for example when a 
male is unable to decide whether to fight or court a female. Often such animals will display 
so-called displacement activities which to an outside observer seem totally irrelevant. They 
will start scratching themselves, or start pecking into the ground, etc. (Humans are believed 
to show displacement activities, too, for example in the form of sucking on pens and 
spectacles, head scratching, beard stroking, McFarland, 1987.) In many species of birds 
such displacement activities have evolved into ritualized behavior. 
 Conscious control over one's own behavior perhaps presupposes a behavioral 
flexibility which enables one to solve conflicting impulses in a more creative fashion. This 
can only evolve the moment an animal is able to postpone the execution of some of its 
drives or the moment it is able to transform or integrate its drives. True control is only 
achieved if the animal is able to give priority to some goals over others or if it is able to 
devise new goals and plans in order to integrate some mutually almost incompatible drives. 
It presupposes the ability to devise internal models of the possible results of one's own 
different possible strategies. It is known that chimpanzees, at least, are able to suppress 
short-term desires in favor of the achievement of their goals. Frans de Waal tell us, for 
example, how one chimpanzee pretended not to know where some bananas were buried only 
to unearth them the moment no other colony members were watching (de Waal, 1981). 
 Such conscious control over one's actions probably transforms instinctive drives into 
a system of values which can be used to weigh alternative action-plans. Even human beings, 
however, do not always think before they act. `Free will' is only a relative notion: the 
stronger the ability to predict the consequences of one's own actions and to adjust and 
change one's plans creatively, the freer one is. It seems to me that most of us are not always 
as free as we would like to be. 
 Consciousness should not be thought to be linked to a free will, however, but to the 
experience of qualia. An animal that experiences qualia is able to learn from its experiences, 
but it may also have to endure experiences from which nothing more can be learned than 
that the world is not always pleasant and just. 
 Self-consciousness. In one form or another consciousness can always be viewed as 
self-consciousness, because it is always one particular point of view that is experienced and 
many animals need to know the effects of movements of their own bodies. A squirrel has to 
guess its own weight, a zebra has to know when her young is standing in her own shadow, 
etc. Additionally, all social animals which live in a hierarchy that is not fixed, but results 
from competition, seem to need some kind of image of their own social status. Individuals 
of such species which are consistently defeated in encounters with their opponents often 
become psychologically `down', display timidity in encounters with new opponents and 
will, as a result, remain in their position of low rank. This effect can even be observed in 
bumblebees and crickets (Wilson, 1980: 123), although, of course, it is unclear what kind of 
self-image is implied. Of course, one possible test that an individual is aware of its own 
status would be the purposeful use of signals and ornamentation to advertise one's status. 
Recently, it has been discovered that the reddish taint of the breast-feathers of the 
Lammergeier is not only placed there by themselves, but is also a clear signal of its status. 
 At the moment many authors 
seem to agree that self-consciousness, as 
it is expressed in apes and humans, is 
probably a result of social evolution. The 
idea is that a self-image enables us to 
guess how we are judged by conspecifics 
and, therefore, also enables us to 
manipulate them better. A good 
argument for this position is that our 
self-image always seems to reflect social 
value-judgments and that the way in 
which we relate to ourselves, even in 
diaries and prayers, is tightly linked to 
judgments concerning `merit' and `self-
esteem'. A closely related argument is 
afforded by the theory of reciprocal 
altruism: it is predicted that it is adaptive 
to deceive oneself and others about one's 
investments in the reciprocal 
relationship. To be able to do this one 
needs on the one hand a flattering self-
image - on the other hand one needs to 
`know', unconsciously, one's real purposes (Trivers, 1985; 1991; `knowing unconsciously', 
of course, is an interesting paradox). The ability to recognize oneself in mirrors, which can 
be learned by chimpanzees, orangutans, and dolphins, but not by most gorillas and not by 
any monkey (Parker et al., 1994), could be a side-effect, perhaps also related to a talent for 
object manipulation and rotation. 
Figure 3-4. To the extent that animals share 
particular parts of our brains known to have 
specific functions, it is reasonable to believe that 
they share the corresponding experiences. 
Redrawn after Baars, 1997: 32. 
 Anatomical evidence. Often anatomical evidence offers a invaluable amplification of 
the behavioral evidence (the argumentation used is a kind of triangulation). For example, 
both corvids and parrots are known to be groups of birds displaying an extreme level of 
playfulness and intelligence. (I recently watched a crow trying to open an acorn by dropping 
it repeatedly on the road). At the same time, it is known that both groups of birds have a 
relative big hyperstriatum, which is the part of the forebrain responsible for general 
intelligence in birds (Savage, 1995). Above that, corvids are at the top among birds with 
respect to brain size, having a brain-to-body ratio equalling that of dolphins. 
 If we use this kind of anatomical evidence and study the evolution of the brain in our 
own lineage, there is are good reasons to believe that we share the division between waking 
and sleeping with reptiles, that we share the behavioral flexibility which comes with an 
elaborate system of values and emotions with all mammals and that we share our detailed 
visual world with all primates (Baars, 1997; fig. 3-3). 
 Conclusion. In what kind of animals may we expect consciousness and the ability to 
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suffer? It seems that the ability to use symbols and language and to recognize one-self in 
mirrors are neither necessary nor sufficient for the ability to suffer. The ability to suffer 
seems directly implicated by the ability to experience qualia. (Qualia seem to be linked to 
the type of behavioral flexibility we see at least in birds and mammals.) More sophisticated 
psychological abilities could enhance it, but they could also give some relief. 
  II  
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 ** Ape, biology, culture **   
 
Many discussions on evolution get stuck at the moment that the human ability to absorb 
and create culture is raised. Almost always this ability is mentioned as a sign that 
humans are unique and often it is implicated that culture simply defies an evolutionary 
explanation. In a kind of relativistic rhetoric, which is sadly enough characteristic for our 
age, it is then claimed that only some aspects of human behavior and culture can be 
explained with reference to evolution or `biology'; other aspects are claimed to be `purely 
cultural' in origin, whatever that may mean. 
 In this part I will try to correct the wrong assumptions underlying this double 
misunderstanding. In essence they arise as a consequence of the remnants of an old 
dualistic way of thinking in which man is citizen of two worlds, a natural world and a 
world of symbols and meanings. The human ability to speak language is then often 
thought to enable him to leave the first world and to enter the second one. Yet, it is 
forgotten that the natural world is full of signs and symbols, for example in the area of 
courtship and even in the predator-prey relationship, and that there is no reason to 
believe that a capacity to handle large amounts of signs and symbols in a very quick 
fashion is purely a luxury from a biological viewpoint, something without adaptive 
meaning whatsoever. 
 To free ourselves from the old, dualistic way of thinking it is necessary both to 
change our opinions on nature and animals and our opinions on humans and culture. 
Hopefully, I have already shown in the first part of this book that knowledge and 
consciousness did not start with humans and that animals are often more complex than 
we think. In this second part I introduce an alternative model of culture. Culture is not 
`reduced' to something at a `lower' level. At the same time the ability to absorb and 
create culture does not arise out of the void and culture is simply the human way of doing 
what everyone else does in slightly different ways: surviving, eating, hiding, protecting 
oneself, mating, competing, selecting. Instead of enabling us to transcend the `struggle 
for life', culture is our specific way of fighting. Our unique human capacity for symbols 
and language is simply our unique weaponry. Above that, the complexity of culture does 
not arise out of nothing, but is solidly grounded in the complex value system already 
present in our ancestors. Symbols and language enable us to create an infinite number of 
variations on a limited series of old themes. 
 Chapter 4 is a historical reconstruction and `justification' of sociobiology and 
evolutionary psychology which may function as an introduction to some, as a mnemonic 
to others. Sociobiology is understood as a revolution in ethology, necessitated by 
ethology's growth beyond its borders and especially by its need to be properly rooted in 
evolutionary biology. Sociobiologists demanded that phenomena should be explained at 
the proper level: characteristics of groups for example should not be explained with 
resort to group selection when it is possible to explain them as a result of individual 
selection or even `gene selection'. The explanation of social behavior could no longer be 
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based purely with reference to the `survival of the species', but was preferably based on 
cost-benefits analyses of alternative strategies from the perspectives of all parties 
concerned. Their interests can ultimately be only understood with the aid of evolutionary 
genetics, which predicts that interests can diverge even within groups and families of one 
and the same species. 
 In the second part of chapter 4, some common charges against, and 
misunderstandings about, sociobiology and evolutionary psychology are discussed. 
Against the charge of `genetic determinism' it is argued that a difference should be made 
between genetic determinism and evolutionary explanation. Against the charge of 
`adaptationism' it is argued that adaptationism is  flexible enough to encompass effects of 
maladaptation, chance and complexity. Against the charge that sociobiology resorts too 
much to AD HOC theories it is argued that sociobiology is in essence precisely a reaction 
against AD HOC theories which result when nobody cares about the compatibility and 
integratibility with adjacent disciplines. 
 Thus sociobiology is simply understood as the result of an integration of 
ethology with evolutionary genetics and an `energy-budget' view of life, in which 
behavior is explained with reference to its costs and benefits. Evolutionary psychology, a 
term which was already used by William James, is its extension in the domain of 
psychology and explicitly addresses questions with respect to the adaptedness of specific 
psychological mechanisms, thrown up by evolution to solve particular behavioral 
problems. (One of the favorite dogma's of evolutionary psychology - and perhaps one that 
is used much too easily - is that many psychological mechanisms that were adaptive in 
the long hunter-gatherer stage of human evolution are not so in our current, 
industrialized circumstances.) 
 In chapter 5 it is argued that both sociobiology and evolutionary psychology 
form the proper basis for the analysis of culture. Culture cannot be considered to be an 
autonomous realm, floating above the interests of its biological bearers. An evolutionary 
analysis of culture cannot, therefore, concentrate on the differential reproduction of 
`memes' as if cultural evolution is a more or less autonomous, elevated process which 
uses humankind as its humble substratum. Instead, `memes', `culture-genes' or `ideas' 
should be considered to be pieces of information with which individuals try to assist, 
influence or manipulate each other. `Memes' are almost continually manipulated in such 
a way that they can be used in a kind of biological warfare as `mind viruses' not with an 
eye to their own survival interests, but serving the survival interests of their creators and 
manipulators, often infecting other individuals and bringing them to behavior that is not 
in their own interests. Within this view of culture, deception is one of its essential 
components. 
 Although a clear correlation between intelligence and reproductive success is 
perhaps hard to give, it is clear that an ability to absorb and create ideas has fitness 
consequences. One of the reasons that things are not simple may be that culture is a 
complex environment of its own in which different individuals may follow different 
strategies which may coexist in a complex equilibrium. 
 Chapter 6 is an attempt to do justice to the complex ways in which cultures are 
used by individuals to adapt themselves to particular ecologies. Apparently, cultural 
traditions are used and changed to adapt individuals and their societies to particular 
ecologies, just like instincts adapt an animals to their niches. This would explain the 
parallels between, for example, the mating patterns of animals and the marriage systems 
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in different human societies, although mating patterns are produced by a process of 
relatively slow, organic evolution, whereas marriage systems are products of cultural 
evolution, which is a very fast process of coping with changing ecological and economic 
circumstances. I think, however, that one can claim that culture `replaces' instincts. First, 
in opposition to what perhaps is suggested by the word itself, `instincts' are flexible 
already. Second, humans are not totally without `instincts' and cultural evolution is thus 
not an independent para-evolutionary process. Humans are very flexible, but not 
infinitely so and I will try to show that human behavior is based on conditional strategies 
which are activated by particular ecological and economic circumstances. Probably 
human behavior is more affected by cognitive and cultural processes than the behavior of 
any other animal, but that does not mean that humans are able to change their innate 
values, goals and conditional strategies at will. On the basis of a series of innate values 
and goals, and as a result of their unique capacity to look forward and plan, humans are 
continually making and evaluating scenario's in which they can virtually test alternative 
behavioral strategies. On the basis of such internal scenario-weighing they are 
continually creating and correcting their life programmes to suit particular ecologies and 
economies. In the end, however, it is their emotions, that is their innate value systems (see 
chapter III), that guide them through life, and emotions can best be seen as the subjective 
manifestations of conditional strategies. Chapter 6 gives some examples of the way in 
which conditional strategies give rise to particular cultures as a result of particular 
circumstances. 
 The upshot of part II is that culture is not opposed to `biology' and that culture 
enables humans to adapt themselves to different environments. Culture does not make life 
easy, however, because it seldomly suits perfectly to each individual's own innate 
teleonomic value system and thus forces individuals to find compromises or new 
solutions. Culture as the sediment of a large number of individual decisions, solidified as 
a result of imitation and teaching into massive traditions, can weigh heavily on a young 
individual of a new generation that still has to find its own place and to fight for its 
unique codes. Perhaps freedom is the ability to create your own course of life despite the 
plurality of advises with which one is bombarded almost continually. In that case one 
could also claim that freedom is not opposed to `biology' either, but that it represents the 
talent of remaining true to oneself (to one's fundamental character) in the midst of the 
dynamics of cultural change. 
  4  
  ** A revolution through integration: 
the origins of sociobiology and 
evolutionary psychology \  
 
       Great is the power of steady 
misrepresentation. 
 Darwin, 1872 
 
4.1 INTRODUCTION 
In recent years, sociobiology and evolutionary psychology have gradually gained 
acceptance, partly as a result of a wave of popular and more scientific accounts (e.g. Wright, 
1994; Ridley, 1996; Roele, 1996; Thiessen, 1996; Low, 2000, etc.). Sometimes, however, 
one still hears the classic objections expressed by the old critics of sociobiology, which was 
supposed to be a `genetic' or `biological' `determinism' (Gould, 1977; Harris, 1979; Kitcher, 
1987; Rose & Rose, 2000) and to be a form of panadaptationism or `adaptationism' (i.e., 
using adaptation as an all-explanatory principle, Gould & Lewontin, 1979). Partly as a 
result of the power of these critics the term `sociobiology' became a curse during the 
eighties and nineties and many researchers have rejected the term (e.g. Alexander, 1987: 6) 
and resorted to new or other names, like behavioral ecology, socio-ecology, evolutionary 
anthropology and evolutionary psychology - often by giving a new twist to the original 
ideas. All these tendencies culminated in 1996 when the successful journal Ethology and 
Sociobiology was renamed Evolution and Human Behavior. 
 Intellectual honesty demands, however, that justice is done to the history of a 
discipline. In this chapter I will delve into the roots of sociobiology. I set out to demonstrate 
that despite a number of misleading statements from the first generation of sociobiologists 
themselves, neither blind genetic determinism nor extreme adaptationism have ever formed 
the central core of sociobiology. Sociobiology was simply an attempt towards 
interdisciplinary integration (Barkow, 1989: 3, speaks of `vertically integrated explanation'; 
Wilson, 1998, uses Whewell's `consilience'), emanating from the knowledge that it is 
important to keep the presuppositions of adjacent disciplines compatible and to explain 
phenomena at an adequate level. 
 According to my analysis, sociobiology and all sister and daughter disciplines 
(behavioral ecology, socio-ecology, evolutionary psychology, etc.) should be viewed as 
long-term effects of the emancipation of ethology. At a certain point ethology began to 
ripen, and it was increasingly confronted by its limitations. The result was that in choosing 
between alternative hypotheses within ethology it was no longer possible to decide on the 
basis of ethology alone: it became necessary to give it a `foundation' into the discipline that 
studied the `underlying' level - evolutionary biology. Eventually a bold attempt towards an 
evolutionary foundation forced ethology into a process of transformation and deepening, 
which in turn led to the creation of sociobiology. 
 On the basis of this analysis the relationship between sociobiology and the human 
sciences is placed in another perspective. It is no longer the issue whether sociobiology (or 
behavioral ecology, evolutionary psychology, etc.) attempts to `reduce' independent 
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sciences to biology. Rather, independent sciences which started to ripen and to come to their 
most fundamental assumptions were confronted with their borders and limitations. To be 
able to decide between several possible sets of assumptions a mature scientific discipline 
needs to consult with its adjacent disciplines to keep its assumptions compatible with the 
theoretical result of those other disciplines with whom it has become interwoven in the web 
of successful scientific theories which form our best current interpretation of the world. 
 Figure 4-1 gives an idea of the kind 
of integration that I have in mind. It is an 
ontological (or even metaphysical) 
interpretation of a historical process. 
Initially, evolutionary science, the social 
sciences and ethology tried to establish 
themselves as independent disciplines. Over 
time, it proved impossible for these 
disciplines to justify their own fundamentals 
purely on the basis of their own expertise. At 
some point all disciplines concerned with 
realms of related phenomena on specific 
`levels' of reality had to cross the borders of 
their own `level' to justify some of their 
principles. Sociobiology and evolutionary 
psychology represented historical points at 
which disciplines in adjacent realms had to 
be united, integrated or brought into balance with each other: sociobiology represents 
largely an integration of ethology with evolutionary science, evolutionary psychology was 
an attempt to integrate the social sciences within the new synthesis. 
 
Figure 4-1. An ontological interpretation of 
the evolution of conceptual maps at three 
`levels of reality': evolutionary science, 
ethology, and the social sciences. 
 
 
 
4.2 A REVOLUTION THROUGH INTEGRATION 
The creation of sociobiology is an excellent example of a scientific revolution which does 
not simply result from new technologies or measurement methods, but from conceptual 
integration of a number of previously independent disciplines. It is probably characteristic 
that the first monumental public program of sociobiology, E.O. Wilson's Sociobiology: the 
new synthesis (1975), had a great deal in common with a summary work. In the terminology 
of the last chapter, one of the biggest virtues of sociobiology is robustness or multiple 
derivability. 
 In his Sociobiology Wilson synthesized a great quantity of information from 
ethology, evolutionary biology, development biology, genetics and ecology in order to trace 
the evolutionary conditions of the various forms of social behavior (aggression, territorial 
behavior, dominance systems, caste systems, mating patterns and parental investment). He 
defined sociobiology as "the systematic study of the biological basis of all forms of social 
behavior" (Wilson, 1975: 4), apparently without realizing that `biological bases' are 
(erroneously) associated by many psychologists, sociologists and jurists with `unchangeable 
determining factors' (Alexander, 1987: 6-12). To avoid confusion it would have perhaps 
been better if he had have spoken of the evolutionary backgrounds of all forms of social 
behavior (including cultural transmission). In fact, the central claim of Sociobiology is not 
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so much that behavior is completely genetically preprogrammed, but that the (sometimes 
more, sometimes less flexible) aptitude for social behavior and the different varieties of 
social behavior have to be explained within an adequate evolutionary frame-work, a frame-
work in which the costs and benefits of different types of behavior are critically assessed. 
 The central message of Wilson's book is the realization that it is not self-evident 
that animals (and people) live together in groups: group-members are often a nuisance to 
each other. Yet, in many animal species we see many types of social forms and habits, 
which are not only explained by examining their evolutionary origins (phylogenetic inertia), 
but also by current ecological circumstances. The central antitheses in sociobiology are then 
not those between `nature' and `nurture', but those between the ultimate causes (selection 
factors in the direction of specific adaptations) and proximate causes of behavior (the actual 
realization of adaptations in specific hormonal and neural organizations), or to put it simply: 
between the functions/the evolutionary `why?' and the causes/the 
physiological/psychological `how?' The fact that extreme flexibility in social behavior is 
prevalent in a number of animal species, including man, calls for an evolutionary 
explanation in itself. It is, therefore, surprising to see how such a fierce critic of 
sociobiology as Marvin Harris (Harris, 1979: 140) refers in most of his criticism to this 
flexibility as if sociobiologists do not acknowledge it, while Wilson not only acknowledges 
it, but also tries to explain it (Wilson, 1975: 547). 
 
2.1 Ethology as the mother-discipline 
It seems to me that Wilson's Sociobiology is an important milestone, which however should 
be seen as the culmination of a revolution which was gradually taking place at that time in 
ethology, the discipline for which von Frisch, Lorenz and Tinbergen got their Nobel Prize in 
1973. In its first phase ethology, as the study of instinct (Tinbergen, 1951), was not always 
aware of the importance of the evolutionary basis of behavior or of the exact consequences 
of evolution. Some `classic' observers of animal behavior, such as Fabre, had never even 
been evolutionists. They continued to remain completely oriented towards the description 
and classification of animal behavior. The twentieth century founders of ethology were, 
however, evolutionists, but were initially limited to somewhat generalized and sometimes 
even wrong hypotheses concerning the function, survival potential or adaptiveness of 
behavior. 
 In the important summary work of 1951 The Study of Instinct, with which among 
other things Tinbergen attempted to make European ethology more accessible to the 
Americans, he admits that at that time the study of the evolution of behavior lagged still 
very much behind the knowledge possessed with respect to morphological evolution (1951: 
185). He attributes this lagging behind to the relative intangibility and fossilizability of 
species-related behavioral repertoires and to the difficulty of establishing their genetic basis. 
 A factor that Tinbergen does not name is the absence of competitive explanatory 
models, however improbable these may appear or be. These can move researchers into 
better underpinning the foundations of their specialist field, helping to expose and highlight 
any eventual imperfections.  
 An all-too-easy truism, which led many pioneer ethologists, such as Lorenz, astray, 
was the truism that certain forms of behavior did not so much serve the continued existence 
of the individual, but served that of the group or the species (Lorenz, for example, speaks of 
the Arterhaltende Funktion and Arterhaltungswert of behavior). This idea was often not 
presented as a hypothesis, but as an obvious consequence of Darwinism. It was probably so 
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popular because it created the possibility of grinding the sharp edges of Darwinism, and 
presented natural selection as a Providence concerned with the survival of species, which 
arranges everything in nature to everyone's best advantage. 
  In his famous work on aggression, Das sogenannte Böse, Lorenz states that 
individuals of the same species seldomly damage one another, because two fighting 
individuals of one species are in the end both oriented towards the `conservation of the 
species'. If conflicts get nevertheless out of hand, such as amongst man, this is caused by a 
`Fehlfunktion'. The hypothesis that both the provocation of a conflict and the avoidance of 
an escalation could sometimes be an advantage to the individual (or even his genes) remains 
undiscussed by Lorenz (Lorenz, 1966). 
 
2.2 An evolutionary mechanism: group selection 
The very attempt to systematically underpin and prove the theory that a great deal of 
behavior is aimed at the survival of the group (instead of the survival of the individual) 
started an extremely fruitful discussion, which in turn laid the foundations of sociobiology. 
It was V.C. Wynne-Edwards with his Animal dispersion in relation to social behaviour 
(1962), who forced a discussion about the precise benefits and costs from investments in 
group activities. (Before the work of Wynne-Edwards a modest model of group selection 
had already been proposed by Sewall Wright, who was criticized by Simpson, but it was 
only Wynne-Edwards who started to use group selection as an explanation of almost 
anything.) 
 Wynne-Edwards based his discussion on a number of studies that indicated that the 
distribution density of many animals was related to the distribution density of their food 
sources: in fact, the number of sea birds in each part of the Atlantic Ocean related quite 
accurately (correlation +0.85) to the plankton density in that area. Wynne-Edwards 
subsequently demonstrates the consequence of the inability of man to determine whale and 
fish catch quotas: as a result of overfishing the catch will eventually reduce. Consequently, 
Wynne-Edwards asks how it is possible that the behavior of man is responsible for 
disturbing the balance of nature. What mechanism prevents other predators from exhausting 
their food supplies? In his opinion, "something must restrain them, while in the midst of 
plenty, from over-exploiting their prey" (Wynne-Edwards, 1962: 7). 
 The mechanism that he put forward is group selection: groups successful in 
adjusting their population density to the level of food available in the area have been able to 
build up and maintain their restrictive characteristics over the millennia, whilst groups with 
a tendency towards short-term planning would have become extinct over the millennia as a 
result of food shortages. 
 Wynne-Edwards now thought, as a real sociobiologist, he had found a key to 
understanding a wide spectrum of astonishing forms of social behavior: from territorial 
behavior and the struggle for dominance, to the formation of large schools and swarms. 
According to him, territorial behavior is easily explained because it guarantees an efficient 
distribution of individuals over the available area, in addition to accurately attuning the 
population density to the availability of food. The moment no territory remains for new 
individuals, the optimum population density has been reached. Dominance hierarchies have 
the same effect: these prevent lesser individuals from reproducing themselves and guarantee 
that the most healthy and powerful individuals  maintain the group. Wynne-Edwards is at 
his most original in his explanation of the large shoals or swarms prevalent among many 
animals: these so-called `epideictic' displays apparently function as a sort of unconscious 
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population count, that as a result of negative feedback has subsequent repercussions on the 
size of the population. 
 
2.3 Wynne-Edward's presuppositions 
Wynne-Edwards' model made explicit a mode of thought that was common amongst 
biologists and ecologists at that time, and thought it through to its ultimate consequences. 
By drawing radical, and often completely contra-intuitive conclusions from more or less 
silently accepted premisses, Wynne-Edwards exposed a great deal of the presuppositions in 
this viewpoint while defending them. In doing so he made himself extremely vulnerable. 
That earns him considerable scientific merit. 
 One of the presuppositions that he very clearly puts forward and defends is the idea 
that groups are more or less bound to one location, forming closed units as a result, between 
which very few genes are exchanged. In Wynne-Edward's words, such local populations are 
of "common descent, self-perpetuating and potentially immortal" (1962: 144). Only in this 
manner can they form a genetic reservoir, in which characteristics attributed only to groups 
and not to individuals are disseminated. Wynne-Edwards very explicitly postulates that 
"what is actually passed from parent to offspring is the mechanism for responding correctly 
in the interest of the group in a wide range of circumstances" (1962:144). 
 The presupposition that he makes explicit here, is that certain group characteristics 
evolved because groups without them became extinct. "What is at stake is whether the 
group itself can survive or will become extinct" (1962: 144). Selection at the level of entire 
groups, that will or will not survive as a result of their capacity to limit births, must be 
stronger than selection at the level of individuals. A very long time ago groups with selfish 
and non-moderating members must have caused their own demise as a result of exhausting 
their environment (1963). In that respect Wynne-Edwards' work also contained a very clear 
message and warning for man, who has apparently already lost the capacity for natural birth 
control: this species must beware of the "axe of group selection" (1963). 
 In fact, by making his presupposition so explicit Wynne-Edwards made it very 
easy for his critics. The entire construction of his theory would collapse like a house of 
cards at the moment that it could be demonstrated that his presuppositions were incorrect 
and that all his examples of social and `altruistic' behavior could be explained as 
advantageous on the individual level. 
 
2.4 Wynne-Edwards' Critics: Lack and individual selection 
David Lack, whose book The natural regulation of animal numbers (1954) Wynne-
Edwards acknowledges as a particular inspiration (1962: 2), reacted immediately by means 
of the latter strategy. He discussed the invasions of Crossbills, Nutcrackers and Waxbills 
from the Taiga to our regions, that Wynne-Edwards actually viewed as a sort of collective 
altruistic suicide in the interest of maintaining the species (he literally writes about an 
`automatic social guillotine', 1962: 471). Lack reminds Wynne-Edwards that he had already 
excluded the suicide explanation in his 1954 book on the basis of two arguments: in the first 
place such a clear suicidal tendency would have been quickly wiped out by natural 
selection, and in the second place there are not many, but enough indications that emigrants 
- mostly juveniles that in competition with older individuals suffer defeat - in many cases 
fly back to the country of origin at the moment that the situation there is more favorable 
(Lack 1954: 232; 1966: 304). 
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 Lack also demonstrated that most cases of reproductive self-limitation, such as a 
limited number of eggs per nest for example, can best be explained by selection at an 
individual level (equated by Lack to natural selection). In the Sparrow, Swallow and mostly 
also in the Great Tit, the number of eggs per nest correlates to the maximum number of 
offspring for which the parents could find food for the duration of a specific season (Lack, 
1954: 22 e.v., 1966). The effect of laying more eggs is, therefore, counter-productive, and 
eventually leads to less offspring. Of course if this were not so, the genotype of the most 
fertile - the most egg producing individuals - would spread fastest through the population. 
As Lack noted in 1954: "natural selection operates on the survival rate of the offspring of 
each individual or genotype" (1954: 22). 
 
2.5 Williams and the selection of genes 
Lack was not the only `orthodox' Darwinist, who was forced by Wynne-Edwards to come 
with clear arguments for his point of view. In reaction to Wynne-Edwards a great number of 
authors felt it essential to indicate how group characteristics could be the result of the 
adaptedness of individuals to group life (Wiens, 1966). In his book Adaptation and natural 
selection (1966) G.C. Williams tried to create some clarity about the levels of selection, 
whereby he makes a distinction between `genic selection' or the natural selection of 
alternative alleles, resulting in organic adaptation, and `group selection', resulting in `biotic' 
adaptation. There is a clear difference between a population of adapted insects and an 
adapted population of insects (Williams, 1966: 108). 
  His argument against group selection does not mean that this form of selection is 
not possible, but only that it is a rather superfluous and implausible explanation for most 
adaptations that we see in nature. He shows that many explanations that refer to `group 
selection' and even to the `good of the species' confound effects and functions. For example, 
the `survival of the species' may be an effect of reproduction, but not its function. 
Individuals simply reproduce because they have inherited genes that caused their ancestors 
to do the same. Sex may confer evolutionary plasticity to a species, but only individual 
reproductive advantage can explain why asexual and sexual modes of reproduction are 
chosen in particular circumstances. The population as a whole may benefit from the 
tendency of birds to adjust their clutch size to the availability of food in a given year, but 
this property could only evolve because this tendency benefits individual reproductive 
success. In all, one should be very careful in identifying adaptations, because a property of 
an organism can only be called an adaptation if it really evolved as a result of the benefits it 
conferred on its possessors in the past. To call something an adaptation is to make a 
historical and causal claim. 
 According to Williams, very few traits can have evolved because they conferred 
benefits to groups or species. Group selection presupposes a series of circumstances which 
seldom occur in nature. Groups would have to possess a unique genetic code as a whole, 
that would have to force them into extinction or help them to survive as a whole. Groups 
would have to be relatively small and isolated, because otherwise selection on the level of 
individuals within groups would become more important. However, in contrast to 
individuals, groups seldom become extinct as a group, and that means that they are rarely 
`adapted' as a group. Williams can only find one example in the literature in which group 
selection is really the most likely explanation (Williams, 1966: 117). 
 Actually the only unit that 
according to Williams is stable enough to 
change significantly over many generations 
as a result of selection is the gene, defined 
as a chromosomal fragment that is not split 
by continuous recombination or meiosis, 
which is, therefore, `potentially indestructi-
ble'. Even individuals are not completely 
suitable as units of selection as long as they 
are unable to replicate themselves as 
individuals and can, as a result of meiosis, 
never contribute to much more than about 
half of the characteristics of the offspring 
(of course, mothers somewhat more than 
fathers, because they also contribute the 
first cell and its extrachromosomal DNA). 
The phenotypical physical appearance of 
Socrates plus the genotype lying at its 
foundation died out in the fourth century before Christ, but it is quite possible that some of 
Socrates genes still exist amongst us (Williams, 1966: 24). 
 
Figure 4-2. In diploid organisms the mean 
relatedness between offspring is ½. 
 With that, Williams' reaction to Wynne-Edwards and other group selectionists 
appears to have brought him to the other extreme. His argument is not only that selection at 
the level of the individual is stronger than selection at the level of groups: he immediately 
seeks the most fundamental level of selection and thus arrives at his `one-locus model of 
natural selection'. In doing so he does not deny that it is eventually individuals in which 
genes are tested (1966: 65), but he argues that it is the genes that connect generations, and 
that it is the genes, therefore, that are subject to variation and selection over many 
generations. 
 
2.6 The altruism question as a test: Hamilton and `inclusive fitness' 
A crucial test for the tenability of such a perspective was, of course, the possibility this 
model offered to explain behavior that in Wynne-Edwards' opinion could only be explained 
by alluding to group selection. From the very beginnings of sociobiology it has always been 
the explanation of altruism in particular that has remained the focus of attention. In ethology 
the term `altruism' is used to indicate behavior in which one individual sacrifices energy and 
reproduction opportunities for the benefit of the energy and reproduction opportunities of 
another individual (the extent to which altruism is accompanied in some animals with 
intentionality and awareness is, therefore, left open in this definition). The behavior of 
worker ants is described as being `altruistic', because they themselves do not reproduce, but 
invest all their energy in the reproduction of the queen of the colony. Another example that 
is often referred to (e.g. Maynard Smith, 1965) is the alarming of tits in groups of tits. The 
alarm call does indeed have acoustic qualities that make it difficult for a sparrow hawk to 
locate it, but it nevertheless remains a risk to the alarming individual and an advantage to 
the individual that is being warned. It therefore poses a problem for everyone rejecting 
group selection and its resultant unconditional group loyalty. 
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 In order to explain altruistic tendencies without resort to Wynne-Edwardsian group 
selection both Williams and J. Maynard Smith subscribed to the work of the geneticist 
Hamilton, who must surely rate as one of `fathers' of sociobiology (and whose recent death 
therefore means another blow to that discipline). Hamilton (1963, 1964) showed that 
altruism can evolve if the altruistic investment correlates to the extent of the genetic 
relatedness between the altruist and the 
benefiting individual. To demonstrate that 
altruistic behavior could evolve under this 
condition, he had to assume that a mutant 
with a slightly greater altruistic tendency 
would have more success under certain 
circumstances than his conspecifics that 
mutations - thus enabling the successful 
`altruistic mutant' to spread its altruism. 
 In other words, Hamilton postulated 
a genetic basis for altruistic behavior - `a gene 
for altruism' - which in fact is not at all that 
unusual when considering ants. A `gene for 
altruistic behavior' could emerge and prevail 
if the resultant altruism benefited other 
carriers of that same gene. The sacrifice of the 
altruistic gene in one individual could be 
compensated for by its survival in other 
individuals favored by the altruism. Altruism 
would therefore be specifically expected 
between gene-sharing individuals or kin. As Dawkins was to express it later: kin act as 
`survival machines' for the same genes, and altruism between kin could be the strategy of a 
`selfish' gene that is able to survive yet another generation as a result of mutual help among 
the survival machines that it has constructed (Dawkins, 1976). 
 
Figure 4-3. Relatedness in a haplodiploid 
species 
 Hamilton, for example, explained the independent evolution of infertile worker 
classes in several groups of hymenoptera as the result of the extra portion of kinship 
between sisters in this group, being a consequence of the fact that hymenopteric fathers are 
haploid and only produce identical sex cells (1964; see figure 3.1 and 3.2). (Hymenoptera 
can, like Water-Fleas, choose the sex of their offspring. Unfertilized eggs become males, 
which therefore have only one set of chromosomes.) As the process of natural selection 
therefore not only leads to the maximization of the fitness of individuals, but also to the 
maximization of the fitness of their kin, Hamilton introduced the concept of inclusive fitness 
to describe the effect of natural selection. (According to the Oxford Companion to Animal 
Behaviour (1987), fitness refers to "the ability of genetic material to perpetuate itself in the 
course of evolution"; inclusive fitness "is a measure based upon the number of the animal's 
genes that are present in subsequent generations, rather than the number of offspring"). 
 
2.7 Maynard-Smith: the difference between kin and group selection 
Maynard-Smith (1964) introduced the concept of `kin selection' in order to clarify the 
difference between the Hamilton model and that of Wynne-Edwards. At a later stage he 
sharpened the distinction between group selection and kin selection even further by very 
explicitly insisting on the extinction of isolated populations in group selection (1976). 
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Contrary to group selection, kin selection can explain the existence of altruism in non-
isolated populations of mutually competing individuals. In contrast, group selection requires 
that only a limited number of individuals are exchanged between groups: the altruism 
resulting from group selection could otherwise be misused by egoistic mutants, that would 
be able to plunder the environmental resources of their group and would leave for another 
group at the moment that their behavior caused an escalating shortage of food. Group 
selection requires that such mutants become extinct with the group which they have harmed, 
as a result of which this egoism does not pay. 
 So, while Wynne-Edwards was convinced that the competition and selection 
within groups would be suppressed and `overridden' by competition and selection between 
groups, the `fathers of sociobiology' (Lack, Williams, Hamilton, Maynard-Smith, Wilson, 
Dawkins) were placing the emphasis on selection within the group as the explanation of 
social behavior. For the very reason that the group selection model can be used more or less 
to explain everything as an adaptation aimed at group welfare, it is a methodically sound 
starting point to keep explanatory models as straightforward as possible and assume 
selection at the lowest possible level. If group characteristics can be explained as the result 
of the sum of many individual interactions, it is no longer necessary to present the group as 
a whole as a separate metaphysical entity. It is as a result of this critical approach that one 
would be able to distinguish those cases in which selection is really effective at the level of 
entire groups. If it can be demonstrated that a specific animal living in small isolated 
populations is sometimes entirely wiped out as the result of the emergence of egoistical 
mutants, and eventually becomes completely extinct including the egoists, then the 
suggestion that in this case there could probably be a question of group selection might 
possibly be proven. (Ewald, 1991, reasoned, for example, that group selection could well be 
the mechanism behind the relative good-naturedness of some parasites, that in their harmful 
form would not only destroy their host but also their own living environment: in the past 
only those parasites survived that remained beneficial to their host at least until they were 
able to move to a new one.) 
 
2.8 A new aspect of aggression: the evolutionary stable strategy 
The totally different methods with which Maynard-Smith (1976) and Lorenz (1966) 
approach the phenomenon of aggression are typical of the new approach. As said earlier, 
Lorenz believed that the ritual confinement of aggression could be explained as an 
adaptation serving the preservation of the species. Maynard-Smith drew up a mathematical 
model that takes the advantages and disadvantages of different behavioral strategies into 
account from the point of view of the individual, and illustrates how (hypothetical) 
populations, in which every individual has a specific strategy, are sensitive to an invasion of 
an alternative strategy, `misusing' the original strategy. The idea is that the selection process 
continuously removes those strategies that are sensitive to the invasion of alternatives. The 
result is the evolution of an evolutionary stable strategy, a behavioral pattern that is 
optimally adjusted to the unpredictability of the behavior of conspecifics. 
 With the aid of examples Maynard-Smith suggests that a strategy of unconditional 
aggression is very soon replaced by a strategy whereby an attempt is made to estimate the 
strength of the opponent, because individuals cannot blindly assume that they will always 
be the strongest in any potential conflict. From this theoretical model the ritual `sublimation' 
of aggression that we see in many animals can be understood to be an attempt by the 
individual parties to estimate their mutual power without having to be exposed to any 
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particularly great risk. It is not necessary to explain it as an altruistic act on behalf of an 
individual to maintain the species, but simply as the optimum strategy for the individual, 
considering the unpredictability of the behavior and strength of the opponent. 
 The concept of the evolutionary stable strategy can also throw light on the 
emergence of altruism in nature. A widespread misunderstanding of Hamilton's theory 
postulates for example that altruism in nature appears to the extent to which there are 
similarities between the genotypes of the parties involved. Hamilton's kinship theory does 
not, however, predict altruism on the basis of any global similarity between two genotypes. 
It only shows that a new emerging altruism-promoting mutation can more easily arise to the 
extent that it is shared by related individuals, who are likely to benefit from each others 
altruism: thus, between kin, the cost of altruism is balanced by the resulting benefits and it 
becomes an `evolutionary stable strategy'. 
 The question that the theory answers is thus: how is it possible for an alternative 
strategy, i.e. altruism, to break through within a population of egoists? An individual that 
only depended on the similarities between genotypes would enslave itself in the service of 
its conspecifics, and also in the service of related species, with the result that it would have 
no resources left to spread the gene responsible for this behavior. Altruism does not arise 
automatically the moment individuals coincidentally share a number of genes, as a gene 
promoting such altruism would eradicate itself. 
 To understand the origin of altruism we have to examine the circumstances under 
which a `gene for altruism' would be able to emerge in the population, in other words, the 
circumstances under which the disadvantage that such a gene would cause its possessor is 
compensated for by the advantage gained by another possessor of exactly the same gene. 
Under nearly all circumstances such a gene would again be selected out immediately, 
because it would prevent the owners from reproducing and therefore spreading further. 
Only if the gene emerges simultaneously in closely related individuals and it results in 
altruism that is oriented towards possessors of the same gene, can the gene spread this 
altruism as a result, i.e. it is evolutionary stable. 
  What actually counts, therefore, is not so much the global similarity between 
genotypes, but the chance that another specific individual shares a gene for altruism 
(Trivers, 1985: 126). Undirected help to congeners is therefore evolutionary unstable, as 
opposed to kin-specific help. Only nepotistic genes that promote copies of themselves in 
other individuals are therefore able to multiply through these individuals and will spread 
through the population like a stain of oil. In this universe, only altruism-promoting genes 
that guarantee their own propagation by being `selfish' (helping their own kind), will 
flourish. 
 
2.9 Levels of organization and explanation and the evolutionary stable individual 
In this analysis we see the characteristic `bottom-up' approach of sociobiology: considering 
that behavior must always first have a genetic basis somewhere, and that behavior that 
propagates its own genetic basis will increase in the population, we can view individuals as 
survival machines of their own `selfish' genes (Dawkins, 1976). This does not mean, 
however, that we can explain everything at the level of individual genes: this is because 
genes have to be `tested' in, and are dependent on, the individuals that build them up, thus 
forcing them to `cooperate' and preventing them from `parasitically existing' on the other 
genes with which they continuously move from body to body. In the process of selection the 
individual therefore represents an extremely stable organizational level, a `holistic' top-
  
145 
down element that may never be omitted from evolutionary explanations (Maynard-Smith, 
1990). Genes are selected to build up individuals together that will try to preserve 
themselves as long as they are able to spread these genes further. (Again and again, it is the 
holistic properties of the individual that are tested by natural selection each generation, 
however much these properties are caused by a collection of specific genes.) Only to the 
extent that individuals have lost their residual reproductive capacity and have become a 
burden toward kin will they sometimes develop self-destructive tendencies (De Catanzaro, 
1991). The cooperation of individuals within a group, however, is less harmonious than that 
of genes within an individual, because parasitic individuals can move from group to group. 
As a result sociobiological models force the acceptance of a hierarchy of selection and 
explanation levels that form a correctable midpoint between the purely speculative extremes 
of reductionism and holism (Trivers, 1985: 135; Maynard Smith, 1990; see also Slurink, 
1996, on holism and reductionism). 
 
4.3 CONFLICTS OF INTEREST WITHIN GROUPS, WITHIN SPECIES: TRIVERS' 
FOUR FUNDAMENTAL THEORIES 
Sociobiology began as an attempt to underpin claims with respect to the function of 
different forms of social behavior by means of more accurate cost/benefit analyses and a 
more accurate insight into the underlying evolutionary genetic level. An integration of 
ethology, ecology and evolutionary genetics was necessary, simply because without the 
latter the first two disciplines would be left dangling in the air. 
 Strictly speaking, the sociobiological revolution was a return to the original 
Darwinism, which arose as a reaction to the negative consequences of the emancipation of 
various biological subdisciplines, such as ecology and ethology. Sociobiology did not do 
away with these disciplines, but merely showed that it was not possible within these 
disciplines to make a choice from all the possible theories that could be raised by them. 
 It was G.C. Williams (1966) who pointed out that all the aspects of group life that 
Wynne-Edwards interpreted as consequences of group selection can also be interpreted as 
statistical consequences of individual adaptations. In his discussion of shoal formation in 
fish he remarks that the striking compactness and mutual coordination of shoals of fish do 
not intuitively lead us to the individual, but to considering the total shoal as being the 
primary body to be explained. Nonetheless, he asserts that shoal formation can only be 
understood by ignoring this intuitive reaction completely, and thinking in terms of the 
individual interests of each fish separately: shoals exist mainly in an environment where 
there is no shelter from predators, and the fish in shoals use their companions as a type of 
living shield. Because each individual continues to avoid the periphery separately, shoals 
often result that are so compact that predators are able to take advantage of them (he reports 
an observation of an enormous shark taking bites out of a dense shoal of herring as though it 
was an apple). Indeed, the nonconformist strategy of the Einzelgänger is relatively 
dangerous, otherwise shoals would cease to exist. 
 In his Geometry of the selfish herd (1971) Hamilton elaborates on this theme, but 
he also considers another factor that can make life in groups attractive: the increased chance 
of reproduction. He attempts to explain the curious dancing movements made by a swarm 
of mosquitoes by assuming that within these swarms there are actually advantages to being 
located on the outside: swarms of mosquitoes consist of males that act together to attract 
females, and quite possibly the males on the outside have the greatest chance of being first 
to welcome newly-arriving females. The irregular dancing movements of swarms of males 
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could then be explained by the tendency of each male to continuously seek compromises 
with respect to his position in relation to the wind direction, chances of being captured by a 
predator and chances of finding a mate. 
 The increasing emphasis on the explanation of group characteristics on the basis of 
individual interests can also be seen within the development of the study of the ecological 
determinants of various forms of society, i.e. socio-ecology. In the first instance socio-
ecologists only looked for correlations between types of food and forms of society. That led 
to the discovery that the differences observed in the social structures of the Red Colobus 
and the Black and White Colobus were basically a result of a difference in the use of food. 
Gradually socio-ecology began attaching increasingly more importance to the role of 
several other variables, such as the internal dynamics of interests resulting from the 
presence of two sexes, or the external pressures exerted by predators (Van Schaik & Van 
Hooff, 1983). Due to the criticism of group selection models it became inevitable to explain 
social phenomena at the appropriate level and to chart out all causal factors involved. 
 At that time the ultimate causes of social behavior had been problematicized to 
such an extent that it became obvious that an attempt could be made to systematize them in 
some way, and that is evidently one of the challenges that inspired Wilson to his 
Sociobiology. He provided us with a list of factors lying behind social evolution, which not 
only included defense against predators, but also the increase in competitive capacity 
(against other groups), the increase in foraging efficiency, the capacity to colonize new 
habitats, the increase in reproductive efficiency, the increased chance of survival at birth 
and the possibility of adapting the environment to the requirements of the collective needs 
of the group. The fact that animals often live together was no longer a matter of course for 
sociobiology, and that alone probably explains the anxiety felt by many social scientists and 
philosophers. Sociobiology put an end to social structures being taken for granted, and 
enabled a new analysis to be made of conflicts and antisocial tendencies within groups. 
 
1. Trivers' analyses of conflicts of interest: parents and children 
It was Robert Trivers in particular (1971, 1972, 1974, 1985; Trivers & Willard, 1973) who, 
by means of a number of concrete analyses of conflicts of interest, cleared the way for a 
deeper understanding of conflicts within societies. For example, in his article Parent-
offspring conflict (1974; see also Trivers, 1985: 145) he developed a theoretic model to 
explain the `weaning conflict' and other complications in the parent-child relationship. It 
was shown that the optimum cost/benefit ratio of parental investment from the perspective 
of the parents develops differently from the perspective of the offspring. From the 
perspective of the parents all successive offspring are in a certain sense survival machines 
of equal merit for their own genes (all their children bear at least half of their nuclear DNA); 
from the perspective of offspring other progenies are only equal to the extent in which there 
is a chance that they share genes. Considering that offspring are the products of sex cells 
that have undergone a reduction division, the chance that a specific gene is shared by a 
brother or sister is on average 0.50: for each individual gene there is a 50% chance that the 
brother or sister has obtained the parallel allele from the other parent (fig. 4-2). 
 The process of natural selection in parents and offspring will now produce 
differing optimum strategies. Parents will be selected to invest until the costs become 
greater than the benefits, in other words: until further investment in a specific child no 
longer balances up against the option of investing energy in a possible new child. Offspring, 
however, will be selected to stretch the parental investment until the costs (for the parent) 
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are twice as great as the benefit if there is still any chance of brothers and sisters, and until 
the costs are four times greater than the benefits if there is principally any chance of half-
brothers or half-sisters. In other words: offspring will be selected to consider themselves as 
being worth twice the trouble of being favored over brothers and sisters, and four times 
more than half-brothers or half-sisters. 
 Many predictions follow from this model, including the prediction that in species 
where the fathers come and go, the offspring remain demanding help from the mother for 
longer (after all, any new offspring are only half-brothers or half-sisters), and the prediction 
that older parents are likely to invest more in their children. In the meantime a number of 
these predictions have been proven by extensive empirical studies. It appears that older 
hinds produce better calves, despite their age, and Californian seagulls appear to invest 
more time in their offspring as they become older. In baboons, older mothers start rejecting 
their offspring later than younger mothers and reduced rejection rate is associated with 
longer time until the mother reproduces again (Trivers, 1985). On reading Jane Goodall's 
story about the exceptional relationship between the old, powerful, female chimpanzee Flo 
and her cherished offspring Flint, one is reminded of Triver's theory, but then incidental 
cases can hardly apply as evidence (Goodall, 1971; 1986). Neither can the fact that amongst 
humans, both in our own and other cultures, young mothers will sooner kill their children be 
considered as evidence, but it does fit exceptionally well into the theory (Daly & Wilson, 
1988: 76). 
 In many other species however, such as grey flycatchers, both parental investment 
and the child's call for help has been measured exactly. During the first nine days of their 
life young, grey flycatchers are apparently fed without ever having to cry or call for food. 
From the tenth to sixteenth day after leaving the nest the young have to chase their parents 
to an ever-increasing extent in order to obtain food, and despite all their efforts are fed less 
often and with ever-decreasing portions. The result is that they have to learn to catch flies 
and other insects themselves. Fourteen days after leaving the nest young flycatchers obtain 
more food from their own catches than from their parents. 
 The same patterns can be observed in many different species of animals: nearly 
everyone in Europe has probably seen the great crested grebe feeding its young. Especially 
later in the season one can often see how older young beg for fish continuously with an 
enormous degree of spectacle, but despite all their efforts are nevertheless chased away. 
 What happens if parents and offspring do not share genes can be seen the cuckoo: 
in this case the offspring has no interest whatsoever in the survival of its `brothers' and 
`sisters' and in the residual reproductive capacity of its parents. When the cuckoo comes out 
its egg, its first act is to throw its `siblings' overboard. Then it starts exploiting its 
stepparents by growing at least twice their size. Anybody who has ever seen a deceived 
wren, robin or hedge sparrow sitting on the back of `its' cuckoo offspring to feed it knows 
the extent of the cuckoo's parasitism on its hosts. It is no wonder that an evolutionary arms 
race is going on between the cuckoo and its parasites, which have evolved the capacity to 
recognize the eggs of the cuckoo, even if these have evolved a resemblance with the eggs of 
the host (Davies & Brooke, 1991). 
 Two further significant aspects of the parent-offspring conflict theory still remain 
to be discussed, in particular because they are also especially important to human 
psychology (Trivers, 1985: 155; Badcock, 1986; 1990). The first one concerns the 
consequences of the vulnerable, dependent position of the offspring in comparison with its 
parents. Because it possesses relatively little physical strength, it is to be expected that it 
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will employ psychological tactics in order to prolong parental investment: one of them 
could be something like the Freudian regression, an attempt at looking younger and more 
dependent than is really the case (Badcock, 1990). It is safe to assume that offspring possess 
a far greater degree of psychological skills for manipulating parents at a very early stage 
than they are credited with, and that in some cases parents develop counter strategies: for 
example, it appears that unlike their male counterparts, female budgerigars are immune to 
the begging of their offspring. Additionally, it is to be expected that offspring of intelligent 
learning species, such as humans, will develop both an internal representation of the 
interests of their parents and that of themselves. It was Trivers himself who pointed to the 
parallels with the Freudian system of super-ego, id and the arbitrating ego that lies between 
them (Trivers, 1985: 163). 
  A second additional aspect concerns the conflict between parents and offspring 
regarding the relationships between their offspring. Assessed from the parent's point of view 
the offspring have to be mutually altruistic if the benefits of that altruism (for the offspring 
being helped) are greater than the costs (for the helping offspring), because from their 
perspective offspring are survival machines of equal merit for parental genes. From the 
offspring's point of view altruism with respect to its brothers and sisters is only rewarded if 
the benefits are twice as great as the costs, because they only share approximately half of 
their own genes with them (in diploid species!). In relation to half-brothers and half-sisters 
the benefits have to be four times greater than the cost. A consequence is that disagreement 
is to be expected regarding the behavior of the offspring. Because the offspring is far more 
dependent on the parent in an early phase than in a later phase, it will adapt to parental 
wishes in the earlier phase: bringing to mind Kohlberg's good-boy/nice-girl stage. However, 
around the time that offspring become sexually mature they will begin reorganizing their 
own personality in such a manner that it more accurately represents their own interests. If 
they are still living at home at this stage this can imply the explosion of a bio-psychological 
time-bomb. 
 
 
2. Trivers' analyses of conflicting interests: sex differences 
Another Trivers' model (Trivers, 1972; 1985: 203) explains a number of the most significant 
sexual differences in various parental strategies. Contrary to some socialization theories, 
this model does not only refer to sexual differences in humans. On the contrary, like all 
sociobiological theories it tries to apply an understanding of the behavior among all living 
beings in general to throw light on the behavior of humans. 
 Trivers ties into the famous study made by Bateman in 1948 regarding the 
differences in the reproductive success between the sexes of the well-known fruit fly, 
Drosophila. The study revealed that there was a great relative difference in reproductive 
success among the males in particular. A small number of males appeared to achieve 
unbelievably high scores, while among females the number of matings following the first 
mating did not appear to affect the eventual number of offspring. Bateman explained the 
variation as being due to the different investment of both sexes in their sex cells (anisoga-
my). The production of an individual sex cell costs a male very little energy, so that it is not 
the production of sex cells that limits his total reproductive success, but the preparedness of 
the female to mate. For the female, however, the situation is different, because she lays the 
eggs, and her eventual reproductive success is therefore not limited by her ability to have 
the eggs fertilized, but by her capacity to produce them. 
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 Trivers subsequently noted that in all species in which the males refrain from 
making a large initial investment, the reproductive success of the males shows a far greater 
degree of variation than in the females (he quotes field studies about dragonflies, baboons, 
frogs, prairie dogs, geese, lizards, walruses and dung flies). At the same time, however, he 
remarks that in monogamous species the reproductive success of males would vary just as 
little as in females if there were no possibility for adultery and no variation in the mortality 
of females. He consequently attempts to arrive at a more general wording in which parental 
investment is coupled to sexual selection. Thereby he defines parental investment as every 
investment made by the parent in an individual offspring which results in the chances of 
that offspring to survive (and therefore reproduce) being increased at the cost of the 
capacity of the parents to invest in other offspring. He then arrives at the rule that the sex 
providing the greatest parental investment is a limiting factor for the opposite sex and that 
this latter sex will mutually compete for access to the more investing sex. 
  With this formulation he simultaneously corrects the impression, which might 
possibly be raised by the Bateman study, that it is always the males that fight over females. 
What is actually explained is that the sex making the greatest initial investment usually 
specializes in a qualitatively high-value further investment, while the sex with the smallest 
initial investment usually has to compete mutually to gain access to the most investing sex. 
 Because egg cells are larger than seed cells this usually concerns females and 
males respectively, but that is not always the case. In a number of species the initial 
investment made by the male is also considerably high. In mormon grasshoppers, for 
example, the male adds a spermatophore to his seed that is extremely rich in nutrients, male 
sea horses have a pouch in which to keep eggs, in at least one species of frog it is the male 
that transports the eggs, and among grey fringillines, emus and lily-trotters it is the males 
that brood and hatch out the eggs. In all these species the females fight for the males instead 
of the opposite way around. 
 A beautiful scene from David Attenborough's Trials of Life clearly shows, for 
example, how a female lily-trotter marches across the water-lily leaves toward an 
industriously brooding and much smaller male lily-trotter. Once she has looked about to 
establish that there is no `lady' around to protect this `gentleman' she resolutely runs up to 
the brooding male, drives him off the nest and tramples the clutch of eggs. A little later we 
see her mating with the male, undoubtedly to leave him shortly afterwards sitting on a new 
clutch. 
 The reproach that Trivers' theory is sexist (e.g. Roeleveld & Kemps, 1986) is 
therefore somewhat paradoxical, because it is Trivers himself who has focused so much 
attention on these cases, and as such can justifiably claim to have put a definite end to 
stereotypes (Trivers, 1976). On further study, this reproach, as formulated by Roeleveld and 
Kemps, appears to rest on an incorrect interpretation. Roeleveld and Kemps interpret the 
theory of parental investment by assuming that this means that the total reproductive 
investment in females is greater than that of males. They triumphantly state that males make 
at least as much effort, because they deliver their sex cells in great quantities and in addition 
to that they fight over females! In fact this was exactly what the theory of parental 
investment was trying to explain. What the theory of parental investment is concerned about 
is not the total reproductive effort, because from the sociobiological perspective it is 
actually expected that all male efforts - exactly like the female efforts - are eventually 
oriented toward the spreading of their genes. It concerns the differing manner in which 
males and females make the effort, and in particular their different investment in each 
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individual offspring (which Roeleveld and Kemps could have known if they had read 
Trivers' definition of parental investment). 
 Of course, Trivers' theory of parental investment would have undoubtedly been the 
product of a male bias if he had blindly assumed that it was always the females that invested 
more per individual offspring. However, he actually avoids all bias by defining parental 
investment in such a way that high initial male investment, such as the result of male egg 
hatching for example, is also included, and by not postulating that males always fight over 
females, but that the less investing sex always fights over the more investing sex. That 
female mammals have to make a high initial investment as a result of pregnancy, and 
therefore have a tendency toward polygamous systems where often one male is temporarily 
involved in defending a complete harem of females, is of course another matter all together. 
Only a small minority of mammals are monogamous, amongst which, however, 37 species 
of monkeys. Amongst birds those ratios are, however, completely different, as the males are 
able to help in hatching the eggs.  
 Perhaps Trivers' explanation of sex differences on the basis of opposing and 
divergent investment strategies has been his most influential theory. Sociobiologists and 
evolutionary psychologist have been concentrating on the study of sex differences almost 
continually. In recent years there have been a lot of studies on sex differences in mate 
choice and sexual selection. One of the big questions is whether sexual selection can be 
seen as an alternative to natural selection, as Darwin saw it already (Darwin, 1871; Zahavi 
& Zahavi, 1996; Miller, 2000). In principle, individuals could choose partners with 
characteristics that are disadvantageous if it comes to simple, straightforward survival. The 
peacock is an obvious example. His beautiful tail cannot be said to be practical apart from 
its function in attracting mates. It is a handicap rather than handy, but it has evolved simply 
because peahens prefer males with a lot of `eyes' in their tails. Why would they prefer such 
males? It could be simply an evolutionary luxury, evolving by runaway sexual selection: if 
most females like males with large tails, males with large tails leave more descendants and 
mean tail length will increase rapidly. Having sons with short tails would become unwise 
rather soon and that would reinforce the tendency to choose males with long tails (the `sexy 
son hypothesis'). It is also possible that tail-length reflects general health and strength. If 
only healthy males are able to grow long tails, long tails would be ideal `fitness indicators' 
(Miller, 2000). Despite being a `handicap' (Zahavi & Zahavi, 1996), the tail of a particular 
peacock would in that case advertise good genes. The beautiful song of a Song Thrush with 
its many repetitions could be translated into "ex Hey dear eee, e I am here eee, To what 
I tell eee, e Listen well eee, e In this contest eee, e My e genes proof best eee". 
 Of course, it is unlikely that 
sexual selection runs completely opposite 
to natural selection. Yet, at the moment 
that in a particular species one sex almost 
invests nothing in its offspring, it can 
concentrate fully on transferring genes to 
the next generation via the bottleneck of 
pleasing, courting and mating. For the 
non-investing sex in such species pure 
simple surviving becomes of secondary 
importance. Only one thing counts: being 
chosen, whatever that may imply. It is 
also not unlikely that in some species 
some individuals (Don Juan-types) 
specialize in being chosen as good-genes 
suppliers, while other individuals 
(respectable house-fathers) advertise via a 
mix of good genes and other services. 
Trivers himself has dedicated one whole 
chapter of his most important work Social 
Evolution (1985) purely to show that the 
differential mortality by sex in humans is 
no accident, but that it reflects differences 
in priorities which have been shaped by 
natural and sexual selection. 
 
Figure 4-4. A variation on figure 0-1: sexual 
selection as an extra creative loop in evolution. 
 
3. Trivers' analyses of conflicts of interest: preferring children of one sex over another 
A third, much less obvious, Triversian theory was coauthored with the mathematician 
Willard (Trivers & Willard, 1973) and concerns small deviations in the proportion of males 
to females, the so-called sex-ratio, in different species. It carries the way of thinking 
expressed in the first two theories one small step further, but this small step is great indeed 
if one looks at its consequences. 
 According to the mathematician and geneticist Fisher sex-ratio's will tend to be 
50/50 (ratio of males to females) at birth, because a relative overproduction of babies of one 
sex will always be counterbalanced by an increase in the reproductive value of babies of the 
other sex. Parents who in that situation produce babies of the opposite sex can be certain 
that their children will be able to choose the best available mates and will produce a 
maximum number of grandchildren. In the long run the optimal strategy is to produce 
babies in a 50/50 ratio. 
 According to Trivers and Willard there is, however, one factor which could result 
in small deviations from this ratio: the relative high variation of male reproductive success. 
If male reproductive success varies with health and strength, it makes sense to produce and 
favor sons which are healthy and strong. This is probably only possible if the mother itself 
is in good condition. If the mother is in poor condition, daughters could be a better 
investment, because their chances of failing to reproduce are smaller. 
 Trivers and Willard cite an interesting series of examples to sustain their claims. 
For example, it seems that there are two species of seals of which females pupping early in 
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season produce sex ratios larger than 120/100, while females pupping late produce a 
complementary ratio (less than 80/100). It seems that sex ratio at birth in dogs, deer and 
humans drops after an increasing number of pregnancies and an increasing litter size 
(personally, I have had two elder brothers and two younger sisters, but, of course, it is 
dangerous to take one's own family as an example). Because in mammals it are the males 
who determine sex of offspring, it is assumed that female `control' over sex ratios involves 
early differential male mortality. It is known for a long time that more male embryos result 
in miscarriages than female embryos. 
 Trivers and Willard suspect that the model can be applied to humans as they are 
differentiated according to their position on the socioeconomic scale. They point to the 
tendency of females to marry upward the socioeconomic ladder (hypergamy) and to a 
correlation between socioeconomic status and sex ratio at birth. They also predict that 
parents in better condition or in higher social classes will show a bias toward male 
offspring. 
  Gradually, some evidence has been collected the last ten years to show that the 
`Trivers-Willard effect' is no fiction indeed (for overviews, see Voland, 1993, and Mealy, 
2000). First, it has been found that increased resource access and increased dominance 
correlate with an increased production of sons. One of the postulated mechanisms relates to 
the testosterone-level of the mother (Grant, 1998). Second, a series of good examples are 
found in which the predicted postnatal patterns of favoritism for one sex over the other fit 
the Trivers-Willard model. Voland (1984, 1993), for example, found a clear relationship 
between sex ratio and social status by researching historical records of a farmer community 
in Sleswig-Holstein. Bereczkei & Dunbar (1997) researched a group of Hungarian gypsies 
and found a series of female-biased reproductive strategies, exactly as one would expect this 
in a community of a discriminated minority. Lee Cronk (1989, 1999) discovered a postnatal 
favoritism for daughters among the Mukogodo, a Kenyan tribe that only recently left its 
caves and its atavistic hunting habits and has considerable difficulty competing for cattle 
with the neighboring Massai and Sambura. Daughters in this community have much more 
changes of finding a good partner outside their community than sons. Strangely enough the 
Mukogodo say that they prefer sons over daughter just like the surrounding tribes, but their 
actions speak louder than words.  
 In many other societies a clear favoritism for sons is found. In the upper classes of 
India this is particularly visible. It would be interesting to research the behavior of current 
chinese families, now that there are emerging larger differences in income and now that 
there is still an official one-child policy. From the theory of Trivers and Willard one would 
predict, that there would emerge a favoritism for daughters among the poor. The daughters 
that are `exported' and are given at western adoption parents would then descend from the 
relatively rich. Undoubtedly, the Trivers and Willard effect will keep sociobiologists busy 
for a long time to come. 
 
4. Trivers' analyses of conflicts of interest: living together with 
non-relatives 
A final major contribution made by Trivers to sociobiology was a 
model with which the origin of cooperation between non-related 
individuals could be explained (Trivers, 1971, 1985, but also G.C. 
Williams, 1966: chapter 4). According to Trivers, cooperation 
between non-related individuals is possible if they at least live for 
long enough, can recognize one another personally and are able to 
observe one another for long enough. Under these conditions 
reciprocal altruism is possible, i.e. cooperation on the basis of an 
exchange of investments. Trivers saw that complications arise in 
reciprocal altruistic relationships that do not occur in relationships 
that are the product of kinship: for example the problem of taking 
undue advantage by means of raising false expectations, of distrust in 
general, and the effect of `social monitoring' by third parties, who 
follow the interactions between two individuals and record which one 
cheats the other most. 
 In the meantime studies have been made into reciprocal 
altruistic relationships in a large number of species, including vampire bats, baboons and 
chimpanzees. The tense relationships between two territory holding neighbors amongst 
birds are also extremely suitable for analysis using the model. Neighbors recognize each 
other's call and leave one another in peace, provided the unwritten territorial borders are 
respected. A number of sea mammals, including whales, dolphins and walruses, are also 
talented reciprocal altruists. Just as among chimpanzees and vampire bats, a situation of 
mutual dependency exists in these species, because a wounded animal can easily drown. 
Whales and dolphins demonstrate a stubborn tendency to lift their wounded to the surface, 
an action which they have even been observed to do with drowning humans. 
 
Figure 4-5. Reciprocal 
altruism. If b rewards 
investments of a with 
equal investments, a 
cooperation can 
emerge from which 
both parties gain profit. 
 Trivers himself gave cause for extensive speculation with respect to the 
consequences of reciprocal altruism for the human psyche (Trivers, 1971, 1985; Badcock, 
1986, 1990). In his 1971 article he expressed his suspicion that the growth of the human 
brain could well be a product of the complicatedness of reciprocal altruistic relationships in 
humans. Among other things these make the demand that the individual should pretend 
rather than be altruistic. Considering that it is easier to lie about something to others if you 
believe it yourself, this could lead to the evolution of an unconscious representation of one's 
own interests (the id).  
 In contrast to this unconscious representation of one's own interest, group interests 
can also be internalized into a `super-ego', which we have already encountered in the 
context of the parent-offspring conflict. Reciprocal altruistic relationships in somewhat 
larger groups can, as a result of a process of collective mutual monitoring, generalize into a 
moralistic pressure to invest in the welfare of the group. Dominant individuals, who are best 
served by an atmosphere of decency and dedication, can start playing the role of the 
representatives of the `collective interest' and can start rewarding altruistic investments 
made in the group's welfare and punishing egoistic actions. Alexander (1979, 1987) called 
this kind of reciprocal altruism, in which it becomes important to be known as a reliable 
cooperator (to have a high `moral status'), indirect reciprocal altruism and considers it to be 
the most important drive behind the creation of group moralism amongst people (cf. also 
Slurink, 1989, 1994). 
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 This speculation connects well to that with respect 
of the parent-offspring relationship, because in human 
society it is usually the parents that attempt to introduce the 
group's standards to the child. The super-ego is therefore 
first identified with the parents, and later with different 
standards of ethics, e.g. those referring to `the welfare of the 
group' or even to the ideal of universal welfare. However, 
the ego continues to zigzag between the super-ego and the 
id in such a manner that on the one hand the interests of the 
id are looked after, while on the other hand the moral status 
of the individual remains undamaged. Sociobiology proofs, 
therefore, not to be incompatible with aspects of 
psychoanalysis and may even claim to have rediscovered, 
within a completely new evolutionary frame-work, some of 
the psychoanalytical doctrines of the topography and 
dynamics of the subconscious (Badcock, 1986; 1990). 
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4.4 IF FOR BIRDS AND BEASTS, WHY NOT 
HUMANS?: THE CRITICS. 
Trivers' four above mentioned analyses all refer to areas of 
intraspecific conflict which are central to human 
consciousness and suffering (Trivers, 1976), but offer 
completely new, contra-intuitive, trans-phenomenological interpretations of them. As a 
result, we probably will never see the relationship between parents and children, brothers 
and sisters, men and women, friends and enemies in the same way as before. In that respect, 
sociobiology represent a fundamental Gestalt-switch which often makes it hard to 
understand for people that are still too much immersed in analyses at the proximate level. 
 
Figure 4-6. Indirect reciprocal 
altruism: 1. c, d and e observe 
the way a treats b; 2. c 
concludes that a is a good 
cooperator; 3. a is judged a 
good cooperation by all, 
because of his conduct with 
respect to b and c. 
 Often such people tend to understand evolutionary analyses, in which simply 
nothing is self-evident, as analyses in terms of particular proximate mechanisms, especially 
in terms of a rigid, genetic predetermination of behavior. In fact, if behavior is rigidly 
preprogrammed, as it probably is in insects, this is because it is selected to be so during 
evolution. Human behavior, which is selected to be adaptable to a variety of habitats and a 
spectrum of sex-age classes, social roles and cultures, can be expected to be highly flexible. 
 Currently, human sociobiology is often referred to as evolutionary psychology to 
avoid the incorrect association between `biology' and `unchangeable and genetically 
determined' (Cosmides & Tooby, 1987). Ironically, no one seems to remember that this 
term was first used by William James (1890: e.g. 146). Nowadays it is used, however, to 
underline the importance of investigating not only the adaptedness of behavior, but also the 
specific mechanisms through which this adaptedness is achieved by natural selection. Only 
that way can we appreciate the limits to adaptation, which is not the result of a conscious act 
of design, but simply of a blind process of variation and selection. Evolutionary 
psychologists often stress that the human psyche has evolved during the Pleistocene while 
humans were hunter-gatherers; many psychological adaptations seem only to make sense 
within this context (Barkow, Cosmides & Tooby, eds., 1992). Thus, one should not expect 
all modern human behavior to be perfectly adaptive. Also, because the human mind consists 
of a series of independent modules (Tooby & Cosmides like to compare it to a swiss-army 
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knife; Horgan, 1995), one should not expect that it is an all-purpose problem-solver which 
can be applied to any problem with the same ease and speed. 
 However, even in this new shape sociobiology is sometimes still experienced as 
dangerous and offending (Rose & Rose, 2000). People are well able to accept that the earth 
has been dominated by Dinosaurs for more than two-hundred million years, that the earth 
will be swallowed by the sun in about five billion years or that the universe will collapse in 
a Big Crunch or will expand forever. With respect to these topics they rely blindly on 
experts who will claim now this way, now that. When it comes to a deeper understanding of 
their relationship with their parents and children, with their lovers and partners, with their 
friends and foes, however, many think they are experts and that their experiences are unique 
and cannot be understood with reference to general laws that apply to other species as well. 
 It is this obsession with our own human uniqueness and dignity (plus the hope that 
the factors determining our destiny are controllable) which have made analyses which refer 
to proximate factors, often very specific for the human species, far more popular within the 
human sciences than analyses which refer to ultimate, evolutionary factors. Yet, it cannot be 
denied that inventories of the ultimate level are still often speculative and that there can be 
made many mistakes when we try to map this unknown territory. Exactly those points that 
are placed central by a recent generation of evolutionary psychologists, the swiss-army 
knife metaphor of the human mind (the hypothesis of functional modularity) and the myth 
of the stone-age mind (the hypothesis of delayed adaptation) could belong partly to the 
category of `informed speculation'. Of course, such speculative assumptions that could turn 
out to be mistakes are often placed central by critics in their search for weaknesses and in 
their attempt to make the whole enterprise seem ill-founded and ridiculous. 
 It seems a good idea to give some attention to the criticisms that are still often 
raised. Let us concentrate on the issues that are raised in discussions on sociobiology and 
evolutionary psychology: 
- 1. the accusation of strong genetic determinism, 
- 2. the accusation of adaptationism (`ultra-Darwinism') 
- 3. the reproach of ad hoc speculation, 
- 4. the idea that adaptationist theories are dispensable and unnecessary, 
- 5. the idea that sociobiologists underestimate forms of group selection, 
- 6. recent criticisms of evolutionary psychology. 
- 7. the reproach that sociobiologists are falling prey to the naturalistic fallacy. 
 
 
 
ad 1.Human sociobiology: genetic determinism? 
At least in the articles written by Trivers very little can be found which justifies the criticism 
that human sociobiology is characterized by an extreme genetic determinism and 
adaptationism. The underlying train of thought is of a completely different nature. It does 
not state that: "animal behavior is innate; man is an animal; therefore, human behavior is 
innate as well", but "living in groups has serious disadvantages and animal societies are 
always characterized by conflicts of interest between generations, sexes and non-related 
individuals; people also live in groups; let us examine how people deal with their conflicts 
of interest". The possibility that man has an exceptional way of living together is left 
completely open. There is no question of man being dealt with as being "just like any other 
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animal" in the global and pejorative sense, in which, unfortunately, people often speak 
about animals. 
 The only implicit claim is that man should be viewed as a product of evolution, 
and that, accordingly, all unique human characteristics, such as human intelligence and 
morality, require an explanation in terms of selection, whereby, however, group selection 
should not be too easily invoked as a sort of deus ex machina. From the point of view of 
sociobiology, the social sciences form typical examples of emancipated and liberated 
disciplines that are in need of having their presuppositions calibrated against the underlying 
level. The division of the reality into sub-sectors does not justify scientists to neglect their 
`antidisciplines' (Wilson, 1990). 
 A crucial distinction that should be made in this context is that made between 
`reduction by dissection' and `evolutionary reductionism' (Alexander, 1987). Reductionism 
by dissection refers to the proximate organization of an organism and examines how it is 
composed: the male sex hormone, for example, appears to effect a small increase (5%) in 
the total combustion. Evolutionary reductionism however poses the why-question, and 
reveals why men that burned more in the past had greater reproductive success, so that now 
men on average burn a little more than women. The danger of `reductionism by dissection' 
is that it often does not recognize the complexity of an organism, because it only isolates 
one essential causal factor. 
 Evolutionary reductionism does not, on the other hand, make any pronouncement 
regarding the complexity and flexibility of a specific organization, because it often just 
examines the effects, leaving the ways in which these are achieved aside. Evolutionary 
reductionism expects a specific capacity for fitness maximizing choices from both the 
neural nodes of a flatworm and the human brain, explicitly leaving open the possibility that 
the human brain has to perform far more computation to achieve the same objectives. 
Contrary to `reductionism by dissection', the evolutionary reductionist concentrates on the 
characteristics of the whole organism as it is functioning in its environment, because in the 
past it is these characteristics which have been tested by natural selection. The evolutionary 
reductionist has good reasons to assume that organisms are purposeful entities, that 
distribute their own building plan. His reduction, therefore, refers to this purposefulness, 
towards this tendency towards inclusive fitness maximization or selfish gene propagation. 
This tendency itself is a holistic property of the organism such as it is functioning within its 
environment and such as it has been bred and tested, again and again, by natural selection in 
the environment in which its ancestors were bred (the E.E.A. or environment of 
evolutionary adaptedness, Bowlby, 1969; Tooby & Cosmides, 1990). Thus, evolutionary 
reductionism presupposes a version of holism, in which only the organism as a whole is 
`visible' to natural selection. Defects and new properties are only `known' to natural 
selection via their fitness consequences, that is via the differences in reproduction success 
that they bring about. 
 In the past the claims made by sociobiology were often incorrectly interpreted as 
being reductionist in the dissectional sense. It was, in fact, Wilson himself (1975) who 
unfortunately gave reason to this. In his closing chapter he wrote somewhat confusedly 
about the effects of biology on sociology: 
 
 The transition from purely phenomenological to fundamental theory in sociology 
must await a full, neuronal explanation of the human brain. Only when the 
machinery can be torn down on paper at the level of the cell and put together 
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again will the properties of emotion and ethical judgement come clear... Having 
cannibalized psychology, the neurobiology will yield an enduring set of first 
principles for sociology (Wilson, 1975: 575). 
 
This passage, as I have quoted it with the omission of several nuances, can easily be read as 
an attempt to reduce sociology to neurobiology. In all probability, these types of passages 
have misled the critics. Unfortunately the resultant effect was that the actual meaning of 
sociobiology disappeared from sight. The need to assess behavior within a specific 
evolutionary context became confused with taking up a specific position in the nature-
nurture discussion. The importance of selection at the level of individuals or genes (contrary 
to at the level of groups) was confused with genetic determinism (Dawkins, 1982). 
 In fact, sociobiology leaves open the possibility that the behavior of man is to a 
great extent the product of learning processes, cultural habit-forming and intelligent 
planning (Wilson, 1978; Alexander, 1979, 1987). It is just these types of mechanisms that 
evidently make man capable of surviving under a multitude of ecological and social 
circumstances. On the basis of evolutionary theory we should not expect a `gene-free 
culture' (Harris, 1979), but a culture that enables people to survive in a multitude of 
ecological circumstances. Within the context of sociobiology it is even possible to speculate 
about human freedom and its function. Human freedom is interpreted then as the capacity to 
make optimum inclusive fitness maximizing choices within a wide variety of cultural 
contexts (Slurink, 1989). It is not opposed to physical determinism, but it is opposed to a 
psychological determinism in which drives directly express themselves in behavior, without 
mediation of learning, experimentation, culture, and creativity. For a species which has to 
survive in a variety of ecological circumstances such a capacity is highly adaptive. 
 Indeed, it has been this very hypothesis that has been tested successfully many 
times in recent decennia. For example, social success is defined differently in a diversity of 
cultures: it can be defined by power, wealth, ferocity, and so on. However, it is striking that 
there is often a correlation between social and reproductive success: in cultures where 
wealth is valued most (as in the Yomut Turkmen, Irons, 1979), the rich have often most 
children, in cultures (such as the Yanomamö) in which ferocity is valued most, ferocious 
men have the most children (Chagnon, 1988), and in societies with a despotic character it is 
the powerful who appear to monopolize the women (Betzig, 1991). Apparently the 
universal tendency to increase one's reproductive success is somehow determined 
genetically, via a series of psychological mechanisms, while the standards of social success 
can be adapted to the circumstances to some extent (obviously ferocity and the ability to 
become wealthy or powerful are not completely different phenotypical traits). 
 The same complicated relationship between genes and culture can be seen in 
numerous aspects of human behavior. For example, the various cultural forms of marriage 
that we see in different societies are apparently not innate, but neither are they merely 
expressions of an unbridled creativity in search of a change. Just like dunnocks, people are 
monogamous, polygamous or polyandrous dependent on ecological circumstances: amongst 
ourselves, too, it appears that only `rich' territory owners are capable of attracting and 
maintaining multiple females (Flinn & Low, 1986). That means at the same time, however, 
that in both dunnocks and man the genetic potential includes a polygamous option that 
emerges under particular circumstances. The underlying cause is undoubtedly the 
anisogamy (the difference in size of male and female gametes) shared by dunnocks and 
man: the large size and small amount of the female gametes implies a relatively large 
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original investment, which forces females to be much more careful with the resultant 
offspring. The moment that paternal certainty drops, or that there are more females who 
prefer one superior territory, males of both species can permit themselves the luxury of 
adopting a relatively non-obligatory attitude with respect to their offspring, which forces 
females to accept a relatively large part of the parental responsibility. 
 Yet, there are a number of differences between dunnocks and man that we will 
have to sketch out in order to remain ahead of the critics. One of the differences with 
dunnocks, for example, is the phenomenon of `socially imposed monogamy' (as opposed to 
`ecologically imposed monogamy', Alexander, 1979, 1987) in large societies: this form of 
monogamy, that is quite exceptional in historical terms, but which has gradually spread over 
the entire world (Betzig, 1991; Low, 2000), appears to be a product of the incapacity of the 
elite to monopolize power in `modern' societies, and is in all probability partially due to a 
common dependency on technology. In large societies the social pressure of the masses on 
the dominant group has increased to such an extent that it has had to abandon the sexual 
privileges that are coupled to dominance in many societies. 
 Using data from Murdock's ethnographic atlas, Frans Roes has demonstrated that 
monogamy and the belief in moralizing deities - products of a collective moralistic 
aggression - is directly related to the size of societies (Roes, 1992; chapter 6). Language and 
morals do not so much create a new, independent, `super organic' (in the terms of 
Durkheim) dimension, as new balance-of-power relationships with far-reaching 
consequences. A sociobiology of man that does not take this into account can be compared 
with a sociobiology of the hawk that fails to take into account its hooked beak. 
 The human capability for creating culture should, therefore, not be merely viewed 
as a luxurious creativity, but as a gene-based capacity for making fitness-maximizing 
choices under a diversity of ecological and social circumstances. Standards and values are 
not created from thin air, but are adjustments to circumstances. Many of our Western 
standards and values can, for example, be understood as the effects of relatively low infant 
mortality. Infant mortality is of immediate significance for determining the most optimal 
reproduction strategy: one aimed more at quantity or one aimed more at increasing the 
chances of relatively few children (Reynolds & Tanner, 1983). Many Islamic countries have 
been faced for centuries with a relatively high occurrence of hunger, war and infant 
mortality in comparison to Christian countries: these differences are expressed in various 
regulations with respect to sex, marriage, celibacy, abortion, etc. 
 Because religious decrees often have a reproductive-strategic content, individuals 
can determine their own reproductive strategy in their choice for specific cults. As such, 
religious doctrines give a large amount of elbow-room for strategic adjustment. Christianity 
attaches much value to the individual and as a result it is favored in countries with a 
relatively low infant morality. The whole pattern of values characteristic of our modern 
welfare state, especially the increase in the emphasis on the individual and his self-
realization (relative, even, to traditional Christianity), can be seen as the effect of scarcity 
combined with an exceptionally low infant mortality. 
 Viewed in this way the claim that sociobiology is `genetically deterministic' 
appears somewhat unfounded. Sociobiology does not claim that people are genetically 
programmed to behave in specific ways, but more that they are capable of devising 
inclusive fitness-maximizing ways to cope with a wide variety of circumstances (Alexander, 
1987). As people have been continually tested in this respect throughout their evolutionary 
history, their psyches have become orchestrated with a collection of drives and values that 
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ensures that they do not forget important points on their teleonomic agenda. Of course, 
some of these drives may themselves become non-adaptive in a changing ecology, and it is 
only to be expected that individuals continue to be born that display non-adaptive 
combinations of psychological characteristics. Without variation, evolution would not 
occur. 
 
ad 2. Human Sociobiology: adaptationism? 
This now brings us to the problem of adaptationism: sociobiologists and evolutionary 
psychologists have often been reproached for being somewhat too frivolous with 
explanations in terms of adaptation. Linguistic categories in particular are suspected of 
having mislead them in their search for adaptations. Furthermore, they also apparently fail 
to give sufficient consideration to evolutionary neutral characteristics, or to characteristics 
that are non-adaptive consequences of other evolutionary acquisitions. Just as Pangloss in 
Voltaire's Candide they see perfection in everything, while paying too little attention to the 
banal role of chance (Gould & Lewontin, 1979; Gould, 2000). 
 Again, the critics are right with their warnings, but unfair in their diagnosis. 
Sociobiologists and evolutionary psychologists are no Panglossians. It was C.G. Williams 
himself, one of the originators of sociobiology, who warned against the use of `adaptation' 
as an all-explanatory magic word in his book Adaptation and Natural Selection. Williams 
states that a fundamental rule that must be accepted is that "adaptation is a special and 
onerous concept that should be used only where it is really necessary" (4). It is true that 
Wilson speculates in the final chapter of his Sociobiology about the human `biogram' 
(ethogram), but he does not claim to know already to what extent all its independent 
properties are adaptive or are still adaptive: 
 
 One of the key questions, never far from the thinking of anthropologists and 
biologists who pursue real theory, is to what extent the biogram represents an 
adaptation to modern cultural life and to what extent it is a phylogenetic vestige. 
Our civilizations were jerry-built around the biogram. How have they been 
influenced by it? Conversely, how much flexibility is there in the biogram, and 
in which parameters particularly? (Wilson, 1975: 548) 
 
Of course, Wilson and other sociobiologists are firmly rooted in the `adaptationalistic 
program': i.e. the theoretical commitment to start interpreting the characteristics of people 
and animals as adaptations. As indicated previously, there are good reasons for doing that: 
important characteristics do not develop without a cause. A peacock's tail, the hooked beak 
of a hawk and the heavy brain of man must all have an ultimate cause. Coincidence is an 
insufficient explanation for the complicated combinations of genes that generate such 
organs. Put an ape behind a typewriter and the chances of obtaining the works of 
Shakespeare are extremely small. 
 This does not, however, mean that speculation with respect to the ultimate causes 
of specific human behaviors or characteristics is not without risk as long as nothing is 
known about the proximate mechanisms responsible, and the conditions under which they 
become operative. Indeed, because man is currently living in a rapidly changing 
environment, one which is greatly different from the environment in which he evolved, it is 
safe to assume that at least important parts of his behavior are not `adapted'. Proximate 
mechanisms, that were previously purely functional, can now be extremely harmful. A 
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thorough knowledge of the conditions under which man evolved (the `environment of 
evolutionary adaptedness' (Tooby & Cosmides, 1990), therefore represents a long-cherished 
dream for sociobiologists. Evolutionary psychology even has placed the `environment of 
evolutionary adaptedness' central (Tooby & Cosmides, 1990). 
 But man's changed environment is not the only cause of the unadapted nature of 
much human behavior. Another cause lies in the ways in which evolutionary adaptations are 
brought about. Adaptation is not planned improvement, but a process in which the most 
successful variants are reproduced, simply because they are most successful in reproducing 
themselves. Such variants often owe their success to developmental changes that usually 
turn out favorably, but often have a damaging effect too. A specific psychological tendency 
- striving for status for example - can in general be fitness-increasing, but in a number of 
conspicuous cases it can in fact have a completely opposite effect. If these cases draw a 
relatively high level of attention, the impression may be created that man is a victim of 
supra-evolutionary impulses, while in fact he is only a victim of the discrepancy between 
adaptation and perfection. 
 Alcock (1989) proposed a methodology that would allow us to implement the 
adaptionalistic program for man. Instead of preparing hypotheses for all the different human 
properties, in his view only three possibilities have to be analyzed each time: 
- The property is functional; possessing it leads to increased reproductive success. 
- The property was previously functional; it led to reproductive success during some 
part of human evolution. 
- The property is an adverse by-product of an apparently functional characteristic. 
By considering these three possibilities each time one is tempted to assume an adaptation, 
he thinks that we can avoid remaining at the level of ad hoc hypotheses. Each possibility 
leads to a specific prediction for each special human property under consideration, and 
could in principle lead to testable hypotheses. In this manner three alternative hypotheses 
can be weighed up against one another for an entire series of themes - from suicide, celibacy 
and belligerency to incest and homosexuality. 
 
ad 3. Are sociobiological theories ad hoc? 
With that, we arrive at a criticism which we sometimes hear: that sociobiologists do only 
create an endless series of ad hoc hypotheses. In my opinion this reproach is inspired by a 
number of less successful attempts to make certain phenomena fit within the evolutionary 
framework. The fact that such attempts have been made is in my view perfectly legitimate. 
It would be equally as wrong to consider the fact that here on earth two objects, such as a 
feather and a stone, which do not usually fall to the ground with equal speed, to be an 
immediate refutation of the laws of gravity. Of course it is all too easy to collect several 
examples of simplistic ad hoc reasoning from the extensive amount of sociobiological 
literature available. Of course, sociobiologists did initially attempt to place all kinds of 
surprising phenomena into Alcock's first category. 
 However, such ad hoc maneuvers are unavoidable in virtually every science that is 
occupied with phenomena of which the complexity exceeds that of a simple physical system 
to a number of powers. The number of ad hoc maneuvers that have been used to defend the 
theories of Freud and Lévi-Strauss are also virtually infinite. Nevertheless, the question 
remains as to whether it is fair to place the emphasis on a number of all too evident ad hoc 
maneuvers by sociobiologists, especially considering that sociobiology started by putting an 
end to the ad hoc character of ethological theories by underpinning them with reference to 
genetics and evolutionary theory. In the social sciences too, sociobiologists seem to face 
considerably more difficulty than their colleagues because they have to keep their theories 
compatible both with evolutionary biology and with the facts. 
 Of course it is possible, for example, to view Trivers' theory of reciprocal altruism 
as an ad hoc theory that has to be mobilized because kinship alone cannot sufficiently 
explain all forms of altruism (Gray, 1985). However, this accusation misses the fact that the 
underlying reasoning behind kinship theory is not that kin necessarily help each other in 
nature (in fact that is quite often not the case), but that a genetic disposition toward altruistic 
investments can only arise if the benefits of such an investment exceed the costs involved, 
both viewed in terms of the number of offspring. In the majority of animals this results in 
relatives helping one another. In longer living animals this same principle can also lead to 
altruistic investment in non-relatives if the interaction between both parties has a somewhat 
long-term character as a result of which their is a fair chance that altruistic deeds can be 
repaid. Of course, this requires a lot more intelligence for the processing of complex social 
interactions and for the calculation of the balance of reciprocal investments. When a 
researcher decides to explain the behavior he has observed by appealing to reciprocal 
altruism, certain predictions follow with which he can test his theory: it should be possible 
to exclude kinship as an explanation, specific partners should cooperate, help should be 
rewarded at some later stage, negligence should be punished, etc.. As Wilkinson's research 
relating to vampire bats shows, the conclusion that some forms of altruism arise as a result 
of reciprocity no longer can be considered to be an ad hoc hypothesis (Wilkinson, 1990).  
 An example of apparently ad hoc reasoning can also be found in the explanation of 
the hypersocial structure of termites by incest cycles (Trivers, 1985: 180). The fact that 
termites are eusocial and not haplodiploid led to a further study of their genetic system, 
whereby it appeared that the mutual kinship between (both male and female) members of 
the non-reproductive caste is extremely great as a result of another factor. It was discovered 
that the winged colony founders were not the direct product of other winged colony 
founders, but that eggs were produced by `secondary' queens in the colonies, that were 
fertilized by `secondary' kings from their own colony. The result of these incestuous 
activities is that the resultant winged kings and queens, who are intended to leave the 
colony, have identical sets of genes for all their characteristics (are homozygous). When two 
such non-related individuals are crossed, the kinship between the offspring is extremely 
great, because it continuously combines the genes of both parents (see figure 4-7). While 
sisters in haplodiploid insects share the genes of their father, termites therefore often share 
the genes of both fathers and mothers! 
 An objection that might be raised to this theory could 
well be that in this case sociobiologists are attempting to sweep 
a problem for their theory, namely that the hypersocial termites 
are not haplodiploid, under the carpet. It could also be 
remarked that sociobiologists first attempted to explain the 
universal incest taboo in human societies by referring to the 
risks attached to incest, while they now suddenly need incest 
again in order to complete their story. However, both 
objections fail to take the complexity of the biological world 
into account, in which no law can ever be blindly applied 
without first examining the exceptional circumstances to which 
it is being applied. 
 
Figure 4-7. Relationships 
between offspring of 
homozygous individuals. 
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 The hypersocial structure of termites does indeed appear to correspond to that of 
hymenoptera, but there are also dramatic differences. With termites we find an infertile 
worker-caste of both sexes, with both a king and queen at the top; in social hymenoptera the 
male sex is totally marginalized and the workers and soldiers, in addition to the actual 
founders of the colony, are female only. Males are usually only produced for a short period, 
in order to be disposed of again as quickly as possible. That termites are diploid, and 
therefore more strongly related to their sisters, can therefore be interpreted as an important 
confirmation of the theory. The fact that termites nevertheless have a hypersocial structure 
screams for an explanation, which does not necessarily have to be ad hoc. In fact it would 
be ad hoc if the sociobiological thesis held that the haplodiploid reproductive system was 
the only cause for hypersocial behavior. The thesis, however, is that individuals maximize 
their inclusive fitness and it can therefore be expected that reproductive systems which 
generate an extremely high degree of kinship between family members can evolve extreme 
forms of social behavior. 
 While at first sight it might appear that the `incest theory' is an ingenious attempt to 
neutralize an anomaly, new predictions do in fact follow. For example, you could 
reasonably expect to find other species in which cycles of inbreeding lead to the evolution 
of infertile worker-castes. It has since appeared that the East African naked mole-rat is 
exactly such a species (Sherman et al., 1992). 
 The objection that incest is avoided in much larger mammals can also be refuted in 
a similar way. The fact that naked mole-rats are extremely incestuous does not necessarily 
imply that no incest avoidance mechanisms have evolved in larger mammals. In fact, no-
one doubts that incest must have significant disadvantages, even for termites and naked 
mole-rats. However, natural selection is not an anticipatory organizer searching for the best 
of all possible worlds, but is more an untidy architect who, if necessary, would save a 
cathedral from collapsing by filling it with concrete. The disadvantages of incest amongst 
termites, and also amongst naked mole-rats, in all probability finds compensation in a 
substantial overproduction of individuals. If a number are born with defects they can be 
raised by their brothers and sisters and still become soldiers. In large mammals the costs of 
an individual are directly proportional to the duration of pregnancy (man probably forms an 
exception if it is true that birth occurs too soon in relation to body weight). Individuals then 
become so expensive that the negative effects of incest weigh far more heavily. That could 
well be a cause of the exogamous social systems found among many species of birds and 
mammals, in which incest is avoided by the migration of males or females, or even by 
psychological incest-barriers (the so-called Westermarck-effect), that provides a possible 
explanation for the universality of the incest taboo in human cultures (Van den Berghe, 
1983). 
 Now that we are on the subject of incest and ad hoc explanations: the avoidance of 
incest in man can also be viewed as a problem for the sociobiological theory with respect to 
incest taboos. The recently proposed attempt to couple incest between a father and child to 
the uncertainty of fatherhood (Welman, 1990) could be interpreted as an ad hoc manoeuver, 
once again intended to set the entire story straight. However, this explanation of father-child 
incest is not totally unfounded, but is supported by data, and therefore either falls apart or is 
reinforced by the quality of that data. If that data should appear to be valid, and fathers do 
indeed tend toward incest if they doubt their fatherhood, it would mean that there are indeed 
conditional psychological barriers (which can more or less be considered to have been 
clearly demonstrated for the brother-sister relationship (e.g. Van den Berghe, 1983). 
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 Hopefully, I have shown here that sociobiological theories often appear to be more 
ad hoc than they are, and that they in fact form a dramatic example of an attempt, once and 
for all, not to base social sciences on ad hoc points of departure. The idea that man can 
attribute the greatest part of his behavior simply and purely to `culture' (often used as  a 
vague notion that gives the impression of some kind of independent supernatural 
dimension), is an example of such an ad hoc point of departure, which is incompatible with 
the rest of the current scientific world view. 
 Of course nobody denies that man is a cultural being, and that each individual 
pattern of man's behavior bears the stamp of his local culture. For that matter (as we have 
seen in chapter 1.5e), the extent to which animals display culture, in the sense of non-
genetically inherited behavior, is often underestimated. Nonetheless, the theory of evolution 
forces us to confront the questions as to how the extreme cultural dependency of man was 
created (part III), what purpose the culture of early man actually served, and to what extent 
our genes continue to ensure that we exactly pick those elements from our surrounding 
culture that we can best use to realize particular biological goals. Evolutionary theory leads 
us to believe that culture in itself is never an objective, but just a means as other means in 
the `struggle of life'. In addition, the comparative biology of societies has taught us that 
even the total spectrum of human cultures demonstrates only relatively small variations on 
the recurrent basic patterns of human nature, and that a large number of human 
characteristics that we tend to interpret as being self-evident, are in fact typical human 
characteristics and bear the traces of our evolutionary history which is unique, just like the 
evolutionary history of all other species. 
 
ad 4. Are sociobiological theories dispensable? 
Now that sociobiology and evolutionary psychology are gradually becoming accepted in 
academic circles, one can sometimes hear a completely new way of debunking them. The 
new argument goes like this "Yes, an evolutionary approach can be very fruitful in the 
analysis of some of the biological bases of human behavior. But we sociologists/ 
anthropologists/ philosophers are studying phenomena on a different level. Such theories 
are simply not relevant for our subject matter." 
 This is, of course, a relatively clever argument. While the three former critical 
approaches still presupposed some expertise in the subjects criticized, one can rely on this 
argument without any acquaintance with it. Above that, the argument contains always a 
grain of truth. It is always possible to outline one's `subject' (this fetish which lies at the 
heart of academic territorial behavior) in such a way that even the study of human nature is 
not relevant to it. Often the argument is accompanied by the tempting challenge to show the 
relevance of evolutionary analysis to some tiny subject studied by the scientist in 
question. If the sociobiologist is stupid enough to try an evolutionary analysis (personally, I 
always bite), it is easy to show his ignorance with respect to this tiny subject. If his 
argument does not ignore the facts, however, one can always accuse the sociobiologist of 
creating ad hoc theories. 
 Where does the mutual irritation emerging from such debates come from? First, of 
course, there is the discrepancy between those interested in the `big picture' and those 
interested in particular empirical details. Second, there is, however, the question of authority 
and legitimacy, in short the issue of academic territory ownership. In the eyes of many 
scientists, authorities are those who have studied a particular empirical domain exclusively 
for many years. Apparently, evolutionary theorists are often experienced as intruders, 
jumping to conclusions much too fast on the basis of an inadequate knowledge of a 
particular subject. It is exactly their enthusiasm for new perspectives and covering 
paradigms which becomes fatal to them. 
 In defense of the evolutionary approach it should be remembered, however, that 
there does not exist a correlation between the endurance of a paradigm and its truth value. 
Of course, a longduring acquaintance with a subject often guarantees deep knowledge. Yet, 
it can at the same time imply blind spots and even a narrowing of vision. Sometimes, the 
insights of relative outsiders can be refreshing and can even be necessary to break through 
the taboos of a discipline. 
 Of course, there is nothing wrong with the empirical approaches used within the 
human sciences. Yet, the human sciences can reach a point in which they themselves are no 
longer able to decide between two possible sets of presuppositions. I have argued that 
ethology was revolutionized at some point simply because it ripened to such an extent that it 
needed a more detailed evolutionary foundation which allowed a better analysis of the costs 
and benefits of particular types of behavior. It seems to me that this situation is repeating 
itself in the human sciences. Often, human scientists are no longer able to decide between 
two sets of hypotheses on the basis of their own discipline only. At such a moment a 
recursion to a wider, covering paradigm is necessary. The presuppositions of social 
scientists need to be kept compatible with developments in biological thinking. 
Sociobiology, as the study of the biological laws governing all social behavior, was 
concerned with a series of areas in which the presuppositions of the social sciences had to 
be deduced from evolutionary principles. Of course, each discipline has to protect its own 
goals and its own reliable methods and data. In the end, however, all disciplines have to be 
kept compatible, because it is inconceivable that what is true within one discipline is untrue 
within another discipline. 
 
 
 
ad 5.New versions of group selection: multilevel selection 
It has to admitted, though, that even 
within biology the way in which 
sociobiologists have accentuated 
selection at the relatively low level of 
the individual is still debated. 
Recently, the biologist David Sloan 
Wilson and the philosopher Elliott 
Sober have written a volume on 
altruism in which they try to get the 
best of both worlds by defending 
`multilevel selection'. They claim that 
altruism can evolve to the extent that 
altruists and nonaltruists become 
concentrated in different groups 
(Sober & Wilson, 1998: 26). If 
temporary subgroups with a relatively 
high number of altruists grow faster, 
altruism may spread in the global 
 
Figure 4-8. If groups with relatively high 
numbers of altruists grow relatively fast, the number 
of altruists in the general population grows steadily. 
Changed after Sober & Wilson, 1998. 
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population, even though in direct conflicts between altruist and egoists the altruists turn out 
to be the losers. 
 Figure 4-8, slightly changed after Sober & Wilson (figure 1.1), clarifies their point. 
It is a thought experiment in which we start with an original population of seven altruists 
and seven selfish individuals. They are divided in two groups, one (1) in which the self-
seekers predominate with 6:1 and one (2) in which the altruists predominate with 1:6 (`the 
self-seeker/altruist ratio or s/a ratio). Then, we assume that group 2, with the relatively high 
number of altruists, has more reproductive success and triples (becomes 3:18), while group 
1, with more self-seekers, only doubles in size (becomes 12:2). The result shows that the 
balance between self-seekers and altruists is now disturbed in favor of the altruists which 
have gradually become three-fourth of the general population (group 1+2: 15:20). The point 
is that altruists can grow in numbers, because they may profit from their own behavior via 
the well-being of a subgroup which prospers as a result of their behavior. 
 All this could work in principle, but it is still based on a presupposition, namely 
that the proportion of self-seekers and altruists remains constant in a population. In the 
above mentioned example, in subgroup 2 the small number of self-seekers could grow 
disproportionally, because these self-seekers could profit from the services afforded by their 
altruistic group-members. Even in group 1 the number of altruists could decline, because 
they would probably put all their energy in helping their more selfish group members. As a 
result, the relative number of self-seekers would probably not decline as predicted by 
Wilson & Sober, but remain constant. 
 Of course, there is something intuitively plausible in the idea of the relative 
adaptiveness of altruistic behavior in small subgroups that subsequently dissolve in larger 
wholes. It seems to me, however, that this phenomenon can be explained with reference to 
kin selection and reciprocal altruism, perhaps supplemented by sexual selection and the 
handicap principle (if altruistic partners are sexually more attractive or if altruism is a 
handicap which demonstrates one's force and vitality, this could explain a moderate level or 
altruism; Zahavi & Zahavi, 1996; Slurink, 2000). 
 Of course, one should also beware of simply dividing populations in self-seekers 
and altruists, as if altruism is a matter of genes only. It is much more plausible that 
individuals behave altruistically if they can afford it, for example if they do not yet have 
their own offspring to care for, if it costs them relatively little or if they can see that it 
contributes to the well-being of their relatively small subgroup. In fact, if altruism was a 
phenomenon that was displayed continually by at least some individuals, I would probably 
be more interested in theories like Sober and Wilson's one. It seems to me, however, that 
what we witness in our societies is that individuals turn into self-seekers at the moment they 
become part of bigger subgroups. Part of the reason that many people feel some nostalgia 
towards the past is that individuals in the much smaller communities of the past were often 
forced to exhibit more social awareness - a phenomenon which can be explained very well 
by the theory of direct and indirect reciprocal altruism. 
 
ad 6. Criticisms of evolutionary psychology 
Evolutionary psychology is gradually gaining influence. Yet, some of the old critics keep 
repeating the same criticisms and accusations, for example in the volume Alas, poor Darwin 
(Rose & Rose, 2000). In the mean time sociobiology and evolutionary psychology have 
evolved, and have tried continually to clarify their real theoretical motives. For some critics, 
however, the best is not good enough. It is somewhat comical to see the complex 
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somersaults that such critics are prepared to make to keep finding weaknesses in their 
opponents. 
 I give one example from the first two pages of Alas, poor Darwin. During the 
eighties E.O. Wilson was often ridiculed for his claim that the evolution of the human 
species was still going on. As a consequence evolutionary psychologists started to stress the 
fact that the culture in which we live today is so young that it probably has had a relatively 
small impact on the human genome. The largest part of our history as a species we did not 
have cars, refrigerators, computers and faxes. Hence, evolutionary psychologists stressed 
the fact that we are adapted to the life of hunters and gatherers. This could be called the 
`myth of the stone-age mind' or the `hypothesis of delayed adaptation', because it 
presupposes that the genetic evolution during recent history has been relatively minor. 
 Now that the critics have understood that they can no longer accuse evolutionary 
psychologists of claiming that humans are even adapting to their modern cultural 
environments they start claiming that it is absurd to think that human nature is still frozen in 
its ice-age form: 
 
 Thus, for evolutionary psychology, what its protagonists describe as the `architecture of 
the human mind' which evolved during the Pleistocene is fixed, and insufficient time has 
elapsed for any significant subsequent change. In this architecture there have been no 
major repairs, no extensions, no refurbishments, indeed nothing to suggest that micro or 
macro contextual changes since prehistory have been accompanied by evolutionary 
adaptation. The extreme nature of this claim, granted the huge changes produced by 
artificial selection by humans among domesticated animals - cattle, dogs and even 
Darwin's own favourites, pigeons - in only a few generations is worth pondering. Indeed, 
unaided natural selection amongst the finches in Darwin's own islands, the Galapagos, 
studied over several decades by the Grants is enough to produce significant changes in the 
birds' beaks and feeding habits in response to climate change. If for birds and beasts, why 
not humans?' (Rose & Rose, 2000: 1-2). 
 
It is surprising to see how the critics have absorbed one of the insights of the early 
sociobiologists - that evolution never stops - to use it against modern Darwinians. Of 
course, the criticism is unfair, because evolutionary psychologists are the last to deny that 
evolution is still going on. The only thing they have claimed is that currently our 
environment is changing at such a speed that one cannot expect the human genome to be 
adapted to it. Even our domesticated animals have still largely retained their original 
behavioral programmes, despite their changed physical appearance. A dog is still a group 
hunter and groups of escaped dogs sometimes start harassing deer. Cats are solitary hunters 
and they will exercise their skills on mice, but if mice are not available they will use a ball 
of wool, or any other object that rolls or moves in response to pushing and pulling. Of 
course, smaller and larger evolutionary changes are continually taking place, especially in 
small, isolated populations. Evolutionary psychologists are the last to deny this. 
 This is only one example of the complex mix of misunderstanding, mispresentation 
and false accusations that one still sometimes meets, even after an almost continual stream 
of books in which sociobiology and evolutionary psychology are explained. Sociobiologists 
and evolutionary psychologists have been particularly frustrated by one critic, who has a lot 
of power and continues to repeat his misrepresentations as if his criticisms have never been 
answered and without referring to the literature. This is Stephen Jay Gould, who also 
contributed to the recent volume (Rose & Rose, 2000), and who has misused his column in 
Natural History, to fulminate against the `ultra-Darwinists' that dare to assume that human 
behavior is adaptive or results from mechanisms that once were adaptive to some extent. 
One is sometimes even reminded to the ways in which the `fathers of the church' once 
commented on the gnostic schools. If one would try to reconstruct the views of 
sociobiologists and evolutionary psychologists on the basis of Gould's essays alone (and 
like the books of the fathers of the church the copies of his books outnumber those of his 
victims), one would indeed find that one knows almost nothing about them (in the same 
way as we did not know much about the gnostics before the finding of the Nag Hamidi 
scriptures). For example, from Gould's essay on the views of Dawkins (Gould, 1984) one 
could conclude that Dawkins is blind 
for the organism as a whole, which is 
far from the truth (Dawkins, 1982). 
Apart from misrepresenting 
sociobiologists, Gould has also been 
very cunning in using his reputation as 
a Harvard scholar in bluffing authority 
in evolutionary matters. If we analyze 
Gould's essays (as John Alcock did) we 
find in fact that their force lies in fact in 
a series of very simple rhetoric tricks 
(Alcock, 1998; table 4-1). 
Step 1. Advertize the scholarly credentials of the author. 
Step 2. Characterize persons with opposing views as bumpkins. 
Step 3. Demolish a strawman afflicted with `genetic determinism'. 
Step 4. Make a small (and insincere) concession to opposing views. 
Step 5. Proclaim allegiance to all that is politically correct and morally 
desirable. 
Step 6. Assert that behavior X is immune to adaptationist analysis. 
 
Table 4-1. Gould's recipe for writing an essay on 
sociobiology, according to John Alcock, 1998. 
 
ad 7. The naturalistic fallacy 
Let us get back to serious problems, however. Sociobiologists and evolutionary 
psychologists have often been accused of being fatalistic, supportive of the status quo, and 
of committing the naturalistic fallacy. By revealing the fundamentally different nature of 
the sexes or of the hierarchical nature of human societies they are supposed to be against 
equality or reform. By pointing to the selfish or even genocentric nature of human motives 
sociobiologists would run the risk of promoting selfishness. 
 Of course, fatalism is a danger. Yet, it was Socrates himself who placed the dictum 
`Know thyself' at the heart of ethics. If our moral attitudes would melt like snow under the 
sun of scientific truth, they would not be worth much. Indeed, it has been sociobiology 
which has discovered that genuine altruistic motives are compatible with the scientific 
world-view. It has been modern genetics which has shown (in contrast to the philosophical 
views of Aristotle c.s.) that men and women contribute about the same to their progeny (in 
fact, women contribute more, namely their mitochondrial DNA). It has been modern 
sociobiology which has stressed that male and female strategies have evolved in a kind of 
arms race and that it thus would be very unlikely that one of them is a `winner' or a `loser' 
(Trivers, 1976). 
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 Thus, instead of undermining 
altruistic or moral attitudes, scientific 
models can reinforce them by lifting 
prejudices. Of course, a scientific 
analysis of morality does not give a 
foundation to it and even shows that 
there is no such a thing as an absolute 
non-perspectivistic `good' and `evil'. 
Values arise in the context of the 
interests that animals and humans have 
in their own survival, well-being and 
reproduction (Pugh, 1978; see chapter 
3). For a darwinist, it is unlikely that 
the values of different organisms are in 
harmony and that there thus exists a 
`good' that is good for everyone (apart 
from the sun). Of course, every 
organism wants to survive and to 
reproduce, but predator and prey, if 
they could speak, would probably have different concepts about who has the right to survive 
and would probably have different moral codes as well (Slurink, 1994). 
 
Figure 4-9. The common good emerges when 
individuals together can increase their utility space, 
even though they remain competitors in taking their 
share (Slurink, 2000). 
 All this shows that a naturalistic approach to ethics is not compatible with the kind 
of absolutist morality which one would need to commit the `naturalistic fallacy'. In fact, 
from the perspective of evolutionary theory, morality can be seen as an emergent property 
of a social system based on direct and indirect reciprocal altruism (Alexander, 1987). 
Because all parties in such a system have their own `good', but are mutually dependent at 
the same time (for example, because they can together, and only together, exploit particular 
natural resources), they have to determine their common interests and their `common good' 
by negotiating (fig. 4-9). Even if they agree on some `common good', this is not an absolute 
good to which all could agree. The history of morality shows that there are always some 
parties excluded, be it slaves, women or animals. Indeed, I cannot imagine a morality to 
which everyone would agree, because this would mean that there would not be a struggle 
for live: there would be no cheaters, no parasites, no criminals, etc. In such a world we 
simply do not live. 
 Yet, happily enough we do live in a world in which most people agree on a series 
of common goals. If we accept a series of such goals, we are perfectly able to talk about 
good and evil in an almost empirical fashion. We are not hindered at all by a naturalistic 
fallacy if we decide that it is "good not to beat your wife and children", because we agree 
silently that it is important that our wifes and children are happy and will be happy in the 
future. Considered this way, the sciences have an enormous influence on our knowledge of 
good and evil. If we agree that animal suffering is bad, knowledge about the stress caused 
by different ways of keeping animals is immediately relevant. Instead of committing a 
naturalistic fallacy we can even make a naturalistic deduction of a moral imperative, of 
course not based on absolute values, but on an agreement about moral goals. 
 It is shocking how easily philosophers interested in ethics are sometimes 
dismissing the importance of scientific knowledge with sneers about the naturalistic fallacy. 
It seems that such philosophers do not realize that knowledge is the only weapon against 
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prejudices and unrealistic expectations. Wisdom is not based on a mystical contact with 
supernatural values nor on transcendental imperatives which can be only witnessed in a 
state of ratiocinative trance, but simply on a throughout and compassionate knowledge of 
human nature and of animal nature generally (for a more extensive discussion of the theme 
of sociobiology and ethics see Slurink, 1979; 1994 and 2000). 
 
5. MULTIDIMENSIONAL THEORY EVALUATION AND THE POSITION OF 
THE SOCIAL SCIENCES 
Finally a word about the legitimacy of theories. Specialists in the social sciences are 
sometimes still devoted to the creeds of positivism, sometimes they are flirting with social 
constructivism, depending on the philosophy of science that they use. As I have argued in 
part I, evolutionary theory gives an extra argument for realism, not by way of an `absolute 
foundation', but simply because only evolutionary theory can explain why truth matters to 
some organisms at least sometimes. For want of one absolutely reliable way of establishing 
the truth of theories, I have given a sketchy analysis of some of the values that people in fact 
use to decide between various theories (chapter 2.5) and of the types of arguments one can 
use to decide whether these values do only refer to social success or do in fact point also to 
ontological adequacy. In accordance with this approach, I propose to use several criteria at 
the same time to decide between theories. Of course, in practice this will increase the 
amount of subjectivity involved, but perhaps some subjectivity is good for a fruitful 
pluralism in situations in which no certainty is given. 
 Whereas traditional philosophy of science stressed the importance of the values 
such as coherence, verifiability (or falsifiability) and predictive power, within an 
evolutionary approach explanatory power and robustness or multiple derivability (Wimsatt, 
1981) become crucially important. This is because evolutionary theories often cross the 
borders of several disciplines and refer to several ontological levels at the same time. 
Whereas it is not always possible to decide their relevance with respect to each discipline 
apart, data from several disciplines together can form pieces of the puzzle that is emerging 
from an interdisciplinary approach. 
 As claimed before, evolutionary explanations and `evolutionary reductions' do not 
imply a `reduction by dissection' (Alexander, 1987). Rather they restore Aristotle's idea of 
multiple explanatory dimensions, placing them within the context of a world in which goals 
emerge as a result of variation and selection. Of course, it would not be wise to try to find 
modern equivalents of the four categories of causes proposed by Aristotle. Yet, a complete 
evolutionary explanation of a behavior would entail at least a hypothesis about an existing 
atavistic variation on a particular trait, a postulated atavistic selection pressure, a genetic 
basis, a protein-mechanism, a tissue-mechanism and models about the ways in which these 
mechanisms do their job in different environmental and social contexts and about the 
differences in reproductive success that they currently produce. 
 Of course, with respect to most phenomena to be explained we are still far away 
from such complete explanations. In the next chapters, I will try to do my best, however, to 
explore the phenomenon of human culture from an interdisciplinary evolutionary 
perspective in the hope of finding a theory which is strengthened by data from several 
sciences and fits ordinary experience as well. 
  5  
  ** Culture, the Human Arena \\ 
 
Conflict is the father of everything. 
 Herakleitos 
 
Omnis cultura ex natura. 
 David Bidney 
5.1INTRODUCTION 
Anthropologists, social scientists and philosophers who are not familiar with animals or 
with the scientific study of their behavior, ethology, sometimes tend to make 
generalizations about animals in which everything between cockroaches and apes is 
lumped together as if the differences between cockroaches and apes are not much greater 
than those between apes and men. It is no wonder, then, that some of such thinkers are 
inclined to consider human culture as completely `beyond biology', a new form of life, the 
origin of which lies in a cloud of mysteries or at least far in the past. In fact, this way of 
thinking is probably partly reinforced by the emancipation of the various human sciences 
which all have to demonstrate that they are studying independent `realms' of reality, but 
which, as a result, sometimes forget to study the sciences of adjacent `realms'. The history 
of sociology and anthropology is far too rich, however, too allow for generalizations and 
there have always been researchers who were not obsessed with the delineation of their 
specialism and who were, as a result, often much more relaxed in their statements about the 
independence of their ontological `territory' (e.g. Ritzer, 1988; Moore, 1997). 
 Perhaps the sociobiology-debate of the seventies and eighties has had the unhappy 
effect of a polarization which makes it not always easy to approach the phenomenon of 
human culture in a balanced way. As we have seen, sociobiology has been fiercely 
criticized since its diverse manifesto's in the seventies proclaimed that it would have serious 
consequences for the social sciences. Although the criticism that sociobiology is inherently 
genetic deterministic, adaptationistic and characterized by ad hoc hypotheses was not 
justified, one weak point remained: the lack of sufficient convincing examples of links 
between genes, brains and behavior that show that the many peculiarities of human nature 
can be explained as evolutionary adaptations. As long as everything between genes and 
behavior remained a black box, sociobiology had to remain just a handbag of general 
biological principles for most people working in philosophy, psychology and the social 
sciences. 
 Happily a lot has changed since the seventies. A new generation of sociobiologists 
has arisen within the bulwark itself of the human sciences (e.g. Crawford, Smith & Krebs, 
1987; Betzig, Borgerhoff-Mulder & Turke, 1988; Maxwell, 1991; Betzig, 1997). They 
have started fresh research in which an evolutionary perspective is brought to bear on the 
traditional research questions of their disciplines. Often this research is no longer labeled 
sociobiology, partly because this term has become too much of a burden, partly because it 
would be much too general to refer to the specific research that is being done. In spite of 
that, much of this research, be it under the name of behavioral ecology, social biology, 
biopolitics, evolutionary psychology, etc., is characterized by the same interest in the 
evolutionary foundations of human behavior displayed by classical sociobiology. 
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 Sometimes the new names betray a revolutionary new orientation, however. This is 
especially the case with evolutionary psychology, which arose out of the realization that the 
`black box' approach to the link between genes and behavior was disastrous (e.g. Symons, 
1987; Cosmides & Tooby, 1987). The only way in which genes can affect behavior is, of 
course, via specific physiological and psychological mechanisms. The fact that these 
mechanisms have to be viewed, from an evolutionary perspective, as products of selection, 
does not imply that they are without peculiarities or without non-adaptive side effects. 
Because humans have invaded a variety of biotopes and have changed their own 
environment dramatically, it is not to be expected that their psychologies are completely 
adapted to their current environments. Evolutionary psychology tries to map and to dissect 
the conglomerate of psychological mechanisms which constitute the human mind. (Of 
course, the term evolutionary psychology was already invented by William James and I 
will use it in a general sense, not referring specifically to some beliefs which may be 
exaggerated by some evolutionary psychologists, e.g. the hypothesis of delayed adaptation 
(the belief that we are still essentially adapted to the hunter-gatherer way of life of our stone 
age ancestors) or the hypothesis of functional modularity (the belief that our minds consists 
of a plurality of independently evolved domain specific modules, like a swiss army knife, 
Tooby and Cosmides, 1994; Horgan, 1995; Mithen, 1998)). 
 In this chapter I will try to select an adequate model of the relationships between 
genes, mind and culture. Time and again, a series of questions re-emerge in discussions 
about the evolution of human behavior, which refer to the much-vaunted human capacity to 
create culture: should culture be considered as a phenomenon that enables humans to 
`transcend' their `biology' or should it be considered an extension of an evolved human 
nature? Is human culture the expression of an almost unlimited human psychological 
flexibility or should it be understood as the result of a series of very specialized 
psychological faculties that have been shaped by variation and selection during the 
specifically human evolutionary trajectory? Is culture the product of human nature or is 
man, as claimed by Geertz (1973), the product of culture? 
 I will try to show that evolutionary psychology (with or without functional 
modularity and delayed adaptation) may well be the crucial innovation enabling us to 
integrate the concept of culture within an evolutionary frame-work. Whereas most social 
scientists are justified in considering man to be a species that is uniquely dependent on 
culture, especially on a `symbolic culture', they are mistaken to the extent to which they 
interpret culture as a `superorganic' level `imposed' on an almost infinitely malleable 
human nature. Certainly culture enables people around the world to display a wide variety 
of customs, rules and behaviors, but these all remain variations on a limited series of basic 
themes, most of which we share in one way or another with other animals. Some of these 
themes arise out of the same devotion to food, safety and reproduction that is displayed by 
most nonhuman animals, but even a series of apparently uniquely human themes can be 
shown to be elaborations of behavioral tendencies which we share with other species. Even 
our capacity to acquire language and other symbolic systems is firmly rooted in our 
evolutionary past, although it forces us into unique technological arm-races and into 
uniquely accelerated cultural and social changes. 
 The most important point, however, is that culture does not create humans, or at 
least does not create them ex nihilo, but is needed, used and created by them to realize their 
needs and drives. Although culture as the cumulative product of a history of individual 
learning processes can be opposed to the interests of the individual, it remains the 
individual that actively molds culture to suit its personal teleonomic needs, drives and  
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values. Culture, then, is not merely imposed upon individuals, but is used by them and is 
transformed as a result of the continual competition between societies and individuals 
within societies. 
 Cultural evolution can then be modelled to some extent as an independent process 
at an independent level `above' the genetic evolution, but such a model has only limited 
explanatory power, as long as it does not include the evolved psychological mechanisms 
which force humans to adopt particular cultural systems rather than others. In the end, 
many apparently purely `cultural' phenomena can only be understood if we understand 
culture as the cumulative product of the universal reproductive arms-races between 
individuals of our species. Of course, this needs not to be immediately apparent, because 
this competition is mediated by a plurality of psychological mechanisms. 
 Despite all this, it remains true that culture creates its own laws and does often lead 
to apparently maladaptive behavior. The crucial question of this chapter is therefore: to 
what extent is there a conflict between the phenomenon of culture in the human species and 
the universal organic tendency towards inclusive fitness maximization? I will try to show 
that human culture is a manifestation of the same `struggle for life' and the same 
reproductive competition that underlies all life. My claim will be that the level of 
`meanings' which is often taken as characteristic of human culture is more directly linked to 
the level of needs and musts than is usually thought. What we take as the `independent' 
level of human culture is the outcome of the conflicting strategies of many individual 
humans which all use and transform the collective `culture pool' to their own ends. As a 
result, culture reflects the continuing conflict between cooperation and competition within 
the human species. 
 At the same time, cultural `meanings' have often functions at different levels and 
often contain `biological' signals. Yet, it is not always easy to understand the adaptive 
function of `biological' signals, even in nature. As Darwin and Zahavi have both observed, 
biological signals sometimes may overrule the laws of simple straightforward utilitarian 
selection. The fact that this does not make an evolutionary analysis easy and intuitive does 
not imply that it is not the kind of analysis needed. 
 First, I will present six alternative models of the genes-mind-culture relationship 
(Lumsden & Wilson, 1983; Flinn, 1997). These are used as a first generation of theories, 
which are objects of selection, retention and manipulation. After a first inventory their 
advantages and disadvantages, I will start my work as a selector, the substitute of natural 
selection at the level of theories. The first model is the `ideational' concept of culture, 
which is defended by many anthropologists, for example Clifford Geertz. Often it is this 
`symbols-and-meanings' view of culture of which sociobiologists and evolutionary 
psychologists are accused to be ignorant. I will try to show that it presupposes, at least in 
the writings of some anthropologists, a certain concept of `biology' and of `animals' which 
is not warranted by the evidence. I will claim that Geertz' model presupposes a kind of `top-
down determinism' or cultural determinism which leaves many aspects of culture 
unexplained and which leaves, on the whole, culture hanging `in the air'. 
 The second model that I will discuss also stems from the traditional human 
sciences. It is the view that a given culture is purely the product of the environmental 
conditions in which it arises. Exemplary for this vision is the `cultural materialism' of 
Marvin Harris, which is really a kind of environmental  determinism. While this approaches 
has yielded a very rich spectrum of explanations for a variety of cultural phenomena, it is 
severely limited by its neglect of the evolved complexity of human nature. I will illustrate 
this with citations from Harris' writings and argue that there are reasons to believe that 
Harris' view of human nature is too limited. 
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 I then turn to the evolutionary models. Surprisingly enough they sometimes seem to 
make the same mistakes as the traditional science models in neglecting human nature. I will 
show that models 3 and 4, the `ideational selection' model and the `dual inheritance' model 
of culture are incomplete to the extent that they do not explain why particular ideas, habits 
and rituals are more successful in a given environment than others. A purely `symbols-and-
meanings' view of culture is always incomplete and should be replaced by a `musts-and-
meanings' view in which symbols and meanings are no longer understood as parabiological 
phenomena and in which complex psychologies mediate between genes and culture. 
 After these eliminations two evolutionary models are left which both somehow try 
to cope with the constancy underneath the variety of human cultures. The first model 
(model 5) is in my opinion largely a chimera, a caricature needed by traditional social 
scientists like Geertz and Harris to be able to contrast their views with a view which is 
obviously mistaken. Yet, it shows that the relationship between genes and human nature at 
this time in history, now that the humane genome project is underway, is still unclear and 
still needs a lot of clarification. It is useful, therefore, to review some current knowledge 
with respect to the nature-nurture dichotomy in the hope of finding the right level at which 
we can expect adaptations. Only after this, can we expect to find a reasonable answer to 
questions with respect to the existence of a human nature and the adaptive nature of culture. 
To what extent is man a cultural being by nature? Why do people have culture? What 
drives artists, scientists, political leaders? Is culture adaptive as a whole, or does it reflect 
many individual adaptations? 
 In my opinion evolutionary psychology (model 6) is closest to answering such 
questions. Because it stresses an independent level of psychological phenomena between 
genes and memes it is able to deal with those behaviors that are not adaptive or are no 
longer adaptive in our present environment. Yet, evolutionary psychology has certainly its 
blind spots and unnecessary dogmas and therefore I will try to pursue my own analysis in 
determining what `drives' human culture. 
 One of the vague ideas that an evolutionary analysis has to handle is the myth that 
culture is a good that benefits all equally, something which brings harmony where brute 
nature only has to offer conflict. I will claim that the evolutionary approach implies that 
culture is used by each one individually for his or her own benefit and is driven by 
competition. As a result of different processes of competition and selection within groups, 
cultures are a battleground in which different characters and sex-age classes pursue 
different strategies. I will even consider the hypothesis that the different human characters 
reflect an underlying polymorphism. `Human nature' therefore should not be understood as 
a monolithic, homogeneous entity, but something which is evolving constantly. Beneath the 
variety of cultures there is a variety of continually evolving human strategies trying to cope 
with a variety of ever changing environments. As a result of an ever accelerating cultural 
and technological evolution the conflicts inherent in a particular ape society are 
transformed, but never transcended. 
 
5.2 SIX ALTERNATIVE MODELS OF THE GENES-MIND-CULTURE 
RELATIONSHIP  
Let me first give a very short impression of the six models of culture that I will discuss. It is 
challenging to depict them in the form of a kind of diagram as in figure 5-1, because in this 
way we are better able to discuss and compare them. Our first two models stem from the 
traditional social sciences. They have a lot in common, but depart from each other in one 
important respect. 
 First, let us take the 
ideas of Clifford Geertz (1973) 
as exemplary for the `ideational' 
concept of culture (Durham, 
1991). Because this influential 
anthropologist does not mention 
genes and does not agree with 
any `levels-approach', and 
because he believes that the 
human mind is very malleable, 
his position can be schematized 
simply by drawing an arrow 
between the level of culture and 
the level of mind (fig. 5-1: 1). 
According to Geertz, cultural 
ideas are `programs' which turn 
a multi-purpose neural tissue 
into a specific encultured being, 
be it a Bushman or an Inuit: we 
could call this top-down 
determinism, cultural 
determinism or culturalism. As I 
will show below, this position is 
unsatisfactory, because it does 
not answer the question where 
ideas come from. If particular 
cultures were solely shaped by 
ideas, a Bushman could be 
clothed in the hides of bears and an Inuit could go almost naked, as Bushmen do. Clearly, 
at least to some degree, culture is determined by environmental conditions. 
 
Fig. 5-1. Six alternative models of the genes-mind-culture 
connection. 
 It is here that the other model from traditional social science comes into play. It 
stresses that cultures do not arise apart from their ecological context or are even a product 
of this context. A good example is formed by the writings of the anthropologist Marvin 
Harris. Marvin Harris is well-known for his brilliant explanations of all kinds of cultural 
phenomena - from India's sacred cows to the cruel rituals of the Inca's (Harris, 1974; 1977). 
In his Cultural Materialism (1980) he explains why these explanations are always so 
elegant: it is a challenge "to explain much by little". According to Harris one should be 
very parsimonious about postulating human bio-psychological drives and predispositions. 
Apart from our need to eat and to love, we are sponges that can absorb almost any kind of 
culture. "As a species we have been selected for our ability to acquire elaborate repertories 
of socially learned responses, rather than for species-specific drives and instincts" (1980: 
62). As a consequence it is possible to relate all kinds of complex cultural phenomena to a 
very small collection of human needs. The complexity of a culture is not the product of 
human nature, but of the complexity of the environment (fig. 5-1: 2). We could call this 
position environmental determinism. 
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 Next, we turn to the evolutionary models. Especially model 3 has been very 
influential recently and we have encountered it already as a version of evolutionary 
epistemology. It is the idea that culture is inherited in a way that resembles genetic 
inheritance. Culture is seen as a network of `memes' (Dawkins, 1976), `culture-genes' 
(Lumsden & Wilson, 1983) or whatever, which have differential reproductive success just 
like ordinary genes. As a result, two processes of evolution are postulated, one of which 
results from the variation, selection and reproduction of genes, and the other from the 
variation, selection and reproduction of memes. This model, sometimes called `memology' 
is very appealing, because it allows us to talk about the rise and fall of ideas, cultural habits 
etc. in a new, epidemiological way. Ideational phenomena, the objects of cultural 
transmission, ideas, habits, etc., often behave as if they are `mind-viruses' which infect a 
particular population and spread in it as a stain of oil. It could also be called `ideational 
selection theory', because it stresses the unique character of ideational phenomena, while 
applying the idea of evolution by variation and selection to them. 
 Memology or ideational selection theory has also disadvantages, however. It is a 
return to a rather simplistic nature-nurture dualism, which could explain its appeal, but does 
not prove its worth. It is unclear about the role of human nature in favoring particular 
memes above others and has limited explanatory power in this respect. Finally, it does not 
explain why inclusive fitness maximizing organisms would allow mind-viruses to 
parasitize their neural tissues without doing anything in return. 
Theory Human nature and its 
ability to learn 
What determines cultural 
contents? 
Function of 
culture 
1. Geertz & 
`culturalism' 
No human nature or 
blank slate; mind is 
ready to receive any 
`program' 
Unclear; culture programs 
the mind, but what 
determines culture itself is 
unclear 
Provide meaning 
(Geertz) 
2. Cultural 
materialism 
(Harris) 
A few biopsychological 
predispositions plus an 
ability to acquire 
elaborate repertories of 
socially learned reponses 
The environment and a small 
connection of human needs 
(eating, convenience, sex, 
love and affection) 
Find a balance 
between 
production and 
reproduction 
(Harris, 1980) 
3. Ideational 
selection 
Unclear: blank slate or 
evolved 
Differential reproductive 
success of memes/mind 
viruses 
Unclear 
4. Dual 
inheritance 
Simple learning biases: 
imitation, conformity 
Learning biases and 
transmission processes 
determine culture content 
Unclear 
5. Genetic 
determinism 
Unclear Genes via human nature } 
Individual 
inclusive fitness 
maximization 
} 
6. Evolutionary 
psychology 
 
Multiple learning 
aptitudes; an ability to 
adopt culture content 
with adaptive value 
Individuals adopt those 
elements from a culture that 
they can use in a particular 
environment 
 
Table 5-1  Six theories of culture. Expanded and changed after Flinn (1997). 
  
 Model 4, Durham's `dual inheritance model (Durham, 1979, 1991) is more hybrid 
and less dualistic and can be seen as an admission that the evolution of genes and memes is 
not independent. This model recognizes the role of simple learning biases in channelling 
cultural evolution. A set of `primary values' (compare Pugh, 1978) enables humans to select 
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those `secondary' cultural values that prevent them from creating completely non-adaptive 
cultures. Imitation and conformity ensure a, to  some extent, independent evolution of 
culture. Yet, it is assumed that evolution has not been able to refine the human learning 
mechanisms enough to enable humans to select those cultural forms which are adaptive in a 
given situation. As a result, many cultural traits may be transmitted without being judged 
on their adaptive value for the individual that is copying them. Of course, it remains to be 
seen whether a relatively small collection of learning biases is able to explain all cultural 
diversity and to what extent the dual inheritance model is able to explain why humans have 
cultures, how they use them and to what extent human nature limits the universe of possible 
cultural expressions. Only if sociobiologists and evolutionary psychologists would fail 
finding specialized learning modules and would fail to give adaptive explanations for 
phenomena like suicide, celibacy, and homosexuality, dual inheritance as defended by 
Durham would be supported. Otherwise, in figure 5-1(4) at least the mind/brain would have 
to be reintroduced between genes and culture. 
 Although they have different views about the influence of the environment on a 
culture, it is clear that many social scientists like Geertz and Harris agree on one important 
point: human nature can be almost completely disregarded. It is a very general learning 
device with two or three extra biological drives, but apart from these it is very malleable. It 
is clear that both model 3 and 4, although they pretend to be `evolutionary models', share an 
important assumption with models 1 and 2: human nature is thought to consist of a 
relatively simple collection of bio-psychological mechanisms plus a relatively general 
learning device. 
 It has been especially Marvin Harris who has made much fuss about another model 
of culture which does not share this presupposition: sociobiology. In his view, which has 
been very influential indeed, sociobiology is almost identical with a genetic determinism 
which neglects complex organism-environment interactions (fig. 5-1: 5). This would imply 
that sociobiology is simply a `reverse model' of the top-down cultural determinism of 
Geertz and co. This position is purely a straw-man, a position attributed to many, but 
entertained by nobody, at least to the best of my knowledge. It assumes that the 
intermediate level of psychological mechanisms is a perfect instrument for inclusive fitness 
maximization. It is a black box which somehow translates genetic interests directly into 
actions and can therefore be omitted with impunity from the analysis. It is not sure whether 
this is biologically possible, because it probably would require an enormous brain and 
almost infinite computational resources. Of course, to what extent the human mind is 
actually an optimal inclusive fitness maximization instrument can only be decided 
empirically. Whether Harris likes it or not (or is interested in it or not), different 
`sociobiologists' and evolutionary inclined theoreticians work with a variety of provisional 
hypotheses with respect to this question (Lumsden & Wilson, 1983; Barkow, 1989; 
Durham, 1979; 1991; Richerson & Boyd, 1992; Flinn, 1997; Janicki & Krebs, 1998). 
 A model which is much closer to the intentions of the original sociobiologists is 
model 6, a simplified version of evolutionary psychology (fig. 5-1: 6). In this model the 
intermediate level of proximate psychological mechanisms has been given more autonomy. 
According to the evolutionary psychologists, this level, the level of our innate drives and 
motives, is imperfect in representing genetic interests, because it is simply the result of 
blind trial-and-error-engineering, because it reflects all kinds of design-compromises and 
because it is adapted to a mixture of past environments. This model is a simplification of 
evolutionary psychology, because probably most evolutionary psychologists would also 
draw an arrow downwards from culture to genes, not to imply a kind of Lamarckian 
heritability of acquired characteristics, but to imply what Lumsden and Wilson (1983) 
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called `gene-culture coevolution'. 
 Table 5-1 summarizes the successive models, adapting and expanding on a figure 
from Flinn (1997). The second column in this figure is probably the most important: all 
these different views of culture boil down to different presuppositions with respect to 
human nature. Does human nature exist or is it entirely a product of culture? If it exists, to 
what extent is it flexible? Does human nature consist, simply, of a series of simple learning 
biases and can it adopt almost any culture content? Or is it characterized by a series of 
highly specialized modules which together constrain the universe of possible human 
cultures? To some extent, these questions can be answered empirically, that is, by referring 
to the success and failure of various models to predict data obtained in all kinds of tests and 
experiments. Of course, this is important, because only hard data are able to force us into 
choosing between alternative models. Let me try to review the merits of the successive 
models, then, on the basis of their compatibility with the empirical evidence. 
 
5.3 GEERTZ AND THE `IDEATIONAL' CONCEPT OF CULTURE (MODEL 1) 
First, I investigate the view that there does not exist something like human nature: humans 
are unique in that they can be made into almost anything as a result of education. This view 
was eloquently defended by the anthropologist Clifford Geert in one of the best-known 
discussions of culture in anthropology `The Impact of the Concept of Culture on the 
Concept of Man' (1973). Geertz starts by noting that during the Enlightment many thinkers 
believed in a kind of universal human nature, underlying cultural differences as large as 
those between eighteenth century France and classical Greece. In his opinion this notion of 
an `underlying' universal human nature is an illusion, because men unmodified by the 
customs of particular places do not exist, have never existed and could not in the very 
nature of the case exist. Very consistently, he attacks what he calls the `stratigraphic' 
conception of the relations between biological, psychological, social, and cultural factors in 
human life, the `levels approach'. He calls it a `halfway house between the eighteenth and 
twentieth centuries' and claims that the parallelism between biological requirements and 
cultural practices is `a mere correlation, and that intuitive, of separate findings' (1973: 42). 
He is only one step away from the relativistic idea that everything we can ever claim about 
our biological nature is just another cultural construct. 
 Fortunately, Geertz does not become a relativist, however. What he defends is a 
`control mechanism' view of human nature, according to which: 
 
           ... culture is best seen not as complexes of concrete behavior patterns - customs, usages, traditions, habit clusters - 
as has, by and large, been the case up to now, but as a set of control mechanisms - plans, recipes, rules, 
instructions (what computer engineers call `programs') - for the governing of behavior... man is precisely the 
animal most desperately dependent upon such extragenetic, outside-the-skin control mechanisms, such cultural 
programs, for ordering its behavior (44). 
 
He even claims that the behavior of man, undirected by such cultural programs would be 
`virtually ungovernable, a mere chaos of pointless acts and exploding emotions, his 
experience virtually shapeless'. 
 In this context he launches a well-justified attack on thinkers who assume that 
culture is just an external add-on to an otherwise wild animal. Geertz explicitly argues on 
the basis of what was then (in 1973) known about human evolution that there is not such a 
thing as a mental Rubicon that was crossed at some date, after which cultural evolution 
took over biological evolution. In that respect he is, paradoxically, a forerunner of Lumsden 
and Wilson's idea of gene-culture coevolution (Lumsden & Wilson, 1981; 1983). 
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 It is a pity, however, that he dogmatically thinks that this process of biocultural 
evolution is a process in which humans have become ever more plastic. It is here that his 
program-metaphor probably works misleading. If one compares specific cultures with 
computer software on traditional serial computers, one has to assume that the hardware is a 
very general unspecialized multi-purpose machine. Culture is then compared to software 
which can change such a general unspecialized multi-purpose machine in a very specific 
machine, be it a calculator, an editor, a drawing-tool, a data-base. According to Geertz, 
only a very general collection of talents, like the capacity to speak, is innate; all else is the 
product of specific cultures, about which one can make no general statements. 
 It is this, alas, what he means with the statement: "without men, no culture, 
certainly; but equally, and more significantly, without culture, no men" (1973: 49). He 
simply could have referred to gene-culture coevolution with this claim, but he clearly 
intends to make a much more radical statement, which, however, presupposes a tabula rasa 
view of human nature. To show what he has in mind, let us compare his sentence with the 
following: "without Finches, no songs, certainly; but equally, and more significantly, 
without songs, no Finches". It has been known since a long time that the song of the 
Chaffinch knows local dialects. Recently, it has been found out that these dialects are 
transmitted culturally and are an ideal tool of studying cultural evolution (Slater, 1994). It is 
clear that this sentence about Finches is as true as Geertz' claim about humans, even though 
Geertz thinks he has pointed to something uniquely human. Apparently, the much more 
radical intention of his claim is hidden in an apparent self-evident truth (compare "without 
birds no nests (feathers), certainly; but, equally, without nests (feathers), no birds"), as a 
result of which it is difficult to contradict him or to catch him erring. What he has in mind, 
however, would be comparable to the statement that Finches as a result of their song could 
turn into Penguins, Ostriches or even back into Dinosaurs. 
 The fact is that humans are not the only organisms which are completely dependent 
on some kind of extrasomatic medium which can be adjusted to local circumstances or 
which is subject to the whims of local traditions. Of course, there is no creature on earth of 
which the behavior is affected by culture in so many domains and which has to learn so 
much before being able to reproduce itself. There is no other creature with such a complex 
society in which everyone has to be able to play so many different roles. There is probably 
no creature that has to adapt its life-program so often within one life-time as a result of 
changing ecological, social and economic situations. 
 That does not mean, however, that humans are free to create their drives and desires 
and that human culture transcends their teleonomic needs. It does not mean that man is a 
tabula rasa and that he can reincarnate at will as the creature he wishes to be (compare the 
ideas of Plato and Pico della Mirandola). It simply means that man is a blank form, a 
questionnaire, in which many questions have to be answered and which allows for a lot of 
options at each particular question and which has to be filled in many times during one life. 
The questions, themselves, however, could well be universal and could well refer to a series 
of fundamental needs, which might be shared with many non-human animals (one only has 
to think of the need for warmth, shelter, safety, company, dominance and sex). 
 Geertz' view of culture as a kind of `program' which can be `run' on an infinitely 
malleable neural tissue, which cannot even be called `human nature', presupposes a kind of 
top-down determinism in which ideas have an enormous `causal power'. Ideas somehow 
have the capacity to form even the essence of what we are. Apparently, the only reason that 
one culture differs from another is that it is determined by a different set of ideas. One 
wonders where all these different kinds of ideas come from and to what extent they can be 
mixed and recombined. Would it be possible to create a culture in which food, sex, safety 
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and status are completely irrelevant and in which other factors determine our behavior? 
Would it be possible to create a culture in which, for example, ten sexes are acknowledged 
and in which children are deemed wiser than elderly people? 
 In all, Geertz' `ideational' concept of culture is a half-truth at best. No one can 
disagree if the `ideational' concept of culture (Keesing, 1974; Durham, 1991) simply states 
that culture is a body of ideas, values, beliefs (all `ideational' phenomena) that are 
transmitted socially by means of symbols, and that gives rise to traditions and particular 
histories of particular cultures. Almost everyone will admit that human behavior is uniquely 
dependent on ideas and that those ideas are shaped by a unique process of `ideational 
evolution' in which ideas and symbols are formed, selected, transformed, combined and 
accumulated. 
 We are losing contact with reality, however, if this idea is presented as implying 
that individuals do not have needs that force them to acquire and develop specific skills and 
specific forms of knowledge and culture rather than others. The problems begin when we 
focus exclusively on the content of particular beliefs or on the differences in cultural styles 
between periods or peoples and when we forget to ask why individuals adopt particular 
beliefs or cultural styles rather than others. The ideational concept of culture may seduce us 
to concentrate exclusively on ideas as if people do not have good reasons to entertain 
particular ideas. 
 Of course, the ideational concept of culture is not defended by Geertz only. It has 
been defended in many versions and often it is based on (or closely related to) a series of 
presupposition and misunderstandings: 
a. Usually the gap between man and the other animals is exaggerated, because only 
man is supposed to be able to use symbols. (However, even bonobos, dolphins and 
sea-lions understand some grammar, as was claimed in chapter 1.) Even if there 
were a very deep gap between man and the other animals, this would not 
necessarily mean that man's linguistic skills do raise him beyond the realm of 
biological necessities and urges. 
b. Often the nature of learning is misunderstood. The ability to learn is not identical to 
the ability to acquire almost any information or skill. Often an ability to learn 
specific skills has evolved to enable an animal to improve its skills and to adapt it to 
particular circumstances. From an evolutionary point of view it is very implausible 
that an organism would evolve that would be able to learn almost anything as if the 
acquisition of particular skills would not matter more to survival and reproduction 
than the acquisition of other skills. 
c. Often cultural differences are too easily taken as evidence for an infinitely 
malleable human psyche. The fact that humans who are `unmodified' by particular 
cultures do not exist does not imply that there are no cross-cultural constants in 
human nature. In fact, there do not even exist dandelions which are `unmodified' by 
the particular meadows in which they grow. 
d. Often evolution is misunderstood as something which has happened `in the past' 
rather than as the process resulting from the differential reproductive success of 
particular genotypes. In fact, it is impossible to `stop' or `transcend' evolution, 
including human evolution, except by applying nuclear arms. If a characteristic of a 
species remains constant during millennia this is not as a result of the lack of 
differential reproductive success, but as a result of stabilizing selection. Stabilizing 
selection weeds out deviant forms, which arise as a result of mutations and 
recombination all the time, and cause a characteristic to remain constant over time 
(see fig. 5-3). If a species has characteristics which apparently enable it to 
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`transcend' a series of narrow biological goals, these characteristics have to be 
maintained by selection in order not to fade away within a few generations, like the 
wings of the flea's ancestors or the hind-legs of those of whales. If a species has 
characteristics which are of no adaptive worth whatsoever they have either to be 
linked to adaptive characteristics or they will gradually vanish like the eyes of many 
cave-inhabiting fish and insects. Therefore, the talents that enable humans to 
participate in cultures and to create networks of meaning can not be completely 
adaptively `neutral': the `ideational' aspect of culture should at least have some 
biological basis. 
In short, the ideational concept of culture is wrong to the extent that it assumes 
a. that there is not such a thing as `human nature' as something which characterizes 
humans as a species among other species; 
b. that the ability to learn and to adopt specific cultures implies an almost unlimited 
flexibility of the human mind; 
c. that universal psychological characteristics would imply a constant, unaltered 
expression of those characteristics across a variety of ecological, economical and 
social conditions; 
d. that biological evolution, including human evolution, can ever be `completed' or 
`finished', except by complete or final extinction. 
A complete theory of culture, therefore, should not concentrate on ideas and other deposits 
of cultural behavior per se, but should try to map the way in which such phenomena are 
used and produced by a plurality of individuals in a given environment. Instead of 
exclusively studying culture in the library or at the museum, a theory of culture should also 
focus on the psychologies and circumstances that gave rise to particular trends, styles and 
works of art. A complete theory of culture should not only interpret  `meanings', but try to 
link them to the underlying `musts' as well. These `musts' are certainly not inflexible, 
constant `givens' that express themselves identically across a variety of cultures. To the 
contrary, from an evolutionary perspective it is to be expected that they can be molded to 
some extent to fit the conditions posed by the environment. 
 
5.4 HARRIS AND HIS CULTURAL MATERIALISM (MODEL 2) 
Fortunately, most theorists within the social sciences do not place a culture completely 
apart from the human needs from which and the ecological context in which it arises. Often 
it is attempted to explain cultural phenomena in terms of environmental variables. A good 
example of an anthropologists who apparently succeeds in explaining a whole spectrum of 
cultural phenomena almost exclusively on the basis of environmental variables is Marvin 
Harris (e.g. 1974; 1977). 
 In his Cultural Materialism he gives an interesting theoretical foundation for this 
undertaking. It appears that he is partly inspired by the simplicity of models in the natural 
sciences. Powerful explanations should be simple: "our object is to explain much by little" 
(1980: 63). "The more parsimonious we are about granting the existence of bio-
psychological constants, the more powerful and elegant will be the network of theories 
emanating from sociocultural strategies". Yet, he admits that "without postulating the 
existence of selective principles operating at the bio-psychological level, one cannot 
explain how infrastructure mediates between culture and nature." Thus he ends up with a 
minimum list of human bio-psychological drives without which even an `environmental' 
explanation would not work: 
1. People need to eat and need proteins and other nutrients. 
2. People like convenience and prefer to expend as little energy as possible on a given 
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task. 
3. People `are highly sexed' and like sexual intercourse - more often heterosexual 
intercourse. 
4. "People need love and affection in order to feel secure and happy". 
This list is interesting for several reasons. Firstly, whereas it is meant to point to a very 
small collection of fundamental human drives, it hints at a human nature that is much more 
complex. People need to eat, but they do not only need proteins. People like sex, but 
preferably heterosexual sex. People need love, but they apparently need to feel secure and 
happy as well. 
 Secondly, as Harris admits, for each item on this lists one can immediately think of 
antithetical behaviors and thoughts. "For the first, there is obesity, voluntary starvation, 
vegetarianism, and self-inflicted dietary pathology. For the second, there is the intensive 
expenditure of energy in sports and artistic performance. For the third, there is abstinence, 
homosexuality, masturbation. And for the fourth, there is infanticide, domestic strife, and 
exploitation." According to Harris, this does not prove that his list is wrong, but only that 
people are inefficient in attaining their goals. He suggest that scarcity could explain why 
people sometimes deviate from their four original bio-psychological drives. Yet, scarcity is 
a perfectly natural phenomenon that is almost universal and it would be strange if people 
would start behaving completely differently under such a normal condition. Above that, 
scarcity does not explain sports and arts and Harris does not offer a satisfactory explanation 
for either one of these. 
 It seems to me, then, that a careful reading of Harris list indicates that human nature 
must be much more complex than he thinks. It is as if he is describing a floating ice-berg 
and denies that a big part of it lies invisible underneath the water. Why would Harris deny 
so obstinately that human nature contains more than those four bio-psychological 
principles? 
 Apparently, he is afraid that his explanations will loose much of their elegance if he 
needs to delve into the real complexities of human nature. Above that, he is afraid that 
cultural anthropology will loose much of its independence vis-à-vis biological anthropology 
and other biological disciplines.  
 
 "You may wish to postulate that human beings also naturally seek to create music and art, 
to dichotomize, to rationalize, to believe in God, to be aggressive, to laugh, to play, to be 
bored, to be free, and so forth. By succumbing to the temptation to open this list to all 
nominations, you will rapidly succeed in reducing every recurrent cultural trait to the status 
of a biological given." 
 
Yet, it is here that he reveals his lack of understanding with respect to biological 
approaches to human culture and psychology. Why would the attempt "to render a 
complete account of what it is to be human" (Harris' wording) end up in a denial of culture, 
cultural variety and complex interactions between human nature and culture? Why would it 
be necessary to claim that humans are on a bio-psychological level as simple as amoebas or 
flatworms to do justice to the relative causal autonomy of their culture? Why would a more 
complete rendering of `biological givens' do injustice to the many ways in which these 
givens result in all kinds of cultural traditions and institutions? Does one do justice to the 
richness of the phenomenon of human culture by denying the complexity of the underlying 
level? 
 It is clear that Harris is fighting with a self-created chimera. His enormous 
knowledge with respect to human cultures around the globe contrasts sharply with his very 
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meager understanding of the complexity of animal life and the complexities of human 
biology and psychology. Even most birds and mammals have more than the four bio-
psychological predispositions that he lists. While it may be a good thing to abstain from 
redundant explanatory principles in physics and cosmology, there is no reason to suspect 
that the behavior of a primate with a history of many millions years of evolution deposited 
in a genome of 46 chromosomes will be explainable from four bio-psychological 
principles. The explanation of complex phenomena in terms of a whole series of causal 
factors is not the same as the introduction of redundant explanatory deii ex machinae. It is 
simply not possible to explain the workings of a camera simply be referring to its lens or to 
its shutter although both are indispensable. In the same way, culture may be a complex 
whole created by a network of causal factors. Its explanation would then require the 
unravelling of all these causal factors. 
 If one tries to artificially reduce the number of causal factors involved in order to 
create `powerful and elegant' theories, one will sooner or later be confronted with the 
limitations of such theories. In many cases one will discover that the choices that one has 
made to get a `minimal set of human bio-psychological selective principles' were arbitrary. 
Critics will come up with alternative explanations on the basis of an alternative selection of 
principles. In the case of Marvin Harris this has happened, for example, when the 
anthropologist Napoleon Chagnon questioned the cultural materialist explanation of 
Yanomamö warfare, asking "why fight over bananas if you can fight over women?" 
(Gibbons, 1993). 
 The history of human sciences is filled with examples of bio-psychological 
minimalism leading to powerful and elegant theories. It is a pity that most of these theories 
are one-sided and are finally criticized on the basis of different, equally arbitrary, views of 
human nature. In the case of Freud, for example, this happened when Jung postulated a 
more complex human nature stacked with all kinds of exotic archetypes. The only way to 
`get it right' is to avoid both the Scilla of minimalism and the Charybdis of an obscurantistic 
holism. Both a comparison with our closest living relatives and a working knowledge of 
human psychology can be helpful here. 
 Perhaps it is good to refer to G.E. Pugh again in this context. In chapter 3 I have 
already explained why he thinks that `value-driven decision theory' predicts a much more 
elaborate view of human nature than the traditional social sciences are willing to admit. In 
his book The biological origin of human values (1978: 284) he comes with a list of 
fundamental human (social) motives that is based on his own `value-driven decision 
theory', and on his primatological and psychological knowledge. According to Pugh the 
variety of human instinctive motives is hidden somewhat, because many of these motives 
are linked to the same value sensations or emotions. That does not mean, however, that 
there is no natural differentiation in human motives. 
 
 "For example, being liked will make us happy, participation in play or conversation will 
make us happy, working in a team can make us happy... Almost all of the `social motives' 
seem to be concentrated in just two of the nine emotional dimensions, specifically the 
emotions of joy versus sorrow and pride versus shame". 
 
According to Pugh this does not prove anything about the number of natural motives. Pugh 
comes to an `illustrative list' of 11 basis motives, which all relate to separate innate human 
goals. 
1. Desire for dominance 
2. Desire for approval 
3. Desire for social acceptance 
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4. Gregariousness 
5. Enjoyment of conversation  
a.  Talking 
b.  Listening 
6. Activity motive (desire to exercise one's body and exploit one's physical skills) 
7. Enjoyment of humor in conversation and play 
8. Social preferences 
9. Team motive (desire to work with others for common goals) 
10. Constructive motive (desire to make or build something) 
11. Contribution motive (desire to contribute or do something meaningful for society) 
 
Although Pugh admits that this list is speculative he is able to defend all motives included 
and in many cases his defence sounds convincing. His list can in principle be corrected 
continually on the basis of knowledge emanating from ethology, neurology, 
psychofarmacology and psychiatry. Hopefully, the human genome project and other 
projects will throw also some light on the links between genes and the human mind. 
 Without knowing whether Pugh is right in his postulate of 11 distinct innate 
motives (he also refers to McDougalls instinct theory), I think that his `value-driven 
decision theory' should be taken seriously. Decision systems having to cope with 
complicated environments such as the human primate are unlikely to be based only on four 
fundamental motives. At this point it is only important to note that it can in principle be 
dangerous to be too parsimonious if one not only tries to create powerful and elegant, but 
also realistic theories. We can conclude that model 2 has to be rejected as too simple, too. 
 
 
 
5.5 WE ARE ALL DARWINIANS: MEMOLOGY (MODEL 3) 
Traditional human sciences are not the only ones that have often yielded to the temptation 
of constructing `powerful and elegant' theories. The same reproach can also be made with 
respect to most evolutionary models of human culture. The human mind seems only able to 
understand something by simplifying. 
 One of the ironies of the reception of the sociobiological approach has been that 
many commentators thought that Richard Dawkins with his Selfish Gene (1976) was a 
representative of an extreme genetic determinism. In fact, in the last chapter of this book 
Dawkins revived an approach that to some extent turns Darwinism upside down and gives 
the level of culture and ideas, dubbed `memes' (unit of imitation, from Greek `mimeme', 
English `memory' and French `même'), an autonomy which reminds one of the ideational 
concept of culture. "I am an enthusiastic Darwinian, but I think Darwinism is too big a 
theory to be confined to the narrow context of the gene", Dawkins wrote. According to 
Dawkins `memes' evolve just like genes by variation, selection and differential 
transmission and their replication is called imitation. They started their evolution as 
replicators in a primeval soup, like genes, but this "new soup is the soup of human culture". 
The new replicator, the meme "is still in its infancy, still drifting clumsily about in its 
primeval soup, but already is it achieving evolutionary change at a rate which leaves the old 
gene panting far behind". 
 Meme theory, memology or ideational selection theory has been criticized by the 
philosopher Mary Midgley because culture is holistic and `thought is not granular' 
(Midgley, 2000). Meme theory suggests that there exists `atoms of culture' and that a 
unified theory of culture would be possible. Yet, the opposition between holism and 
reductionism is often artificial, because wholes emerge from parts and some researchers 
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just love parts while for others the whole is holy. In principle there could be `atoms of 
culture', although I tend to agree with Ortega y Gasset (1955) and to find them in `customs'. 
In contrast to Midgley and her co-authors (Rose & Rose, 2000) I do not think memology is 
too darwinistic, but that it is not darwinistic enough. Indeed, memology is only darwinistic 
to the extent that it recognizes the power of variation and selection. It is not `taking Darwin 
seriously', to the extent that it neglects the conative beings that have their private interests 
in selecting, manipulating, adapting and transmitting particular memes or culture-genes 
rather than others. 
 In the wake of Dawkins many thinkers have thought of themselves as radical 
evolutionists or darwinists, because they applied natural selection to the level of ideas. A 
lot of philosophers, including Donald Campbell, Thomas Kuhn and Daniel Dennett (1995) 
are enthusiastic memologists. As has been shown by Chris Buskes (1998) it clarifies a lot in 
the philosophy of science, because it enables one to transcend the traditional rationalistic or 
empiristic models of science. The idea is that scientific theories are never completely 
falsified, but are simply replaced by more successful theories. Successful theories are not 
necessarily the product of better methods or minds, but are simply those informed guesses 
that survive in contrast to the competing guesses: they leave more `offspring' in the form of 
young, enthusiastic (literally) scientists prepared to spread them even further. 
 Ideational selection theory itself, however, is unable to explain why humans under 
certain conditions would prefer theories with qualities like verifiability, explanatory power 
and coherence above theories that are simply pleasing or stimulating. To answer such 
questions, ideational or hypothesis selection theory necessarily needs to be complemented 
by an evolutionary epistemology in the Lorenz-Vollmer tradition. Even that tradition would 
not be enough, however, to explain why most people are hardly interested in science. 
Ideational selectionist simply observe that "variation and selection happens", but do not 
explain the differential survival values of different memes in different environments 
(societies or segments of societies). Why would science remain an endeavor of an elite, 
while religious ideas are spread throughout society? Why would particular scientists favor a 
radical scientific innovation, whereas other scientists are inclined to resist it? To answer 
such questions ideational selection theory would have to be complemented by a 
sociological and psychological approach to theory-acceptance, which is informed by 
sociobiology and evolutionary psychology. 
 This incompleteness of ideational selection theory becomes a handicap at the 
moment that it tries to explain the evolution of culture in other areas. Let us look at 
clothing. Why would certain echelons of a society try to distinguish themselves using white 
collars, silken ties, perfectly ironed suits, expensive watches and suitcases? Ideational 
selection theory may suggest that the `idea' of a white collar survives because it is 
apparently replicated by many diligent and devote believers. The idea uses the believer to 
replicate itself. The believer wears his white collar with a beautiful silken tie, young people 
watch him in the streets and are impressed and will, after many years of strain and struggle, 
finally have money enough to buy the same kind of shirt and tie. 
 Those same believers and converts would transmit a completely different idea and 
buy a completely different suit, however, if that was in their interest. With other words: not 
only do ideas use believers, believers are driven by much more and ultimately they are used 
by genes as well. Motives and genes are far more robust entities than ideas, which are 
volatile and replaceable. Therefore, motives and genes are more appropriate and more 
encompassing explanatory principles. Whatever ideas people have, it is the genes that have 
the last word, a word that may have been transmitted already long before the advent of 
human culture. 
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 Of course, people are prepared to die for ideas, apparently even for the idea of a 
white collar, but the reason why they are prepared to do so is that some ideas are in their 
(genes') interest. Studying ideas without studying the ways in which people use them for 
their own (extended) benefit is like studying birds solely on the basis of stuffed specimens. 
Only by studying the behavior of the whole bird, can we interpret the function of some of 
its feathers and only by studying businessman in action can we understand why they need 
expensive `classic' clothing to distinguish themselves instead of wearing, for example, 
simply extravagant clothing, which would be much cheaper. To me it seems that the 
correspondence between the bird's need for ornamental feathers and the same need for 
ornamental clothing in humans is much more important than the differences between 
natural feathers and cultural clothing. It might not be an accident, for example, that white 
collars are used: as the color which is the hardest to keep clean it constitutes a `handicap' 
which efficiently signals the luxury of letting other people do the dirty work (more on 
Zahavi's handicap theory below in section 5.12). (The general idea that the gap between 
biology and the social sciences is not as deep as that between biology and other natural 
sciences is defended by Anne Ruth Mackor, 1997). Of course, however, as humans we like 
to stress our uniqueness and therefore the enormous variability of human ornamentation, 
which is made possible by culture, which distinguishes tied businessmen from ordinary 
peacocks. We also cherish our apparent ability to `transcend' `low' biological motives, 
forgetting that many other biological creatures exhibit extremely altruistic behaviors and 
that we are at our best in demonstrating our beautiful ideals and motives exactly at the age 
that we are also showing off with other beautiful feathers. 
 The fact that memology and ideational selection theory are neglecting the level 
beneath culture was pointed out by several sociobiologists, but the most impressive 
argument I heard came from Lee Cronk while he was speaking for the AAAS*93 in Boston 
(the 1993 meeting of the American Association for the Advancement of Science; Cronk, 
1993; see also Cronk, 1999). Cronk argued that people often use ideas to manipulate each 
other, and people manipulate others in the service of their own genes. The history of ideas 
is the product of a kind of biological warfare, in which people try to infect each other with 
their mind-viruses. For example, religious and ethical leaders may try to seduce people to 
invest in projects that are seemingly in the interests of all, but which are in the first place in 
their own selfish interests. The notion of a `disinterested' morality, of a `free will' that 
enables everyone to choose `differently', etc., etc., all are often used to manipulate people 
into doing things which they perhaps would not do if they would know more about the 
persons using those very notions or ideas. People are continually changing and `genetically 
manipulating' those mind-viruses in order to adapt them to the current conditions. To 
understand processes of cultural change one should first try to understand the way in which 
ideas function within a particular ecological, economical and social context; the differential 
reproduction success of different ideas is of secondary importance. 
 It seems to me that the popularity of memology can be explained as a result of the 
assumptions it shares with culture determinism. For those who in their hearts remain 
culture determinists, but who want to be Darwinians too, ideational selection theory offers 
the possibility to get the best of both worlds: a platonic world of ideas ànd Darwin's 
mechanism of natural selection. Yet, the presuppositions that it shares with culture 
determinism are its Achilles' heel, too. Ideational selection theory seems to presuppose the 
idea of humans as blank slates which can be used by ideas at will. It often exaggerates the 
gap between man and animals, misunderstands the nature of learning and concentrates on 
cultural differences without considering the underlying similarities. It does not have any 
predictive power. All in all, it seems to me often a kind of culture determinism with a 
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darwinistic flavor. 
 It has to be admitted that some of the best Dutch philosophers of science seem to be 
memologists (Buskes, 1998; Callebout, 1993). To them I can only recommend my list of 
values on the basis of which theories are selected (ch. 2.5). Only if this list is combined 
with an adequate knowledge of the human beings, can we predict anything about the 
theories that people will adopt in the future (e.g. about the likelihood of a worldwide 
darwinistic or islamic revolution). 
 
 
 
5.6 THE BEST OF BOTH WORLDS: DUAL INHERITANCE (MODEL 5) 
An attempt to do justice to the complex interrelationships between genes and culture can be 
found in Durham's `dual inheritance model' of gene-culture coevolution (Durham, 1979; 
1991). Durham offers some of the most complex and perhaps profound discussions about 
the evolution of culture and his model is certainly an improvement on simple ideational 
selection models. He criticizes those models for postulating "the gradual and cumulative 
organic evolution of an organ (the brain) that meanwhile often functions antagonistically to 
natural selection" (1979: 58). At the same time, he criticizes `sociobiological' explanations 
which he identifies, alas, too much with genetic ones (evolutionary psychology is 
apparently still unknown to him). His own proposal can be seen as an attempt to `save' an 
independent realm of ideational phenomena, while admitting that humans must have 
evolved means to ensure that their cultural systems do not completely drift apart from their 
biological interests. In this context, he relies on Pugh's (1978) distinction between primary 
or evolved values and secondary, cultural values. Despite the fact that they have originated 
to ensure a `fit' between primary values (biological interests) and culture, secondary values 
have started a life on their own and as a result, culture is to some extent an independent, 
autonomous level. Durham attaches much value to the idea that much cultural evolution is 
completely neutral or even in opposition to the `biological level'. 
 While Durham's model has an appearance of sophistication and shade, it still seems 
to share a lot of presuppositions with pure culturalism and pure culture selection theory. 
Durham often seems to neglect the forces that drive cultural evolution in the first place, for 
example the complex patterns of cooperation and competition between the creators and 
selectors of culture. As a result, he seems unable to look beyond the superficial impression 
that many expressions of culture are non-adaptive. The fact that culture on the whole is 
adaptive does not mean that each cultural act has to be adaptive or that all cultural 
phenomena benefit each individual of the species. If this were true, the human species 
would only count winners and no losers. No one would deny, however, that bird song and 
the peacock's tail have adaptive functions, although many individual birds meet with 
considerable personal misfortune as a result of their relative inability to sing the right song 
or as a result of the clumsiness of their tails. 
 It seems to me, then, that Durham's analyses (and with that model 4) still suffer 
from a lack of detail on the sociopsychological level, the level between genes and memes. 
It is on this level that the memes are chosen, tested and changed. If we want to understand 
the evolution of culture in flesh and blood we have to look for the ways in which people 
use ideas for their own interests and causes. Culture is not a completely independent level 
above the genetic or psychological level. Even in human societies a lot of competition is 
going on and many expressions of culture result from this competition and its resulting 
arms races, either those between individuals or those between groups at different levels. 
Many expressions of culture can be understood as ways of drawing attention, showing off 
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one's identity or manifesting one's qualities or even one's superiority, both on the level of 
the individual and of its cultural identity group. To look at these expressions as if they have 
been created for the sake of a platonic realm of ideas is like considering flowers as a means 
to embellish a divine herbarium or like considering butterflies as emanating from God's 
entomological interests. In the course of this chapter we will hopefully arrive at a better 
model. 
 
5.7 PURE GENETIC DETERMINISM: A RHETORICAL DEVICE? (MODEL 5) 
Now that we can at least exclude two-third of the above mentioned models, one thing has 
become clear: Culture has to have at least some biological roots. It has to, simply, because 
clearly a neural and even social substratum is needed: mushrooms are unable to have 
cultures, because they do not have brains; butterflies do not have cultures, because they 
lack the necessary contact between individuals of different generations; ear-wigs do have 
this contact (they care for their young), but probably do not have enough time to learn. 
There are a lot of species which are currently thought to have at least some culture (chapter 
1), but they all need to have at least some intergenerational contact and a minimum 
cognitive ability. Many species are simply living to short to make the cultural transmission 
of knowledge a strategy that is worthwhile. They are simply too specialized, too much 
build for a specific way of life in a specific environment to need culture. 
 Clearly, a phenomenon like human culture presupposes an enormous learning 
capacity and an enormous flexibility. This does not imply the kind of human nature 
envisioned by Geertz or Harris, however. A human nature that would be able to profit from 
its learning capacity and its flexibility would need guidance also, in order not to loose 
contact with its biological objectives. Humans that would go learning around completely 
undirected and that would blindly adapt to any circumstances, would probably forget to 
reproduce and go extinct. If we define culture as a body of information which is transmitted 
in a nongenetical way, there is no reason to suppose that the transmission of this 
information does not require elaborate genetic instructions for dealing with this kind of 
information and for using it in an adaptive way. 
 On the other hand, if we take this definition of culture seriously, at least one other 
model of culture can immediately be excluded: pure genetic determinism (model 5). If the 
contents of particular cultures were themselves directly genetically determined, rapid 
cultural changes would become a mystery. Not only the long learning period of humans 
would become somewhat superfluous, but it would become unclear what culture actually is 
and why it ever evolved. If we take genetic determinism as the hypothesis that our 
psychological mechanisms are perfect instruments for inclusive fitness maximization and 
that culture is simply the deposit of all the adaptive decisions of all individuals, it becomes 
unclear why we need such a long learning period and why human life is characterized by so 
much experimentation. As I already pointed out, this hypothesis is very implausible, 
because it probably would require more brain power and more computational power than 
we actually have and we would have needed more time to have evolved them (Lumsden & 
Wilson, 1984). Let us not forget that the common ancestor of chimps, bonobos and humans 
has probably lived only about five to ten million years ago. (This was perhaps the biggest 
discovery in anthropology in the 1980s. Before that, anthropologists could still believe that 
man was more closely related to Ramapithecus than to Pan. Now Ramapitecus is 
considered to be an ancestor of the Orang-Utan.) 
 Clearly, pure genetic determinism would imply a misunderstanding and a denial of 
the brain as an autonomous organ which allows the organism to interact with its 
environment. Pure genetic determinism does not even apply to dandelions, because even 
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these grow in an interaction with their environment and in reaction to the available 
nutrients and the available light. In animals pure or absolute genetic determinism would 
require an almost infinite reservoir of detailed motor instructions coupled to a typology of 
all possible situations that an animal could meet. It would require infinite genetic 
instructions and an enormous brain. As I have claimed with Pugh in chapter 3 and 5.4, an 
elaborate innate value system is much more likely for the explanation of human behavior 
than a series of rigid step-by-step motor instructions. Only an elaborate value system is able 
to enable to make adaptive decisions and to work towards sensible goals in an enormous 
variety of circumstances. Although such a value system would be innate, it would allow 
and require at the same time an enormous degree of freedom. The individual is continually 
weighing the different emotional value outcomes of all its available behavioral options and 
its decisions are not predetermined, but the result of this complex weighing and planning 
processes. 
 Pure genetic determinism would also deny the trade-off between fertility and 
cognition in nature (see chapter 6.3). Animals can react to unpredictable environments 
either by having large numbers of offspring or by increasing their cognition-based 
flexibility. The quantity-based solution requires low investment per offspring and thus 
cheap constructions based on fixed action patterns. The quality-based solution requires high 
investment and a long learning period, but results in behavioral flexibility. Genetic 
determinism refers only to those organisms in which the arch between genes and behavior 
is relatively short. Humans clearly do not belong to this category. Genetic determinism 
does not do justice to their behavior, which shows that the gap between genes and behavior 
is filled with a lot of psychology and cognition. 
 As we shall see shortly, even behavioral geneticists are no proponents of genetic 
determinism. Twin studies show that about one-third of the variance in personality traits is 
not due directly to genes (Bouchard, 1994: 1700). Of course, it is not always clear how one 
should separate and calculate the percentages of genetic and environmental influences. I 
will come back on these issues in 5.9 and 5.10. 
 Given these considerations, it is not a miracle that probably no one has ever been a 
serious genetic determinist. It is largely a position created by writers such as S.J. Gould and 
M. Harris as a rhetorical device for ridiculing an evolutionary approach to human affairs. 
As noted before, the human mind often thinks in terms of opposites. As a result it often 
needs caricatures to defend its own arbitrary choices. The attempt to rise above such simple 
dichotomies is the real hall-mark of philosophy. 
 
5.8 BETWEEN GENES AND MEMES: THE AUTONOMY OF THE 
PSYCHOLOGICAL (MODEL 6) 
It is clear now that most of the models discussed are too simplistic. They are not necessarily 
wrong, but they do not explain enough either. They simply do not answer some questions 
which keep coming back to the mind of an evolutionist: Why would we create culture? 
Why is it not enough to chew on a bunch of carrots? Why would we still work even if we 
have enough food? 
 It seems to me that the lack of explanatory power of models 1 to 5 can be explained 
by their neglect of a third level between genes and memes - a level which is placed central 
in evolutionary psychology (model 6). I take the central idea of evolutionary psychology to 
be that the level of evolved mechanisms of behavior is to some extent autonomous. Never 
do genes directly determine behavior - in fact, it is not clear how they should manage to. In 
every case in which the influence of genes on behavior is studied more extensively, genes 
influence behavior via the characteristics of particular tissues, via particular hormones or 
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via neurotransmitters. The physiological and psychological level has a life of its own - it 
constitutes the level at which behavior is created and decisions are made instantly, the 
`executive board'. As a result, we can often see animal behavior that is maladaptive: it is 
apparently caused by evolved physiological and psychological mechanisms, which are 
inadequate in a particular situation. Thus, even in animals without culture there are already 
two levels, the level of genes and the level at which behavior is directly caused. 
 If we add the level of culture, the picture becomes even more complicated. It seems 
that human individuals are neither automata driven by their genes, nor robots programmed 
by a particular cultures. Certainly the particular culture that surrounds us points us into a 
certain direction. It is constituted by collective norms and values as a result of which we 
feel stimulated or slowed down in certain directions (as birds in a flock are moved to some 
extent by the forces of the collective - but, of course, within this collective there are 
individuals with more power to push others in certain directions). At the same time we 
often feel resistance and sometimes we feel obliged to follow a completely different way. 
Thus, the extent to which we allow a particular culture to be influential in our personal 
lives depends to some extent on idiosyncracies within our personalities, like our amount of 
obedience, defiance, dominance and originality. Such personality characteristics may 
originate in our genetic make-up, but they may also depend on factors like our position in 
our families or in the power-pyramid of our society. In all cases, however, psychological 
characteristics are decisive factors with respect to the viability of particular cultural 
elements or memes. The psychological level is the level at which the practicability of a 
specific culture is finally tested. It is the level at which a specific culture is accepted, 
rejected or adjusted. It is also the level at which the struggle for power in societies is fought 
and memes are often just weapons in this struggle. 
 With respect to the conceptual nature-nurture schizophrenia which has infected 
many theoretical debates in the human sciences, this means that nature and nurture are not 
in opposition, but that nurture presupposes a certain nature, a genetic blueprint of the 
learning possibilities of the mind. Culture can perhaps be defined as the cumulative effect 
of collective knowledge, evaluations and aesthetical preferences as this often stretches 
beyond individual generations. To some extent it constitutes an independent level to which 
individuals can respond by selecting only those influences from it that they can use for their 
own purposes. At the same time, however, those cultural elements which are not used, and 
therefore replicated and modified, by at least some segments of the `underlying' societies 
will go extinct immediately. Cultures are products of humans and not vice versa, because 
humans are selected to use only those elements of cultures which happen to fit their 
evolved psychologies as they have developed in particular circumstances. 
 This precedence of humans over culture can be easily proved by a thinking 
experiment. If there happened to be two types of humans, one of which was completely 
determined by the surrounding culture and the other of which was able to select useful 
culture elements, certainly the latter individuals would have an advantage. Critical culture 
selectors and modifiers would mold a culture that perfectly suited their teleonomic needs 
and would therefore leave more genes to their descendants. It is the genes that have the last 
word, not the memes. The mind is a product of genes and it chooses those memes that it 
can use. 
 In most cultures, what we indeed see is that culture is `superimposed' on a 
hierarchical group structure, that we seem to have inherited from the apes. Often it is the 
dominant group that chooses the culture that suits their interests best; the subdominants find 
themselves in a situation in which their interests are not optimally represented. Of course, 
the dominant group is involved in arms races with other such groups. As a result even they 
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are not free to choose the culture that they like most. On the whole, one can not say, 
however, that `culture makes man', but it is more appropriate to say that cultures reflect a 
series of reactions of human beings to their environments and to each other. Culture is a 
human `deposit' rather than the other way round, although this collective deposit often feels 
like a burden and a cage to the individual, especially the subdominant one. 
 As a result, models which tend to neglect the autonomy of the psychological level 
are necessarily incomplete. They either exaggerate the influence of culture (model 1 and 3) 
or the environment (model 2) and neglect the autonomous choices of the individual, or they 
do not sufficiently map the important area between genes and culture (model 4 and 5). At 
this moment, I prefer the evolutionary psychological model (model 6), because only this 
model does justice to genes, memes and mind. Yet, at the same time I have to admit, first, 
that picture 5.1 gives a very simplified version of evolutionary psychology, and, secondly, 
that evolutionary psychology, as I view it, is not represented by one author, but by an army 
of researchers who share some beliefs, but disagree on others. As a result, as I have 
indicated before, evolutionary psychology, a term created by William James, has become 
associated with a series of more specific hypotheses, like the `swiss army knife' and `stone 
age mind' hypotheses of the human mind (Cosmides & Tooby, 1997; Allman, 1994). 
 In my view, evolutionary psychology is simply a sophisticated version of 
sociobiology in which the human mind is taken seriously - as, by the way, E.O. Wilson was 
already trying to do in his books On Human Nature (1978) and Genes, Mind, and Culture 
(Lumsden & Wilson, 1981). Yet, sociobiology has been widely misunderstood as genetic 
determinism. The only way to come further, then, is to delve deeper into the relationship 
between genes, mind, and culture. Before we are ready to answer questions like the 
question why culture evolved and why it does not gradually disappear like the hind-legs of 
whales or the tails of our ancestors, we first have to look more closely at the influence of 
genes on behavior. In the next paragraphs we will inspect some current knowledge with 
respect to nature and nurture. 
5.9 NATURE VERSUS NURTURE 1: BEHAVIORAL GENETICS 
Let us first have a look at behavioral genetics. As a result of sophisticated new methods and 
models, behavioral genetics has gradually ripened into an important field, which deserves 
attention and respect from all scientists and philosophers interested in man. Behavioral 
geneticists try to disentangle the complex relationship between nature and nurture by 
studying similarities and differences of individuals that share genes and/or a family 
environment. Twins and adopted individuals provide the natural experiments that they need 
most, and behavioral geneticists have indeed succeeded in locating many. Literally 
thousands of twins have been studied by Loehlin, for example, and the so-called Minnesota 
Study of Twins Reared Apart (MISTRA; Thomas Bouchard and co-workers) has even 
succeeded in locating hundreds of monozygotic twins that have been separated at an early 
stage (Bouchard, 1994; Wright, 1998). 
 Behavioral geneticist have 
gradually learned to interpret their data 
very critically, fitting them into different 
models at the same time, and sorting out 
those that optimally explain the data. 
They have learned to take into account 
factors that tend to complicate the 
interpretation of the natural experiments 
that they work with: the inheritance of 
recessive and polygenic traits, the 
effects of assortive (not random) mating 
and the tendency of children to select 
their own environments (Plomin, 1990). 
Gradually, they have collected an enormous set of data, mainly with respect to the 
inheritance of mental abilities, personality traits and mental illnesses. 
 
Fig. 5-2. Factors contributing to phenotypic variance 
according to recent estimates from behavioral genetics (e.g. 
Lalumière, Quinsey & Craig, 1996). 
 The picture that emerges from all these data is that genes, indeed, play an important 
role in the development of cognitive abilities, personality traits, and several mental 
illnesses. Monozygotic twins raised apart proved to be in many respects as similar as 
monozygotic twins raised together. The most spectacular and disturbing discovery was, 
however, that the so-called `shared environment', the environment that individuals share 
which are raised in the same family, accounts for only a small part of their similarities (7% 
according to the Minnesota study; 5% according to Locurto & Freeman, 1994). Children 
raised in the same family tend to diverge and are more deeply influenced by environmental 
factors outside than by those inside their own families, the so-called non-shared 
environment (Lalumière et al., 1996). Those factors need not to be purely accidental: to the 
contrary, the picture that emerges is that of individuals actively looking for particular 
environments in which they can learn what they want to learn (Plomin, 1994). This picture 
is reinforced by the fact that the genetic component of a trait increases and never decreases 
with age (Wright, 1998: 88). 
 Of course, one of the problems for any attempt to determine the heritability of a trait 
is to come to sound system of the fundamental traits themselves. As many personality 
psychologists seem to agree on the existence of the `big five' personality traits, behavioral 
geneticists have measured the hereditary basis of these five relatively often. The Minnesota 
Study of Twins Reared Apart found that the `big five' personality traits have a heritability 
of about 41%. That means that at least 41% of the similarities of two individuals can be 
purely attributed to shared genes. That does not mean that 59% is purely environmental, 
however. As said, only about 7% is estimated to be a product of the shared environment. 
The remaining 52% is attributed half to the nonshared environment and half to error of 
measurement. As a particular nonshared environment will be to some extent the product of 
someone's genetic inclination to watch out for certain stimuli, it cannot be said to be purely 
`non-genetic'. In the terms of Dawkins (1982), the environment is partly one's own 
`extended phenotype'. As a result Bouchard can conclude from the MISTRA that "about 
two-thirds of the reliable variance in measured personality traits is due to genetic influence" 
(Bouchard, 1994: 1700).  
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 Figure 5-3 shows one of the three 
data sets on which Bouchard's claims are 
based. The figure shows at the same time 
that the total genetic influence is currently 
divided in `additive' and `nonadditive' 
genetic influences. As Mendel already 
knew, the effects of separate genes cannot 
be always simply added up: there are 
dominant and recessive genes and 
sometimes the effects of genes are 
suppressed by other genes. First-degree 
relatives often share `only' the purely 
`additive' genetic effects, while identical 
twins also share the effects which arise 
from specific combinations of genes 
(dominance, interlocus interactions)1. 
Thus, by comparing the correlations between close relatives and identical twins one can get 
an idea to what extent traits are polygenic in origin. Lykken et al. (1992) have coined the 
word `emergenesis' to refer to those traits that are thought to be `emergent properties of 
configurations of monomorphic genes'. Yet, figure 5-3 also shows that one should not 
exaggerate the extent to which traits derive from such `nonadditive' genetic effects. 
 
Fig. 5-3. Estimated sources of variation in personality. 
(Data from Rowe, 1994: 65; see also Bouchard, 1994: 
1701.) 
 Gradually more forms of cooperation between behavioral genetics and other 
disciplines, from molecular biology to psychology, are beginning to emerge. Geneticists are 
currently very busy to reveal the complex causal trajectories between genes and specific 
traits. In fact, some of the causal trajectories between genes, particular hormones and 
psychological traits are already known well enough to be manipulated by drugs. Of course, 
this new knowledge is gradually also having repercussions for divisions in personality 
psychology. For example, the biological psychiatrists Cloninger has proposed a new 
taxonomy of seven basic personality of which at least three are now known to be based on 
the working of specific neurotransmitters. To give an idea of the kind of cooperation that 
gradually arises, I will discuss some research on two of these traits and on the genetic basis 
of homosexuality, drawing on information from the book of Hamer and Copeland (1998).  
 Novelty seeking. The MISTRA showed that identical twins had a correlation of 0.54 
for a trait called novelty seeking (closely related to extraversion) by the psychologist 
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1 Suppose alcoholism has a hereditary basis via allele `A'. If the effects of A are purely additive the severeness of 
the alcoholism simply increases with the frequency of `A'. Nonadditive effects include dominance (A suppresses its 
parallel a, which is called `recessive) and (for example) the influence of another (hypothetical) recessive allele `b' which 
suppresses A. 
 Beers or glasses of wine/night 
Type of effects AA Aa aa 
4 2 Additive effects 6 
6 2 Dominance effects 6 
Effects of 
other allele b 
+BB 6 4 2 
+Bb 6 4 2 
+bb 2 2 2 
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Cloninger, while fraternal twins scored 0.32. On the basis of these figures one estimated the 
heritability of this trait to be about 59 percent, which was the same for twins raised 
together. By accident, an Israeli team of geneticists found a gene of which the length was 
related to the score for novelty seeking in the questionnaires of Cloninger. An American 
team, led by the geneticist Dean Hamer was able to confirm the relationship. It was 
estimated that the gene concerned, which makes a receptor for dopamine called D4, 
accounts for about 10 percent of the trait of novelty seeking. It was already figured out that 
dopamine has a direct influence on the pleasure centers within the brain and is partly 
responsible for the way in which we feel. The apparent novelty-seeking gene influences 
certain parts of the brain such that novel experiences are rewarded by pleasure. It was 
found, for example, that gay men with the D4 dopamine receptor gene had experimented 
more with female partners, while half of the straight men with the D4 dopamine receptor 
gene had at least once experimented with a male partner. Note that a trait like `novelty 
seeking' may directly influence cultural evolution, as it is possible that it increases the 
turnover rate of particular memes. 
 Harm avoidance. Another trait about which a series of interesting discoveries have 
been made is called harm avoidance and includes anxiety, fear, inhibition, shyness, 
depression, tiredness and hostility. It proved identical to the trait neuroticism, which the 
MISTRA found to have a heritability of about 50% (earlier studies found it to be lower, 
30%). For some years it has now been known that some antidepressants work by 
influencing the amount of the neurotransmitter serotonin. Now it has been found that one-
third of the population has one or two copies of a relatively long and powerful version of a 
gene that produces the so-called serotonin transporter, while two-thirds have one or two 
copies of the shorter version of the gene. As a result, about two-thirds of the population is 
relatively liable to mild anxiety and depression. It also turns out that people with the shorter 
version also have sex more frequently, which could explain why the shorter version has not 
gone extinct so far. Apparently, people with a tendency towards anxiety and depression 
also are more obsessed with sex, which may make the trait evolutionary stable. (In § 5.19, I 
will come back on such issues and try to explain personality differences as a result of 
complementary behavioral strategies that remain in a stable equilibrium.) 
 Homosexuality. Perhaps most famous is the research on the genetic basis of 
homosexuality in men. In contrast to homosexuality in women, which seems to be 
culturally transmitted and is strongly influenced by the shared environment, male 
homosexuality has a heritability of 50% and its shared environment component of variance 
is 0%. As it is inherited via the maternal line, Dean Hamer and co-workers started to look 
on the X-chromosome. There they found a region called Xq28, in which a combination of 
five markers turned up in 33 of 40 homosexual male sib-pairs (Hamer et al., 1993). The 
gene itself, however, has not yet been found. In another study they found that the female 
carriers of the gay version of Xq28 began puberty on average six months earlier than other 
women. If the gene indeed lengthens the reproductive life-span in woman, male 
homosexuality could actually be a nonadaptive side-effect of a characteristic favoring the 
female carriers of the gene! As Trivers has pointed out, "such a gene might only need to 
provide female carriers with a benefit one-half as great as the cost to males" (Masters, 
1993). 
 To see this, let us call the normal 
version of the X-chromosome x and the `gay 
version' x'. If a male carrier x'x, apparently a 
bisexual, mates with a female carrier x'y, 
they produce three types of gametes: x, x', y. 
These combine into a generation in which 
females are two times as often carriers of the 
gene x' as males (see table 5-2). Thus, if 
there is a benefit ½b to being a female carrier 
of the x' chromosome, this is enough to compensate for the cost of -1b to being a male 
carrier. 
_ \ _ x' X 
x' x'x' (+ ½b) x'x (+ ½b) 
y x'y (- 1b) Xy 
Table 5-2. A male homosexuality trait (x') can be 
evolutionary stable, even if it is disadvantageous 
to the males in which it is expressed (-1 benefit), 
if it is advantegeous to its female carriers (+ ½ 
benefit). 
 All this could imply a genetic basis for male homosexuality, even if this is not an 
adaptive trait. Yet, remember that behavioral geneticists only have found a heritability of 
about 40-50%. It seems likely that homosexuality is at least partially a conditional strategy. 
This would presuppose that it is to some extent adaptive, however, and works as a kind of 
adaptive alternative tactic or even as a kind of `genetic short cut'. (I will come back to this 
possibility in chapter 5.19). 
 In all, the provisional lesson that we can learn from behavioral genetics is that 
behavior, in humans, is neither exclusively the product of genes nor of the environment. 
This is exactly what we would expect if the relationships between genes and culture are 
somewhat more complex as in most models of culture that I discussed. This is also what we 
would expect from a Darwinian point of view. From a Darwinian point of view one would 
expect the evolution of conditional strategies, which are turned on or off dependent on the 
situation. For example, if being dominant has reproductive advantages, one would expect 
the evolution of a genetic proclivity to display dominant behavior. Yet, genes cannot 
guarantee that an individual will actually become dominant: they probably will move 
through dominant and subdominant individuals continually. It is to be expected, then, that 
individuals will be selected on their ability to adapt their strategy to their place in the 
group's hierarchy. In the long run, their genes may both contain optimal subdominant 
strategies and optimal dominant strategies plus the ability to switch between them 
according to the social situation. 
 The fact that many behavioral genetic studies focus on psychological characteristics 
does also support the idea that genes influence behavior via a series of psychological and 
evaluative mechanisms. In chapter 3 I have argued with Pugh that consciousness is not 
purely information about the world, but arises out of a natural system of values which 
enable organisms to weigh information in adaptive decisions. Apparently, some within-
species variation in valuative and cognitive mechanisms exists, which may not even be 
purely stochastic, but may constitute a polymorphism reflecting a natural balance between 
opposite strategies (see 5.19). 
 
 
 
 
5.10 NATURE VERSUS NURTURE 2: EARLY EXPERIENCE 
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What we learn from embryology is not that organisms are build according to a completely 
fixed building-scheme, but according to a series of steps. If one step is finished, the next is 
initiated. A nice example is the way in which male and female characteristics form. In 
mammals the Y chromosome contains very little information, but it contains the crucial 
information for the development of testes. In the early embryo, testes produce testosterone 
196 
that influence the growth of the brain in such a way that a male brain is formed. The 
testosterone receptors in the male brain subsequently are orchestrated in such a way that 
typical male behavior evolves. The normal pattern of development of a male individual out 
of the `initial universal female embryo' can be easily disturbed, however, for example under 
the influence of female hormones. As a result, even in humans, boys can be born with a 
series of female behavioral characteristics (and vice versa; Moir & Jessel, 1991). In mice, 
the expression of male characteristics, including aggression, is influenced by the position of 
the embryo between its fetal siblings: if a male has been sandwiched between two sisters it 
will display an increased sexuality and a decreased level of aggression (vom Saal, F.S. et 
al., 1983). 
 If the environment already plays such a big role in the uterus, it is unlikely that it 
will have no effect ex utero. At the moment that it is outside the uterus the new individual 
has much more opportunities to gather crucial information about the world in which it is 
born and to adopt a strategy accordingly. The process of natural selection tests the abilities 
of individuals to adapt their strategies and thus, conditional strategies are likely to evolve. It 
is therefore not completely unlikely that there is, indeed, a period in our childhood in which 
our personality is formed. This is an idea which is very popular in our culture, probably due 
largely to its compatibility with the idea of progress and fostered by completely opposite 
psychologists from Freud to Watson and Skinner. 
 Yet, if we take behavioral genetics seriously we should be very careful not to 
exaggerate those early influences (Rowe, 1994). Bouchard claims that the non-genetic 
influence of parents on the child can only account for about 7% of its characteristics; Rowe 
is even more skeptical. Only with reference to hard facts can we decide what childhood 
experiences do mold the personality of a ripening individual. Hard facts are hard to come 
by, however, because the literature is dominated by perspectives in which the extent to 
which the supposed pedagogical influence of parents on their children is not critically 
separated from possible genetic factors (Rowe, 1994; 2000; Harris, 1999). As a result, even 
within the Darwinian paradigm, the influence of childhood experience is easily 
exaggerated. Let me mention a few examples of recent hypotheses about the influence of 
early experience from a Darwinian perspective. 
 Attachment theory. Like Freud, John Bowlby, father of attachment theory, thought 
about himself as an evolutionist. Indeed, he had a decisive influence on evolutionary 
psychology by coining the word `environment of evolutionary adaptedness' (Bowlby, 
1969). The notion that children can be either securely or insecurely attached as a result of 
the behavior of their mothers or caretakers and that these different attachment types 
determine their later social behavior has influenced many evolutionary psychologists. 
Belsky et al. (1991), Draper & Harpending (1982) and more recently Chisholm (1994, 
1999) have tried to rephrase attachment theory in terms of conditional strategies: an 
insecure attachment is not viewed as a purely pathological phenomenon caused by 
accidental failures during raising, but as an adaptive response to a particular type of 
environment in which parents did not have either resources or time to be able to provide 
enough love and security to a child. Chisholm (1999: 200) even bases himself on 
behavioral genetic research showing that genetic love style have no genetic causes (I will 
come back to Chishom in chapter 6). 
 All this may be exaggerated, however, if behavioral geneticists are right. Their 
evidence is often very compelling. Especially the Texas Adoption Study described by 
Rowe (1994: 69) shows the limited nature of rearing influences. Generally speaking one 
can claim that children adopted at an early age show much more similarities to their 
biological parents and to their adoption parents. Attachment theory simply attributes too 
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large consequences from influences that are relatively small. It is hardly worthwhile to take 
the three volumes of Bowlby's Attachment and Loss to your psychologist if it explains 
maximally 7% of your misery. The research of Jerome Kagan on the (normal) cognitive 
development of Guatemalan school-aged children who had endured an early parental 
treatment which would be judged as child neglect by American standards (Kagan, 1998) 
further undermine attachment theory's explanatory monopoly. As a result, theoreticians 
have started to look for other early influences on the developing personality. 
 Sibling rivalry. One factor contributing to someone's personality could be the 
family in which the individual finds itself. Behavioral geneticists were surprised to find that 
individuals raised in the same family are often more different than individuals raised apart. 
Brothers and sisters from the same household tend to diverge; if raised in different 
households, those same brothers and sisters could converge (Lalumière et al., 1996). As a 
result, one finds the most surprising similarities if brothers and sisters are raised apart. 
(Often we notice, too, that we start looking and behaving like our parents when we grow 
older.) 
 Recently, Frank Sulloway has proposed that sibling rivalry is the chief source of the 
differences of individuals from the same household. On the basis of their specific talents on 
the one hand, and on the basis of their position in the family on the other hand, siblings 
develop their own niches within their families. Sulloway claims that the effects of sibling 
rivalry are even stronger than those of sex differences, although they are not genetically 
determined in the sense that one and the same genotype will develop differently purely as a 
result of its position in the family. 
 One of the most important differences in which siblings tend to diverge, according 
to Sulloway, is their level of conformism. First-borns are generally more conforming and 
closely identified with their parents. Later-borns are Born to Rebel as is already claimed in 
the title of Sulloway's treatise (1996). They have to find new territories and new niches to 
survive. As a result, cultural revolutions may find their origin in population explosions in 
which a lot of later-borns are produced. I will return to this topic in a later section (5.18). 
 Peer-group socialization. Another recent proposal with respect to the main 
influences on the developing child is also partly inspired by some results of behavioral 
genetics and by evolutionary considerations. Given the limited influence of parents on 
children and given the fact that siblings often diverge rather than converge, who else may 
have influence on the developing child? Judith Harris proposes in The Nurture Assumption 
(1998) that peers may be more influential than parents. One of her arguments is that the 
nuclear family could be a relatively recent discovery and that in many societies children are 
more or less raised by each other, at least not exclusively by their biological parents. Even 
in our own society children spend only part of their time with their parents. 
 One strong argument in favor of Harris' idea is that one cannot choose one's parents, 
but one can choose one's peers. The idea of Harris is therefore perfectly compatible with 
the idea that the developing individual creates its own environments and is actively looking 
for efficient ways of mastering particular skills. Children that would wait with learning, for 
example, about sexuality until their parents taught them about it, would be at a 
disadvantage in many situations. They are already replaced by children that are continually 
looking for learning situations and that are actively choosing friends from which they can 
still learn. (Children from which you cannot learn anything are boring...). 
 Early experience: a myth? Despite the number of theories, current behavioral 
genetic and biopsychological literature reflects a enormous uncertainty with respect to the 
factors that mold a personality. It seems to me that the evolutionary approach can 
sometimes help researchers by giving arguments in favor of an optimal mix between genes 
198 
and learning. For example, from the gene's point of view it would be risky to give early 
childhood experiences a decisive influence on someone's personality. It would be unwise to 
burden limited and fallible parents with responsibilities having an decisive effect on a 
child's later success or failure. Above that, as David Rowe states `fixing the design of an 
organism to information that is 15 to 20 years outdated would seem to be a poor 
evolutionary choice, given that weather-driven famines last 1 or 2 years and that intergroup 
warfare can change the demographic structure of a tribal group in a single day' (Rowe, 
2000: 354). 
 In all, it seems to me that the theory of early experience should not be used as an 
all-explaining theoretical framework. Even if we assume that psychotherapies based on this 
theory really work, and improvements are not just the result of the healing effects of time 
and attention, this does not prove that the theory is right. At this moment the only thing that 
we know certain is that genes have an enormous influence on human behavior via bio-
psychological features and mechanisms. Even the extent to which early experiences 
contribute to the personality of an individual is genetically determined. The same goes for 
the extent to which an individual is formed as a result of his position between other siblings 
or as a result of the influences of friends. 
 
5.11 THE MISSING LINK: CULTURAL AND REPRODUCTIVE SUCCESS 
All this is not without implications for our models of culture. The idea that individuals are 
molded by culture has to be replaced by the idea that some of the ways in which individuals 
deal with culture have a genetic basis. Some of the personality traits that have been studied 
by behavioral geneticists (e.g. novelty seeking and other personality characteristics) have 
direct implications for the ways in which individuals react to memes. This strengthens the 
belief that culture is not simply superimposed on a biological substratum, but that it also 
emerges from this substratum. To some extent it can even be considered to be an 
`epiphenomenon' of the learning and culture-creating talents of interacting on a group level. 
Words like `substratum', `emergence', `epiphenomenon', however, have caused many 
philosophical debates, simply because they seduce us to make conceptual dichotomies 
where in reality only complex systems exist. In complex systems the whole is always more 
than its parts, but it can never exists apart from them. 
 Now that we have found that human culture is to some extent based on human 
nature we are perhaps ready to delve somewhat deeper. The evolutionary psychological 
approach is by no means identical to the idea that human behavior is genetically determined 
via certain evolved psychological mechanisms. It is a way of asking questions. Current 
psychological mechanisms have evolved in the past, they reflect past environments. It is 
here that we meet again Bowlby's concept of the `environment of evolutionary adaptedness' 
(Bowlby, 1969). Thus, evolutionary psychology does not simply ask what genes or 
psychological mechanisms are responsible for various types of human behavior, it is 
interested in the original function of those mechanisms. Why did they evolve? An 
evolutionary psychological approach to culture thus asks why we have psychological 
characteristics that cause us to absorb and create culture. Instead of only studying 
proximate causal explanations (referring to evolved mechanisms) we also have to study 
ultimate ones (referring to past selection forces that molded these mechanisms). 
 Of course, it would be premature to conclude that human cognitive adaptations do 
only reflect past environments: I called this the hypothesis of delayed adaptation. It is 
therefore not implausible that some of the selection forces that originally started human 
culture are still in place. Theoretically, they would have to emerge spontaneously from any 
sufficiently complete model of culture. Thus, let us look first, what we have now. 
 We have come to the conclusion that we need at least three levels in our theory of 
culture. Figure 5-4 is an attempt to do justice to some of the complex relationships between 
the three levels. The three most important causal 
relationships are given numbers: 
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 1. Genes, of course, are responsible for the 
neural tissue that enables humans to create, select 
and modify culture in the first place. As a result of 
past selective forces, the mind is selected already to 
create a culture that solves problems which arise 
from the particularities of the environment and the 
society in which it finds itself. Genes determine for 
about 40 to 80% of a person's general intelligence, 
his language capacity, his level of altruism, 
conformism, aggressiveness, cooperativeness, 
ambition and a spectrum of other talents (Bouchard, 
1994). 
 2. Individuals face a series of problems in 
their environment and society, which they solve in 
part by creating (2a) and selecting (2b) cultural 
elements that they can use. The culture that they 
produce collectively is the product of a large 
number of individual choices and creations. As a 
result, for each individual the surrounding culture is 
largely as unchangeable and monolithic as the 
environment. Yet, relatively dominant and 
powerful individuals have more possibilities to 
change their surrounding culture in their own 
interest. Thus, corresponding to a spectrum of 
human differences there is also a spectrum of different ways of relating to one's 
surrounding culture. 
 
 
  Fig. 5-4 A three-level theory of culture. 
 3. Individuals which successfully use the possibilities afforded by their culture (or, 
in some cases, which successfully resist the coercion enforced by their culture) are 
rewarded by relative reproductive success. As a result, their genes are spread throughout 
the population. These genes result in individuals with particular skills, attitudes and talents. 
In a complex environment such as culture it is to be expected that conditional alternative 
characteristics are adaptive. Thus, the expression of a particular attitude will often depend 
on circumstances. Human individuals may have the possibility of adapting their strategies 
to the environment and culture that befalls them. 
 The evidence for this model lies, of course, scattered throughout an enormous 
literature. Traditionally, culture was only studied as an almost independent phenomenon, 
sometimes in relationship to knowledge with respect to the mind. Ecological anthropology 
has tried to bring the environment in, but it was only since the rise of behavioral ecology 
that relationship 2 was studied systematically. Behavioral genetics has brought relationship 
1 back on the agenda. 
 However, more than anything else, relationship 3 has always been a `missing link'. 
The importance of this relationship was stressed by sociobiologists, but they were accused 
of neglecting the subtilities of relationship 2. This is unfair. It is the essence of science to 
abstract. When predicting the course of a bullet, students in the area of ballistics probably 
do not include the humidity of the air or the gravity of the moon in their calculations. 
During the rise of evolutionary psychology sociobiologists have learned to include factors 
in their models that result from the autonomy of the psychological level, including 
maladaptation. Currently, conditional strategies are postulated at a regular basis, even with 
the risk of unfounded speculation. Yet, the general or global teleonomic tendency of 
humans towards inclusive fitness maximization still can be studied abstracting from all 
kinds of individual and psychological aberrations. 
 On the whole, sociobiological studies during the last decennia have confirmed the 
idea that humans indeed maximize their inclusive fitness. More than a dozen studies have 
clearly shown that the pursuit of status and wealth in many societies is an approximation of 
inclusive fitness maximization (Voland, 1993; Low, 2000). The first of these, and the most 
famous, is the study of William Irons (1979) which showed that wealthier Yomut Turkmen 
(an ethnic minority of northern Iran) have more reproductive success. The wealthier half of 
the population's men were reproducing at a rate of 1.75 times that of their poorer 
counterparts; wealthier women at 1.12 times the rate of poorer women. Thus wealth in the 
Yomut proved directly linked to reproductive success, as table 5-3 shows for the male 
fertility data. 
 
 Wealthier Half of Population Poorer Half of Population 
Ages Person 
Years 
 
Births 
Age-
Specific 
Birth Rate 
Person 
Years 
 Age-
Specific Births 
Birth Rate 
15-19 
20-24 
25-29 
30-34 
35-39 
40-44 
45-49 
50-54 
55-59 
60-64 
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 The same correlation between wealth and reproductive success has been found in a 
number of traditional societies, including the Hausa (Barkow, 1977), the Kipsigis 
(Borgerhoff Mulder, 1987), the Mukogodo (Cronk, 1991) and the Ifalukese (Turke & 
Betzig, 1985). 
 Of course, wealth is not the only proximate goals which humans are pursuing. In 
many primitive egalitarian societies and in some relative sophisticated modern societies 
(the medieval church, communistic Cuba) the possibility of accumulating properties was 
limited. The effect, however, is apparently not a relaxed reproductive competition. A 
number of studies suggest that in such societies we have to look for other symbols of status 
and social distinction. Among the Yanomamö of Venezuela, for example, one's prestige 
seems to be determined by one's ferocity. Napoleon Chagnon, who has stayed among the 
Yanomamö for 50 months, discovered a surprising difference in reproductive success 
between those Yanomamö who at least once had to undergo the purification ritual 
`unokaimou' after killing a person and those who did not. As shown by table 5-4, the so-
65-69 
70-74 
1,889 
1,468 
1,125 
909 
723 
546 
417 
277 
169 
100 
35 
17 
83 
293 
345 
297 
257 
178 
105 
58 
38 
17 
5 
2 
.044 
.200 
.307 
.327 
.356 
.326 
.252 
.209 
.225 
.170 
.143 
.118 
2,189 
1,42 
1,516 
1,265 
1,008 
735 
528 
338 
223 
156 
86 
39 
49 
228 
335 
337 
275 
178 
123 
51 
18 
11 
4 
1 
.022 
.124 
.221 
.266 
.273 
.242 
.233 
.151 
.081 
.071 
.047 
.026 
Table 5-3. Summary of male fertility data from the Yomut Turkmen of Persia, collected by W. Irons in 
1973-1974. Irons, 1979. (df = 12, x2 = 113.36, p<.001.) 
called `unokais' (killers) had more wives and more children (Chagnon, 1988). 
 Similarly, among the Ache a correlation was found between a person's hunting 
reputation and his reproductive success (Kaplan & Hill, 1985). All in all, the idea that there 
exists a correlation between different measures of `cultural success' on the one hand and 
reproductive success on the other hand is at least a good provisional hypothesis with 
respect to traditional societies (Irons, 1993). 
 Yet, there are signs that the relationship between cultural and reproductive success 
breaks down in modern industrial societies. Vining (1986), for example, could not find a 
positive relationship between wealth and reproductive success in the U.S.. Pérusse (1993) 
could not find a positive relationship between cultural and reproductive success in Quebec, 
but he found an interesting positive relationship between cultural success and `number of 
potential conceptions' or matings instead. If we have to believe his study, both 
contraception and socially imposed monogamy are effective in counterbalancing the 
advantages of cultural success for the reproductive success of ambitious men. Women still 
show a tendency to choose cultural successful men over less successful ones, but these 
choices do not result in extra reproductive success any more. Of course, as Betzig (1993) 
points out, the number of children born from extramarital affairs of cultural successful men 
is difficult to measure. 
 Unokais 
 
Non-unokais 
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Number 
of 
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Average 
number of 
offspring 
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Number 
of 
offspring 
 
Average 
number of 
offspring 
 
20-24 
25-30 
31-40 
>41 
Total 
 
5 
14 
43 
75 
137 
 
5 
22 
122 
524 
673 
 
1.00 
1.57 
2.83 
6.99 
4.91 
 
78 
58 
61 
14 0.18 
50 0.86 
123 2.02 
46 193 4.19 
243 380 1.59 
   
Table 5-4. Reproductive success of unokais and Non-unokais of 1987. 88% Of the 137 unokais have 
reproduced compared to 49% of the 243 non-unokais. From Chagnon, 1988. 
 Yet, we should not forget that modern industrial societies are characterized also by 
an extreme low rate of child mortality. To some extent, we can afford ourselves the luxury 
of having very small numbers of children. Modern industrialized nations are also extreme 
in requiring a level of education which is unknown to any tribal society. Instead of 
investing in large quantities of offspring, we are to some extent forced to invest in a high-
quality upbringing for our children (a K-strategy as opposed to an r-strategy, see chapter 
6.3). It is unclear whether this constitutes a strategy which makes sense from an 
evolutionary perspective or a consequence of innate tendencies which were adaptive in the 
past, but maladaptive nowadays. 
 The fact that women in industrial societies still seem to prefer men which are 
somehow cultural successful shows that both industrialization and the pill did not 
completely change the human psyche. Social prestige is enhanced by cultural success and 
cultural success does have at least some advantages, although in different societies what 
counts as success may be something different. As shown by Chagnon, it is important in a 
Yanomamö society to be known as ferocious. Their societies are characterized by 
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continuing tribe wars, physical combats between men and the abduction of women. 
Probably it is in the interest of everyone to have ferocious allies. Apparently, women prefer 
ferocious men, too, because ferocious men may defend them and their children better. 
Ferocity could also correlate to some extent with other characteristics, like ambition, 
responsibility, industriousness, concern about the welfare of their kin and willingness to 
take risks (Chagnon, 1979). In societies in which property plays a large role, the 
accumulation of properties may prove the same series of characteristics. At the same time, 
wealth itself may also be attractive, because it affords an economical basis for raising 
offspring. 
 As a result, human societies can often be analyzed using the same `polygyny 
threshold' model as is used for other species, especially birds. This models states that a 
species may tend to be polygynous as a result of a female preference for males that have 
access to relatively superior resources. At some point, mating an already-paired male may 
result in more offspring than mating a bachelor with inferior resources (Borgerhoff-Mulder, 
1997). Monique Borgerhoff-Mulder has shown that at least in one society, the Kipsigis of 
Kenia, the patterns of polygyny can be very well explained using this model. 
 If such a model would apply to human societies everywhere this would explain the 
human tendency to accumulate more properties than one needs for the maintenance of a 
small nuclear family. Almost everywhere, males do not stop accumulating resources if the 
requirements of their own nuclear families are met. Today, in societies around the world, 
the rich become richer often by making the poor poorer. This irrational tendency to 
accumulate resources would be strange if economic or social success would not have 
correlated with reproductive success at least in the past. As we saw, our own apparently 
monogamous societies are possibly an exception (yet, to some extent, our `mating system' 
of serial monogamy may be disguised polygyny; children may also benefit from having 
relatively rich and powerful parents.) 
 What counts, however, is not one's properties only, but one's power and status. 
Even in societies without properties males do not work only for their own nuclear families. 
Among the Ache of Eastern Paraguay males are `showing off' by catching large prey which 
is distributed evenly throughout the whole community (Hawkes, 1991). Apparently good 
hunters have more relationships outside their own nuclear families and therefore also more 
illegitimate offspring. Thus, the correlation between economic and reproductive success 
found by Irons (which we can thus call `Irons' rule') and others is probably only one 
example of a more general correlation between social status and reproductive success 
(which we can thus call the `generalized Irons' rule'). 
 
5.12 INTELLIGENCE, SOCIAL SUCCESS AND SELECTION FORCES 
According to a series of authors, there seems to be also a correlation between social success 
and intelligence in western societies. The general intelligence factor g, for example, is a 
better predictor of job performance than any other single personality trait. It can be 
understood as the ability to deal with complexity and is perhaps linked to the overall speed 
and efficiency with which the brain processes information (Gottfredson, 1988). The 
heritability of IQ rises from about 40% to 80% during a lifetime and behavioral geneticists 
are starting to find genes that may be responsible for it. 
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 Of course, not everyone agrees that the concept of 
`intelligence' refers to a `natural kind', something that can be 
exactly quantified, rather than a vague collection of overlapping 
qualities. Howard Gardner has tried to distinguish eight or nine 
different kinds of intelligence, for example (Gardner, 1998). As 
long as one does not confuse evolution and progress, an 
evolutionary perspective does not commit one to expect one 
monolithic `success factor' which evolves by `directional' 
selection (selection in one direction). As the differences between 
the psychologies of males and females show, at least some 
personality characteristics have arisen as a result of `disruptive' 
selection (selection pressures which force subpopulations with 
different genes in different directions). If there was only one trait 
responsible for one's social and reproductive success and if this 
trait was inheritable, everyone would have it already as a result of 
the reproductive success of its possessors in the past. From an 
evolutionary perspective, one would rather expect a kind of trade-
off between opposing factors, as a result of which the actual 
population exhibits a spectrum of characteristics. As so often in 
nature, there is not one final stage, but a flexible and dynamic 
equilibrium which shifts according to the circumstances. 
 Perhaps the strong correlation between intelligence and social success is not the 
whole story, therefore. Perhaps, intelligence is a factor which should be combined with 
other factors to result in reproductive success. One of the possibilities is that intelligence 
also poses a risk in traditional, conformist societies and that sexual selection is directed at a 
mix of intelligence and at least some opposite characteristics (as argued by a series of 
philosophers, including Ortega y Gasset, 1960). If this is true, individuals with an average 
intelligence could be most successful and both individuals with a less-than-average and 
with a more-than-average type of intelligence would be at a disadvantage. Intelligence 
would then be a typical product of `stabilizing selection', as a result of which deviations of 
some optimal average are selected against (see figure 5-5 for the three types of selection). 
This would explain the sinus-like curve of the distribution of intelligence throughout the 
population. (Of course, this curve can also be explained simply as a result of biological 
factors which make it difficult to orchestrate an intelligent brain.) 
 A recent study seems to confirm this intuition. Mueller and Mazur (1998) 
investigated the reproductive success of all graduates of the 1950 class of the U.S. Military 
Academy. They found that high rank (and thus, presumably, intelligence) predicts 
reproductive success, but that the competitive qualities leading to top rank probably have a 
negative effect on fitness. Lieutenant generals and full generals had fewer children and 
fewer grandchildren than brigadier and major generals. It would not surprise me if this 
same tendency could also be found for, for example, artists, scientists and philosophers. It 
is a well known phenomenon that the most brilliant minds often die childless, while 
apparently only the somewhat less devoted know how to find a balance between 
reproduction and spiritual self-realization. In reproductive terms, perhaps it is not 
excellence that pays, but versatility and even some `mediocrity'. 
 All this points to the role of stabilizing selection in maintaining an optimal level of 
intelligence within the population. This does not mean, however, that intelligence is 
necessarily a constant factor in modern populations. In fact, the relatively old idea that 
intelligence is deteriorating in modern populations has recently found new adherents, who 
 
Fig. 5-5. Three types of 
selection, after Trivers (1985). 
Arrows represent selection 
pressures on one end of the 
spectrum of varieties 
(directional selection), on both 
ends (stabilizing selection) or 
on the average (disruptive 
selection). 
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seem better able to underpin their claims with data than ever before (Miller, 1998). If this is 
true, and if this claim is not simply the expression of the concerns of the elite finding 
themselves on the most right part of a sinus displaying intelligence as a function of 
reproductive success, this would imply that human culture in the long run is undermining 
its own foundations. 
 This issue needs not to be resolved here, however. It is obvious that intelligence has 
increased over the last five million years. The evolution of culture since the common 
ancestor of humans, chimps and bonobos (huchibo's) will have depended both on 
directional and stabilizing selection, and probably also on a lot of disruptional selection. 
Whether there is a general g factor or not, the evolution of culture must have depended on 
and still depends on a large spectrum of specialized mental (and cultural) abilities which 
form the `missing link' between genes and memes. 
 
5.13 DOES SEXUAL SELECTION EXPLAIN THE EVOLUTION OF CULTURAL 
ABILITIES? 
Whatever the role of a general intelligence or of a series of specialized talents is, there 
seems to be a correlation between something like `social status' and reproductive success, 
as is attested by a series of sociobiological studies. Apparently, human culture is the 
product of the cumulative efforts of individuals to attain social esteem and prestige. The 
correlation between social and reproductive success could be compared, then, to the 
correlation between tail length and reproductive success in male swallows or to the 
correlation between number of tail feathers and reproductive success in peacocks, - both of 
which are products of sexual selection. Perhaps human culture should be compared to the 
`lek' system which we find in a series of bird species, in the Netherlands represented by the 
Ruff (Philomachus pugnax) and the Black Grouse (Lyrurus tetrix; alas, almost extinct in 
our country now). In these species males defend small territories on a communal display 
ground at which they display their feathers (and `sing' or make gobbling, popping, rattling 
or bubbling noises as in the Black Grouse). If females are in need of a package of good 
genes they can inspect the males here and can select the most impressive ones. 
 At least some theorists think that human cultural abilities are products of sexual 
selection (Miller, 1996; 2000). Indeed, it has been found that there are at least some 
similarities between the behavior of birds on leks and the behavior of humans on 
`communal display grounds', for example in bars or at universities. Robin Dunbar and his 
student Anna Marriott have studied the subjects of human conversation (Dunbar, 1996). 
Surprisingly, they found relatively few differences between males and females. What they 
found, however, was that males start talking more about their work, about difficult 
academic subjects or about religion and ethics at the moment that women are present. In 
young adults males talk about two thirds of the time about themselves, whereas females 
talk only about one third of the time about themselves. Clearly, a lot of self-advertisement 
is going on in human conversation. Male `cultural displays' are often at least partially 
fuelled by potential female admiration. 
 
 
Ranked Ratings by Males Ratings by Females 
 Value Variable Name Mean Std.Dev. Variable Name Mea
n 
Std. Dev. 
1. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
5. 
6. 
205 
 
 
 This brings us to the question whether this potential female admiration is merely a 
male chimera. Are females really impressed by these male displays? The largest cross-
cultural study on 
mate selection criteria is that of David Buss (1990; 1994). With the aid of native residents 
of 33 
different countries, he has succeeded in interviewing (using questionaires) 9,474 
individuals from 37 different cultures across the planet. The result shows, once again, that 
there are a lot of similarities between male and female preferences with respect to potential 
partners. Humans are really a pair-bonding species, which distinguishes us from other apes. 
At the same time, however, Buss found a series of interesting differences between the 
sexes. In one of his summary tables, which is reprinted here as table 5-5, I have italicized 
those preferences which are ranked relatively high in the respective sexes. 
 As can be seen Education and Intelligence, Sociability, Ambition and 
Industriousness, Similar Education, Good Financial Prospect and Favorable Social Status 
or Rating are more important to females. Good Health, Refinement and Neatness, Good 
Looks, Good Cook and Housekeeper and Chastity are more important to males. Of course, 
Buss found considerable cultural differences. The largest effect of culture occurred for the 
variable of Chastity, followed by Home and Children and Good Housekeeper. 
 In all, however, it is not unfair to claim that females on the whole are relatively 
sensitive to characteristics of males that make them more likely to attain higher social 
7. 
8. 
9. 
10. 
11. 
12. 
13. 
14. 
15. 
16. 
17. 
18. 
 
Mutual Attraction - Love 
Dependable Character 
Emotional Stability and 
Maturity 
Pleasing Disposition 
Good Health 
Education and Intelligence 
Sociability 
Desire for Home and Children 
Refinement, Neatness 
Good Looks 
Ambition and Industriousness 
Good Cook and Housekeeper 
Good Financial Prospect 
Similar Education 
Favorable Social Status or 
Rating 
Chastity 
Similar Religious Background 
Similar Political Background 
 
Mean 
2.81 
2.50 
2.47 
2.44 
2.31 
2.27 
2.15 
2.09 
2.03 
1.91 
1.85 
1.80 
1.51. 
1.50 
1.16 
1.06 
0.98 
0.92 
 
1.87 
0.16 
1.46 
0.20 
0.29 
0.33 
0.19 
0.28 
0.50 
0.48 
0.26 
0.35 
0.48 
0.42 
0.37 
0.28 
0.69 
0.48 
0.36 
 
0.57 
Mutual Attraction - Love 
Dependable Character 
Emotional Stability and 
Maturity 
Pleasing Disposition 
Education and Intelligence 
Sociability 
Good Health 
2.87 0.12 
2.69 0.31 
2.68 0.20 
2.52 0.30 
2.45 0.25 
2.30 0.28 
2.28 0.30 
2.21 0.44 
Desire for Home and Children 2.15 0.35 
Ambition and Industriousness 1.98 0.49 
Refinement, Neatness 1.84 0.47 
Similar Education 1.76 0.38 
Good Financial Prospect 1.46 0.28 
Good Looks 1.46 0.39 
Favorable Social Status or 
Rating 
1.28 0.27 
1.21 0.56 
Good Cook and Housekeeper 1.03 
0.75 
0.35 
Similar Religious Background 0.66 
Similar Political Background   
Chastity 1.94 0.63 
 
Mean 
Table 5-5. Prefered characteristics in potential mates. Summary of ratings by sex using entire 
international sample of 37 cultures. From Buss, 1990. I have italicized variables which seem relatively 
important to one of the two sexes. 
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positions in the future and that make them more likely to earn a lot of money. It is not 
unlikely that males which are more productive culturally are not doing bad with the girls. 
At the same time it is clear that women look to a surprising spectrum of other 
characteristics as well. If there is sexual selection for culture creating traits this could well 
be a kind of stabilizing selection which promotes intermediate forms. In that case, a genius 
is simply the embodiment of an extreme version of a trait which is normally maintained in 
the population as a part of a much larger package of adaptive characteristics. 
 That means, at the same time, that the differences between the sexes are not big 
enough to justify the idea that man is simply a typical `lek-bird', like the Ruff, the Peacock 
or the Black Grouse, although there are some surprising similarities. On the whole, 
however, human culture seems to be much more than a mere beauty contest, even if the 
concept of beauty is enlarged so that it also includes internal beauty. It is time to reflect on 
the kind of social and `mating' system that underlies human culture. 
 
5.14A DUAL SELECTION THEORY OF CULTURAL ABILITIES 
What surprises most, if we compare the human `mating' and social system with that of 
other species is that we can compare humans with at least two other different groups of 
organisms. On the one hand, we are clearly descendants of a chimpanzee-like ape with a 
social hierarchy in which power and politics play a dominant role (Wrangham & Peterson, 
1996). What makes chimpanzee groups unique among primates generally is the cooperation 
among males. Most primate societies are centered around a group of related females. In 
apes, however, females have become exogamous at least since the common ancestor of 
gorillas and chimpanzees. In gorillas we see a trend in which dominant silverbacks may 
share a group of females. In chimpanzees cooperation among males has become the rule 
rather than the exception. Thus, male chimpanzees, who are more related to us than gorillas 
and who probably are more similar to our common ancestor, are not only selected on their 
ability to impress females but also on their ability to cooperate. That is one reason why we 
would also expect human male characteristics to be not exclusively the product of sexual 
selection by females. 
 On the other hand, marriage and the nuclear family seems to be a universal human 
feature (although in most cultures, males may have more than one wife or may take 
mistresses and concubines). This suggests similarities between our species and pair-
bonding species, for example, most birds, which behave somewhat differently from lek-
birds anyway. While there are about 37 monogamous primate species, among mammals 
generally a system in which males assist in the raising of offspring is rare. 
 Something very strange seems to have happened with our ability to cooperate. In 
chimpanzees, dominant individuals, males and females alike, seem to need each other to 
attain and maintain power within the group. This has created a relatively sly and intelligent 
ape, but an ape nonetheless, with a relatively small dependence on cultural inherited habits 
and technologies. In humans the ability to cooperate seems to have taken over completely. 
Not only are we completely dependent on each other at almost every level, but we are also 
completely dependent on culturally inherited habits and technologies in almost every realm 
of life (Slurink, 1994; chapter 7). 
 This ability to cooperate seems to go hand in hand with our tendency to form 
nuclear families. In almost all societies the institution of marriage creates at least some 
clarity with respect to relationships and paternity, as a result of which at least some of the 
tensions resulting from sexual competition are abated. Paternal uncertainty in most cultures 
lies within the realm of 10% to 20%, which moralists may deplore, but which contrasts 
favorably with the 100% paternal uncertainty in chimpanzees. 
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 Thus, on the one hand we form societies which remind one of colonies of birds, 
each pair with its own nest, on the other hand we cooperate and compete in networks 
throughout the whole `colony', as a result of which our societies evoke reminiscences to ant 
or termite colonies. Yes, we have descended from something like the apes, but at the same 
time, we have turned into something very dissimilar, apparently an eusocial, very 
cooperative ape which has become completely dependent on culture. Extraterrestrial 
exobiologists would be enthusiastic about finding such a termite-like ape with such un-
termite-like mating habits. To some extent, we are stranger even than naked mole-rats, 
which are mammals with a mating system with much more similarities to termites (Jarvis, 
1994). 
 Our strange social system suggests a solution to the problem of apparently sexually 
selected cultural abilities. Our cultural abilities, properties like the control over language, 
our aesthetic sense, our dexterous skills which are expressed in various crafts, our logical 
and mathematical talents, are apparently not only products of sexual selection, but also of a 
selection-process which favors individuals that are particularly useful for the group 
generally and for the dominant elite in particular. This forces us to accept a version of the 
generalized Iron's rule in which there is a link between at least some culture creating talents 
and reproductive success (without assuming that cultural talents are directly sexually 
selected): gifted individuals are useful allies and are admitted to the dominant elite, as a 
result of which they are allowed to share in its privileges, which includes reproductive 
advantages as well. 
 Apparently, the key to the problem of the relationship between genes, mind and 
culture lies in the fact that we have evolved as `culture cooperators', who have a unique 
talent for the groupwise exploitating of natural resources. Individuals of our species form 
naturally hierarchies and at the top of those hierarchies are dominant individuals who are 
most skillful at coordinating a collective effort to exploit the available natural resources. 
Originally this cooperation enabled our ancestors to hunt relatively large prey and to defend 
the group, but with the advent of agriculture and industry this has led to the evolution of 
complex states in which many specialized individuals contribute to collective interests. 
 In chimpanzees hunting and `warfare' are some of the activities which are 
undertaken groupwise and which may constitute a motor behind social evolution. In 
humans we see that cooperative activities have invaded all realms of life: all fundamental 
`biological' activities are `culturally mediated' (if we are not alert, perhaps the very act of 
procreation will even be replaced by a cultural substitute). Social learning has become so 
dominant that sometimes individuals don't dare to think for themselves: culturally inherited 
paradigms even influence the way they interpret their most intimate experiences. 
Dominance hierarchies are to a large extent based on the proficiency of individuals in the 
command of culturally acquired skills and knowledge. 
 It seems to me that the only way to understand this transition from a chimpanzee-
like social system to a human-like one is to compare different evolutionary scenario's to the 
available archeological and paleontological evidence. I will try this in the third part of this 
book. At this point, we can conclude that it is reasonable to assume that human culture is 
not something which was created ex nihilo by an unspecialized ape, but a way of living 
which is only possible on the basis of a unique social system, which is part of human 
nature. Human culture requires a series of physical and psychological specializations which 
can only be explained by a process of gene-mind-culture coevolution which was cranked 
up when a particular kind of ape became more and more dependent on culturally inherited 
ways of solving its problems. 
 We thus come to a model which includes elements of sociobiology, evolutionary 
psychology and primatology. Sociobiological is the idea of gene-culture coevolution 
(Lumsden & Wilson, 1981, 1983) and the idea that sociocultural success translates into 
reproductive success. Evolutionary psychological is the idea that culture is based on a 
series of specialized modules or `talents', which somehow must have been evolved by 
natural selection. Primatological is the idea that human uniqueness should be understood as 
the result of a unique social and mating system. Figure 5-6 is an attempt to summarize the 
model that I have outlined so far. In principle, this model does not only schematize the 
relationships between genes, mind and culture, but 
it does also explain why culture evolved in the 
first place, or, at least, what kind of stabilizing 
selection maintains cultural abilities within the 
human population. 
 
5.15 STRUCTURE OF THE CULTURAL 
`SUBSTRATUM' 
Thus, we come to a model in which cultural 
abilities may be linked directly (via sexual 
selection) and indirectly (via the membership of a 
dominant group) to reproductive success. The 
`substratum' in which memes or cultural inherited 
ideational phenomena are replicated is maintained 
by natural selection. One could argue, however, 
that this is still consistent with the idea that 
cultural evolution is somehow independent, 
`supervenient' on the biological process. Of 
course, much depends on the meaning of words. 
One could claim that the evolution of bird song 
`supervenes' on processes of sexual selection and 
competition in birds. It seems to me, however, 
that such a terminology would obscure the fact 
that the evolution of bird song is driven by sexual 
selection and territorial competition. In the same way, I think that abstract `dual inheritance' 
models obscure the fact that cultural evolution is driven by processes of cooperation and 
competition within our species which directly arise out of the patterns of biological 
interests. 
Fig. 5-6. An evolutionary theory of culture. 
 How? In figure 5-6 I have made an attempt to show what drives individuals 
(especially males) to establish themselves as members of a society of cooperating 
individuals. Individuals cooperate by participating in a particular culture, which represents 
a solution to problems posed by a specific ecological situation. This `culture-cooperation' is 
possible as a result of their overlapping interests and is based on the mechanisms of direct 
and indirect reciprocal altruism (chapter 4). Within the culture cooperation, the egoistic 
drives of the individual are legitimized and turned into motivational energy that can be used 
by the society: hence the difference between `egoistic' sex drives and socially accepted love 
and marriage and between machiavellistic power politics and socially accepted ambition 
and responsibility. 
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 As shown by figure 5-7, 
males have both to be accepted by 
females and by other males to 
become reproductive members of 
the cooperation. The two 
motivational systems within their 
psychology are, however, not 
incompatible, because, as 
Kissinger once said, power is an 
important aphrodisiac: status is 
often important to women. To 
become accepted as a part of the 
society, males must fight, because 
the cooperating males tend to 
keep new males out (as in 
chimpanzees). A series of tests 
and barriers are created to keep 
new males out, to establish a 
hierarchy and to defend the 
system against free riders 
(parasites). Females often reinforce the male hierarchy by preferring high status males over 
low status males both as sexual partners and as cooperators in obtaining power. As a result 
no one can attain social and reproductive success by discarding the preexisting culture and 
its underlying power hierarchy (rapists try to take a short-cut, but theirs is a high-risk 
strategy). Everyone striving for social and reproductive success will have to respect the 
`rules of the game' dictated by a particular culture, that is, by the network of dominant 
individuals. That means that culture can be compared to a kind of arena in which 
individuals compete for resources and for status, both because these are prerequisites for 
being sexually selected and because they enable them to raise offspring. 
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5.16 CULTURE AND THE HANDICAP PRINCIPLE 
One of the similarities between arenas of different types is that one can only win in them by 
really being the best (Zahavi & Zahavi, 1997). If it were possible to fake impressive antlers, 
one could be the top deer without being the strongest. In the same way it has been shown 
that Barn Swallows with artificially lengthened tails did not gain in reproductive success 
and that Great Tits with artificially broadened bands on their chest were in need of extra 
testosterone to beat dominant Great Tits (Smith & Montgomerie, 1991; Järvi & Bakken, 
1984). One of the characteristics of cultural expressions, too, is that it is hard to fake to be 
good in them. One can, perhaps, fake to be an artist by wearing extravagant clothes or by 
behaving in a nonconformist way, but often one look at a painting will convince almost 
everyone about one's real talents. At the same time, in every cultural activity that I am 
aware of there is a struggle going on between different talents which correlate with 
different strategies: there are `originals', `imitators', `fads' and so on, there are those who 
profit from having good connections, being socially clever, or being able to foresee what 
the public wants. Because there are always established reputations that set a high standard, 
the road to recognition is long and painful. Thus, if an artist finally arrives in the public 
limelight, there is a lot clear about his talents. 
 Of course, the cultural expressions themselves are also direct manifestations of the 
artist's genotype quality. Qualities that are displayed via cultural expressions may vary from 
 
 
Fig. 5-7. To become reproductive members of a society, males 
have to be both sexually selected by females and to be socially 
accepted within the usually male-dominated power pyramid. 
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good sense-organs to sheer discipline and perseverance, or from a healthy body to supposed 
aesthetic and moral qualities, but their common denominator is that they require innate 
talents of some sort. As a result, in at least the germanic languages the etymology of `art' 
refers to abilities: thus one could claim (in German), "Kunst zeigt was man kann", or (in 
Dutch), "kunst toont wat je kunt". This link between art and talents explains also why the 
public has often problems with modern art: the real problem with some `abstract' modern 
art is not that it does not `represent' anything, but that it does not prove anything about the 
artistic talents that gave rise to it - it seems relatively easy to imitate. 
 An essential point of the theory of the `Handicap principle' of Amotz and Avishag 
Zahavi is that animals can only convincingly display their genetic quality with signals that 
incur real costs to them. Only if a signal costs a lot of surplus energy can an individual 
demonstrate that it can permit itself this waste. According to them, this is the reason that 
swallows and peacocks with artificially lengthened tails will in the long run become 
exhausted. 
 The handicap principle can be directly applicated to almost all levels of cultural 
activity that I am aware of. Perhaps it is possible for a mediocre artist to paint one relatively 
nice painting each year, but a characteristic of a real genius, like Picasso, is that he is able 
to attain high levels again and again, sometimes at the price of periodic depressions. 
Talents in many areas of culture are often a burden to their owners, many of whom have to 
suffer a lot as a result of their extreme sensitivity, some of whom are prone to mental 
illnesses of different kinds. Many studies have independently found increased rates of 
depression, manic-depression and suicide among artists (Jamison, 1997). This link between 
manic-depression and `talent' is probably not an accident. Intense emotional fluctuations 
seem to offer a kind of Husserlian `eidetic variation' which forces particular individuals via 
involuntary learning routes to all kinds of `esoteric' wisdom (at least wisdom unattainable 
to others). Perhaps manic-depressive illness constitutes a kind of cognitive zoom lens 
which allows the tormented mind to observe many different aspects of reality and enables it 
to become familiar with the full range of human experience, a familiarity that is conditional 
to true wisdom and perhaps to great art, too. 
 
5.17 CULTURAL EVOLUTION DRIVEN BY BOTH COOPERATION AND 
COMPETITION 
This brings us to other biopsychological roots of culture. I wrote about `culture-
cooperation'. Of course, however, I did not mean that culture is only characterized by 
cooperation and harmony. If there was only cooperation and harmony, culture would 
probably not have evolved. Cooperation and harmony, at least in a culture-producing ape 
species like we are, probably requires dictatorship and censorship: they thus would  make a 
culture rigid and static. In the terminology of the anthropologist I.M. Lewis (1971), culture 
is normally characterized by both central and peripheral cults. Central cults are those cults 
that are in the interest of the dominant group, normally a group of cooperating males and 
the subdominant females around them. Peripheral cults are cults that are in the interest of 
minorities that don't find their interests represented well in the central cult. 
 As my formulations already show, I see a direct link here between the sociology of 
beliefs and memes and ethological findings about dominance hierarchies in apes. Beliefs 
and memes are not floating above the bipedal, naked apes that produce, transmit and obey 
them, but they represent the viewpoints and interests of particular groups and subgroups of 
those apes vis-à-vis other groups and subgroups. It is only natural that dominant individuals 
tend to have viewpoints that represent not only their sometimes superior cognitive abilities, 
but their interests as well, and that their cooperation with other individuals is to some extent 
211 
symbolized by an overlap between their viewpoints. As not everyone shares the interests of 
the leading group, it is to be expected that other, relatively `subversive', viewpoints will 
arise, probably originating from subdominants that are excluded somehow. 
 Thus, differences in viewpoint ultimately represent differences in cognitive-
competitive abilities and genetic interests and memes do in part arise as weapons in the 
struggle for life. There is a direct, evolutionary link between the power struggles of the 
chimpanzee or the common HUCHIBO ancestor and the power struggle between, for 
example, the catholic church and a series of heresies or between the way in which in 
chimpanzees groups grow, split and finally become enemies and the way in which 
protestant churches grow, split and decry each other. 
 Of course, science and philosophy do not transcend this struggle for life at the level 
of ideas. Here too, we can often witness sabre-rattling between central and peripheral cults. 
Here too, we can observe how hierarchies are established and how groups split. This is only 
partly the result of scarce resources; in principle other species could have evolved in which 
those scarce (funding) resources were distributed in a completely different way. Scientific 
minded or philosophical inclined ants or termites would probably have much more 
unanimous scientific or philosophical communities that would, however, wage wars with 
other such communities. 
 At this point it may be worthwhile to remember the Kuhnian notion of a paradigm 
(Kuhn, 1961). In his later years Kuhn has stressed that this was not purely meant as a 
relativistic notion, although it has often been taken that way (perhaps on the basis of 
seductive suggestions of Kuhn himself). The notion of a paradigm is meant to express the 
fact that there is much more to theories than just observations and experiments. As the 
original meaning of the word theooria already shows, theories are ways of viewing things. 
That does not only mean that they arise from particular perspectives, but also that they are 
products of a commitment to particular theoretical values. These values can be seen as the 
weight given to the properties of theories that I have listed in chapter 2.5. 
 
5.18 WHAT COMPETITION?: SIBLING RIVALRY? 
One of the dimensions in which choices between paradigms happen to fall wide apart 
between different groups of people is their correspondence to the received wisdom of a 
particular field or of a particular group or tradition. Abandoning traditionally held beliefs 
implies an enormous risk, because one always knows what one has, but not what one gets. 
Often traditional held beliefs embody an accumulation of knowledge acquired during 
generations, and it often seems frivolous to throw all this away in favor of something that 
simply may be a new fashion or trend. Also, one often has to show adherence to a particular 
belief to be admitted to a group and to be able to rise in its hierarchy; it may not always be 
possible to change one's beliefs afterwards. 
 On the other hand, the fact that a theory has worked for many years does not say 
anything about the future. The situation may have changed, new data may have arrived, etc. 
Revolutions in science and philosophy are sometimes necessary to enforce a fundamental 
Gestalt-switch as a result of which things are seen in a completely different light. Traditions 
often have to be blown apart, because they may stand in the way of progress, sometimes by 
offering misleading `intuition pumps' (Dennett, 1984), sometimes simply by offering a false 
certainty and an excuse for intellectual laziness. 
 Thus, sometimes it may be `rational' to be conservative, sometimes it may be 
`rational' to believe in a more revolutionary attitude. It is not possible a priori to decide 
which attitude is better and often both attitudes simply offer different sides of the same 
story. What, then, makes particular scientists and philosophers more conservative and some 
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more revolutionary? 
 Almost anyone will agree that probably some personality factors are involved. 
Biologists will associate different personalities with different strategies. Both innate and 
acquired factors may be involved. As far as I know, the heritability of conformism has not 
been studied by behavioral geneticist, but of course the innateness of novelty seeking, harm 
avoidance and intelligence are all relevant, and they have been studied (e.g. Hammer, 
1998). 
 At the same time, it is more than likely that people will become more conformist 
over time at least in some dimensions. A revolutionary attitude is a high-risk strategy which 
all primatologists will associate with young, subdominant males that still have to rise in 
power. The conformist attitude is easily associated with the defensive attitude of the 
accomplished territory-holders or those who try to cooperate with them. 
 Another factor that may influence a person's conformist or revolutionary attitude is 
his position in his family. As I noted before, Frank Sulloway claims that first-borns tend to 
be more conformist, whereas later-borns tend to have a more revolutionary attitude. In his 
Born to Rebel (1996) Sulloway tries to show that almost all proponents of revolutionary 
theories were later-borns. The idea is that first-borns have many advantages over later-
borns, even in societies without primogeniture. First-borns are simply earlier on the world, 
they are stronger, and they simply have to defend what they have got: to them, change 
means decline. Later-borns meet a world in which they have to fight for their position, in 
which alternative strategies may be needed, in which justice means change. 
 The idea that birth order may affect personality development is not strange to 
anyone familiar with birds. In most birds of prey, for example, eggs do not hatch at the 
same time and the second and third chicken that is born stands only a chance if there is 
enough food. If food is scarce, one or more of the youngest chickens will simply die, 
because the older chickens will eat everything that is brought in by the parents. In times of 
extreme scarcity, sometimes the youngest birds are even eaten by their older siblings. It has 
now been found that the theoretical concept of `sibling rivalry' can even throw light on 
plant biology (Furlow, 1999). If sibling rivalry is such an omnipresent, powerful 
phenomenon, it is not unlikely that it has led to a series of psychological adaptations as 
well. 
 Frank Sulloway claims to have discovered that a person's level of conformism is 
just such a trait. He claims that during radical ideological revolutions later-borns are about 
10 times as likely to support innovations, whereas first-borns display a tendency to resist 
them first and to accept them only after a considerable lapse of time. That would mean that 
sibling rivalry is one of the motors of cultural evolution. 
 Being myself a later-born, I felt initially very attracted to the hypothesis of 
Sulloway. It explains wonderfully why my own philosophical perspective is so much 
deeper than that of my two older brothers (of course, they disagree). The fact that later-
borns often disagree with the theory (Rowe, 1997; Ruse, 1997; Harris, 1998) fits in very 
nicely, too. The fact that Galilei, Newton, Einstein, Luther and Freud were all first-borns 
may only show that their theories were not so revolutionary after all. 
 Yet, Sulloway has some serious problems. First, as two first-borns have stressed, he 
has his own idiosyncratic means of `measuring' conformism and the revolutionary mindset 
(Rowe, 1997; Ruse, 1997). Second, there are reasons to believe that genetic effects overrule 
birth order effects and that the behavioral differences between siblings are context-
dependent. As soon as children are outside the family context, completely different laws 
start determining their behavior (Harris, 1998). 
 There are also studies that seem to confirm Sulloway's theory, however, at least to 
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the extent that there are significant birth order effects and that niche formation within 
families does occur. Jennifer Davis (1997) found that older children are more status 
oriented than later-borns. Catherine Salmon and Martin Daly (1998) found that firstborns 
and lastborns both are most parentally and familially oriented, while middleborns are the 
least. They suggest that "the combination of firstborn favoritism, lastborn freedom from 
competition from successors, and maternal age effects appears to result in greater family 
interest and reliance on the part of the first and lastborns, whereas middleborns apparently 
invest more of their efforts in non-kin reciprocal relationships" (Salmon & Daly, 1998: 
311). 
 As a philosopher, who happens to be a middleborn as well, I do not feel competent 
to decide who is right in the ongoing debate on birth order effects. Perhaps it is still to 
early, too. One thing I know for sure is that in large families (I come from a family of five) 
a lot of niche formation is going on, but whether the patterns of parental investments and 
character formation can always be predicted from such a simple phenomenon as birth order 
I do not know. In a generalized form, Sulloway's ideas make a lot of sense to me, however. 
Cultural evolution is driven by an equilibrium of opposing strategies within the population, 
such as conformism versus rebelliousness, cooperation versus competition. In that respect 
his theory seems to me to point at least into the right direction. Once again, a picture 
emerges of individuals with `biological' interests, who have to join in the `culture play' to 
attain their goals. Culture is shown to be an `arena' and cultural abilities are really fighting 
abilities which demonstrate the vitality and genetic qualities of their owners. 
 
5.19 WHAT COMPETITION?: DIFFERENT CHARACTERS? 
As far as we now know, the difference between firstborns and laterborns is entirely 
nongenetic. If culture should be seen as a kind of `arena', perhaps some innate personality 
types or tendencies can also be seen as the embodiment of opposing evolutionary strategies. 
Traditionally, evolutionary psychology has paid little attention to the possibility of adaptive 
genetic variation within the human population. Yet, in a large number of species adaptive 
individual differences have been observed and these differences are typically caused by a 
mixture of genetic polymorphism and phenotypic plasticity (D.S. Wilson, 1994). In recent 
years, Dutch researchers like Koolhaas and van Drenth have discovered two types of 
individuals in mice, great tits and pigs: an impulsive, aggressive type and a more cautious, 
thoughtful type. The fastness and brutality of the first type is thought to be particularly 
favorable in social environments, whereas the prudence and tact of the second type is 
thought to be favorable in new, unknown environments. It is almost impossible to resist the 
temptation of drawing parallels to humans, for example to the differences between 
extraverts and introverts which have a heritability between .32 (`narrow-sense', purely 
additive effects) and .49 (`broad-sense', that is including nonadditive effects; Rowe, 1994). 
 A somewhat more complex polymorphism has been found in the Ruff 
(Philomachus pugnax) in which three different types of males all seem to embody different 
strategies (Ehrlich et al., 1994; Van Rhijn, 1991). This species is especially interesting to 
me in the context of this chapter, because it is a species with `leks' or communal display 
grounds and I have been comparing culture with a kind of arena. In the Ruff, there are on 
the one hand `independent' males (`honkmannen' in Dutch) who aggressively defend a 
territory on the lek, while displaying their dark display plumage, especially their ruff of 
neck feathers. On the other hand there are `satellites' (satelietmannen) who generally do not 
display and are more or less tolerated by the independents. They can be easily recognized 
by their light or even white ruff. A third group of males are the marginal ones 
(`randmannen' in Dutch): they have not yet succeeded in establishing a territory on the lek. 
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 The strategy of the `independents' probably costs most energy, because they have to 
fight a lot. Their strategy has evolved, because it affords the best mating opportunities. In 
one case one independent male on a Dutch lek was seen to participate in 52 of 100 
copulations. It is still unclear why independent males tolerate satellites, but it is likely that 
they help to attract the females, who sometimes copulate with them opportunistically. It is 
not hard to see why it is better to be a satellite male than a marginal one. 
 Of course, there are no exact parallels between the lek-system of the Ruff and the 
human cultural arena. The underlying mating system is also completely different: male 
Ruffs do not help feeding the young. Yet, one can argue that, if the relatively simple lek 
system of the Ruff gives rise to different strategies, the complex lek-plus-pair-bonding 
system of man should have allowed for the evolution of even more specialized strategies 
which all find their own niche in the system. Models in game theory show that behavioral 
strategies can give rise to opposing strategies which coexist in a stabile equilibrium (e.g. 
Ridley, 1996). Certainly, if we look at the ways in which it pays to be specialized in 
cultures around the globe, even in `primitive' ones (in which one specialize in being a good 
hunter, a skilled toolmaker, a craftsman, a midwife, a shaman, a leader, etc.), it seems not 
unlikely that a lot of disruptive selection (see figure 5-3) has been going on for many, many 
millennia. 
 At the same time, as geneticists are gradually decoding the human genome, it 
gradually becomes both tempting and inevitable to speculate on the adaptive meaning of 
variations that can be found in certain genes. The moment a genetic basis for 
homosexuality, depression, schizophrenia, novelty-seeking etc. is found (as we discussed in 
5.9 and 5.10), at least some theoretians will start wondering why these genes evolved in the 
first place, why they did not go extinct long ago and whether they are, perhaps, part of an 
adaptive human polymorphism. It has been suggested, for example, that homosexuals are 
really a kind of satellite males who apparently pose no thread to the macho `independents', 
but who turn out to be occasional bisexuals or `cryptic heterosexuals' if there is an 
opportunity (Badcock, 1990). If we accept the notion that man is a pair-bonding species 
with male competition over women and resources and with women trying to bind 
resourceful or dominant men and force them into more paternal investment, homosexuality 
can be interpreted as a strategy which both evades direct competition with other males over 
women ànd female sexual selection and manipulation. Because homosexuals are able to 
evade many of the pitfalls of male-male competition over women as well as the burden of 
paternal investment, they could be relatively joyful and carefree - thus, gay - and they could 
have plenty of time to attain high positions in their societies. In the end the fitness loss of 
having no official children could be compensated by the extra, occasional bisexual 
opportunities offered by their power and freedom. (While this hypothesis is at the moment 
pure speculation inspired by indications of a hereditary basis of homosexuality (5.10), it 
could be made testable easily.) 
 An intriguing speculation with respect to a polymorphism that could be relevant 
with respect to the origin and nature of human culture, concerns the adaptive meaning of 
schizophrenia. Price and Stevens (1998; see also Stevens & Price, 1996) note that 
schizophrenia has a genetic base and affects 1% of the population, although it leads to a 
30% fertility reduction in patients. The rates of schizophrenia in parents and siblings of 
patients are about the same, which excludes the possibility that genes for schizophrenia are 
protected from selection by recessivity. Price and Stevens speculate that schizophrenia is an 
extreme manifestion of the schizotypal personality, first noted by characterologist 
Kretschmer (see, e.g. Helwig, 1972). Schizotypes often display highly idiosyncratic 
perceptions and beliefs and the delusions and hallucinations of schizophrenics are really 
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only extreme manifestions of this characteristic. Shamans, prophets, gurus, cult leaders and 
other religious personalities have apparently been schizotypal personalities and their 
auditory hallucinations have given them authority as divine mediators or oracles. They 
often have a talent for forming new ways of seeing things - new theories or `paradigms' - 
through a radical rethinking of what they have learned. 
 Price and Stevens refer in this context to the work of the psychologist Wallace 
about `mazeway resynthesis' (1956). The mazeway is the individual equivalent of culture 
and comprises an individual's values, goals, beliefs, and his experience of himself, other 
people, and the world as a whole. The mazeway may come under strain in difficult periods 
and some individuals may go through a period of illness or depression to emerge afterwards 
with new ideas about themselves and the world. Wallace calls this phenomenon `mazeway 
resynthesis'. Philosophers of science, after Kuhn, would, of course, speak about 
`paradigms', because ultimately, according to Kuhn, the transition from one paradigm to 
another has no foundation and can be compared to a conversion. It is never `proven' that 
one paradigm is wrong, but if anomalies accumulate and if someone finds a new a way of 
explaining the data, a Gestalt switch may occur in which a new paradigm arises. (Of 
course, mazeways are to some extent more encompassing, but less rigid, than specialized 
scientific theories.) 
 Price and Stevens place the notion of mazeway resynthesis in the context of group 
formation and group splitting. They argue that human groups are normally organized under 
ideological banners and that it is possible, within groups, to relate in different ways to this 
banner. One can, for example, cooperate with other males to defend the ideology, one can 
also use it more hypocritically or neglect it altogether. They propose that it is the 
`schizotypal strategy' to form a new ideology and to attempt founding one's own group. 
Schizotypes who succeed are cult leaders, prophets, gurus etc., schizotypes who do not find 
a following are considered to be madmen or schizophrenes.  
 Whether true or not, their speculation shows how the traditions of characterology 
and personality psychology might help evolutionary psychology in finding alternative 
strategies. Informed by an increasing knowledge about different individual strategies within 
animal societies, by new knowledge about the genes and hormones that influence specific 
patterns of behavior, and by better techniques to find patterns in an overwhelming amount 
of data, psychologists of the future will gradually be able to separate the wheat of human 
adaptations from the chaff of pure accidental variation. At this moment, human personality 
psychology is just starting to think about the adaptive advantages of certain traits and the 
first hypotheses are still either overcautious or rather speculative (Buss, 1996; Winter, 
1996). Let us look at two systems and investigate whether they in principle could reveal 
something like an adaptive human polymorphism: the relatively old-fashioned 
`constitutional' system of Sheldon, and the currently more popular five-factor model of 
personality. 
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 Sheldon. I have to admit that I feel some kind of personal commitment to the 
system of Sheldon, perhaps because I learned about it already at a relatively young age via 
the book of Helwig (1972) and have been trying to understand my world in `Sheldonian' 
terms ever since, although not always with much success (personality differences are not 
only a big scientific problem, they are often the source of the most fundamental questions 
that one can have with respect to human destiny, freedom, justice, meaning, good and evil). 
Yet, I find it very strange that the few references to Sheldon's system in modern textbooks 
of personality psychology do not offer me decisive reasons to reject his system. Instead, 
they give me the impression that Sheldon's system has simply been forgotten too fast. There 
are a few very positive references, but most textbooks (e.g. Winter, 1996; Pervin, 1996) 
simply neglect both Kretschmer and Sheldon, jumping from Jung's to Eysenk's introverts in 
a hurry to end up singing the joyful message of the five factor model. Are personality 
psychologists forgetting that the research of Sheldon was very thorough indeed and was 
based on physical and psychological examinations of hundreds of individuals? To me 
Sheldon seems still very interesting as a biological thinking psychologist - it seems as if it 
was no accident that his godfather was nobody less than William James, the godfather of 
evolutionary psychology as a whole. 
 Thus, let us have a look at his system (e.g. Sheldon, 1942; Helwig, 1972; Verdonck, 
1972). On the basis of the physical examination of 4000 male students, Sheldon first 
developed a classification of body types. To his surprise he found that the best way to order 
Character type -------> Viscerotonic Somatotonic Cerebrotonic 
Development of embryo 
layer 
Endoderm (stomach and 
intestines) 
Mesoderm (muscles and 
bones) 
Ectoderm (skin and nerve 
tissue) 
Related body type Endomorph Mesomorph Ectomorph 
Prominent physical 
characteristics 
Soft & round. Hard & angular with 
heavy bones, muscular. 
Long, fragile bones; dry 
skin. 
Temperamental 
characteristics 
Likes comfort & luxury. 
Very social, emotionally 
extraverted, 
conformistic. 
Likes to excercise & to 
conquer. Extraverted at 
the level of action (not 
feelings).  
Needs to be alone & to 
reflect. Sensitive and 
irritable. Introverted and 
complex. 
Relation to `big five' 
personality dimensions 
Agreeableness 
Extraversion (emotional) 
Emotional stability Intellectual openness 
Extraversion (action) Introversion 
Relation between 
conscious and 
unconscious 
Direct and immediate 
contact. 
`Horizontal barrier': no 
direct contact. 
`Vertical circulation': 
complex relation to 
oneself. 
Sociocultural niche Social specialist: 
networking properties & 
social glue. 
Discipline specialist: 
dependable and hard 
worker. 
Dreaming and planning 
specialist: visionary that 
can inspire people. 
Characteristic 
subcultures 
Gastronomic & social 
events. 
Sports & military. Arts & Intellectual. 
What it promotes in a 
society 
Social cohesion & well-
being. 
Safety, discipline & 
productivity. 
Creativity & wisdom. 
Table 5-6. The three main character types according to Sheldon and a speculation about their role in 
different societies. According to Sheldon, each individual is a mixture of these three types and can be 
given a `score' for each trait. 
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the data was by giving each individual a `score' for three body components that `happened' 
to correlate with the relative weight given to functions related with the three layers of the 
embryo, the endoderm, mesoderm and ectoderm (the score for each component is from 1 to 
7, originally the total score was thought to be between 9 and 12, later Sheldon found 
individuals with total scores up to 15). 
 The real surprise, however, came when Sheldon started to look for correlations 
between the body types and characters of 200 students. The psychological research of each 
student consisted of 20 interviews in which 60 different traits were scored. This research 
forced Sheldon to group theses traits to his surprise into three groups, with a very high 
correlation (.80) to the three body types. The viscerotone correlates with the endomorph, 
the somatotone with the mesomorph, and the cerebrotone with the ectomorph. Because 
psychological characteristics correlate with body types, Sheldon is able even to `classify' 
historical figures: he recognizes Jesus, for example, as a typical 235 or 236 (viscertonic 
component 2, somatotonic component 3, cerebrotonic component 5 or 6). One of the 
reasons, of course, that his classifications has appeal for the evolutionists, is that Sheldon 
relates his components to the development of the three different layers of the embryo. This 
makes it more easy to imagine that there already have been `master genes' related to the 
development of these layers which simply had to be developed further by disruptional 
selection. 
 A summary of the first decades of critical evaluation of Sheldon's work can be 
found in the work of Verdonck (1972). Some studies show that the exact `determination' of 
a specific body type can be reliably replicated by independent researchers. It seems that 
Sheldon's body types are also independent of diets and sports and that it is not extremely 
hard to classify them independent of age. A critical point mentioned by Verdonck is that 
Sheldon both supervised the `somatotyping' and the psychological measurements. Yet, 
other studies, in which the psychological measurements were based on various systems of 
self-assessment, found also correlations, sometimes higher (Cortés en Gatti, 1965, 1972), 
sometimes lower (Child, 1950). 
 In principle, Sheldon's classification into three main character types could clarify a 
lot with respect to culture. The fact that one even feels resonances of Plato's and Aristotle's 
division into a life of `pleasure', `honor' and `theory' makes it sound familiar to 
philosophers, who are themselves the typical `cerebrotones', according to Sheldon. While 
most other culture creators and bearers (including artists, educators, psychological mentors) 
at least have a strong cerebrotonic component in their personalities, cultures are more or 
less dominated by other personality types as a consequence of a complex interplay between 
ecological, political and technological-economical circumstances. In cultures which are 
dominated by the military, like ancient Sparta and nazi Germany, a whole set of values 
which are especially embodied in the `somatotonic' personality type are cultivated: 
discipline, a distaste for the aberrant, a strong competitive spirit. Thus, cultures are 
dominated by character types that are mostly needed as a result of particular circumstances. 
As these circumstances change over time, the whole profile of a culture may shift. At the 
same time, there are constant factors which have had an influence over centuries in some 
parts of the world. As a result, selection may have promoted particular personality types for 
such a long period that they have become part of the national character. The existence of a 
national character would thus not be a myth, nor a biologistic and deterministic dogma, but 
a real consequence of the processes of interaction and reinforcement which are going on 
between genes, ecological circumstances and culture. 
 Of course, it should be stressed at the same time that the dominance of one 
character type in a culture will almost automatically create peripheral subcultures in which 
alternative strategies are stressed and defended. This is especially the case in very large 
societies like our own in which the amount of cultural niches is enormous and in which the 
dominant group is limited in its power to enforce her rules and values. Individuals that do 
not fit the dominant culture are not reinforced by that culture in their personal strategies and 
will not feel at ease in that culture. They will, consequently, either look for a subculture in 
which their strategies and values are reinforced, or create one themselves. Of course, their 
lives will not be as easy as those individuals that do fit the dominant culture and often they 
will never find their own niches and simply end up in chronic depression or other diseases. 
Naturally, patterns of reproductive success will to some extent reflect the different success 
of different characters and strategies. In this way, different genes will be tested in one 
population throughout its cultural history creating a gene pool which harbors adaptive 
properties for a wide variety of economic and cultural circumstances. 
 Figure 5-8 is an attempt to remodel my 
hypothesis in Sheldonian terms. A particular 
culture becomes dominant because it offers the 
best solutions to the collective problems as 
they arise within particular ecological and 
economic contexts. As a result, a `working 
force' is needed with particular talents. 
Individuals displaying those talents are 
selected and stimulated with awards which 
enhance their status and/or their reproductive 
success. Because each culture selects particular 
properties from a `talent pool' which is at least 
partially based on a series of genes (and 
partially reinforced by different subcultures), it 
automatically has consequences for the `gene 
pool' also. 
 The spectrum of human 
characterological differences thus reflects the 
history of selection during the series of cultures 
which a population has created in interaction 
with its environmental and economic problems 
throughout the millennia. Because different 
ecological and economic circumstances are 
beneficent to different characters, however, an 
unused reservoir of human possibilities survives each generation. As long as the resources 
of the population permit this, such talents are nurtured and reinforced within all kinds of 
subcultures. The selection pressure becomes tighter, however, in harder times. In these 
circumstances, competition becomes fiercer and the dominant culture may become less 
tolerant with respect to different subcultures. As we have often seen during the twentieth 
century such intolerance may even climax in internal genocide, a process which is difficult 
to explain by means of the standard theories of social science. 
 
 
Fig. 5-8. Interactions between culture and 
different character types. 
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Extraversion: Surgency, Introversion-Extraversion, Dominance, Positive Emotionality 
Is outgoing, decisive, persuasive, and enjoys leadership 
roles 
Is retiring, reserved, withdrawn, and does not enjoy 
being the center of attention 
Neuroticism: Anxiety, Emotional Stability, Stress, Reactivity, Negative Emotionality 
Is emotionally unstable, nervous, irritable, and prone to 
worry 
Quickly gets over upsetting experiences, stable, and 
not prone to worries and fears 
Consientiousness: Conformity, Dependability, Authoritarianism, Constraint 
Is planful, organized, responsible, practical, and 
dependable 
Is impulsive, careless, irresponsible, and cannot be 
depended upon 
Agreeableness: Likability, Friendliness, Pleasant, Aggression 
Is sympathetic, warm, kind, good-natured, and will not 
take advantage of others 
Is quarrelsome, aggressive, unfriendly, cold, and 
vindictive 
Openness: Culture, Intellect, Sophistication, Imagination, Absorption 
Is insightful, curious, original, imaginative, and open to 
novel experiences and stimuli 
Has narrow interests, is unintelligent, unreflective, and 
shallow 
Table 5-7. The five factor model of personality as it is presented by Bouchard, 1994: 1700. 
 
 The five factor model. Such speculations, however, could also be based on other 
characterological systems. As I said already, the five factor model of personality traits is 
currently much more popular than Sheldon's system. Table 5-7 gives an impression of the 
`OCEAN'- version of this model with both poles for each trait. One of the strong points of 
this model is that it has emerged as a consensus between many independently working 
researchers. At the same time (as we have seen in 5.9), behavioral geneticists have found 
relatively high heritability scores for each of the `big five' personality dimensions. In figure 
5-3, I already gave the parameters as they are estimated by Rowe (1994; compare 
Bouchard, 1994, who does not give exact numbers). According to Rowe, there is a small 
influence of the rearing environment on all five personality dimensions (2% to 9% of the 
total variation), but the parent-child environmental influence is negligible. (To place these 
figures in perspective, the heritability of height is .80; for weight it is .60; for IQ it is .50, 
for TV viewing it is .20; Pervin, 1996). 
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 At the same time, psychologists are gradually starting to speculate about the 
possible adaptive meaning of the five traits (Tooby & Cosmides, 1990; Bouchard, 1994; 
Buss, 1996). Strangely enough, however, there is one factor that often complicates the 
search for this adaptive meaning. This is the tendency to evaluate a trait as desirable or not. 
What I often find missing in discussions about the possible adaptive meaning of personality 
traits is an awareness that both ends of the spectrum of scores for each trait could point to a 
particular adaptive strategy. If only one pole of the continuum would be adaptive, this 
would point to a simple process of directional selection (see figure 5-5): this would mean at 
the same time that large differences would be unlikely. If, however, personality differences 
reflect a real human polymorphism these differences would somehow have to be 
maintained by stabilizing and/or disruptive selection (again, see figure 5-5). That would 
mean that it is not always good to be extraverted, open to experience, conscientious, 
nonneurotic, and agreeable. Otherwise, why wouldn't genes for introversion, 
authoritarianism, non-conscientiousness, neuroticism and hatefulness go extinct? Ideally, 
the distribution for each trait could give us clues about the kind of selection involved, but I 
do not know whether such data exist. 
 The first steps into the direction of an adaptive interpretation of personality traits 
can be found in the literature, however, as was already indicated in § 5.9. Much speculation 
is going on, for example, with respect to the biological basis for each trait, and with respect 
to the role that each trait plays in the context of the whole behavioral repertoire of an 
individual. For example, extraversion is linked to a `behavioral approach system' (BAS) 
which drives the individual forward towards the challenges that it faces, while neuroticism 
is linked to an opposite `behavioral inhibitation system' (BIS) which forces an individual to 
be cautious (Gray, 1987; McAdams, 2001). The underlying neurotransmitter could be 
dopamine in the first case and serotonin in the second case (Cloninger, 1991). Thus, we 
would come back to the differences between tits at the feeding station observed by Drenth 
and others. Opposite personality traits thus would reflect fundamentally different strategies 
with respect to the struggle for life. 
 Another dimension in which opposite traits/strategies could be adaptive could be 
the tension between the egotistic drive towards self-fulfillment and the tendency to behave 
socially acceptable and desirable. The psychologist John Digman (1997) suggests, for 
example, that the `big five' boil down to a `big two'. Agreeableness, conscientiousness and 
emotional stability (nonneuroticism) help a person to remain part of a cooperation group by 
loving and working, while extraversion/introversion and openness to experience help a 
person to develop his own possibilities (McAdams, 2001). 
 These suggestions still do not explain, however, why there are such differences with 
respect to each trait. An attempt to find the adaptive value of the variation for each trait, 
inspired by Tooby and Cosmides (1990), can be found in Winter (1996: 522-524) who, 
however, thinks in very `group selectionistic' terms: 
 
 ... social organization may require `surgent' leaders, but it also needs nonsurgent followers; 
thus both types would coexist in a mutually beneficial relationship... Agreeable and 
conscientious people may be necessary to get the routine work of a society done, but 
creative innovation may come from the disagreeable and lazy people who ignore social 
conventions and think up new and better adaptations (Winter, 1996: 522). 
 
Extraversion: Surgency, Introversion-Extraversion, Dominance, Positive Emotionality 
Leadership: reproductive advantages Accepting a subdominant position to avoid conflict: it 
is better to loose than to die 
Neuroticism: Anxiety, Emotional Stability, Stress, Reactivity, Negative Emotionality 
Recognizing & avoiding danger at an early stage Striving for one's goals in life, resistance to stress 
Conscientiousness: Conformity, Dependability, Authoritarianism, Constraint 
Being a helpful and dependable cooperator: fitness 
advantages of cooperation 
Being able to follow one's own ideas and needs: being 
innovative and creative (?) 
Agreeableness: Likability, Friendliness, Pleasant, Aggression 
Being part of a social network Being able to defend one's own interests,  
resisting social pressure and too much obligations 
Openness: Culture, Intellect, Sophistication, Imagination, Absorption 
Being able to adapt a culture to new circumstances Relying on `received wisdom' and conformism 
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Table 5-8. Possible reasons why variation in the `big five' personality traits is maintained. Changed after Winter, 
1996: 522. 
In table 5-8 I have reworked a table by Winter partly by stressing advantages of each trait at 
the individual level. The idea behind this table is that variation in the big five personality 
factors is maintained, because the process of competition and cooperation within a society 
creates opposing strategic niches like leading ←-→ following, networking ←-→ resisting 
social pressure, cooperating ←-→ following one's own needs, resistance to stress ←-→ 
avoiding of stress, creativity ←-→ conformism. Of course, over time the selection climate 
will also fluctuate as a result of which the `equilibrium point' between both poles of a trait 
is continually moving. It is quite possible, for example, that all Neanderthals were much 
less open to experience than even a relatively conforming modern Homo sapiens. From an 
evolutionary point of view personality traits are, of course, just the opposite behavioral 
dispositions of individuals at a given point in their species' history. 
 
5.20 CONFLICTS BETWEEN THE SEXES 
While evolutionary psychology has been neglecting characterology and personality 
psychology to some extent, it has stressed the evolutionary roots of sex differences. At least 
one third of the literature on evolutionary psychology is devoted to this subject, probably as 
a consequence of its relevance in an era which is dominated by an egalitarian ideology and 
a large demand for female workers. Much of this literature is devoted to differences in 
sexual strategies between the sexes, which arises from the facts of anisogamy (in most 
plants and animals) and internal incubation (in mammals). 
 
type of mating what men want what women want 
short-term  many partners 
 clues about sexual 
accessibility, fertility 
 minimizing cost, risk and 
commitment 
 increasing their resources 
(rewards, gifts) 
 evaluating their short-term mates 
as possible long-term 
mates 
 good genes 
 backup partners 
long-term  paternity confidence 
 large residual reproductive 
capacity 
 clues about youth and 
fertility 
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 As I have explained in chapter 3.2, Trivers postulated in 1972 that differences in 
sexual strategies between the sexes derive from differences in parental investment. 
Members of the most investing sex are a scarce commodity to the less investing sex, 
because they limit their possibility to reproduce their genes. As a result, members of the 
less investing sex compete with one another over the access to members of the most 
investing sex. In fish and birds the most investing sex is sometimes the male sex. As a 
result of pregnancy and lactation, the female sex is the most investing sex in most 
mammals. In opposition to chimpanzee males, human males exhibit some paternal 
 commitment 
 good parental skills 
 high-quality genes 
 men who are able and willing to 
invest 
 clues with respect to wealth & 
success 
 physical protection from 
aggressive men 
 commitment 
 good parental skills 
 high-quality genes 
Table 5-9. Differences in the reproductive priorities of man and women as reflected in different attitudes towards 
short-term and long-term relationships. Changed after Buss, 1994. 
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investment in their offspring. As a result, one would expect in humans much competition 
between males, but also a moderate degree of female competition over males. One would 
also expect sexual selection in human females not entirely to be directed at `good genes', 
but also to be directed, to some extent, at `good fathers'. On the basis of these two 
theoretical expectations one can understand large parts of Western literature and many of 
the intricacies of everyday live. 
 One of the largest studies with respect to sexual selection in both sexes of our 
species has been conducted by the evolutionary psychologist David Buss of the university 
of Michigan. In table 5-5 I have already reproduced (within the framework of the 
discussion of the sexual selection of cultural abilities) some of his findings (Buss, 1990). 
His studies show that there do exist universal patterns in mate preferences. It would thus be 
wrong to assume that human mate preferences are simply idiosyncratic or culture-bound. 
Instead, human males and females continue to exhibit sex-specific strategies that reflect the 
adaptive problems that they have faced during their evolutionary history. The differences 
between male and female strategies stand out especially clear if we study their priorities in 
both short-term and long-term relationships (Buss & Schmitt, 1993; Buss 1994a; 1994b). 
On the basis of the `low cost' of their gametes one would expect males to be more 
specialized in increasing their partner number, while minimizing cost, risk and 
commitment. Within long-term relationships with paternal investment one would expect 
males to be especially obsessive about their paternity, because they alone run the risk of 
being ignorant of the fact that all their investment is directed at children which do not carry 
their genes. On the other hand, one would expect females to be more cautious, selective and 
directed at gaining access to resources within both short-term and long-term relationships. 
Table 5-9 is adapted from Buss (1994) and shows the different priorities of men and 
women as these result from differences in the size of their gametes and in their `obligatory' 
reproductive investment. I have changed the table in such a way that it shows more clearly 
that there is some convergence of male and female interests in the context of long-term 
relationships. 
 By collaborating with 50 scientists in 37 countries Buss was able to survey the 
mating patterns of more than 10.000 individuals and to confirm these patterns. Of course, 
there are some exceptions. Happily enough, The Netherlands is the only country in which 
women place relatively small value on the financial prospects of their long-term mates. On 
the whole, Buss' research has confirmed the expected cross-cultural mating patterns. Other 
studies have shown how sex differences result in differences in sexual jealousy (Buss et all, 
1992) or in the reasons given for divorce (Betzig, 1989). All these studies together have 
seriously undermined the old feminist assumption that gender differences are entirely 
products of culture. 
  Of course, the male and female mind do not only differ in mating preferences. Man 
and women have somewhat different brains (Moir & Jessel, 1991; Kimura, 1992), which 
are to some extent (disruptively) adapted to their specific roles in the atavistic economy. 
Because male and female chimpanzees do already exhibit a sexual division of labor in 
which males do most of the hunting and females are typical gatherers (McGrew, 1992) and 
because we see this division of labor in most primitive societies, it is not unreasonable to 
assume that early man lived in a hunter-gatherer society with a similar division of labor 
(more about this in part III). As we already saw in chapter 2, many cognitive differences 
between man and women can be explained if we assume that human males are typical 
hunters while human females are more specialized in gathering and caring.  
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 Table 5-10 summarizes some of the cognitive and motivational differences between 
men and women that have been found.Note that this table does not simply state that `boys 
are better than girls at math' or that `males are superior in spatial ability' (Hyde, 1996). 
From an evolutionary perspective one would not expect simply a difference in magnitude 
in male and female talents, but different male and female talents. This has inspired, for 
example, Eals and Silverman (1992) to search for alternative spatial skills in women. 
 Of course, some feminist still tend to play down differences between man and 
women. For example, Hyde (1996) looks at some textbook wisdoms in a refreshing way 
and shows that many textbooks tend to overgeneralize and exaggerate differences. She does 
not deny differences altogether, however, and admits, for example, that males outperform 
females in three-dimensional mental rotation tests. The most important difference between 
the sexes that she finds is a large difference in aggression and also one the attitude towards 
casual sex. Hopefully she would agree with my improved list in table 5-10, but I fear that 
she still would find it too biased. 
  
 
Cognitive domains or 
emotional priorities 
Male specializations Female specializations 
Sensation Better vision in brightly lit 
environs 
Better vision in poorly lit 
environs; 
more acute hearing and sense 
of smell 
Perception Recognizing a simple shape 
within a complex figure 
Perceptual speed: finding 
matching items 
Spatial abilities Mental object rotations; reading 
maps 
Object memory 
Motor skills Target-directed motor skills, 
throwing, intercepting projectiles 
Precision manual tasks, 
involving fine motor 
coordination 
Mathematical skills Mathematical reasoning Mathematical calculation 
Linguistic skills Lower verbal fluency, more often 
dyslexic 
Slightly higher verbal fluency 
Social skills Building dominance hierarchies Building social networks 
Interests Oriented on objects/matters Oriented on 
persons/relationships 
Self-image Based on power/influence Based on interaction 
Evolutionary context: 
supposed tasks in 
environment of 
evolutionary adaptedness 
Hunting: searching throughout 
large areas, locating & catching 
prey, perhaps by throwing. 
Defending the group. 
Gathering food near the camp, 
tending the home, preparing 
food and clothing, caring for 
children. 
Table 5-10. Some differences between men and women, according to Tyler, 1965; Hutt, 1972; MacCoby 
& Jacklin, 1974; Kimura, 1992; Eals & Silverman, 1992; Eibl-Eibesfeldt, 1995; Potts & Short, 1999, 
Lopreato & Crippen, 1999. 
Course (+ number of 
years) 
% 
Men 
% 
Women 
Course (+ number of years) % Men % 
Women 
Consumer (2 years) 3 97 Natural sciences (3) 72 28 
Clothing manufacture (2) 4 96 Agriculture 58 42 
Social services (2) 7 93 Natural science-technology 
(2) 
72 28 
Nursing and care (2) 8 92 Processing (2) 88 12 
Distribution and clerical 
(2) 
17 83 Technology (4) 89 11 
Liberal arts (3) 24 76 Woodworking (4) 94 6 
Social sciences (3) 24 76 Operation and maintenance 
(2) 
96 4 
Social (2) 37 63 Technology (2) 96 4 
Economics (2) 38 62 Workshop (2) 96 4 
Economics (3) 42 58 Motor engineering (2) 97 3 
Food manufacturing (2) 48 52 Forestry (2) 98 2 
Horticulture (2) 49 51 Electro-telecommunications 
(2) 
98 2 
Music (2) 51 49 Building and construction 
(2) 
98 2 
Table 5-11. Sex distribution of applicants for courses in Swedish secondary schools, autumn 1980. Data 
from B. Wistrand, Swedish Institute (Potts & Short, 1999). 
Yet, from an evolutionary perspective one expects huge differences between the sexes and 
there is no reason to dismiss all studies with respect to these differences altogether. In 
recent years differences between male and female brains have been found (for example the 
female Corpus callosum contains more connections between both halves of the brain) and a 
phenomenon like the adrenogenital syndrome shows that these cannot be explained as a 
result of enculturation alone. The andrenogenital syndrome results from an abnormality in 
the adrenal glands of the kidneys as a result of which some female babies receive a doses of 
a substance similar to male hormones. These babies develop into individuals with a series 
of male psychological characteristics (Ehrhardt, 1985; Moir & Jessel, 1991). 
 It is clear that sex differences have results at the level of occupational interests and 
choices (see table 5-11) and thus have consequences for the type of culture in which one 
lives. Because men and women have different interests, cultural arrangements of things and 
the organization of a culture will often be more advantageous to one sex than to the other. 
A culture that is dominated by men will be different from a culture that is dominated by 
women. Often there is, of course, a kind of balance of power, even in cases in which males 
occupy most dominant positions. 
 Almost everyone will agree that western culture has changed during the last 
decades in such a way that the role of women has become more prominent or at least more 
visible. The explanation of this process of cultural change could be a testcase of the theory 
exposed in this chapter. If culturalistic theories (including theories of ideational selection) 
would be right, this change would be purely the result of (the selection of) feminist ideas. If 
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cultural materialism would be right, it would be the result of a series of environmental 
changes with respect to a very small collection of human needs. Evolutionary psychology 
would predict that the revolution is a consequence of the ways in which males and females 
and their interaction react to environmental and technological changes. 
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 The weakness of culturalism is that it does not explain why feminist ideas would 
become more influential instead of, for example, fascistic ideas. If a human population is 
`influenced' by a small collection of creative minds, it is unclear who selects this collection 
of minds. A cultural materialistic explanation would have the benefit of introducing 
environmental variables, but would at the same time restrict itself unnecessarily by limiting 
the number of causal factors involved. The evolutionary psychological explanation would 
have the benefit of introducing a more complete model of human nature, thus allowing 
environmental variables to have an influence on factors which do not only concern food, 
convenience, sex and safety. 
 It seems to me that the `feminization' of our culture can only be explained as a 
result of the ways in which technology has improved the lives of women - and has made 
men less indispensable in some respects. Pure muscular power has become less important. 
Hunting and even the role of men as physical protectors of women have become less 
important. On the other hand, in our `information society' social networking, some 
precision manual skills (type writing) and verbal fluency have become very important 
(Roele, 2000). Anticonceptiva have enabled women to invest more time in education and in 
improving their position in the social hierarchy. Because the pill helps women to stay 
young and beautiful longer, dominant males may even sometimes tend to hire women as a 
kind of harem substitute. Certainly the pill has an influence on our mating strategies, too, 
allowing partners to test each other longer and reinforcing a tendency towards serial 
monogamy, which can be seen as a mild version of polygamy. Because the pill does 
strengthen the position of women, it has probably the overall effect of making sexual 
selection more severe. 
 Although it seems that most cultures in the 
past have been relatively male-dominated, there is 
enough historical documentation to prove slight 
fluctuations in this respect. On the basis of 
Alexander's model of intergroup competition, on 
which I shall digress in part III, we can postulate 
that competition between societies forces the 
males within those societies to cooperate more 
intensively, to form more disciplined hierarchical 
social structures and to be less tolerant also 
towards parasitic tendencies within a society. In 
such societies the male power pyramid becomes 
steeper and `vertical' social competition (between 
classes) fiercer. 
 Of course, in a culture in which women 
have more power, female values will be more 
influential. The male power hierarchy will flatten 
and on the whole, egalitarian tendencies will 
become stronger (fig. 5-9). In our times, this may 
have contributed to the rising popularity of the 
idea of human and animal rights. That does not 
mean, however, that a more egalitarian society is 
 
 
Fig. 5-9. A speculation with respect to the 
influence of intergroup competition on the 
balance of power between the sexes. 
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`better'. The moment the male power hierarchy becomes weaker there is less defence 
against both external and internal threats and the whole edifice of the `culture cooperation' 
can be weakened. As a result, cultures tend to zigzag between more hierarchical and more 
egalitarian structures. 
 This should not seduce us into thinking that societies in which women have more 
power are advantageous to all women equally. If societies of the past have always 
oscillated between different power structures, it is to be expected that women are 
ambivalent about male power and some women will have an advantage in male-dominated 
societies, while others profit in a more egalitarian system. Of course, the same goes for 
men. In a world in which power is always scarce, there is no reason to suppose that there 
could be a distribution of power which would satisfy all possible parties. Consequently it is 
implausible that the `feminization' of our own culture implies an improvement for 
everyone. 
 
5.21 CONFLICTS BETWEEN GENERATIONS 
Conflicts between generations can be seen in almost all societies, animal and human alike. 
Natural selection has designed mortal and sexual creatures, because immortal and asexual 
ones would not be able to cope with environmental and parasitical challenges (at least 
according to the theories of Williams and Hamilton). Individual animals, however, are 
survival machines of their unique collection of genes. If those genes are served best by a 
powerful position within a society, it is always best to maintain and defend that position as 
long as possible. From the point of view of a new generation it will be profitable, however, 
to gain access to powerful positions as early as possible. Consequently, apart from the usual 
parent-offspring conflicts, one would expect a more general conflict between individuals of 
subsequent generations, especially but not exclusively, the males (there is probably not 
much more to the `Oedipus conflict'). 
 In our species, the struggle between generations is fought out partly in the arena of 
culture. Different generations are often encultured in slightly different types of culture. The 
older generation will often cling to its own type of culture with its own solutions, 
obsessions and status symbols, the newer generation will come with renewals which are 
supposed to be improvements given new ecological and economic realities. As a result, the 
conflict between generations will deepen at the moment that a culture is forced to change as 
a result of new circumstances. 
 Of course, in many societies the older generation has sought to protect its power by 
creating proofs and symbols of its experience. The almost universal initialization rituals 
function to create a bridge between the inexperienced and the experienced, those who know 
and those who have to be initiated. Again we see here why it is necessary to master skills 
and to create objects which are very hard to imitate. If it were easy to imitate their art and 
skills, the experienced would fall from their pedestals. 
 Of course, to the extent that a society becomes dependent on knowledge or skills 
which are hard to attain, members of the different generations have to cooperate in a 
training process in which knowledge or these skills are passed on. A species in which the 
conflict between generations would be total would have to create a new culture each 
generation. In our own society which is entirely dependent on elaborate technologies which 
are only understood by professionals who have been trained specifically to do so, 
cooperation between generations is imperative and is much stronger than conflict. Yet, an 
underlying conflict may still be the motor of cultural change, especially in areas in which 
quality is to some extent a matter of taste. 
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5.22 COMPETITION AND COOPERATION AS MOTORS OF CULTURE 
I have argued that conflicting biological interests are expressed at the level of culture. At 
the same time, I have to admit that human culture by its very nature is characterized by 
intense cooperation. The explanation of this extreme level of cooperation is as difficult as 
the explanation of other kinds of `bio-altruism' (see chapter 4). A long series of authors, 
between Darwin and Richard Alexander have sought to explain it with reference to the 
competition and arms races between different human societies. If one society is a threat to 
another society, both societies have reasons to have the best weapons, the best discipline, 
the best type of cooperation (see part III). 
 In principle, many elements of culture could be explained with reference to their 
ability to unite a people, to give them an identity, a sense of belonging and meaning. 
Certainly morality and religion seem to fulfill this function. Even human language itself 
seems to have an inherent tendency to diversify into local dialects which separate one 
group from another. Local dialects enable people to distinguish `us' from `them' the 
moment that someone opens his mouth to speak (Dunbar, 1996: chapter 8). Thus, David 
Smillie can write that  
 
 ... culture might best be seen as a way of establishing a symbolic system of social coherence 
and coordination rather than as a means of transmitting knowledge from generation to 
generation analogous to genetic transmission systems (Smillie, 1996). 
 
Whether these two possibilities are really in opposition is another question. Culture could 
have evolved to such an extend in the human species because there were arms races 
between groups - arms races in which those groups with both the best group-uniting 
symbols and those with the best functional knowledge had an advantage over other groups. 
 In the same way the intergroup competition hypothesis and the intragroup 
competition hypothesis of culture could supplement each other as I have claimed: 
competition between groups could enhance the intensity of both cooperation and 
competition within groups (5.20 and fig. 5-9). This idea supplements the dual selection of 
cultural abilities that I introduced in 5.14. On the one hand, human males have to compete 
with other males of the same group to be able to climb on the social ladder and to improve 
their chances of being sexually selected, on the other hand they have to cooperate with 
them and to be accepted as a cooperator by them, because cooperation is indispensable if 
one wants to compete with other groups. The complexity and intelligence of the human 
mind could well have arisen from the resulting mixture of sexual and social selection. All 
this could help to give the evolutionary psychological model of culture (model 6) more 
flesh and blood, but it shows at the same time that this model is necessarily complex and 
hard to explain. Reality is of such a complexity that it is hard to abstract it into a simple 
model in which all selection forces are pushing and pulling into the same direction (e.g. 
`more intelligence'). It is quite possible that sexual and social selection are to some extent 
working in opposition and that different intelligent strategies are co-evolving in ever 
fluctuating divisions of power. In the third part of this book I will come back to the many 
complexities of human cultural and physical evolution. 
 
 
 
 
 
5.23 TESTS, STRESS, WEALTH AND WELL-BEING 
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Is this model of culture compatible with our own subjective experience? Of course, 
scientific models do not always fit our personal feelings and experiences, some of which 
are based on illusions. That is one of the reasons we cannot always trust our intuitions: 
science is often counter-intuitive or trans-intuitive and meant to correct pure intuition. If 
science would not be trans-intuitive we would not need it: intuition alone would be 
sufficient. Yet, with respect to the model of culture that I have outlined, I firmly believe 
that it is to some extent compatible with our own subjective experiences, at least mine, if 
interpreted properly. (Even phenomenologists, who tried to base a whole philosophy on the 
oracle of intuition, had finally to admit that intuition needs interpretation, and turned 
themselves into `hermeneutics'). 
 Let us try to step back and return to ordinary experience and look whether it fits our 
interpretation. Is there really so much competition in our societies? Is our culture really 
such an arena? Does sexual selection really play such a role? I think these questions all 
need to be answered positively. What to think, for example, of the fact that individuals in 
our societies are continually tested? Our whole educational system is based on tests which 
contribute a lot to the continuation of a relatively stratified society. Those tests can be 
explained as attempts at giving each individual its proper place within society, a place at 
which it can fully develop its potential, etc.. Yet, at the same time it is clear that at least 
some of those tests are biased and that they fit the description of a Darwinian struggle at a 
series of essential points: there are individuals with different genes, there are scarce 
resources which offer different reproductive opportunities, and there is a lot of stress 
involved. 
 If we take stress as a factor betraying the level of competition, it is clear that despite 
the wealth of western societies, competition has never decreased, but has been actually 
increasing. It is as if the wealthier we become, the more we have to compete. Instead of 
finally becoming happy and celebrating the success of our joint economic efforts, we are 
increasingly fighting over our shares in the booty (Slurink, 2000). Actually, differences in 
income have increased since the eighties and if we measure wealth in terms of having 
access to public goods it is not certain whether we have become wealthier or happier. All 
our collective efforts are to some extent spoilt in the pursuit of luxuries which we only need 
because we do not want to stay behind our neighbors. Collective progress seems to be the 
result of arms races and it is a characteristic of arms races that they do not allow one to sit 
back and enjoy. 
 Of course, there will always be people claiming that a particular model does not fit 
their subjective experiences. At the same time, models have to be continually improved to 
fit all data and all experiences. That does not mean, however, that there ever will be a 
moment that everyone's intuition is fully compatible with current scientific modelling. The 
relationship between intuition and science remains a complex one and even if they ever will 
be married one day, no one can know for sure whether they ever will be happy together. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
5.24 CONCLUSION 
This chapter had a more humble goal, however. I hope to have shown that culture does not 
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float above the `biological facts' that constitute our physical existence. Culture itself is a 
biological fact constituted by our long learning period, our need to distinguish ourselves (to 
demonstrate our superior genes or group) and by our dependence on all kinds of 
technologies. Cultural change is not the result of our transcendental wanderings through the 
realms of eternal ideas (as in model 1 and 3), but emerges out of changing ecological 
situations resulting in changes in the power distribution of different sex-age classes. Instead 
of forming a kind of `superorganic realm', or even an independent realm (as in models 2 
and 4), culture is a battle-ground for a fight over scarce resources in which the interests of 
the parties engaged are hidden underneath their explicit ideologies. Of course, individuals 
engaged in cultural battles are by no means genetically determined robots (as in model 5), 
but they are flexible decision systems unable to choose or fundamentally change the values 
themselves that they apply in their decisions (model 6, see chapter 3). Thus, model 6 is the 
most successful, but still needs a lot of refinement and a historical framework. 
   6 
   ** Genes, Memes and the 
Environment: Culture in its 
Ecological Context \\\ 
 
 
6.1 GENES, MEMES, AND THE MISSING LINK 
Culture is not simply a `superorganic' phenomenon. To defend this thesis I have shown in 
chapter 5 how culture reflects intraspecific conflicts: to some extent it is the medium in 
which individuals, groups and even peoples compete in different alliances. Culture is 
modified almost constantly as a result of arm races caused by sexual selection and both 
intra- and intergroup competition. Cooperation seems often to exist only because it enables 
different groups to compete even better with one another. 
 Yet, there are still other reasons to reject the idea that culture is purely a 
superorganic phenomenon. Often, it seems impossible to explain human behavior in terms 
of sociocultural habits, rules, roles, institutions and traditions only. For some reason or 
another, cultural rules, roles and institutions are different in different regions of the world 
and are changing continually. Why would they change? Somehow, they have to be 
inadequate sometimes. Inadequate to what? Although everyone agrees that sociocultural 
rules, roles and institutions are no `biological givens', opinions will diverge here. 
 Social constructivists and many thinkers trained in the social sciences will stress the 
`underdetermined' nature of sociocultural phenomena. According to them, cultural 
differences and cultural change both are inexplicable. In this context they will often refer to 
the fact that man is a `cultural being'. Yet, the history of science proofs that the claim that 
`we will never be able to explain x' often is a precursor of an explanation of x. Sometimes 
most pieces of the puzzles are simply already available; and I believe that is the case here. 
The statement that man is a cultural being is, of course, true, but it is simply not really an 
explanation. 
 To explain cultural differences and cultural change one would have to refer to 
something that makes that sociocultural rules, roles and institutions are becoming obsolete 
or at least inadequate. If one does not accept some `divine law of nature', sociocultural rules, 
roles and traditions can only prove to be `inadequate' if they do not fit certain 
biopsychological needs and necessities.  
 In table 6-1 I have depicted a series of links between ethological or biopsychological 
and sociocultural phenomena - between the level of `genes' and the level of `memes'. Most 
culturalists will agree that some of these links are obvious. No one doubts that different 
cultures have different ways of satisfying the human need for food. The further we come in 
my list however, the more people will turn off and think that I am exaggerating. They think 
I have forgotten all I have ever heard about human uniqueness (which is a lot if one has 
studied philosophy). But it is not my intent to deny human uniqueness nor to `reduce' 
sociocultural phenomena to biopsychological phenomena. My purpose is to show that the 
more we know about animals, the more we find phenomena that we also find at the level of 
human culture. Seen in the context of our current ethological knowledge, many cultural 
phenomena are not so strange after all. They have obvious parallels in the animal kingdom. 
Could it be that most cultural phenomena arise out of the same needs and necessities that 
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animals feel or have to deal with? 
 Yet, even if this were true there 
still would be missing something, which is 
also indicated in table 6-1. Even if this 
table would not contain speculative 
elements and even if everyone agreed that 
sociocultural phenomena emerge from 
biopsychological phenomena, we would 
still need some other principle: a `missing 
link' that explains the gap between the two 
levels. This missing link has to explain 
why biopsychological phenomena are 
transformed at the human cultural level. It 
has to explain why cultures are different 
from another and why they change. What 
explains the creative `translation' of 
biopsychological needs and necessities to 
sociocultural rules, roles and institutions? 
  In this chapter I will try to 
bridge that gap by introducing the 
environment, as this is done especially in 
the tradition of behavioral ecology (for 
reviews, see Cronk, 1991; Borgerhoff-
Mulder, 1991; Low, 2000). The claim is 
that cultures differ not because they are 
created ex nihilo out of the fancies of a 
creative elite, but because they reflect the 
ways in which large numbers of 
individuals throughout many generations 
have tried to cope with the demands of 
particular environments. Cultures are to 
some extent `frozen' packets of 
experiences of life, yet, those experiences 
of life reflect particular ecosystems and 
climates which force individuals to choose 
particular strategies from their reservoir of 
possibilities. The ways in which 
individuals react to those environments 
are certainly determined partly by social 
learning and culture. Yet, I will claim that 
individuals are determined by particular 
cultures largely, because it is in their interest and because the suggested options raised by 
those cultures fit in well with innate options emanating from their natures. Particular 
cultures can only become prevalent among a people, because they offer adaptive solutions 
to the problems experienced by most of individuals and because those solutions fit their 
behavioral repertories. 
BIOLOGICAL  HUMAN SOCIO-
CULTURAL 
CORRELATES 
/ETHOLOGICAL 
PHENOMENON 
Need for food 
(carbohydrates, 
proteins, vitamins, 
etc.) 
 Hunting, gathering, 
horticulture, 
agriculture, industry, 
administration 
Biological rhythms  Schedules 
/clocks 
Sex, sexual 
selection, mate-
guarding 
 Prostitution, 
marriage forms 
Physical protection, 
self-ornamentation 
 Clothing  
Safety, physical 
protection, home 
base 
 Huts, iglos, tents, 
houses 
Health & hygiene  Medicinal plants, 
pharmaceutical 
products 
Safety in numbers, 
sociability 
 Clans, groups, clubs, 
societies, schools, 
sects, churches 
Strive for 
dominance 
 Social stratification 
Physical and 
behavioral sex 
differences 
 Gender roles 
Individual 
differences 
 Different tasks, 
roles, functions 
Dominant 
individuals caring 
for harmony within 
group 
 Shamans, priests, 
prophets, ministers, 
psychologists 
Table 6-1. Well-established and more speculative links 
between biopsychological/ethological and sociocultural 
phenomena. 
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 Of course, traditional anthropology has always 
recognized the influence of an environment on a 
particular culture. The influence of the environment on a 
given culture is even placed central in cultural 
materialism. Yet, the model stressed within this 
approach seems often too simplistic. In figure 6-1 I have 
schematized the traditional approach, whereas I have 
tried to render my own approach, which follows the 
tradition of sociobiology, evolutionary psychology and 
behavioral ecology in figure 6-2. 
 
 As can be seen, the notion of `conditional 
strategies' is placed central in this figure. Contrary to 
what it is often thought (e.g. Rose & Rose, 2000), sociobiology, evolutionary psychology 
and behavioral ecology do not advocate a simplistic `genetic determinism' in which only 
genes determine behavior and in which one set of genes correlates to one behavioral 
strategy. Many animals do know different conditional strategies which are activated by 
different environmental conditions and man is no exception in this respect. 
Fig. 6-1. The relationship between 
environment and culture in a simple, 
traditional model. 
 One can even go further: given the human cortex and the human ability to master 
and manipulate enormous amounts of symbols a much greater behavioral flexibility in man 
is to be expected than in any other animal. The difference between sociobiologist, 
evolutionary psychologist, behavioral ecologist and non-evolutionary or half-evolutionary 
theorists is, however, that their explanation of behavioral variations is more in terms of an 
innate range of potential strategies which are activated by particular environments. They do 
admit behavioral flexibility, but do also expect mechanisms that guide flexible animals into 
alternative adaptive routes. There is an element of choice, perhaps even of `free choice', but 
the different options are to some extent already given in the form of different strategies. 
Human nature is not infinitely malleable, but given certain conditions it will generate such-
and-such behavior, whereas in other conditions it will develop completely different 
strategies. This approach fits well to the common wisdom in psychology that the 
environment is partly responsible for personality structures, but is at the same time much 
more specific about the types of causal relations involved. The claim is that different 
environments generate different types of behavior as a result of the activation of partly 
innate conditional strategies. 
 Of course, the social environment of an individual is one of the most important 
causal elements in its behavior. Therefore, I have depicted a `reinforcement arrow' between 
the level of interaction (competition and cooperation) and the level of individual conditional 
strategies in figure 6-2. Individuals will, of course, 
adapt their level of commitment and altruism to the 
general level of cooperation and `justice' that they will 
find in their social surroundings, as is to be expected 
from the theory of direct and indirect reciprocal 
altruism. Another `reinforcement arrow' in figure 6-2 
shows the selection pressures that cultures do exert on 
personality types, as claimed in chapter 5. 
  In the rest of this chapter I will present three 
studies to find indications for conditional strategies. 
Each time I will try to unravel the complex 
relationships between biopsychological needs and 
Fig. 6-2. The environment determines 
culture via a plurality of individual, 
conditional strategies. 
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necessities, ecological circumstances and sociocultural phenomena in the hope of finding 
the adaptive mechanisms that enable humans to adapt their culture to particular 
circumstances. 
 First, I will turn to the relationship between sex differences in mating strategies and 
the different marriage systems that exist across cultures. Is it still possible to believe that 
there are universal psychological and behavioral sex differences, if one faces the evidence 
of different marriage practices in different cultures? I will try to show how certain human 
characteristics that are largely innate nevertheless fan out in a wide variety of cultural 
practices as a result of different environmental conditions. These conditions activate certain 
conditional strategies which then are crystallized into culture or are `culturalized' (`to be 
reinforced into a culturally accepted and promoted practice by imitation or teaching'). Yet, 
this does not mean that there are no stable elements in human nature that manifest 
themselves cross-culturally. I will defend the thesis that actual marriage practices reflect a 
mixture of culturally reinforced conditional strategies and hard-to-suppress natural 
proclivities with a long evolutionary history. 
 Next, I will investigate two particular cases of environmental influences that are 
sometimes thought to reinforce particular conditional strategies. First there is the impact of 
factors like environmental stability, predictability and safety on the dilemma faced by all 
organisms between reproducing more or giving more parental care per offspring - the 
dilemma between more chickens or more love. Animals are known to adopt different 
strategies in environments characterized by different degrees of predictability. Some species 
which live in unpredictable environments are specialized in producing as many offspring as 
quickly as is possible (known as the r strategy); some species which live in predictable, 
stable environments specialize in having relatively few offspring and securing a maximum 
number of grandchildren by protecting and educating their offspring as long as possible 
(known as the K strategy). Some species can react adaptively to different types of 
environment. Although humans are a relatively K selected species, they are characterized by 
large differences in family size. The question is whether different human cultures reinforce 
conditional strategies that best fit particular environments; and whether they do so as a 
result of genes and/or memes. 
 Finally, I will study the influence of the social environment by having a look at the 
impact that sheer size of a population has on the structure of a particular culture. The 
hypothesis advanced is that larger societies consisting of more non-kin need more moralistic 
language and ideas than smaller societies. Smaller societies are kept together better simply 
by nepotistic and reciprocal altruistic relationships. `People know each other better'. That 
may be a truism, but it explains some important cultural phenomena, as I will show. 
 Together these three studies give a picture of the ways in which humans are adapted 
to the environment via conditional strategies. Because our ancestors have faced fluctuations 
in their environments from generation to generation, because they sometimes were born 
poor, sometimes rich, because they sometimes lived in small groups and sometimes in big 
ones, we are able to follow different trajectories and strategies according to different 
circumstances. If large numbers of people follow certain strategies particular traditions and 
cultures are produced. Differences between cultures thus do not show simply that man is a 
cultural being, being able to create himself from nothing. It may show primarily the 
elasticity of the human motivational system which is triggered by different environmental 
conditions to establish different priorities and to follow different courses. 
6.2 STUDY 1: FROM SEX DIFFERENCES TO MARRIAGE SYSTEMS 
As we have seen in chapters 4.2 and 5.16, evolutionary theory suggests that sex differences 
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do ultimately result from differences between gametes (anisogamy). At the moment that one 
type of gamete contains a maximum of nutrients which it can use after fertilization, another 
type will evolve which does not contain nutrients, but is specialized in moving quickly to be 
the first to hit upon the first type. Females are producers of a relatively small collection of 
big gametes with a lot of nutrients, males are producers of a large army of small gametes 
which are relatively mobile. Because it pays (in terms of reproductive success) to be female 
at the moment that females are scarce and it pays to be a male at the moment that males are 
scarce, the numbers of females and males are normally kept in balance automatically (as 
Fisher noted in 1930; Hamilton (1967) found a lot of interesting exceptions to the rule). 
 As a result of anisogamy, it can also be predicted that males and females in mobile 
species will behave quite differently before and after fertilization. Females have invested a 
lot in their gametes: it is in their interest to have them fertilized only with the best genes and 
to protect them, and assure their survival, as long as possible. Males can permit themselves 
to sow their gametes here and there and to refrain from investing in their offspring, as long 
as females are in no position to force them to invest. For females, internal hatching of eggs 
(viviparity) becomes an attractive strategy, although it forces them into a position in which 
males can further blackmail them. 
 Apart from a few exceptions (the Australian Duckbill, for example), almost all 
`modern' mammals are viviparous. Most mammals are also polygamous and do not know 
paternal investment. Oviparity may induce males to share some of the parental effort, 
because eggs can also be incubated by males. As a result of this starting-investment they 
will tend to help females also in later stages. Thus it is no wonder that in birds, many 
species are either monogamous (± 90%) or at least know some form of paternal investment. 
In mammals, female pregnancy constitutes such a large initial investment, that the female 
cost of abandoning her brood after birth becomes too large to `punish' non-investing males 
this way. Males can permit themselves to stop investing in their offspring after a successful 
fertilization and will tend only to hinder other males from fertilizing the female (mate-
guarding). Because females have an interest in good genes, males with good genes are able 
to `collect' females in a harem. 
 Humans belong to the relatively small class of mammals in which fathers may invest 
in their own offspring. Instead of dividing their attention to a number of females, human 
males will often `fall in love' with one particular specimen (folk psychology for a 
physiologically driven process of cognitive and erotic fixation). A long-term commitment 
may result and both partners may raise their offspring together. However, as we can learn 
from many species of birds, the tendency to form pair-bonds often goes together with a 
tendency to sow or collect genes outside the pair-bond. Above that, as typical mammals, 
humans seem to be slightly polygynous. In many cultures males will try to obtain additional 
wives and start more than one family. In other cultures, this practice is absolutely forbidden 
and the only alternatives to monogamy are celibacy, homosexuality, promiscuity or serial 
monogamy. 
 Yet, there are cultures that are described as being polyandrous, too, and at this point 
the relatively simple sociobiological story about two sexes and their different investment 
patterns becomes so complicated that many think that it can only be saved by piling up ad 
hoc hypotheses. Humans seem to have such a long list of `conditional strategies' that it 
seems easier to drop this notion altogether and to stick to `culturalistic' belief that humans 
are the products of their cultures. One particular strong argument in favor of this position is 
that terms like `monogamy' and `polygyny' are not used in the same way for humans as they 
are used for other animals. In humans they refer to marriage patterns, based on the cultural 
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institution of marriage, whereas they simply refer to mating patterns in other animals. The 
gap between humans and other animals is simply to large for one set of terms. 
 Or is it? Despite the fact that human bonding practices are mediated by the cultural 
institution of marriage, they express the same convergence in the interests of sexual partners 
and the same need for cooperation-in-reproduction as sometimes exists in other species. 
Humans are not the only species with a variety of alternative, conditional mating strategies. 
One only needs to think about the Dunnock, Prunella modularis, who can be just like 
humans monogamous, polygynous, polyandrous, or polygynandrous depending on the 
circumstances (Davies and Lundberg, 1984; fig. 6-3). Humans are not the only species with 
culture, either, as we learned already. They happen to be a species though, perhaps the only 
one, in which culture may help to decide between several behavioral options with respect to 
mating. 
 As I have been defending continually, however, from an evolutionary perspective 
`culture' cannot be equated with pure individual creativity and freedom. Rather, cultural 
prescriptions with respect to sexuality and marriage are expected to represent a compromise 
between collective interests (or the interests of a dominant elite) and the reproductive 
interest of the individual. Perhaps the needs of the individual have to be bended and curbed 
to fit a particular economy, power-distribution, and, ultimately, ecology. To enable it to 
survive in a particular society and by means of a particular economy, the human individual 
should perhaps be tamed and molded by a series of cultural patterns that matches that 
economy. 
 Sometimes this insight is taken too absolute and it is claimed that human marriage is 
primarily an economic agreement, which is not exclusively about mating and reproducing. 
As Daly and Wilson (1982) show this could also be said of the pair-bonds of many non-
human animals, who may also have more on their minds than just mating and reproducing: 
 
 The hornbill who feeds his incubating mate, the pair of beavers maintaining 
their dams and domicile - we could call these unions, with their division of 
labor and exchange of benefits, `economic' too. In people, as in other 
animals, the mundane interactions of mated pairs are seldom of immediately 
reproductive function, and yet the union can only be understood as a 
fundamentally reproductive alliance (1982: 288). 
 
Of course, the mistake is that economic activity in any species is not contrary to 
reproductive activity. As Daly and Wilson claim "to contrast economic and reproductive 
goals is to confuse proximate and ultimate considerations" (1982: 289). 
 Nor does the fact that humans are able to adapt their life to a particular ecology and 
economy imply that the human animal does not possess original drives and needs (whatever 
that may mean). To the contrary: hidden underneath the cultural variation, caused by 
specific ecological and ecological variables, there are universal psychological 
characteristics, including cross-cultural sex differences, which express themselves 
differently in each culture apart. 
 Instead of being more or less biologically arbitrary choices between different 
possibilities, marriage patterns seem to be the result of culturally transmitted and reinforced 
compromises between the optimal male and the optimal female solution to particular 
ecological conditions, of course depending on the respective power of both parties in a 
particular society. Often they simply constitute officially accepted or sanctioned mating 
habits which do not necessarily reflect choices of all individuals within a society. 
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Individuals in each society will choose their own strategies and compromises, depending on 
their sex, age, and position in the dominance hierarchy. (Sometimes they are `above the 
law'; sometimes they simply have nothing to loose and are indifferent to rules of their own 
society; often they are simply 
opportunistic hypocrites.) 
 Let us have a look at the 
behavioral ecological literature and try 
to find plausible explanations of the 
different cultural patterns. Murdock's 
ethnographic atlas (Murdock, 1967) is 
often used by behavioral ecologists as a 
tool to study a variety of cultures. It 
allows us at least to get an idea of the 
spectrum of human possibilities: of the 
849 societies listed, 708 are polygynous, 
about half of those societies highly, 
about half mildly so. 137 Societies are 
monogamous; 4 are listed as 
polyandrous (fig. 6-3; Flinn & Low, 
1986). From the view-point of 
behavioral ecology the marriage customs of a culture have to be explained with reference to 
the particular ecologies and economies in which they have arisen.  
 Polyandry and poverty. On the basis of their study of polyandry in Tibet and 
Ladakh, Crook and Crook (1988) come to the conclusion that polyandry is ultimately 
caused by the low carrying capacity of the environment, reinforced by the necessity to meet 
the burden of taxation, imposed by landlords, governments and religious authorities. In most 
cases the men that share a woman in a polyandrous marriage are brothers and the marriage 
is arranged by the parents at the moment that the men are still young. The reason of this 
arrangement is that the parents have only one large resource to inherit to the next 
generation: one piece of land with one farm. The division of the estates would make them 
inviable and would make it impossible to meet the tax demands. Thus, polyandrous 
marriage patterns are determined by a lack of reproductive opportunities for males. 
 Throughout the history of Tibet and Ladakh, areas in which polyandry is best known 
and best studied, landlords had a strong interest in reinforcing the `monomarital system' 
according to which estates would not be divided. Parents would inherit their estate to the 
eldest son, with or without brother, on the day of his marriage. Whereas polyandrous 
families are slightly larger than monogamous ones, eldest sons tend to have more 
reproductive success. In Zangskar, Ladakh, Crook and Crook found in 1980 that 30 % of 
brothers were monks. 
 Sometimes the males in a polyandrous marriage will try to acquire additional wives. 
In the north Indian Pahari this may even result in a unique polygynandric group marriage. A 
single household will then contain two or more men and two or more wives, all men 
considered to be married to all women (Daly & Wilson, 1982). 
 Thus, the fact that polyandry does exist in some societies does not mean that human 
males do not have certain innate, largely mildly polygynous tendencies. The cultural system 
of polyandry is simply the best solution given the limitations posed by the environment. 
Flinn and Low even compare the system to the `helpers at the nest' phenomenon seen in 
about 1% of bird species (about 10.000 species are known), in which reproductive 
 
Fig. 6-3. Marriage patterns in 849 societies. Data from 
Murdock, 1967 (after Flinn & Low, 1986). 
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opportunities are limited by a limited number of available territories or nest-sites. 
 The link between poverty and polyandry is further established if we look at the 
behavior of women. Form the view-point of women, marriage is both about love and 
resources. Women with men which are unable to earn enough money to raise a family are 
known sometimes to resort to `facultative polyandry' (we will come back to this point in 
6.3). The most stable marriages are obviously those in which a man is able to support his 
own family. Thus polyandrous tendencies in women are suppressed in ecological optimal 
conditions; in a situation of poverty they may come to the surface. Apparently some cultures 
have acquired enough wisdom to ensure women an income even if their partner dies or is 
unable to support his family. In the bible we find that if a man died his brother was more or 
less obliged to marry his wife; in the polyandrous systems of Tibet and Ladakh, women 
were simply already officially married to a kind of emergency or assistant husbands. A 
documentary by Desmond Morris suggested that brothers in polyandrous marriages do 
indeed claim their sexual rights. It would be interesting to know, however, whether this is 
always the case. 
 Of course, the most radical polyandrous practice is prostitution. Prostitution is, 
however, not a culturally reinforced marriage form, but an escape route of polygynous (and 
perhaps sometimes hypergamic) tendencies in an officially monogamous system. It seems to 
me that both the official marriage form of polyandry and all kind of unofficial polyandrous 
activities of women including prostitution show that the importance of marriage for women 
lies in a combination of love, sex and economic certainty. Perhaps prostitution shows best 
that if love, sex and money are uncoupled, men and women have completely different 
priorities, men opting for sex where (at least, some) women opt for money. Polyandry 
shows that at least some societies have recognized the necessity of ensuring women an 
income, even without a partner that is able to support her alone. For men, polyandry is no 
doubt not an ideal solution, and that is the reason that it occurs relatively seldom worldwide 
as an official marriage form. 
 Ecologically imposed monogamy. In a situation in which males have more 
opportunities to monopolize resources, either monogamy or polygyny will result, depending 
on the possibility to accumulate those resources. In harsh, unproductive environments it is 
difficult to provide enough food to sustain more than one wife plus offspring. Thus, only the 
very skillful hunters or clever negotiators are able to acquire more than one wife. It is 
therefore not surprising to find that peoples which inhabit the arctic or the dessert, like the 
Copper Eskimo or the Kalahari Bushmen respectively, are monogamous in most cases 
(Flinn and Low, 1986; among the Kalahari Bushmen about 5 percent of men have two 
wives). 
 The fact that such relatively poor and `primitive' societies know monogamy could 
seduce us into thinking that monogamy is the most `original' marriage system. Perhaps the 
story of Adam and Eve still has some deeper meaning and our unique evolutionary 
trajectory started with exclusive pair-bonds (see chapter 8 on the theory of Lovejoy). 
 Studies on such `primitive' societies as the Ache, a native hunting people of eastern 
Paraguay, reveal a completely different picture, however (Hill & Kaplan, 1988; Hawkes, 
1991). The Ache do not practice formal marriage rites, but do know pair-bonds and nuclear 
families. One would expect, then, that males would provide their own families as long as 
their wives remain faithful to them. What happens, instead, is that males that have caught 
some game, hand it over to another male who will distribute it more or less evenly among 
the members of the foraging band. More than 90% of the meat acquired by a male is 
consumed by individuals outside his nuclear family (Hill & Kaplan, 1988: 282). Women 
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and children do not get more meat acquired by their husbands and fathers than would be 
expected by chance if all food were simply pooled and redistributed. 
 What follows is that it is not in the interest of a man to be good hunter as a result of 
the direct profit for his own nuclear family. The advantages of being a good hunter are of a 
different kind: first, women and children of good hunters are slightly favored, because it is 
in the interest of everyone that they remain in the band and continue sharing food; second, 
good hunters have more extra-marital relationships and more illegitimate offspring. It is also 
likely that good hunters are less likely to be cheated on or abandoned by their wives. 
 All in all, at least the Ache do not confirm the idea of an original symmetrical 
monogamous system. It is much more plausible that monogamous systems simply arise out 
of ecological necessity and that they are, in fact, always characterized by some paternal 
uncertainty (see the research of Grammer and my summary in chapter 2). In most 
monogamous species which have been studied closely enough, including the gibbon which 
was long thought to form an exception, ethologists have been able to score at least some 
E.P.C.'s (extra-pair copulations). This follows directly from the asymmetrical interests of 
both sexes, which in monogamous relationships both have an interest in being unfaithful, 
but for different reasons: females are potentially adulterous, because they sometimes can 
collect better genes or some extra investment outside the pair-bond; males are potentially 
adulterous, because adultery may enlarge their reproductive success without necessarily 
enlarging their paternal investment. 
 All this does not mean that the idea of romantic love, at least as a temporal 
phenomenon, is entirely a cultural creation. Although this culturalistic explanation of 
romance is widely accepted in the social sciences, this idea is implausible, because the 
phenomenon of falling in love occurs cross-culturally, is documented in myths and legends 
from a variety of cultures and is driven by a series of chemical substances which definitely 
are not cultural in origin. Apart from that, the phenomenon of falling in love is compatible 
with the idea that humans are a pair-bonding species with elaborate courtship displays 
followed by in-depth interviews and tests of the suitor's genes and his current condition and 
position. In principle, the so-called consortships of chimpanzees (see chapter 10) could be a 
first stage in the evolution of pair-bonding, because there seems to be going on something 
exclusive and personal between such consorts. This does not mean, however, that we are an 
originally monogamous species, because in principle one can have several sequences of 
pair-bonding, mating and reproducing during one life and one can even, during such 
sequences, accumulate partners, which is an officially approved practice in most cultures. 
 Polygyny: happy the healthy and wealthy. Ethologists studying birds have developed 
the `polygyny-threshold' model to explain why female birds may prefer an already mated 
male above an unmated one (Orians, 1969). To stay close to home, a male wren 
(Troglodytus troglodytus, Europe's second smallest bird) with a poor territory may build a 
series of nests and invite a series of females, but all those ladies may prefer his neighbor, 
who has conquered a territory with more insects which will enable them to collect enough 
food for their young. This may sound unfair, but these female wrens have good reasons to 
choose the better territory. Perhaps they automatically choose also the best genes this way, 
because it need not to be an accident that a particular male owns a good territory: perhaps 
males with good territories have also better genes. (Alas, apart from that, evolution can 
never be fair, because one is unable to choose one's own genes). 
 Of course, the polygyny-threshold model could, but does not need to, apply to 
humans. On the one hand, it is possible that female humans, also, start seeing advantages of 
being a second wife in resource-abundant areas of the world, the moment that particular 
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males succeed in accumulating disproportionate large amounts of power and resources. On 
the other hand, human females are at least sometimes forced to marry polygynously. This 
complicates a comparison with birds. Another complicating factor is that polygyny does 
occur in a wide variety of human societies, in some of which polygynists do appear to be 
preferably the healthy, the clever and the fierce, while they in other societies seem to be 
simply the wealthy. Flinn and Low (1986) speak in this context about `mate control 
polygyny' and `resource control polygyny' respectively, but the adequacy of the first term is 
unclear as a result of unclarities about the role of female choice in such societies. 
 What is clear, however, is that there is a male power pyramid even in societies in 
which there are almost no differences in wealth, because there are almost no material goods. 
Some men are simply better hunters, warriors, cooperators and leaders and this advantage is 
translated into relative reproductive success. Among the Yanomamö, for example, one's 
status is defined by the number of enemies one has killed and this number correlates by and 
large with one's number of wives and one's reproductive success (Chagnon, 1988). Of 
course, powerful men earn a lot of respect, but they have to do a lot for it. Again, in the 
Yanomamö, headmen have to support a large group of co-resident kin, who they need to 
support them in return. 
 Apparently, `male' values play an important role in such societies. There is a strong 
tendency to control one's female relatives and sometimes sisters are even taken as co-wives, 
a situation which seems to make polygyny relatively pleasant for females (Chisholm & 
Burbank, 1991). Often, marriages are allowed only between certain types of cousins, called 
`cross-cousins'. 
 Yet, the polygyny in such societies need not to be the product of male coercion, 
only. It could be adaptive for females to choose an already mated or married man if he 
simply has better genes and is better able to ensure the safety of one's children. In a situation 
of intense intra- or intergroup competition it is relatively important for women to bet on the 
potential winners. 
 An important discovery supporting the idea that good genes count is Bobbi Low's 
discovery that polygyny correlates with pathogen stress (Low, 1988). She compared the 
marriage patterns of 93 societies of the standard cross-cultural sample with distribution 
maps of pathogens like malaria and leprosy and found that monogamy is absent in high-
pathogen areas and that there is a significant positive relationship between the total 
pathogen exposure and the degree of polygyny. To do justice to this kind of research I 
propose to call polygyny in such societies `polygyny based on good genes'. 
 Polygyny based on power or resources. In societies which dispose of goods that can 
be accumulated, status is often defined by wealth. Often the pursuit of wealth seems to be an 
almost autonomous psychological goal, which defies an evolutionary explanation. Yet, as I 
have shown in chapter 5.8 a number of studies have clearly shown that the pursuit of wealth 
in many societies is an approximation of inclusive fitness maximization. If I am allowed to 
phrase it somewhat rude, children are expensive, and so are women in most societies - even 
decent ones. In many slightly polygynous societies there are large economic prerequisites 
for marriage, which are tested by demanding a `bride-price', which may be payed in pigs, 
sheep, cows, oxen or cash. In at least one society the height of the bridewealth could be 
calculated on the basis of knowledge about the residual reproductive capacity and 
reproductive condition of the bride and the distance between the home of her parents and 
her future home (Borgerhoff-Mulder, 1988; Ruse, 1989). 
 On the basis of both the Ethnographic Atlas and the Standard Cross-Cultural 
Sample (Murdock and White, 1969) John Hartung (1982) has shown that there is a strong 
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positive relationship between polygyny and bride-price (in opposition to dowry, see below). 
He even claims that this correlation is strong enough to claim that human polygyny is 
essentially `resource control polygyny', polygyny based on differences in the wealth. Above 
that, using again the Atlas (corrected for Galton's problem1) he shows that polygynous 
societies display a typical male bias in the inheritance of wealth. This is easily explained as 
a result of the greater ability of sons to `translate' an excess of wealth into an excess of 
grandchildren. A logical extension of this idea is that poor families, from which sons do not 
have much reproductive possibilities, will invest more in their daughters, because females in 
mammals, including man, have typically less variation in reproductive success and because 
female humans are typically hypergamous. As was mentioned in chapter 3.3 this idea, a 
consequence of the Trivers-Williard hypothesis, was successfully tested by several 
sociobiologists (e.g. Voland, 1984, Boone, 1988, Cronk, 1989). 
 As we have seen, most societies are slightly polygynous and, consequently, show a 
slight male bias. Such societies form a tendency to form male elites at the top that 
accumulate resources and use them to allure young, attractive and fertile women from other 
socioeconomic strata. Perhaps one of the reasons that such societies are common is that they 
do fit those parts of our `deep structure' that we still share with the chimpanzee. After all, 
our last common ancestors probably lived only five to seven million years ago and it is not 
unreasonable to assume that it looked much like chimpanzees do today (Wrangham & 
Divale, 1996). 
 If we take this reasoning one step further it is not unreasonable to assume also that 
both the male coalitions that dominate chimpanzee societies and the male coalitions that 
dominate many human societies, especially the polygynous ones, owe much of their power 
to a climate of intergroup competition. That means nothing less than that behavioral 
ecological analyses of human societies do have to look not only to ecological factors, but to 
the threats posed by other human societies as well. I would expect societies that have 
evolved in places that were worth fighting for to be particularly male dominated. 
 One way of making this claim plausible is by pointing to convergent tendencies in a 
number of famous despotic societies. Laura Betzig has shown that there are a number of 
striking resemblances between the first six civilizations, which all seem to have been based 
on the political and military power of one people that was able to subject and unify a series 
of other peoples (Betzig, 1992). All these civilizations were ruled by power maniacs who 
often seem to have been sex maniacs as well, often collecting young and beautiful women in 
harems and often even claiming the rights to the wives of their subjects (`le droit du 
seigneur'). Contrary to what one would expect on the basis of the beliefs of many cultural 
anthropologists, at least in a number of variables many civilizations are monotonously 
similar. 
 Apparently, power transforms male personalities in somewhat predictable ways. 
Females seem to be attracted to such personalities in somewhat predictable ways, too. The 
male tendency to acquire power and the female tendency to hypergamy are complementary 
in this respect. The resulting societies show a characteristic power pyramid, which I have 
tried to picture in figure 5-7 (compare also the figure of Mildred Dickeman in Dickeman, 
1979). 
                     
1In the Ethnographic Atlas (Murdock, 1967) even societies which are are mutually interacting are treated as 
seperate entities. This may confuse results. The Standard Cross-Cultural Sample (Murdock & White, 1969) 
includes only one culture from each region and does not have this problem (Galton's problem). One can also 
solve the problem by ordering societies in language-groups (this is done also by Hartung). 
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 At this point it becomes clear why it is so difficult to decide whether human 
polygyny is the product of female choice or male coercion: both can be reinforcing one 
another instead of working divergently. It is also not easy to decide when and why polygyny 
is fitness-enhancing for women. Apparently, polygyny is disadvantageous for females in 
most situations, although sororal polygyny (in which co-wives are sisters) at least seems to 
lessen the burden of parental investment as a result of the enhanced mutual help of the co-
wives (Chisholm & Burbank, 1991). On the whole however, polygynous married women 
have smaller families than monogamous married women, as was shown for the Aboriginals 
of Arnhem Land (Chisholm & Burbank, 1991) and for the Mormons (Josephson, 1993). 
Why would women want to marry an already married man if they end up having fewer 
children then they would have if married to an unmarried man? 
 It turns out that we have not evolved to have a maximum number of children. In 
technical terms: fertility is not an exact measure of fitness. Remember, children, too, are 
only a means to an end. We have evolved to `spread our genes' maximally, because genes 
that support opposite tendencies have vanished for long, are still dying out and will die out 
forever. As an approximation of fitness the number of grandchildren is much better than the 
number of children. Josephson shows that, at least for his nineteenth-century Mormon 
sample, both sons and daughters of polygynists had more children then did monogamists. 
The effect is almost strong enough to make up for the lower number of first-generation 
polygynist offspring. Probably the cause of this reproductive enhancement is that children 
of polygynists had simply more resources than the children of monogamists. As we all 
know, love and children cannot be bought, but one should be able to afford them. 
 Thus, polygyny can be an adaptive strategy for females not as a way to increase their 
number of children, but rather as a way to increase their number of grandchildren. 
Apparently, to understand human reproductive decisions, we have to take into account the 
fact that the human life-span covers at least three generations. Within this context at least 
part of human polygyny that we would otherwise tend to explain using the idea of male 
coercion, can now be explained by using the female choice model. 
 To sum up, "it appears that when resources and custom permit, men tend toward 
polygyny, and when any factor (e.g. health, resources) makes some men much better mates 
than others, women too, can profit reproductively from polygyny (Low, 1988). "Yet", 
according to the same author "humans are [in one way], highly unusual polygynists. In other 
species ... typically males compete and females choose. But `third party' patterns in humans 
extend to mate choice. In many societies, others, not the bride-to-be, make the choice" 
(Low, 2000). 
  
 Socially imposed monogamy: a product of egalitarianism or  simply of agriculture? 
With that, we come to the central problem of the behavioral ecology of human marriage 
patterns which makes them occasionally difficult to compare with nonhuman mating 
patterns. Marriage patterns are by definition `third party' patterns, the `third party' being not 
only relatives, but often other powerful individuals and/or institutions like the state. The 
term `socially imposed monogamy' was introduced by Richard Alexander (1979) to 
discriminate between those societies in which monogamy is purely the consequence of 
limited resources and those societies in which group processes are such that no one, not 
even dominant members, are officially approved of having multiples wives or husbands. It 
can be claimed that the very necessity to make this distinction in Homo sapiens is what 
makes this species so special. Indeed, this is what is done by Flinn and Low when they 
claim that "socially imposed monogamy has no homolog in nonhuman species, unlike 
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ecologically imposed, or resource limited, monogamy (Flinn & Low, 1986)".  Yet, 
something special is not necessarily something unexplainable. 
 It have been especially Richard Alexander and Laura Betzig who have attempted to 
explain the rise of socially imposed monogamy. Richard Alexander explained socially 
imposed monogamy in the context of his balance of power theory of human groupings 
(Alexander, 1979). Human groups with more internal discipline have continuously been 
stronger than groups with a lot of internal tensions. The `reproductive opportunity leveling' 
which is expressed in socially imposed monogamy can be seen as an attempt to take away 
the most important cause of internal group conflicts (see Daly & Wilson, 1988, for data 
about conflict over women). 
 Laura Betzig (Betzig, 1986; 1994; 1995; see also MacDonald, 1995) also places the 
rise of monogamy in the context of the cooperation between dominant and subordinate men. 
The moment dominant men become dependent of subordinates and subordinates have more 
possibilities to escape from exploitation, their relationships becomes more based on 
equality. An official commitment to monogamy minimizes potential conflicts over women 
and strengthens the cooperation. Betzig has done her best to prove that, despite the official 
teachings of the church, monogamy did not completely succeed in western Europe until the 
industrial revolution. Only since the industrial revolution did ordinary men gain `bargaining 
power' and become irreplaceable as specialized workers. Also, an increased mobility helped 
to strengthen the independence of modern workers. With more political equality came more 
reproductive equality. Ordinary men were better able to compete for women with their 
superiors. 
 It seems to me that Betzig has become somewhat too cynical about the role of 
polygyny. While it is undoubtedly true that polygynous tendencies have always been part of 
human nature, it is true at the same time that monogamy, including an undivided paternal 
investment in offspring, has many advantages for women. The unstable equilibrium between 
monogamous and polygynous tendencies, between `good fathers' and `good genes', may 
indeed be very old. 
 In this respect it could be worthwhile to pay some attention to the ideas of Helen 
Fisher (1982, 1992). Helen Fisher does not see polygyny, but serial monogamy (in which 
individuals have a sequence of temporally exclusive relationships) as the original human 
mating system and from this perspective she gives a different explanation for western 
monogamy. Serial monogamy works best in small bands of hunter-gatherers where children 
of about four or five years become part of a collective peer group and do not need their 
parents to stay together any longer (the idea that children become socialized partly in peer 
groups is also consistent with Judith Harris' `group socialization theory of development' 
(1995)). According to Fisher agriculture has been the force which broke this original pattern 
of serial monogamy. Agriculture requires families to stay at their somewhat isolated farms, 
which require a steady investment over many, many years and which also can best be 
inherited as single units. The best solution in this situation is to ensure the survival of a 
single farm as an economic unit by  running it by a single reproductive unit, a family. 
 An argument in favor of Fisher's model is that industrialization may not so much 
work in favor of monogamy simply, but actually seems to increase divorce rates which are 
interpretated by Fisher as a return to the original mating pattern of serial monogamy. As a 
consequence, contemporary western societies can hardly be described as purely 
monogamous. Serial monogamy can also be interpretated as disguised polygyny, however, 
because the system allows some men to jump from marriage to marriage. Just like polygyny, 
in a serial monogamous system there exist wide differences in reproductive success between 
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different men. (Low, 2000, sees serial monogamy as `really a sort of temporal polygyny, 
and also cites the Ache and the Cuna Indians, both non-agricultural, as examples). 
 What can we conclude from this complex mixture of theories, speculations and data 
about `socially imposed monogamy'? Perhaps they illustrate again that there is a gap 
between human nature and its innate sex differences and the requirements of particular 
cultures (Low, 2000; Mealy, 2000). First, let me repeat why I believe that mating systems 
are not entirely cultural in origin. If we compare the degree of human dimorphism with that 
of other primates, humans stand out as a mildly polygynous species (Wilson, 1978). If we 
compare human testicle size with the testicle size of gorillas and chimpanzees, humans 
show an intermediate level of sperm competition. This suggest that we are somehow 
intermediate between gorilla polygyny and chimpanzee promiscuity (Harvey & Harcourt, 
1984). Finally, if we study the psychology of human males and females there is clearly a 
tendency of males to be somewhat more polygamous and females to be somewhat more 
monogamous. 
 Given the fact that human babies are extremely dependent creatures and that paternal 
assistance in raising them is not purely a luxury, given the fact also that human males 
occasionally tend to fall in love, it is certainly not simply a romantic idée fixe to suppose 
that there exists a natural capacity for pair-bonding in humans as an unstable power balance 
between male and female interests. As in many birds, a strong tendency towards adultery 
and divorce may simply be the reverse side of the coin. Every individual simply tries to get 
the best of both worlds: females may be continually looking for good genes outside the pair 
bond or for better matches, males may be continually looking for extra reproductive 
opportunities elsewhere, but that does not mean that a pair bond does not exist, at least 
temporally. Apart from that, we definitely seem to have inherited a strong polygynous 
tendency from our primate ancestors which again and again re-emerges if the right 
opportunities exist. 
 It is not implausible to assume that dominant individuals have always felt the 
necessity to cope somehow with this mix of possibilities. The moment they were able to 
subject their subordinates completely, they have tended towards polygyny, although most 
polygynous men will have had their official wives and their favorite mistresses. The 
moment there were no opportunities for despotism, cooperation on the basis of fairness 
became important, and forces proclaiming monogamy would prevail. The moment a society 
is stratified, but at the same time polygyny is prohibited, relatively rich or powerful men are 
a scarce commodity and women are expected to compete for them. Apparently, it is in such 
societies in which families of potential brides may compete with one another over a groom 
by offering a dowry. 
 A dowry is, as mentioned, 
the opposite of a bride-price. The 
dowry is paid by the bride's family 
to the groom's family. It may consist 
of a smaller or larger trousseau, 
consisting of clothing, household 
instruments, servants, jewelry, 
livestock, land, money and even 
lifelong obligations of support. If 
anisogamy and the initial investment 
of pregnancy did not produce a 
divergence of the reproductive 
 Dowry No Cost Bride-Price 
MONOGAMY 
OCCASIONAL 
 POLYGYNY 
GENERAL 
 POLYGYNY 
Sample: 875 
societies 
 20 = 80%* 
 
 70 = 28%  42 = 7% 
  
  3 = 12% 137 = 55%* 153 = 25% 
   
  2 = 8%  41 = 17% 
  
 25 = 100% 248 = 100% 
407 = 68%* 
 
602 =100% 
Table 6-2. Financial rewards (dowry) or costs (bride-
price) related to different marriage systems. Based on 
Murdock's Ethnographic Atlas by Hartung, 1997. 
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strategies of the sexes, one would expect dowry to be quite as common as bride-price. In 
fact, it is much rarer: woman are more often `bought' than men. John Hartung has shown 
that dowry is even more strongly associated with monogamous marriage than bride-price 
associates with polygynous marriage. These associations are shown with asterisks (*) in the 
table 6-2, based on a sample of the Ethnographic Atlas (Hartung, 1997; p < 6.6 x 10-58, 
sample not corrected for Galton's problem). Apparently, in most (that is: 602 out of 875) 
societies women are seen as representing an economic and reproductive value that has to be 
compensated for at the moment they are `given away'. Only in a small portion (25 out of 
875) of societies men have to be compensated for binding themselves to a woman and 
apparently this is most often the case if it prohibits them from marrying other women. 
 Serial monogamy, the pill, and marital satisfaction in our own culture. Some extra 
comments about serial monogamy in our own culture are now at stake. First, it seems likely 
that the balance of power between the sexes may be decisive with respect to the favored 
type of mating system. Although modern industrial societies of North America and Europe 
are officially characterized by socially imposed monogamy, the emancipation of women and 
the increasing differences in income have created a situation in which marriages are 
particularly unstable. As in a polygamous system, women can easily marry `upward' 
(hypergamy) and rich men have more opportunities than poor men. Because polygyny is 
officially not accepted, the polygynous tendencies of both men and women have adopted the 
form of serial monogamy. As we have seen, serial monogamy may at least sometimes look 
like a disguised version of polygamy. Some men will choose at each stage in their socio-
economic life a partner of a residual reproductive potential that reflects their status, while 
some women will try to improve their economic position by marrying upward the economic 
ladder. 
 The most important argument of Fisher (1992) for her belief that serial monogamy is 
most close to the original human mating system is that she sees a link between the supposed 
duration of marriages and the period of time that children need a father. Yet, given the 
problems faced by stepchildren it is doubtful whether a system of serial monogamy has ever 
been adaptive. Thus, I am not yet convinced that serial monogamy is the original human 
mating system. It could simply constitute a mild and socially accepted version of polygyny. 
 It should be remarked also that our `civilization' (that is how we sometimes call our 
culture) is characterized by a series of environmental influences that are totally new: for 
example, the pill. Women can use the pill (or other contraception techniques) to lengthen 
their phase of partner-testing and social climbing. Contraception can also reinforce 
monogamy by wiping out traces of adulterous relationships, at least sometimes. The study 
of Daniel Pérusse in Quebec (Pérusse, 1993), which I already mentioned in the last chapter, 
points to a widening gap between pure mating success and reproductive success. According 
to Pérusse the fact that the relationship between cultural and reproductive success breaks 
down in modern industrial societies can be explained by both contraception and socially 
imposed monogamy. In modern societies status still accounts for 62% of the variance in 
male copulation frequency, but this variance does no longer result in differential 
reproductive success. 
 In all, these data point to a mild polygynous tendency in man. Although we have 
gone a long way from our original way of living and mating, we are still haunted by many 
of the accompanying themes and passions. Our preoccupation with status and a series of 
largely innate sex-specific emotional reactions are still in place. Two of such sex-specific 
emotional reactions can still be demonstrated. First, men and women have different 
concerns about their relationships expressing themselves in different types of jealousy. 
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Males, especially experienced males, are obsessed with their partner's sexual fidelity; 
females are more concerned about their partner's emotional commitment. In two different 
studies Buss and his team found that about 30% more men than women reported greater 
distress over a partner's sexual involvement with someone else. Women, however, were 
found to be more distressed when their partner fell in love with someone else (Buss, Larsen, 
Westen & Semmelroth, 1992). Of course, a good sociobiological explanation is that men 
have more reason to care about their partner's sexual fidelity: they are never certain about 
their paternity the way women can be certain about their maternity. This explanation, 
however, is still compatible with the idea that the lowered level of female sexual jealousy 
points to a mild polygyny in man with women being somewhat more tolerant about their 
partner's sexual infidelity. Of course, modern feminists will object vehemently about this 
interpretation, but it is nevertheless striking how forgiving women married to high-status 
males sometimes are (Hilary Clinton being only one example). 
 A second example of an atavistic emotional reaction can be found in the factors 
contributing to marital satisfaction. Despite our modern political correct notions of equality, 
the mutual expectations of men and women are all but symmetric. Of course, it is true that a 
certain level of homogamy, or similarity in couples, contributes to the success of a 
relationship. Yet, disturbingly, there are also factors in which differences between partners 
are good for relationships. Both in their review of the literature and in their own research 
Weisfeld et al. (Weisfeld, Russell, Weisfeld & Wells, 1992) find that the happiest couples 
are those in which the men are slightly more dominant than their wives and in which those 
wives are slightly more attractive than their husbands. Although male household tyrants 
definitely can make their wives unhappy, on the whole women are certainly attracted to 
relatively dominant men. 
 Weisfeld et al. cite studies from different parts of the world which all show that 
couples in which the wife dominates the decision making are the lowest in terms of 
happiness. Dominance is even more important than wealth; more often, wealth seems to be a 
sign of dominance. At the same time there are studies which show that the economic power 
of women has a negative effect on marriages. Weisfeld et al. show that, cross-culturally, 
women's labor force participation is related to divorce. There are many indications that 
women are attracted to men that are higher on the social ladder than themselves, while men 
are simply preoccupied with signs of fertility, health and residual reproductive capacity in 
their partners. It seems to me that this all fits in well with the idea that man is naturally a 
slightly polygynous species, because when women like dominant men, not all men are liked 
alike and some men will be able to have more partners, either in the form of a polygynous 
marriage system, by having mistresses, or working their way through a series of 
relationships. 
 Yet, the situation in man is much more complicated than that in other polygynous 
species. This is not only due to the flexibility with which we adapt ourselves to different 
environments by means of culture, but also to the fact that we are a species with paternal 
investment in highly dependent offspring. We can conclude that we have a behavioral 
preference for polygyny which is counter-balanced somewhat by a tendency of human 
males to care for their own offspring if there is a high degree of paternal confidence 
(certainty that one is really the biological father of one's official offspring), which may be 
actually reinforced by the institutionalization of pair-bonds by means of marriages. In most 
cultures the fidelity of the wife is judged much more important than that of the man 
(remember Tony Braxton's line: why is it that men are forgiven, and, women aren't?). 
 This tendency towards polygyny is, of course, not the product of `blind' `genetic 
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determinism'. It is a mere psychological tendency which can be switched off and on to some 
extent as a result of ecological and social circumstances. Although it is probably based on 
physiological factors, it can be brought into balance with other psychological tendencies, 
e.g. the loyalty to one exclusive pair-bond or the demand to be socially accepted. Nor does 
the human tendency towards polygyny imply that females are passive creatures, who adjust 
themselves to male choices. To the contrary, if marriage patterns are compromises between 
the optimal male and female solutions to a particular ecological condition, we would expect 
females, too, to have an interest in polygynous systems under particular conditions. Perhaps 
the female tendency to hypergamy, her tendency to prefer sexual partners higher on the 
dominance hierarchy, plus the female tendency to collect `good genes', force females in 
many situations to join an in fact polygynous system, which may make it sometimes more 
difficult to obtain paternal support in the raising of children. 
  Conclusion Although marriages are socio-cultural conventions, the patterns in 
which they are contracted reflects the different interests of the sexes and the power 
distribution within a society. The apparent conflict between the mild polygynous tendencies 
of the human species and the fact that there exists marriage systems ranging from polyandry 
to monogamy results from different strategies of the sexes and from the effects of different 
ecologies on those strategies and their interaction, not on a simply disjunction of `nature' 
versus `culture'. Different cultures have promoted different marriage systems depending on 
the power and interests of the creators of these cultures. Cultural forms thus start from 
natural `givens', but these givens already have a natural elasticity themselves and can be 
manipulated and idealized in different ecological contexts conforming the interest of the 
individuals that have the power to create, manipulate and use culture. 
 Despite the fact that man is a `cultural being' there is thus really hidden a human 
nature underneath the spectrum of human cultures, albeit one that is full of conditional 
strategies. One can even situate human mating patterns among those of other primates as I 
have done in table 6-3. To place human marriage patterns in the context of primate mating 
patterns I have included all homonoids, including the African pongids, which are so related 
to us that it is sometimes proposed to place them together with humans into a new  
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1.a.Males apparently do not cooperate or do not need each other to defend the group → 2 
b. Multiple males → 3 
2.a.Birdlike system of monogamous couples defending their own territories by making calls → Gibbons 
b. Males and females roam at different speeds through overlapping territories → Orang-utan 
c. One dominant silverback male with a harem → Gorilla (sometimes) 
3.a.Paternal care not very important; paternal certainty nihil; high level of sperm competition; third party interference in sexual 
relationships limited → Chimpanzee and Bonobo. 
b.Paternal care not very important; paternal certainty high; low level of sperm competition; dominant `silverback' male tolerates a 
few other, often younger, males → Gorilla (sometimes). 
c.Paternal care necessary; paternal certainty high; medium level of sperm competition; very dependent children; slow 
maturation and long learning process; extreme level of third party `cultural' interference in sexual relationships at the 
level of groups/societies → Humans, different types of culturally reinforced mating or marriage patterns, 4. 
4.a.Females to some extent able to sustain and protect themselves; can look for best mates in different stages of their lives → Serial 
`mono'gamy. 
b.Females in need for male provisioning or protection → 5. 
5.a.Males are unable to sustain more than one wife → Ecologically imposed monogamy. 
b.Some males are able to provide for or protect more than one family or to monopolize more resources → 6. 
6.a.Superior hunters or warriors can have more than one wife, but there is not much power to monopolize → Polygyny based on 
good genes. 
b.Power can be monopolized in the form of arms, land, production means, education; subordinates unable to bargain or to flee → 
Polygyny based on power or resources. 
c.Dominant males are dependent on cooperation by subordinates, their social status based on `democratic' decision on the basis 
of their supposed superior intellectual and moral qualities → 7. 
7.a.Females powerful → Serial `mono'gamy (or, officially, socially imposed monogamy with a high level of divorce). 
b.Females less powerful → Socially imposed monogamy. 
  
Table 6-3. Speculative key to the most important mating patterns of extant hominids (see text). 
category of `hominids' (Martin, 1992). Hopefully, this table shows that human marriage 
patterns do not arise simply as a result of some kind of uncaused, superorganic `culture', but 
do emerge as a result of a series of almost chemical reactions between two ingredients 
(males and females) which are mixed in a series of different circumstances, all which have 
their own catalytic effects.. 
 Paradoxically, human cultural marriage forms show culture to be (on the one hand) a 
natural force that (on the other hand) forces some individuals in some ecological contexts 
into straitjackets which are experienced as highly `unnatural'. Perhaps this is one of the 
origins of this strange nature-culture dichotomy, which could be hard to transcend, because 
it is so often used by different parties either to defend their version of what ought to be 
`culture' opposed to brutish nature or to defend what they see as `nature' against tendencies 
of the prevailing culture to neglect or oppress it. 
 In our own country we are currently experimenting with allowing homosexuals to 
marry. This reflects the attitude in our highly developed, very `unnatural', technological 
society to try to transcend inequalities forced on to us by nature. While some Dutch theorists 
will oppose this, one can still claim, however, that on the whole the cultural institution of 
marriage is designed to ensure an optimal micro-environment for reproduction and child-
rearing. At the same time, the different marriage forms which arise in different ecological 
and historical contexts are never ideally suited for the underlying nature. Monogamy is 
often a cage, both for women who desire better genes than those of their husbands, and for 
men with their mildly polygynous tendencies. Polygamy is not ideal either, however. In an 
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american documentary which was brought out by Discovery Channel polygynous Mormon 
men tell us how difficult it is to live with more than one wife and Mormon women tell us 
how they have to cope continually with jealousy and the fear to be the second. While 
monogamy is to some extent a very unnatural institution, opposed to human nature, 
polygamy is probably not ideal either. 
 Perhaps it is the essence of humans to be always separated from their `true nature', to 
be always forced to `invent it'. In that respect there is certainly a trace of truth in Sartre's 
dictum that human nature does not exist. Of course, human nature does exist and the human 
genome project is part of the process of its gradual discovery, but at the same time we are as 
cultural and existential (conscious and free) beings always forced to adjust it to both our 
unruly needs and the ever-faster-moving film of our external circumstances. 
 
6.3 STUDY 2: MORE EGGS OR MORE PARENTAL CARE? 
 
 
Fig. 6-4. r And K strategies are related to the predictability of the environment: only the K strategist  
are able to risk high investment per offspring. 
 
Our next investigation concerns the effects of different types of environments on individuals 
and the sociocultural structures which they create and in which they are imbedded. Many of 
the speculations on this subject have been engendered by the, at first sight, somewhat 
obscure and clumsy concepts of `r' and `K selection'. Although I find these concepts ugly (I 
would have preferred something like `quantity' versus `quality' selection), they refer to such 
a fundamental issue that it would be wrong to neglect it completely. They refer to one of the 
most fundamental problems faced by all organisms, including man. This problem is that all 
organisms, in order to reproduce efficiently, have to make priorities and have to choose 
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between a number of possible activities, some of which are mutually exclusive. For 
example, it is not easy to be occupied with finding new sexual partners (`mating effort') and 
be devoted to rearing offspring at the same time (`parenting effort'). Organisms with a 
wrong energy-budget or following a wrong strategy can be expected to be `punished' by 
natural selection. However, in some habitats one strategy may be adaptive, in other habitats 
almost the opposite strategy can be adaptive. 
 The two most fundamental opposite strategies within this dilemma were called `K 
selection' and `r selection' by MacArthur and Wilson (1967). They refer to two opposing 
kinds of selection which produce an optimal compromise between 
- (r) a strategy directed at maximally reproducing (maximal intrinsic rate of natural 
increase) and 
- (K) one directed at conquering and defending resources in an environment close to 
its maximal carrying capacity (K). 
Imagine a pool that is still uninhabited by fish. The first couple of fishes released in that 
pool can permit themselves to devote all of their time and energy to reproduction. To be 
able to produce a maximum number 
of offspring they will minimize the 
amount of investment per offspring. 
Because there is almost no 
competition they do not need to 
defend a territory; they can simply 
eat one place empty; leave a number 
of eggs or larvae there, and move to 
the next place. 
r Selection K Selection  
Climate Unpredictable Predictable, stable 
Mortality Often catastrophic, 
nondirected (resulting from 
environmental 
circumstances) 
Directed (selection for 
competitive abilities) 
 Inevitably, if this process of 
care-free multiplication is not 
stopped by a cold climate or by 
predators, the pool will start 
becoming overcrowded. Another 
strategy becomes adaptive, then. As 
a result of the presence of a large 
quantity of competitors, one must 
first carve out a territory and try to 
monopolize a partner. Next, one can 
reproduce. To ensure, however, that 
offspring will survive it becomes 
necessary to defend and rear them 
some time, and, ideally, leave them 
a territory after your death. This 
strategy is directed at increasing 
one's competitive ability and that of 
one's offspring in a saturated 
environment. 
 MacArthur and Wilson 
predicted that with the occupation of 
an ecological vacuum, selection 
would shift from r selection to K selection. One would expect many animals to embody a 
compromise between both strategies or to be able to shift from the one strategy to the other. 
Population 
size 
Variable, unsaturated 
environments which are 
recolonized each year: 
opportunistic exploiters 
Constant, near 
carrying capacity of 
environment: stable 
occupation of habitat 
Competitio
n 
Not strong: one simply has 
to be the first there 
Keen: one has to 
occupy and defend a 
territory 
Selection 
favors 
Rapid development 
Early reproduction 
Small body size 
High energy utilization 
Low encephalization 
Slow development 
Delayed reproduction 
Large body size 
Efficient energy 
utilization 
High encephalization 
Life span Short Longer 
Families Large litter size 
Low degree of parental 
care 
Small litter size 
High degree of 
parental care 
Social 
systems 
Low degree of social 
organization and altruism 
High degree of social 
organization and 
altruism 
Table 6-4. r And K selection according to Pianka 
(1970) and Rushton (1990). 
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One can also claim that whole groups, e.g. insects, are relatively r selected, while other 
groups, e.g. primates, are relatively K selected (Pianka, 1970; Rushton, 1997; fig. 6-4). 
Sometimes it is claimed that humans belong to the most K selected species of all, but this is 
not completely certain (Lovejoy, 1981). Some of the correlates of r and K selection are 
contrasted in table 6-4. 
 The r/K model is helpful to understand within-species differences of clutch size 
(Cody, 1966) and population cycles in small rodents (Krebs et al., 1973; Silverman, 1990). 
Apparently, strategies on the r/K-continuum are not completely genetically determined and 
individuals of at least some species are able to adapt their reproductive strategies to the 
ecological and social circumstances in which they find themselves. 
 The Gypsies and r-selection. Several attempt have been made to apply the concepts 
of r and K selection to humans at different levels. As Silverman (1990) remarks, at a 
minimum these concept could be used to explain the classic paradox regarding human 
birthrates, which are inversely correlated to the quality of child care. In many societies 
impoverished conditions do not lead to a lower birthrate and do, therefore, lead to an 
increased infant and child mortality rate. It is the essence of the so-called demographic 
transition, which is characteristic of industrialized nations, that the birthrate drops only after 
the deathrate has gone down, too. This could be interpretated as a transition to a more K 
selected investment pattern as a result of a change in the environment, which becomes more 
predictable. Also, in modern industrial societies the first priority is no longer to survive the 
contingencies of climate and crops, but to compete on a market which requires certificates 
and specialized know-how. 
 Western societies have much in common with the above mentioned pool at the 
moment it has become saturated with fish. Many people have highly specialized jobs which 
require specific training and certificates. Family size has dropped dramatically and often 
parents invest in two or three children as much energy as would be invested in four to six 
children only one generation ago. Yet, not everyone in Western societies follows the same 
strategy. r And K selection produce a conglomerate of opposite traits and there are several 
subgroups in modern societies in which a series of typical r selected traits manifest 
themselves. Such typical r selected traits include larger families, lower birth weights, 
twinning, earlier onset of sexual activity, higher copulatory rate, shorter menstrual cycles, 
higher mortality rates, more child abandonment, neglect, and abuse. 
 A study which gives the concepts of r and K selection flesh and blood is the one of 
Tamas Bereczkei of Hungary, who compared Hungarian Gipsies with other Hungarians 
(called simply `Hungarians', Bereczkei, 1993). According to Bereczkei the Gipsies can be 
said to follow a typical r strategy. Not only do Gipsies have more children than Hungarians, 
their infants also have a significant lower birth weight than Hungarian children. At the same 
time, Gipsy children with a low birth weight have better prospects than ditto Hungarians, as 
if their lower birth weight constitutes an adaptation which allows their mothers to get more 
children. There are born significantly more girls than boys and girls are cared for better than 
boys, showing the `Trivers-Willard-effect' (see chapter 4.3.3) in action (Bereczkei & 
Dunbar, 1997). Both boys and girls mature earlier and start their sexual career at an earlier 
age. Sexual and marital relationships are generally less stable and father-absent households 
are characteristic. Yet, children are well-cared for, because the extensive kinship networks 
of gypsy societies do more than compensate the instability of Gypsy marriage bonds 
(Bereczkei, 1998). 
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 Social stratification and different strategies. If a minority group such as the Gypsies 
can be said to take a position on the r/K continuum it is not strange to assume that dominant 
groups in a society, with a relatively luxurious prospects, will take the opposite position. In 
fact, the American sociologist and criminologist Lee Ellis has postulated that the whole 
edifice of human social stratification can be derived from the intersection of two 
continuums: the r/K continuum and the continuum between pro- and antisociality. In 
western societies the upper classes can be understood as tending towards the K strategy, 
whereas the labor class can be understood as following an r strategy. Of course, the reason 
for these different strategies has a lot to do with the expectations of individuals within these 
classes. Especially, if one cannot expect to live long, the best thing to do is to start 
reproducing early. It is perhaps no accident that teenager pregnancies are clearly linked to 
relatively poor conditions. Apparently, the reason that Ellis also needs the pro- versus 
antisocial continuum is that there are large 
differences in the amount of social concern 
and investment, especially in the middle 
classes. 
 It should be stressed that all this is 
not just speculation. Ellis uses an extensive 
literature to document the genetic basis of 
both traits on the r/K and the pro/antisocial 
continuum. Of course, in principle one 
could draw a picture like figure 6-4 for 
many traits. It is not unreasonable to 
assume, however, that the variation in some 
traits have more influence on social 
stratification than other traits. 
 Yet, at the moment there is much 
disagreement on the question of the 
heritability. As I have shown in chapter 5, 
behavioral geneticists are inclined to stress 
`the limits of family influence', as in the title 
of Rowe's book (Rowe, 1994). Other 
researchers, however, are interested in possible effects of the family environment on the 
variation in strategies on the r/K continuum. There are many species which can react 
flexibly to their environment by adopting a particular position on the r/K continuum and it is 
often claimed that humans belong to this category. Given the variations of the environments 
in which our ancestors have lived and given the complexity of the human psyche, it is not 
unreasonable to assume that the r/K dilemma is reflected in the human psyche as a 
continuum of conditional strategies which are triggered by different types of environment. It 
is not implausible to assume that individuals have ways to access at an early age in what 
kind of world they are born and what kind of strategies are likely to be adaptive. One twin 
study suggested that the orientation towards romantic love has a relatively low heritability 
(Waller & Shaver, 1994) and arises during childhood. Is it possible that this reflects an 
ability to adapt one's mating strategies to the environment in which one finds oneself? 
 
Fig. 6-4. Ellis' (1991) theory of social stratification. 
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 The genesis of alternative 
strategies. A series of new theoretical 
investigations in developmental 
psychology seem to support this 
hypothesis. There is evidence which 
shows that absence of the father during 
one's development may be a critical factor 
in the constitution of one's adult 
personality and love life (Draper & 
Harpending, 1982). Generally speaking, 
stress during early childhood may 
predispose individuals to follow a 
different developmental trajectory directed 
at faster maturation, earlier reproduction 
and a less committed love style (Belsky, 
Steinberg & Draper, 1991). Belsky, 
Steinberg and Draper connect their ideas 
to those of Bowlby (1969-1980) and 
propose that the different attachment types 
classified by Bowlby and his school are 
used by the developing individual as a 
means to prepare itself to the conditions in 
which it probably will find itself in adult 
life. If the mother or father is unwilling or 
unable to give a child a `secure 
attachment' an adult will result which is 
itself unable to provide comfort and safety 
to its own children. However, whereas 
Bowlby himself was typically moralizing 
and typifying the `securely attached person' as the one who is better off and "more capable 
of making use of opportunities in life, both personal and professional, than others" (Bowlby, 
1986), Belsky, Steinberg and Draper (1991) and Chisholm (1996, 1999) now postulate that 
insecure attachment can also be understood as an adaptation, inciting a strategy that is 
simply adaptive to a different type of environment with much more uncertainties. 
 
 
Attachment 
classification 
Parental reproductive 
strategy 
Child's developmental (i.e. 
incipient reproductive) 
strategy 
Insecure, 
Avoidant 
• Short-term 
• Unwilling to invest 
• High mating effort 
• Dismissing, rejecting 
of     child 
• Maximize current survival 
• Avoid rejecting, potentially 
  infanticidal parent 
Secure • Long-term • Maximize future learning,  
      quality of development • Able and willing to      
     invest 
• High parenting effort 
• More unconditionally   
     accepting, sensitive, 
• Maintain investment from  
      `rich' parent 
  responsive to child 
Insecure, 
Ambivalent 
• Short-term • Maximize rate of 
maturation; • Unable to invest 
• Parenting effort with   minimize age at first 
  inadequate resources   reproduction 
• Inconsistent, 
preoccupied 
• Maintain investment from  
      `poor' parent 
  but not rejecting of 
child 
 
Table 6-5. According to Chisholm attachment 
types could result from the effects of the reproductive 
strategy of the parents on the child.  
 According to Chisholm (1996, 1999) the three typical attachment types that are 
identified in child studies (secure/autonomous, avoidant/dismissing, resistant/preoccupied) 
are conditional strategies that make sense in different situations (table 6-5). The securely 
attached person is simply the person that has been raised in a context in which it pays to 
trust beneficial interpersonal relations and in which high investment parenting is the best 
strategy. The avoidant/dismissing attachment evolved to cope with situations in which it 
pays to be opportunistic. Finally, the resistant/preoccupied attachment evolved to foster 
`helper-at-the-nest' behavior and indirect reproduction. It is probably no coincidence that 
these strategies can be placed on an r/K continuum and form the psychological correlates of 
Ellis' theory of social stratification. That would mean, however, that these strategies have 
both genetic and environmental bases, a hypothesis which is not entirely contrary to 
common sense. 
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 In his most recent book James 
Chisholm (1999) explicitly tries to 
link this evolutionary interpretation of 
attachment theory to life history 
theory. In a stable environment with 
low risks, both human males and 
females tend to form relatively stable 
two-parent families in which paternal 
investment helps to create an extra 
buffer against all kinds of 
uncertainties. Under such conditions 
children have the time to develop 
slowly, to invest in the future and to 
postpone reproduction. In a less 
protected, more uncertain or 
dangerous environment, bonds 
between males and females become 
weaker and their behavior starts to 
fall back on behavioral strategies that 
ultimately have their origin in the 
time that two-parent families still did 
not exist. Because they do not know 
how long they will live, it becomes 
rational for individuals not longer to 
postpone reproduction and not to 
invest in a future which is still far 
away. As a result the `young male 
syndrome' and the `young female syndrome' arise, both directed at maximizing current 
reproduction. Young males take more risks, are more aggressive, and tend to use sexual 
coercion in order to increase their number of copulations; young females start their sexual 
and reproductive careers earlier, tend to have a relatively large number of babies, in which 
is invested relatively less individually, and do no longer believe in monogamy. According to 
Chisholm these syndromes constitute alternative strategies which have their origin in a time 
that the two-parent family still did not exist. The two-parent family which propagates itself 
through generations via secure attachments is dependent on favorable ecological and 
economic conditions; if these break down the interests of men and women start diverging 
and they fall back on the `typical male' and `typical female' strategies (the `young man 
syndrome' and the `young female syndrome' respectively), which are nongenetically 
inherited via insecure attachments. In the terminology of r and K theory, factors like a 
happy childhood and the presence of a father stimulate children to adopt a K strategy in later 
life, whereas early stress and the absence of a father stimulate them to adopt a r strategy. 
Safety, good economic prospects and a stable family environment allow children to spend 
more time on education and climbing the social pyramid. Such children can afford 
themselves the luxury of a K strategy, whereas children in poor conditions are (biologically) 
wiser if they adopt a r strategy.  
 
 
More r selected More K selected  
  
Strategy Maximizing current 
reproductive success 
Maximizing future (+ 
cumulative) 
reproductive success 
 
 
 
Relationship 
between 
sexes 
Diverging male and 
female interests; 
protohuman lifestyles 
Converging male and 
female interests: two-
parent families 
   
Male 
strategies 
Risk-taking & 
aggression; 
Taking responsibility 
for children; 
Sexual coercion; Provisioning & 
protecting; 
 
Low investment & 
polygyny Commitment 
  
Female 
strategies 
Teenage pregnancies; Relatively late first 
sexual contact; Higher 
investment in fewer 
children; Monogamy 
High birth rate; 
Facultative polyandry  
 
 
Table 6-6. An interpretation of Chisholm's 
life-history theory of alternative reproductive 
strategies in humans in terms of r and K selection. 
 Although they sound very plausible, Chisholm's speculations have one weak point 
and that is that they are based to a large extent on the `myth of early experience' which is 
criticized by behavioral geneticists (Rowe, 1994; Bruer, 1999). As Rowe (2000: 356) in a 
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review of Chisholm's book writes, "Good mothers do tend to have more securely attached 
babies, but this may reflect the commonality that both parent and child share the kind of 
genes that make for complementary and pleasant social interactions". Instead of attributing 
the different reproductive strategies to early family experiences, one could in principle also 
attribute them to genetic or cultural influences or a mix of these. Rowe cites several studies 
that show a genetic influence on life history traits that Chisholm tends to attribute to early 
family experiences. 
 The cultural reinforcement of different strategies. Even behavioral geneticists admit, 
however, that not all behavior is genetically determined. As shown in chapter 5.9 and figure 
5.2 behavioral genetic research shows that a large part of human behavior is influenced by 
non-family influences. Many environmental variables are not only shared between members 
of families, but are also shared by whole societies. Could such variables, including 
climatological or economic factors, drive a large number of individuals within a society into 
the direction of the same strategy? Could this have an influence on the type of culture which 
they create? It is here that the research of the British anthropologists Reynolds and Tanner 
(1983; Reynolds, 1991) becomes illuminating. They have investigated the relationship 
between different types environments and the cultures, especially religions, created by 
peoples living in those environments. 
 Reynolds and Tanner notice that 
religious beliefs are often closely related 
to reproductive strategies. Religious 
teachings are continually expressing pro 
and con attitudes towards issues which are 
relevant to reproduction, for example 
sexuality, marriage, divorce, widowhood, 
celibacy, contraception, abortion and 
infanticide. They then divide religious 
teachings in `pro-natalist' and `anti-
natalist': pro-natalist precepts favoring 
reproduction and population growth, anti-
natalist not doing so. A typical set of pro-
natalist precepts is one which applauds 
many births, which stimulates early 
marriage and reproduction, which 
disapproves of abortion and infanticide 
and which encourages remarriage, 
polygamy and reproduction into middle 
and old age (table 6-6). It is clear that the 
pro-natalists are the r strategists, the anti-
natalists the K strategists. 
 
 
Area of concern Pro-natalist Anti-natalist 
Conception Many better Few better 
Infanticide and 
abortion 
Disapproved of Approved of 
Birth and childhood Many births, less 
care 
Few births, more care
Adolescence Early reproduction Delayed reproduction
Marriage Early marriage Late marriage 
Divorce and 
widowhood 
Remarriage 
encouraged 
Remarriage 
discouraged 
Middle and old age Reproduction 
continues 
Reproduction ceases 
Table 6-7. Pro-natalist and anti-natalist religious 
precepts, according to Reynolds & Tanner, 1983; 
Reynolds, 1991. 
 One of the most surprising things found by Reynolds and Tanner (1983) and 
Reynolds (1991) was that pro-natalists attitudes were more pronounced in areas with more 
environmental uncertainty. For example, the Islam has always been more successful in large 
areas of the Middle-East and Asia. It is distinctively more pro-natalist than Christianity, 
which stresses monogamy, celibacy and discourages remarriage and sex for the sake of sex. 
In contrast, the Islam allows polygyny with up to four wives and is much more positive 
about marital sex. In Christianity, much stress is laid on hygiene and health care and the 
individual is valued more. On balance, one could claim that the Islam is much stronger in 
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creating optimal conditions for an increased `mating effort', whereas Christianity is assisting 
people in their `parenting effort'. (The history of Judaism, as recorded in the Bible, shows a 
transition process: remember Jacob married the two daughters of Laban, while in later times 
polygyny was forbidden.) 
 Now, the interesting thing is that in 
those areas of the world in which 
Christianity has flourished for centuries 
have always had to cope less with natural 
disasters, food shortages and bacterial 
diseases than the corresponding areas in 
which the Islam has been more popular, 
according to Reynolds and Tanner. 
Northwestern Europe has a relatively 
fertile soil cover and a relatively benign 
climate. Although it has had its epidemics 
(e.g. the Black Death), they are small 
compared to the plurality of infectious 
diseases which have plagued the Middle 
East and Asia. In these countries there 
have also always been more famines, as a 
result of the much harder climatological 
conditions (most people that I speak are 
not convinced, thus more study is certainly 
required here). 
Protestant Birthr InfMor _Fert Lifee prod$ 
      
United 
Kingdom 
13 10.1 1.8 73 9050 
12 7.8 1.7 76 13820 
Norway 11 7.0 1.6 76 12400 
Sweden 14 6.0 1.7 74 10440 
Finland 10 8.2 1.4 74 11490 
Denmark 12 8.4 1.5 76 9910 
Netherlands 10 10.1 1.3 74 11420 
North Germany 11 7.7 1.6 76 16370 
Switzerland 19 7.1 2.2 77 10270 
Iceland 
Muslim      
      
Syria 47 57.0 7.3 64 1680 
Jordan 46 63.0 7.4 64 1710 
Saudi Arabia 42 103.0 7.2 56 12180 
Turkey 35 110.0 5.1 63 1230 
North Yemen 48 154.0 6.8 44 510 
Algeria 45 109.0 7.0 60 2400 
Libya 46 92.0 7.2 58 7500 
 Reynolds (1991) compares the 
demographic characteristics of a series of 
Protestant and Muslim countries (fig. 6-8). 
These demonstrate that at least in some 
Muslim countries both fertility and infant 
mortality are much higher than in at least 
some Protestant countries. In contrast, 
Protestant countries have a much higher 
life expectancy and gross national product 
per capita. The implication is that the patterns of ethical prescriptions that are popular in 
both groups of countries can be understood from their respective ecological contexts. In the 
words of Reynolds: 
Morocco 41 99.0 5.9 58 750 
Tunisia 33 85.0 4.9 61 1290 
 
Birthr = crude birth rate per 1000 members of population; InfMor = 
Infant mortality rate per 1000 live births; _Fert = total fertility rate, 
average number of offspring per woman; lifee = life expectancy at 
birth; Prod$ = Gross national product per capita in US$. 
Table 6-8. Demographic characteristics of 
selected protestant and muslim countries. World 
Population Data Sheet, according to Reynolds, 1991. 
 
 According to our hypothesis, ecological differences give rise to different 
levels of confidence in the ability to survive, rear children, and solve the 
family's needs for food and other basic resources. Ecological conditions give 
rise to different perceptions. It is the perceived level of unpredictability of 
the environment that determines family size, that is, how many children they 
think they are going to be likely to lose through death and disaster (Reynolds, 
1991: 213). 
 
Of course, these data prove nothing to someone who does not have other theoretical reasons 
to suspect that religious beliefs reflect particular subjective needs. Much more research is 
needed to test the ideas of Reynolds and Tanner and it is likely that a more complex picture 
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will arise. At this point, however, the burden of proof may already lie with those rejecting 
the idea that religious rules may assist individuals in making decisions which are relevant 
for their reproductive careers. At the same time, it is clear that there is no simple linear 
causality involved. If there is a relationship between religious beliefs and reproductive 
attitudes individuals may learn from their surrounding culture as long as this is adequate, 
but will probably change their religious belief if their reproductive needs require this. 
 Genetic and racial bases of different strategies. Of course, in principle differences 
between cultures need not to be entirely non-genetic. The Canadian psychologist Philippe 
Rushton (1990; 1997) claims that individuals from different groups, societies or races 
embody a stronger innate tendency to adopt one or the other strategy. He claims to have 
shown in one study that mothers of dizygotic twins who represent a more r strategy 
compared to mothers of singletons (who represent a more K strategy), had "on average a 
lower age of menarche, a shorter menstrual cycle, a higher number of marriages, a higher 
rate of coitus, a greater fecundity, more miscarriages, an earlier menopause, and a higher 
mortality rate". It is, then, not unreasonable to postulate also that different lineages of 
humans, because they have evolved in regions of the world with different climatological 
conditions, tend to different positions on the r/K continuum. According to Rushton 
Mongoloids are more K selected than are Caucasoids, who in turn are, on average, more K 
selected than Negroids. He cites a study which shows that Mongoloids have about 4 
dizygotic twins per 1,000 births, Caucasoids 8, and Negroids 16. He claims that there are 
over 60 different variables in which Caucasoids consistently average between Mongoloids 
and Negroids and that many of them are linked to positions on the r/K continuum, including 
brain size (Mongoloids, 1,448; Caucasoids, 1,408; Negroids, 1,334) and size of sex organs 
(Silverman, 1990; Rushton, 1990; 1997). 
 Because Rushton does not hesitate to use highly `political sensitive data' (like racial 
differences in IQ and criminal activity) to support his claims, many sociobiologists feel very 
uneasy about Rushton's claims. Most of them being `Darwinian lefts' (Singer, 2000), they 
feel that it would be a pity if sociobiology became associated with conservative prejudices. 
On the other hand, from an evolutionary perspective it would be unlikely if human 
populations were entirely homogenous, even if they would have a common origin of only 
200.000 years. It is to be expected that different human groups embody different positions 
on the r/K continuum, both at the levels of genes and at the level of beliefs. It should be 
stressed also that these two levels are often reinforcing one another. If one position on the 
r/K continuum has been rewarded in some region during many generations, it is both 
plausible that cultural prescriptions have been influenced in one direction and that 
individuals with the right natural tendencies have been increasing. It should be stressed, 
however, that differences within populations could still be both greater and more important 
than differences between populations. Rushton's claims, even if they are methodologically 
sound, are still based on statistical averages, but those same averages can become dangerous 
prejudices if they are blindly applicated to individuals. 
 Conclusion. In all, there are good reasons to believe that humans, like many 
organisms are adapted to a particular position on the r/K continuum of possible reproductive 
strategies and that humans, like some organism, are able to adjust their position somewhat 
to the environment in which they find themselves. Individual human beings are unique as a 
result of meiosis; and it is more than likely that each individual embodies a particular 
strategy has implications for his position on the r/K continuum. Above that, there are 
promising theories which posit that the flexible human personality structure may have 
evolved to adjust individuals to the world in which they find themselves, especially to some 
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of its ecological, economic and demographic variables. 
 Because cultures consist of large numbers of individuals which share many of these 
variables, cultures are likely to reflect the choices of large numbers of individuals. Because 
individuals that fit in naturally in the culture in which they find themselves have an 
advantage over other individuals, a certain degree of gene-culture coevolution may have 
reinforced the genetic tendencies which underlay elements of particular cultures. It would 
not be surprising, thus, to find particular gene-combinations more often in one culture than 
in another culture; nor to find that they in part determine the nature of that culture. This does 
not mean they are completely `genetically determined'; only that a gene-free or gene-
transcending culture does not exist. 
 
6.4 STUDY 3: POPULATION SIZE AND MORALISTIC ATTITUDES 
Until now we have studied two examples of external ecological conditions on the structure 
of cultures. An interesting question is whether there are also effects resulting from the sheer 
size of a society on the type of culture that it is producing - of course mediated by particular 
natural or instinctive reactions of each individual apart. Although there is only a limited 
collection of literature on this subject on which I can `build a strong case', it is too important 
to neglect it. For sociobiologists the causes and effects of groups of different sizes are 
fundamental, because to them groups of individuals and especially societies are in need of 
an explanation. Why would individuals live together? Is each group essentially a `selfish 
herd' (Hamilton, 1971) kept only together as a result of a common fear? Thus, I will simply 
present some of the theoretical views on this subject and an example of research that in my 
view supports some of these views. 
 We have seen that small family groups are postulated to be bound together by 
common interests emerging from shared genes; yet, in many groups individuals are not 
close kin. Why do fish form schools, deer herds, wolves packs, birds flocks, mosquitos 
swarms? As I have hopefully explained clearly in chapter 3, a common fear for predators is 
often the ultimate cause (this goes for many fish, for deer, many birds). Often there is also 
the need of a meeting place to find partners (mosquitos) and sometimes individuals are able 
to catch prey together which they would otherwise miss (wolves). Especially in the last case 
and in intelligent animals cooperation or reciprocal altruism can evolve; individuals are then 
bound together by an intelligent play of giving and receiving and a series of common 
interests which do not simply arise out of shared genes. 
 Of course, human culture could only arise, because humans are extremely social 
animals. To a sociobiologist the question `What kind of sociality binds humans together' 
becomes fundamental, because he expects this kind of sociality to have consequences. In 
our own modern, extremely technological societies we are so completely mutually 
dependent that the original causes of our togetherness are hidden under a thick carpet of 
additional advantages. Small sized hunter-gatherer societies do probably better reveal why 
humans live together: in the first place they hunt and gather together. Yet, this can not be 
the only reason that humans live together. Because group sizes in humans are bigger than 
would be required purely for hunting efficiency, Alexander and others have postulated that 
humans form groups also to be safer against enemy groups (e.g. Alexander, 1979, 1987, 
1990; see part III). This means that human sociality is not fully explained by kin and 
reciprocal altruism theory, but that there is a `selfish herd' effect that drives humans together 
in groups in which many individuals do not know each other personally any more. 
 As explained in chapter 4, reciprocal altruism-theory can be stretched a little. If the 
cooperation between two individuals is monitored by a third one, each individual's `moral 
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status' starts to matter, that is: it becomes important what this third individual thinks about 
the first and second person's attitude, reliability, fairness, etc.. Humans attach a lot of 
importance to what others think about them; apparently this enables them also to live 
together peacefully in groups in which most individuals do not know each other. Individuals 
who transgress the rules that make us feel comfortable and safe even with strangers are 
punished, partly because they are a danger to the very foundation of our society. At least, if 
they are unmasked, they lose their attractivity as cooperators. Thus, the theory of `indirect 
reciprocity' predicts that humans always will do their best to seem absolutely reliable and 
fair while doing their best at the same time to unmask others that do the same. 
 According to this line of reasoning human sociality is a mixed bag. Kinship and pure 
reciprocal altruism play a role, but because we are driven together into a `selfish herd' in 
which it is relatively safe, given the danger of hostile neighboring groups, we are 
paradoxically forced to cooperate with many strangers to combat the enemy within our own 
society, the virus of parasitism. As long as we reap the benefits of living together we are 
inclined to stress our mutual interests and our common good and bad; the moment we feel 
exploited or harmed by our society we can become cynical and parasitical minded 
ourselves. On the whole it will be the successful group of powerful individuals that will 
stress cooperation, because they profit most from it; and it will be the `losers', those who do 
not succeed in establishing a powerful position in society that will be inclined to develop a 
cynical attitude towards this cooperation (we have analyzed this already in terms of r and K 
selection). 
 All this is not completely speculative. There is a lot of research that confirms the 
impression and theoretical expectation that humans are very much preoccupied with the 
reliability of their social and sexual partners. The evolutionary psychologists Leda 
Cosmides and John Tooby (which we met already in chapter 4.4 as reinventers of the notion 
evolutionary psychology) have even tried to prove with psychological experiments that 
humans have a cheater-detection module which enables them to understand complex social 
contracts much better than their purely logical analogues (Cosmides & Tooby, 1992). Less 
than 25% of the people exposed to a Modus ponens in an unfamiliar relation were able to 
use it correctly, while this performance raised to about 75% when it was required to analyze 
a situation in which the possibility of cheating played a role, for example the situation of a 
bar-owner who has to decide who violates the rule "If a person is drinking beer, the he must 
be over 20 years old" (If p, then q; The bar owner has to control to be suspicious about p 
and not-q and can neglect not-p and q). Their investigations show at least that we are often 
much better in understanding social relations then in understanding purely abstract logical 
relations. 
 Because humans are apes with language, they have found ways to express their 
attitudes and to manipulate each other's attitudes through language. Moral language with its 
pushs and pulls, goods and bads, with its referral to a `free will', to responsibility and to the 
rewards of a good life (a heaven or simply a meaningful life) seems thus to bind societies 
together. In fact, one could even speculate that moral language really is a language about 
something, a common good, as an emergent virtual property which grows out of the mutual 
interests of a group of cooperating individuals (fig. 4-9). Morality can then be seen as an 
`emergent' `holistic' `network' property that arises out of the cooperation of a large number 
of direct and indirect reciprocal altruists that together can increase their `utility space', but at 
the same time still are competitors in demanding their part of the booty (Slurink, 1989; 
1994; 2000). 
  Yet, on the basis of evolutionary theory it is easy to predict that the size of such 
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moralistic networks matters enormously. One sociobiological theory and one mixed 
sociological-sociobiological theory both predict that moralistic networks become 
substantially weaker with an increasing group size: kinship theory and the theory of social 
control. Kinship theory enables us to predict that small groups with many relatives will be 
characterized by more pure altruism than the theory of reciprocal altruism alone can predict. 
Because kinship and reciprocal altruism can reinforce one another, it can be predicted that 
moralistic networks will become weaker the moment that groups are larger and contain less 
relatives. 
 The notion of social control, which was used often by the Chicago sociologist 
Robert E. Park (Coser, 1977), but became also part of our common language, seems to 
imply that cooperation will decrease with an increase of group size, as a result of decreasing 
opportunities for continued mutual monitoring. Social control constitutes a kind of virtual 
`supervision' of the cooperation between reciprocal altruistic parties as they can be 
represented with the iterated prisoners dilemma (Axelrod, 1981). The notion fits well into 
the theory of indirect reciprocal altruism (Alexander, 1987), which also predicts that 
cooperation will decrease in larger, more anonymous societies. According to Alexander 
morality arose in the human species largely to enable individuals to live in larger groups 
which were necessary as a defense against other human groups. 
 As we saw in chapter 4, Robert Trivers has pointed to the possibility that a series of 
Freudian concepts like the id and the super-ego constitute internal representations of the two 
parties in the parent-offspring conflict between which the ego has to manoeuvre (Trivers, 
1985: 163). Id (as pure self-interest) and super-ego can also be said to represent the two 
parties in the moral systems emerging from a society of indirect reciprocal altruists, each 
individual's super-ego representing the common good and the requirements posed by it on 
the individual (Badcock, 1986). 
 The idea of a God which monitors an individual's intentions from above (`Thou who 
has tested my heart and kidneys', Ps. 7: 10), seems to be an almost ideal way of imprinting 
such an super-ego in the minds of a people, and thus to jack up the general level of 
cooperation. In contrast to the Platonic idea of the Good, Kantian Duty or the Greatest 
Happiness Principle advocated by the utilitarianists, a personal God which bears 
resemblances to a real father, leader or sage, although being completely fictional, may instill 
real feelings of respect or fear (`the fear of the Lord') and may command a moral attitude in 
individuals who would otherwise mistrust the moral demands of real-world authorities or 
would be indifferent to purely abstract commands. (As Tooby and Cosmides saw, humans 
are better in understanding social relations than purely abstract relations.) 
 Such a non-human God has also the advantage of being perfect or at least non-
partial. Whereas moral rules which are dictated by human leaders could in principle be 
suspected to reflect their personal interests, moral rules which descend from heaven, 
whether inscribed into stone tables or descending via divine inspiration in the words of a 
prophet, may be impartial without being dull and non-convincing like Kant's categorical 
imperative. Raised in a very protestant family, I have been speculating about such issues 
already for a long time: 
 
 Human nature, like that of other primates, consists of a relatively large 
collection of innate reaction patterns which enable interpersonal 
relationships. Charismatic leaders or shamans used those innate reaction 
patterns to breathe life into `collective fantasies' which would inspire other 
group members to devotion towards common ideals. They had thus to 
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provide the collective fantasies with properties (key stimuli) which would 
evoke a mood of submissiveness or ardent devotion. Therefore they created 
Gods which would pre-eminently bind human attention and which would 
arouse feelings between fear and wonder in the believers. The gods had to 
generate the same feelings which in a group of apes are evoked by dominant 
individuals in their `subordinates'. Sometimes they had to make people 
shake, but sometimes they also had to be long-suffering and sensible to 
ardent prayers. Never should their behavior be predictable and their authority 
had to be indisputable and taboo (Slurink, 1986: 36). 
 
I found a similar approach to religion in a lucid argument by the Dutch sociologist Frans 
Roes: 
 
 High gods do not compete with humans for resources, and they seem free of 
self-interest. For these reasons, moral rules serving the collective interests of 
the members of a society, and proposed by high gods, are more likely to be 
accepted than similar rules proposed by human individuals (Roes, 1995: 74). 
 
If this is true, however, and if larger societies have more problems coping with the problem 
of evil or internal parasitism, one would expect larger societies to belief more often in high 
gods producing impartial moral rules than smaller societies. It is here that Roes has offered 
an important  contribution. He has tried to show that the relationship between high gods 
which are supportive of human morality and the size of societies can be tested using 
Murdock and White's Ethnographic Atlas (1986). Because the Ethnographic Atlas has a 
variable called `high gods' about which is even noted whether they are `supportive of human 
morality' or not, it is relatively easy to get quantitative data on the belief in high gods 
supportive of human morality. Strangely enough, it is somewhat harder to get data on the 
sizes of such societies, but by combining six variables (less dependence upon 1. gathering 2. 
hunting and 3. fishing; 4. more intense cultivation, 5. more permanent settlements, 6. larger 
mean size of local communities), Roes constructed a reliable variable. This variable `society 
size' showed a .4987 correlation with the variable `high gods'. A graphical representation 
was possible by defining 14 values for the variable `society size' and showing the 
correlating percentage of those societies believing in high gods. I have redrawn Roes' figure 
in figure 6-6. (Roes shows that this correlation is not an artifact of regional differences; he 
also discusses the influence of stratification. For details, see Roes, 1995.) 
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 One can, of course, 
criticize Roes, because his 
correlation could simply be the 
result of the relatively large 
influence of monotheistic systems 
in large, literate societies (Hans 
van der Dennen, pers. comm.). It 
is true that some relatively large 
societies, like India and historical 
Egypt and Greece, are/were 
characterized by polytheistic 
systems (in the words of the social 
philosopher Voegelin these social 
system were of the `cosmological 
model'). Yet, one could argue that 
these societies are in fact loosely 
organized conglomerates of 
smaller units that all have their 
own favorite cults. Perhaps the 
point is that large societies, the moment that they become more united and organized, 
simply need a unifying deity (think of the roman empire that at some point turned into a 
christian empire). Thus one could still defend Roes, although more studies are clearly 
needed. 
 
Fig. 6-5. Belief in High Gods Supportive of Human Morality by 
Society Size. Redrawn after Roes, 1995. 
 For our purposes the ideas of Roes are important because it shows how something as 
`personal' and as cultural as the belief in a high god can be linked through ecological 
variables to elements inherent in human nature. Of course, as we have seen in 6.3, there are 
also other variables which are reflected in a particular religion. Above that, just as 
phylogenetic inertia' (Wilson, 1975) plays a role in ordinary evolution, it does so in cultural 
evolution. Gods evolve and the landscape to which they have to adapt are the needs of the 
people that change from generation to generation. Yet, it are exactly those needs which can 
be partially predicted by applying some simple behavioral ecological laws. 
 This example can also be used to show the inadequacy of pure `selfish meme' theory, 
according to which memes are `replicators that compete to get copied for their own sake' 
(Blackmore, 2000). Of course, there has been going on variation and selection of deity-
memes all the time since prehistoric times. The question is, however, whether this explains 
the evolution of gods, angels, devils and other virtual creatures and `memes'. To understand 
this evolution one has to discover the function of those memes and the landscape to which 
they are adapted. One also has to understand how and why they were manufactured and 
manipulated at least partially intentionally. That is, they are not products of purely 
accidental mutations that were subsequently sieved out by selection; they do not compete to 
get copied for their own sake; they were designed somehow to instill particular feelings. 
Probably they were designed by a series of relatively clever or even wise leaders and 
prophets on the basis of an intuitive understanding of human nature. Thus, they are not self-
serving `selfish memes' but efficiently constructed mind viruses at least partially serving the 
interests and hopes of their creators. 
 
6.5 CULTURE IN ITS ECOLOGICAL CONTEXT 
Hopefully, these three examples demonstrate sufficiently that culture is not created ex nihilo 
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outside any ecological context. Of course, creators of culture, like prophets and poets, have 
their own idiosyncratic visions and phantasies, but these will be neglected if nobody needs 
these somehow. Prophets and poets who somehow know how to touch a sensitive chord in 
their public are cherished, because they apparently offer something which their public needs 
for its own purposes. Without people needing guidance, inspiration, and justification, 
prophets and poets would have no power at all and would, indeed, remain voices crying in 
the wilderness. Of course, the relationship between cultural leaders and the people that they 
lead is also determined by the amount of power of those leaders and by their talents in 
convincing, negotiating, manipulating and advertising their to some extent completely 
sincere preparedness to serve. From a sociobiological point of view one would expect a lot 
of  mutual deception between leaders and followers, between the creators and consumers of 
ideas, especially if one assumes that group selection was not a strong force during human 
evolution. 
 If my examples in this chapter are well-chosen, however, both creators and 
consumers have an interest in cultural ideas, forms and customs that make sense given the 
ecological situation of a particular culture. In figure 4-9 we could introduce a third 
dimension, which would show that any morality-loaded world-interpretation is not only a 
compromise between the interests of the group and the individual, but is also dependent on 
the means of support and the ecology within a particular society. As we have seen, some 
ecological situations promote monogamy, other ecological situations enable some 
individuals to indulge in their polygamic desires. Some ecological situations stimulate 
people to have many children, others inspire them to have relatively few of them. People 
living in relatively large societies have more reason to be moralistic than people in smaller 
societies. Human behavior and culture is influenced by the ecological context at almost all 
levels. 
 
6.6 WHY DO SOME APES NEED CULTURE? 
In chapter 5 I have stressed biological conflicts of interests within societies as motors of 
cultural change and culture as the medium in which humans compete with one another. In 
this chapter I have shown how culture enables humans to adapt to different ecological 
situations. We end up with a picture of culture as a biological phenomenon at many levels. 
On the one hand culture is a weapon which we use to compete with other humans, both at 
the level of groups and at the level of individuals; at the other hand culture enables us to 
adapt our relatively flexible collection of instincts to a way of live which makes sense given 
a particular ecology. Taken together, these two approaches make us suspect that cultures 
reflect a large number of individual creations rather than collective projects designed by 
groups purely for the welfare of the group. Cultures will always reflect the conflict of 
interest that exist between collective and individual interests, between mutual and 
incompatible interests, as shown in figure 4-9. Within the sociobiological approach the 
fundamental antithesis is thus not the opposition between `nature' (or `biology') and 
`culture', but rather the opposition between individual and group interests as these are 
reflected in culture. 
 Yet, even if we would all agree that `culture' should not be conceptualized in 
opposition to `biology' or `nature' and even if we agree that many animals have forms of 
culture, there still remains an enormous gap between most animals and man, the only animal 
that seems to be completely dependent on culture in all aspects of its life. Why are humans 
standing apart in being dependent on this kind of life? Why would some apes, ancestral to 
man, have started increasingly to create and use culture? Within an evolutionary perspective 
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is seems still strange why something like culture can ever have been evolving. 
 In chapter 5 I have suggested that intelligence and cultural abilities could have been 
the product of some sort of arms races. Yet, it is still unclear how these arms races have 
started. Above that, culture is characterized by a lot of apparent `useless' phenomena. How 
should we explain these? Of course, it would be ideal if it proved to be possible to 
understand the series of selection pressures that gave rise to man as distinct from 
chimpanzees. In part III I will investigate this possibility. 
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  III  
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  *** A unique evolutionary 
trajectory \\  
 
In part II I have shown that the traditional disjunction between `nature' and `culture' is too 
simplistic. Human culture does not transcend the `struggle for life', it is simply another way 
in which this struggle is fought. Different cultural expressions can be ways in which 
individuals demonstrate their fitness, including their superior senses, skills and mental 
abilities. At the same time, cultural systems often represent adjustments to particular 
environments. Ecologically flexible as humans are, they can often profit from cultural 
traditions (from clothing to ethical prescripts) to cope with particular environments. 
 Thus, human culture does not make humans unique in the sense that humans, and 
humans alone, are able to transcend their evolutionary roots. If humans are considered 
unique they have to be unique for some other reason, for example, because their unique 
evolutionary trajectory has bred unparalled capacities in them. Part III is an attempt to 
explain human uniqueness with reference to a unique evolutionary trajectory which worked 
as an `ecological recipe for a bipedal predator ape which has grown completely dependent 
on language and culture'. 
 Chapter 7 starts by criticizing a series of attempts to define our human uniqueness. 
Several characteristics that were thought to be uniquely human have been demonstrated in 
other species. Instead of trying to point to one uniquely human trait I try to show that it is a 
combination of traits which is uniquely human. Those traits have not evolved at the same 
time, but have been acquired during several evolutionary episodes. I try to explain them 
with reference to the specific selection pressures which play a dominant role during these 
episodes. Together they cumulatively molded the human animal with its bipedal gait, its 
unique family system and its complete dependence on language and culture. 
 One of the results of chapter 7 is that climatic change plays a dominant role in 
human evolution. Climatological circumstances changed the habitats in which our 
ancestors lived and favored those that walked upright and that relied on meat as an extra 
ingredient to their diet. A transition to a more carnivorous diet could explain a series of 
human characteristics, including the altriciality of human infants and other aspects of the 
human mating system. Yet, given the fact that there are other large predators that are not as 
dependent on language and culture as humans, it remains uncertain whether the hunting 
hypothesis explains other characteristics of the human social and ecological/economic 
system. Are additional hypotheses needed to explain our elaborate language and our 
extreme cultural flexibility? 
 In chapter 8, I compare the hunting hypothesis with two other hypotheses, sexual 
selection theory and the intergroup competition hypothesis. Both these theories stress that 
there is really something unique about human cognitive and moral capacities. These unique 
properties must be explained as results of a kind of `runaway selection', because it seems 
that they have developed to such a degree that a purely ecological explanation is 
insufficient. While sexual selection theory sees the exaggerated cognitive possibilities 
offered by the human brain as a kind of `fitness indicators', evolved to seduce the opposite 
sex, intergroup competition theory places them within the context of arms races between 
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groups in which groups as teams needed and favored loyal and intelligent members. Of 
course, the question is why this arms race has not occurred in other species. Alexander 
postulates that this arms race started because our ancestors at some time became 
`ecological dominant'. Ecological dominance would have diminished the effects of 
`extrinsic' forces of natural selection such that within-species intergroup competition 
increased. 
 One of the results of chapter 8 is that both the sexual selection theory and the 
intergroup competition theory presuppose a version of the hunting theory and that all three 
theories may refer to aspects of the same process. Only because early hominids were at 
times dependent on the extra calories offered by meat, a division of labor could evolve in 
which some paternal investment could become necessary, as a result of which the moral and 
intellectual capacities of sexual partners started to matter more and more. Only because 
early hominids became at some time became very fierce group hunters could they become a 
threat to other groups of their own species, which forced them to become even better and 
more cunning cooperators, dedicated to their own group's well-being. 
 In all, some readers may well accuse me of being eclectic and indecisive, because I 
try to integrate all attractive theories in an overarching hypothesis. Yet, it seems to me that 
many theories try to isolate only one causal factor and ascribe too much power to it. Like it 
or not, we live in a complex, multicausal world, being part of all kinds of multicausal 
processes. Although many would prefer a theory in which human evolution resulted from 
one powerful causal mechanism it seems that in reality several mechanisms worked 
together. If this is true, human evolution is a coincidence, the result of an accidental 
combination of contingencies. In that case the chances that we will ever find a similar 
species somewhere in the universe will be very small indeed, even if we continue to find 
other planets in other galaxies which are not too close and not too far from their stars. 
7  
  *** Why some apes became 
humans: ecological and 
climatological factors \ 
 
7.1. INTRODUCTION 
Philosophers have long believed that man is in some respect a unique species. This belief 
has seduced them often to reflections which are somewhat comical in hindsight. Often these 
reflections show more love for dichotomies and `speciïstic' (Dawkins, 1976) distinctions 
than real self-knowledge. So we read in a paper about `Die aufrechte Haltung' or `the 
upright attitude' the following sentences: 
 
Ein Tier, das sich in der Längsachse seines Körpers fortbewegt, ist immer auf die 
Dinge zugerichtet. Der Mensch aber, der sich in einer Richtung senkrecht 
zu seiner eigenen Längsachse vorwärts bewegt, den aufgerichteten Körper 
parallel zu sich selbst verschiebend, findet sich allen Dingen einsam 
gegenüber (Straus, 1949: 370).1
 
The writer seems to have forgotten that already many dinosaurs were walking upright 
(bipedal) and that their modern descendants, the birds, do the same, as do kangaroos, while 
there is little evidence in all these groups of an ability to objectivity and critical distance 
toward the world that surrounds them. Would kangaroos display more objectivity than, for 
example, deer, that outside Australia occupy the same kind of niche? 
 In the course of its still short history, ethology has often revealed the superficiality 
of such easy characterizations of our own supposed uniquenesses. Ethologists have 
discovered that man is not the only animal that makes tools and has complex social relations 
and commitments, that has belligerent inclinations, that recognizes itself in front of a mirror, 
and that can use symbols. This did not, however, stop the stream of claims about man's 
uniqueness. Revisionists are always very inventive in devising new versions. For example, 
now that linguists can no longer deny that at least some animals are able to understand 
symbols, they have shifted their attention to the ability to structure meaningful utterances by 
means of some kind of grammar (Bickerton, 1990). About the same time that this new 
essential human characteristic was proposed, reports began to appear about the linguistic 
capabilities of Kanzi, a bonobo brought up by Savage-Rumbaugh, who can discriminate 
between sentences on the basis of word-order (e.g. Greenfield & Savage-Rumbaugh, 1990). 
Also, the equally surprising linguistic skills of a series of dolphins trained by Herman 
(Herman, 1984) and those of Alex, a grey parrot trained by Pepperberg, began to get public 
attention (Pepperberg, 1990; Vauclair, 1996). This should warn us that we cannot be 
cautious enough in making claims about our uniqueness. Of course, we are the only animal 
                                                 
1 "An animal that moves itself along the longitudinal axis of its body is always directed 
towards the objects. Man, however, who moves himself at right angles to his longitudinal axis, 
displacing the upright body parallel to himself, finds himself facing all things in solitude." 
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devising nuclear arms, making interplanetary excursions, and disturbing whole ecosystems 
and climates, but some other animals display certainly rudiments of the talents required. 
 However, the fact that several characteristics of humans are more or less exhibited 
by other animals throws up the question why we are the only ones who exhibit them to such 
a degree. Many other animals show culture or the non-genetic passing on of information 
between successive generations (Bonner, 1980), but we have built cultures around every 
individual biological function of our body, be it feeding, sexuality, sleep, stools, cleaning, 
etc.. Above that we have built cultures around every individual social interaction, be it 
parent-offspring relations, friendships, or relationships between the sexes. Many other 
animals more or less create their own environment by building nests or even by building 
dikes (think of beavers), but no other animal lives so continuously in a self-created 
environment that can be adapted continually to the caprices of climate and seasonality. 
Many other animals have complicated communication systems, but very few of them rely so 
totally upon them as we humans do. 
 From our arrogant man-centered perspective it may seem as if our capabilities to 
create culture and to live in a self-created environment are inevitable products of evolution. 
Looking back on the course of evolution we see a gradual increase of representational 
capacities. The linguist Bickerton did repeat the old belief: 
 
 As long as there are creatures whose motor capacities and environmental 
conditions allow them to benefit from it, evolution will always favor an 
increment in representational power ... Thus, given freedom from 
catastrophe and sufficient time to work in, normal evolutionary processes 
inevitably bring about the progressive development of representational 
systems... If no catastrophe had eliminated them, then fifty million years 
ago there might already have been three-toed lizardlike creatures sitting 
around wondering how language could have evolved out of dinosaur 
communication (1990: 103-4). 
 
There are three things that Bickerton doesn't mention, however. First, there are many taxa 
and only in some of them can we indicate cognitive progress. Second, there are many 
indications that there has not only been one, but many catastrophes during the process of 
evolution on earth (Muller, 1989) and it could well be that they were not obstacles but 
necessary conditions for further evolution - given the conservative way in which niches are 
filled during the more stable periods. Third, cognitive progress is not a goal in itself, but 
only the consequence of the temporary survival value of cognition. The moment stupidity 
would bestow more fitness upon its possessors, stupidity would be selected for. There is no 
guarantee that the most intelligent individuals will always outreproduce the lesser ones. (At 
least among human beings we see that many famous philosophers and scientists died 
childless.)  
 Representational progress or progress in the direction of culture is thus not an 
inevitable consequence of the process of variation and selection which Darwin originally 
called `descent with modification' and which we are accustomed to call `evolution'. Many 
animals manage quite well to live without extraordinary intelligence or without 
extraordinary communicative, reflective or cultural skills and only a series of special 
selection pressures may be able to explain why we humans have evolved such an excessive 
curiosity, creativity and reliance on culture. Let us examine, then, whether we can explain 
why man is apparently the only animal on this planet that seems to be totally trapped in `the 
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cognitive niche' (Tooby & DeVore, 1987) or, better, the `cognitive-technological niche'. To 
explain this, we will need a scenario about our evolution, in short an `evolutionario' 
(Wrangham, 1987). But as there exist evolutionarios of all sorts and varieties, many of 
which are ridiculized by critics as paleofiction and `just-so stories', we have good reason to 
impose some extra demands upon our own favorite: 
1. First, it should be phylogenetically plausible - that is: it should be in concert with 
our best present knowledge about the possible characteristics of the common 
ancestor of both ourselves and the great apes that are most related to us. 
2. Second, it should be paleontologically/paleoclimatologically adequate - that is: it 
should be at least compatible with our best knowledge concerning the 
paleontological record and concerning paleoclimates and palaeoenvironments. 
3. Third, it should be evolutionary feasible - that is: compatible with our best current 
understanding of the principles of evolutionary biology. 
4. Fourth, it must exhibit explanatory specificity - that is: it should not have the 
characteristics of an easy explanatory deus ex machina that could also be invoked 
to explain, for example, why wolves or dolphins are dependent on culture, whereas 
in fact they exhibit culture only to a limited degree. It should explain not only why 
humans have become completely dependent on culture, but at the same time 
explain why other animals did in fact not. 
One of the ideas behind these requirements is that evolution is not a creative process in 
which `Dieu se fait' as Bergson thought (Bergson, 1907). Evolution does not have goals and 
it does not experimentate on purpose. Design reflects the past, not the future. Each species 
that exists has already been tested and proven to be `evolutionary stable': it has already 
shown to be reproducible under particular circumstances. Of course, it can be perfected, but 
radical changes are unlikely to spread through a population that is already stable and 
healthy. New species do often arise as a consequence of the reproductive isolation of small 
subpopulations enduring different circumstances, as is demonstrated, for example, by 
varieties of plant species in different isolated areas of the Alps. Evolution is thus to some 
extent driven by the environment, as postulated by Vrba in her socalled `turnover pulse 
hypothesis' (Vrba et al., 1995): 
 
 Evolution is normally conservative and speciation does not occur unless 
forced by changes in the physical environment. Similarly, forcing by the 
physical environment is required to produce extinctions and most 
migration events. Thus, most lineage turnover in the history of life has 
occurred in pulses, nearly synchronous across diverse groups of 
organisms, and in predictable synchrony with changes in the physical 
environment (Vrba, 1985, cited in Vrba et al., 1995) 
 
Of course, this idea (see also figure 0-1) is important also, because it may constitute, 
together with our four requirements, the difference between a well-based evolutionario and 
another fanciful just-so story. 
 Let us start working with our four requirements, then. First, to make a 
phylogenetically plausible model we have to begin with a reconstruction of a possible 
common ancestor that we share with the great apes that are most related to us. After that we 
will have to look at what we can learn from paleontology and paleoclimatology about the 
environments in which human evolution occurred. With those clues in hand we can begin to 
reconstruct an evolutionary sequence in which human characteristics emerged. To meet our 
third requirement we will try to account for the story of human evolution as a multi-stage 
process in which each step is adaptive in its own right. Finally, it is important that our 
explanation specifically applies only to our branch on the evolutionary tree, because the 
riddle that we will try to solve is the riddle of our own unique complete dependence on 
culture. When our explanation presupposes the evolutionary inevitability of cognitive 
progress the price we would have paid for it would have been too high: we would then have 
to explain why other animals did not reach our stage (and drop requirement 4). 
 Finally, an evolutionary approach opens our eyes for the fact that the present 
constitutes only a tiny slice of time. The earth is always in motion and that thin layer of life 
to which we owe our temporary existence reflects all kinds of geological and climatological 
forces. There have been much more species in the past than those that currently exist. For 
primates the total number of species has been estimated 6000, of which only 180 exist today 
(Foley, 1992). For hominids the total number of species is about 17, of which only one 
survives today. 
 
7.2. PERSONALITY TRAITS OF THE COMMON HUCHIBO ANCESTOR 
During the Miocene (23.3-5.2 myr ago) tropical forests stretched from Beijing to Madrid 
and from Paris to Johannesburg, long before these cities arose. A lot of fossil apes or 
homonoids from this period have been found, for example Proconsul, which may give a 
fairly good idea of the ancestor of all apes and humans, and Sivapithecus which was 
formerly considered a possible ancestor of the Australopithecines, but is now viewed as an 
ancestor of orang-utans. The evolution of hominids (all species of Australopithecus and 
Homo) is now considered to be a largely African event: biomolecular studies show that 
humans are closer to African apes than to Asian apes (fig. 7-1). There are good reasons to 
suppose that the evolution of hominids was put in motion by climatological changes that 
started to make the forests smaller and large parts of Africa dryer and cooler during the late 
Miocene. 
 The gorilla seems to have split 
from our lineage about 8 to 10 million 
years ago. A plausible explanation of its 
evolution was put forward by Boaz 
(1997) on the basis of its present 
occurrence in three isolated populations 
in mountain-forests. When the climate 
became cooler and dryer during the late 
Miocene, savannas started to spread 
through Africa and protogorillas became 
isolated in their mountain-forests, unable 
to cross the savanna. The fact that the 
three populations represent three 
subspecies of gorillas shows that there 
were periods in which the isolated 
populations still interbred. 
 
 
Fig. 7-1. Cladogram with dates for the 
divergence of homonoid lineages obtained from DNA 
hybridisation and from fossils (changed after Sibley, 
1992). 
 Ethologists (especially primatologists) have speculated a lot about the evolution of 
the social structures of the great apes and human ancestors and on the basis of their 
inferences at least something can be said about the possible `personality' of the common 
ancestor (e.g. Kinzey (ed.), 1987; De Waal (ed.), 2001). Wrangham (1986) first 
concentrated on the resemblances in social structures between the African apes and humans, 
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because the molecular data suggested their relative relatedness. From the correspondences 
in the behavioral repertoire of these species he concluded that the common ancestor of all 
African apes and humans 
 
 had closed social networks, hostile and male-dominated intergroup 
relationships with stalk-and-attack interactions, female exogamy and no 
alliance bonds between females, and males having sexual relationships 
with more than one female (Wrangham, 1986: 68). 
 
Ghiglieri (1987) showed that it was still possible to improve upon this model by 
concentrating on the resemblances between chimpanzees, bonobos and humans, who are 
genetically most related and who may be all post-Miocene phenomena. His analyses show 
that the chimpanzee-bonobo-human clade (the HUCHIBO-clade) is characterized by a 
unique cooperation of closely related males who cooperatively defend a common territory 
and who only exhibit moderate sexual dimorphism, "presumably because success in male-
male competition hinges on having larger group size (of kin-related males) during conflicts 
rather than larger individual size" (Ghiglieri, 1987: 339). 
 The general pattern of hominoid evolution that he reconstructs is the following: 
- Before the split between African and Asian apes, societies were largely structured 
around female kin groups like most primate societies: young subdominant males 
have to leave their native group and to find or found a harem elsewhere. Bonds 
between kin-related females were strongest. This pattern can still be devised 
rudimentary in orang-utans, where females stay close to their mothers and young 
males start to wander and emigrate from their natal ranges looking for estrous 
females and reproductive opportunities. 
- All African apes share traces of a decline of the matriarchal core characteristic of 
other primate-groups: the females in a gorilla harem are generally unrelated to one 
another and female exogamy is more pronounced than male exogamy, because 
some adult males stay in their natal groups. In contrast to the HUCHIBOS, gorillas 
are not territorial, however, and most groups contain only one silverback male, who 
in aggressive encounters has to rely on his extreme body size to defend his harem. 
- Between the common ancestor of gorillas and HUCHIBOS and the common 
ancestor of all HUCHIBOS (a period of more than two million years) a new 
revolution occurred: males stayed in their own natal social groups and kin-related 
males started increasingly to cooperate. This cooperation between males sets 
HUCHIBOS apart from the other great apes: 
 
 Unlike gorillas and orang-utans, males of the chimpanzee-bonobo-human 
clade retain their male offspring predominantly, live in closed social 
groups containing multiple females, mate polygynously, restrict their 
ranging to a communal territory, are cooperatively active in territorial 
defense, and, apparently, when a neighboring community weakens, the 
males of some communities make a concerted strategic effort to stalk, 
attack, and kill their rivals as do men (Ghiglieri, 1987: 346). 
 
According to Ghiglieri it was this propensity for cooperation and solidarity between kin-
related males that could well have been "the critical preadaptation for male cooperation in 
dangerous scavenging or hunting in the hominid ancestor". Above that, the fusion-fission 
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sociality characteristic of HUCHIBOS may have functioned as "a preadaptation for a 
division of labor on a daily basis and a diversification of ecological modes" (Ghiglieri, 
1987: 347). 
 Not everyone agrees with this model, however. Ghiglieri boldly states that bonobos 
and chimpanzees largely fit the same pattern, while it has become clear during the last 
decades that there is a huge difference between bonobos and chimpanzees. It has been 
especially the writings of Frans de Waal in which the bonobo is portrayed as a species that 
makes `love, not war'. Sex is continually used for appeasement in bonobos and is 
completely separated from reproduction. Lethal aggression has thus far not been observed in 
bonobos and, while there is some hostility between groups, peaceful mingling also occurs. 
According to De Waal (2001) the bonobo and the chimpanzee can equally be used as a 
model of the common HUCHIBO-ancestor, and there is thus nothing sure about the 
common ancestor and his aggressive proclivities2. 
 There are good reasons, however, to consider the chimpanzee as the better model 
for the common HUCHIBO-ancestor. They are summarized by Richard Wrangham 
(2001:263-4) thus: 
 
 In many ways gorillas are merely a large version of chimpanzees - for 
example, in their cranial and postcranial anatomy. Bonobos, on the other 
hand, are more gracile, smaller headed, and relatively juvenilized and 
sexualized compared to the other apes. Gorillas are thus more similar to 
chimpanzees than to bonobos, which are at best thought of as a specialized 
offshoot of the gorilla-chimpanzee line. 
 What, then, are we to make of traits shared by bonobos and humans, but 
not by other apes? Examples are a tendency to ventro-ventral copulation, a 
trend toward female-female bonding, and canines that differ little in size 
between females and males. Convergence appears to be responsible for 
these similarities. For example, reduction in sexual dimorphism of canine 
teeth is known to have developed more in later than in earlier australopiths 
(Wrangham, 2001: 263-4.) 
 
According to Wrangham, the pattern of reduced aggression and female dominance in the 
bonobo has evolved after the split between a chimpanzee-like Pan prior and 
Ardipithecus/Australopithecus. This is consistent with the idea that the common 
HUCHIBO-ancestor, or Pan prior, already exhibited retention of males in their natal groups 
and cooperation between males, as it is stressed by Ghiglieri. 
 
2 In a recent paper Stanford (2001) points out that the contrast between bonobos and 
chimpanzees, as painted by de Waal (e.g., 2001) derives largely from a comparison of wild 
chimpanzees with captive bonobos. In bonobos, intercommunity encounters, too, often involve 
aggression, and within the group it often are the females that are `demonic'. Preliminary data on the 
sexuality of wild bonobos even relativize the picture of the bonobo as a hypersexual species. All this 
could well imply that the contrast between chimpanzees and bonobos is not as sharp as postulated by 
De Waal c.s.. The idealization of the bonobo might well fall in the long tradition of the belief in the 
Fall of man which led to the `romanticization' of the unknown societies during millenia and which 
seduces us now to hope that we have at least a related ape which is somewhat friendlier than we are. 
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 It is interesting to speculate about the evolutionary mechanism behind the origin of 
male HUCHIBO-cooperation. What factor could have promoted the transition from male 
exogamy towards female exogamy? First, the social structures of orang-utans is already 
different from other primates. Although it has been found recently that orang-utans are by 
no means solitary (Van Schaik in Bartlett, Boyd & Whiten, 2001), males and females often 
wander separately, because of their differences in size. In orang-utans solitary females and 
their offspring are an easy target for solitary males (see Wrangham, 1986, on rape in orang-
utans). A change to a more abundant food-source (as in the gorilla) may have triggered the 
transition to a one-male group. Instead of being harassed time and again by solitary males, 
females could thus secure themselves the superior genes of a strong male who at the same 
time could defend their offspring against foreign males and the threat of an infanticidal take-
over (infanticide is a well-known phenomenon in gorillas). In a next stage the competition 
of such strong males for harems may have started an arms race in which dominant males 
where forced to rely on the help of kin-related males more and more. In the Virungas 40% 
of gorilla groups contained more than one adult or nearly adult male (Ghiglieri, 1987). It is 
also possible that groups simply had to become larger, because this afforded the necessary 
safety against predators in a more savanna-like environment. Chimpanzees do not always 
live in dense forests and it is also thought that the bonobo has evolved in a not completely 
wooded environment (Boaz, 1997). 
 In any case, we now know something about the common ancestor of all 
HUCHIBOS. Chimpanzees, bonobos and humans share some unique behavioral traits, 
which partially seem to derive from male retention in their natal groups. Chimpanzees are 
known to hunt cooperatively in some regions (Boesch & Boesch, 1989; Stanford, 1999) and 
at least part of their diet consists of meat. There are even reports on scavenging (Hasegawa, 
1983). (Yet, they are not very well in digesting meat; they do not chew it well and 
apparently their guts do not digest it well; Boaz, 1997.) Chimpanzees also engage in 
cooperative intergroup aggression (Goodall, 1986). Finally (and this could be more a 
consequence of their omnivorous diet than of their unique social structure) chimpanzees are 
skilful makers and users of tools (McGrew, 1991; Boesch & Boesch, 1984) who pass on 
their skills in a cultural way: different techniques are applied in different regions (McGrew, 
1992; Whiten & Boesch, 2001). 
 Of course, the common HUCHIBO-ancestor need not to have been identical to the 
chimpanzee. It is unlikely, however, that the reliance on tools and other cultural traditions 
has evolved twice. The really enormous (r)evolutionary transition is that between an 
anthropoid ape towards a human being. We share many ingredients of a cultural way of life 
with the chimpanzee and thus, likely, with the common HUCHIBO-ancestor. The question 
is how those ingredients were molded into a recipe for the totally culture-dependent species 
that we are. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
7.3 AUSTRALOPITHECUS AND THE ORIGIN OF BIPEDALISM 
From what we know about the common 
HUCHIBO-ancestor it would seem that 
the recipe for humans can simply be 
derived by studying paleoenvironments 
and the fossil record (Foley, 1987; Vrba 
et al., 1995; Boaz, 1997). However, it is 
not necessarily that simple. The fossil 
record is very patchy and interrupted 
indeed and, in principle, it is possible 
that the main events in hominid 
evolution have not left any traces or that 
researchers are looking in the wrong 
places. It is well possible that human 
evolution resembles in this respect the 
origin of life: it could also be a transition 
that has wiped out its own traces. 
Although spectacular finds are again and 
again filling in major gaps in the human evolutionary story - the last decade the finds of 
Ardipithecus (White et al., 1994, 1995), Australopithecus anamnensis (Leaky et al., 1995) 
Kenyanthropus platyops (Leaky et al., 2001), Orrorin tugenensis (Pickford & Senut, 2001) 
and Sahelanthropus tchadensis (Brunet et al., 2002) - as long as there remain many gaps to 
be filled in, knowledge and speculation will remain entangled. 
 
Fig. 7-2. Speculative cladogram of early 
hominids. Changed after Tattersall & Schwartz 
(2000). 
 A good example of this entanglement is shown by the explanation of the 
heterogeneity of the Hadar materials (attributed to Australopithecus afarensis). If we 
interpret the differences in size of the individuals found there as reflecting sex differences, 
we have to conclude that the hominids living there approximately 3 million years ago 
showed a sexual dimorphism more within the range of the gorilla than within that of the 
chimpanzee. We do not know for certain, however, whether the skeletons found together, 
for example `the first family', belong to one species (Schmid, 1989). Another example is 
constituted by the recent find of Kenyanthropus platyops. The whole idea of placing this 
specimen in a new genus seems to result from the preconception, very popular within the 
Leaky-clan, that Homo represents a distinctive lineage that has evolved separately for a long 
time. As long as this preconception is kept compatible with the genetic similarity between 
man and chimpanzee it could be true. Whether a final decision about this issue can ever be 
made will largely depend on future discoveries. In figure 7-2 I have redrawn a recent 
speculative cladogram by Ian Tattersal (Tattersal & Schwartz, 2000: 99) in which the 
various species of Australopithecus, Aridipithecus and Paranthropus are placed in a 
relationship to one another. I have added Kenyanthropus (Cohen, 2001) to be complete, not 
because I think I know its proper position (the same would go for Sahelanthropus 
tchadensis). 
 To begin a reconstruction of the selection pressures responsible for our divergence 
from the common HUCHIBO-ancestor we need knowledge about the environment in which 
the first hominids evolved. During the last decades, such knowledge has accumulated, but 
there is still conflicting evidence. There are still at least three main possibilities: 
- A savanna. This model has for a long time been the most popular model among 
paleontologists. It is supported by data that show that, as a consequence of a colder 
and drier climate, tropical forests in Africa have given away to more mosaic 
environments, with much savannas, at least since 10 million years ago. Many 
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dramatic changes in the fauna of this period seem to be a result of this transition 
(Tobias, 1991; Vrba et al., 1995). It was originally thought that the evolution of 
Australopithecines coincided with the spread of savannas and that bipedalism was 
an adaptation to a savanna-like environment. The site at which the oldest human 
footprints have been found, Laetoli, was probably a grassland savanna at that time 
(Andrews, 1995). 
- A forest. During the last decades, the picture of the protohuman environment has 
become more complicated. Plio-Pleistocene rainforests in East Africa have been 
found (Williamson, 1985); more extensive pollen analysis also show forests in 
different periods (Bonnefille, 1995). Australopithecines have also been founded in 
an apparently wooded area in Chad (Brunet et al., 1995; later to be called 
Australopithecus bahrelghazali). Lucy (Australopithecus afarensis) proved to have 
relatively long arms and australopithecines proved to have a long and flexible first 
toe which may have enabled the climbing of trees (Susman, 1986; Oliwenstein, 
1995). The Hadar australopithecines apparently lived in a forest. Orrorin 
tugenensis and Australopithecus anamensis were found close to formerly wooded 
areas, too. 
- An environment characterized by the presence of water in the form of marshes and 
lakes. At the site where the `first family' fossils were recovered (at Hadar) there is 
found pollen from bulrushes which invariably inhabit marshes (LaLumiere, 1991). 
Most sites where early hominids were recovered are in the close vicinity of lakes or 
rivers (for example: Tabarin, Hadar, Omo, Koobi Fora, Olduvai) (Foley, 1987: 195; 
table 7-1). The 4.1 million years old Australopithecus anamensis is even named 
after the Turkana word anam, meaning `lake' (Leaky et al., 1995).  
All three models have inspired different explanations of the origin of human bipedalism. 
- Explanations derived from the savanna-model differ most widely. It has often been 
suggested that bipedalism increased the visual horizon of our ancestors on the 
savanna and enabled them to notice both prey and predators from a bigger distance. 
Some theoreticians stress 
the possibility of carrying 
food and tools when 
walking bipedally (Hewes, 
1961, Lovejoy, 1981). 
Others concentrate on the 
supposed energetic 
efficiency of bipedal travel 
in a large home range 
(Rodman & McHenry, 
1980; Pickford, 1989). The 
human ability to run over 
very large distances and for 
prolonged periods of times 
is projected sometimes back 
far in time: it enables 
modern hunter-gatherers to 
run down prey. Further, it is 
noted that the body surface exposed to sunlight is relatively small in an upright 
stance (Wheeler, 1984; fig. 7-3) and that this could have enabled early hominids to 
 
Fig. 7-3. Body surface areas of a quadruped 
(Pan) and a biped (Pan/Australopithecus) exposed at 
5°, 45° and 90° to direct solar radiation. From 
Wheeler, 1984. 
 
275 
 
276 
forage during the mid-day when all predators were asleep (Foley, 1987). Finally, 
bipedalism also frees the hands for throwing. Calvin (1983; 1993) has even 
suggested that the lateralization enabling our ancestors to throw has also 
preadapted them to speech. (Alas, subsequently it has been found that many species 
exhibit lateralization.) 
- As said, proponents of the forest model point to some primitive characteristics of 
the limbs of the early Australopithecus (short lower limb, long forelimb, curved 
toes, long forefoot) which enabled it to climb into trees. A partial foot skeleton of a 
3.5-3 myr old Australopithecine from Sterkfontein shows a long, flexible toe still 
useful for climbing trees (Oliwenstein, 1995). It seems that, on the whole, the 
skeletons of female Australopithecines were better suited to climbing than those of 
males. Thus, it has been suggested that females still got more food from the trees, 
while males spended more time on the ground (Simons, 1989). (This reminds one 
of the sexual dimorphism in the orang-utan which is also compatible with this 
species' dimorphism in body size. Another anthropoid ape spending much time on 
the ground while living in a wooded environment is the bonobo (it is hypothesized 
sometimes to have evolved in a less wooded environment; Boaz, 1997). If 
bipedalism evolved in woods, it may have been functional for reaching up for foods 
(Jolly, 1970) or it may have been functional for the production or efficient use of 
tools (Marzke, 1996). Recently, the forest model has gained new support as a result 
of the find of Orrorin tugenensis (`Millenium man'; six million years old), a 
supposed ancestor of the Australopithecines, which both lived in woods and 
walked bipedal. There has been found also a Miocene ape, Oreopithecus, which is 
thought to have been bipedal (Köhler & Moyà-Solà, 1997). Such finds seem not to 
fit the model according to which the evolution of bipedalism corresponds with 
climatalogial changes that enlarged the savannas. There are even researchers who 
have turned to the occasional bipedalism of the Urang-utan and who claim that it 
provides us with a better model for the original hominid locomotion than the 
African apes. 
- An explanation based on an environment with much water is the aquatic ape theory 
(Morgan, 1990; Roede et al., 1991). Originally inspired by the striking parallel 
between the human subcutaneous fat layer and that of different aquatic mammals, 
most of whom happen to have lost their fur as well, it was expanded by Morgan 
and Verhaegen into an all-encompassing theory that could account for the human 
transpiration system (that would amount to spoiling too much water and salt in a 
savanna-environment), for the threefold brain expansion (aquatic mammals have 
also an enlarged brain) and for the origin of language (possible as a consequence of 
two adaptations of a diving mammal: a descended larynx to inhale large quantities 
of air in combination with conscious control of respiration). Bipedalism could have 
evolved from wading: bonobos have been observed also wading bipedally and 
catching fish (De Waal, 1988). If this is true our anatomy was at some stage so 
completely adapted to wading upright with our heads above water that those 
ancestors that returned to the land remained upright. 
Let us try to weigh the different pro and con-arguments. First, the force of the aquatic 
theory seems to lie in the incompleteness of the savanna-theory as it is often envisioned. 
Some of the criticism leveled by aquatic ape theorists against the savanna hypothesis are 
certainly right. Especially Verhaegen's argument that the human cooling system is 
extremely water and sodium-wasting and therefore unfit for a dry environment seems very 
convincing (Verhaegen, 1987). On the other hand, the danger has to be avoided that a theory 
is devised which can not be verified but nicely fills all the gaps in the fossil record with 
explanations for supposed uniquely human characteristics (Lalumiëre, 1991). To explain 
human tears as a device to get rid of a surplus of salt (Morgan, 1990) seems to me an 
explanation which creates more problems than it solves: why do we so seldomly see people 
weep on the beaches or after a too salty meal, for example? Why would tears be linked to 
sadness if it is the sea that makes us happy? 
 If we study several of the arguments of the aquatic ape theory closely, these 
arguments remind one of the apostles who were rereading the prophets after the death of 
Jesus. For example, it is true that humans have a subcutaneous fat layer, but it has another 
structure than that of sea-mammals and does not prevent us from the dangers of 
hypothermia. If women conceive their children in water the water temperature has to be 
controlled precisely, because a slight aberration can be fatal (Taylor, 1996). 
Locality/age/species Paleoenvironment 
Tabarin, Kenya, 5.0-4.0 myr, 
Australopithecus afarensis 
Lake margin, with locally variable savanna elements 
Middle Awash, Ehtiopia, 4.5-3.9 myr, 
Australopithecus/Ardipithecus ramidus 
Fluvial conditions, with extensive tectonic activity associated with the formation of the 
East African Rift 
Laotoli, Tanzania, 3.7-3.2 myr, 
Australopithecus afarensis 
Savanna woodland, with well-defined wet and dry seasons 
Hadar, Ethiopia, 3.6-2.6 myr, 
Australopithecus afarensis 
Lake and associated floodplain, with braided streams and rivers 
Omo, Ethiopia (Shungura), 3.3-1.4 myr, 
Australopithecus africanus, boisei; Homo 
erectus, sapiens 
After 2.1 myr ago, dry savanna flanking river banks with gallary forest and dry-thorn 
savanna; before this date, the environment was probably forested 
Koobi Fora, Kenya, 3.3-1.4 myr, 
Australopithecus boisei, sp., Homo 
ergaster, erectus 
Before 1.6 myr ago, a freshwater lake with floodplains, gallery forest and dry-thorn 
savanna; during later times, the lake fluctuated from fresh to brackish 
Olduvai, Tanzania, 1.9-<1.0 myr, 
Australopithecus boisei, Homo habilis, 
erectus 
Salt lake with surrounding floodplains with seasonal streams and rivers and dry 
woodland savanna; tectonic changes after 1.5 myr ago resulted in the drying up of the 
lake 
Transvaal, South Africa Makapansgat 3, 
Sterkfontein 4 and 5, Swartkrans 1, 
Kromdraai and Taung), 3.0-1.4 myr ago, 
Australopithecus africanus, robustus, Homo 
habilis 
All were mosaic environments, with Makapansgat Member 3 and Sterkfontein Member 
4 less open (more bush/woodland) than Swartkrans Member 1 and Sterkfontein Member 
5; this suggests a trend from wetter to drier conditions through time 
 
Table 7.1 Early hominid environments in Africa. Changed after Andrews, 1992. 
If it is true that most sites where hominid fossils are found lay in the vicinity of ancient 
lakes, marshes or rivers (Andrews, 1992; table 7-1) this suggests that early hominids may 
have preferred border-areas between forests, waters and savannas. Their most favored 
biotope could well have included a mix of trees, waters and open country like our favorite 
parklands nowadays. The fusion-fission social structure and the in part omnivorous 
possibilities of HUCHIBOS may have been factors enabling early hominids to profit 
maximally from this mixed environment (one clue is a carapace of a giant turtle found 
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among the hominid deposits in lake Turkana, Reynolds, 1991; another, Homo habilis and 
Paranthropus boisei skulls apparently crushed by crocodiles, Taylor, 1996). At a first stage 
they may foraged at the border of the savanna and at the edges of marshes and lakes during 
the day and they may have climbed into the trees during the nights. In later stages, when the 
climate became cooler and drier during the Pliocene, they may have been forced to rely 
more and more on the ability to migrate across the savannas looking for suitable 
environments. 
 Apparently, Australopithecus and probably Homo habilis was still adapted to some 
extent to a partial arboreal life style. Yet, bipedality as such would not have evolved if the 
environment had stayed the same. The human foot and pelvis are too specialized to have 
arisen without strong selection pressures. The problem with finding `the' ultimate 
explanation of bipedality may be that several advantages may have worked together. 
Originally, bipedality may have been a way of moving from tree to tree for apes that walked 
upright on branches, too, like urang-utans. Subsequently, the advantages of bipedality in a 
more open environment may have become apparent: it allowed a clear overview to scan an 
open environment for both food and predators while traveling in a relatively cool (Wheeler, 
1984), non-exhausting way (Rodman & McHenry, 1980). Gradually, its advantages with 
respect to carrying and throwing may have become apparent and it may have opened a new 
series of possibilities with respect to making signs and gestures. In all likelihood there is a 
big difference between the original functions and the additional advantages of bipedality. 
 Although bonobos have split from chimpanzees only about 3 à 2 million years ago, 
a series of similarities with humans suggest an interesting case of convergent evolution 
which may give clues about human origins. Bonobos walk more often bipedally than 
chimpanzees and their upper-body parts are not so heavy. Their societies are not as male-
centered (De Waal, 1988; Wrangham & Peterson, 1996), or their females have found ways 
to overcome the problem of cooperation among males, and as a result their societies are 
much more egalitarian. Sex is not restricted to a period of estrus and functions as a social 
glue. It is often used in exchange for food and functions thus as a kind of currency in an 
exchange economy. Although bonobos currently live in a forested environment, it is 
postulated by Boaz (1997) that they evolved in an isolated area south of the Zaïre in which 
forests became more mosaic between three and two million years ago. Bipedality enabled 
them to cross open areas between patches of wood and their increased group-size enabled 
them to survive in relatively harsh conditions in which fruits and other food were much 
scarcer than in the habitats of the chimpanzee. Contrary to the views of ecologically minded 
primatologists (Wrangham, 1986; Wrangham & Peterson, 1996), Boaz believes that the 
greater degree of bonobo sociality is a result of natural selection for intragroup cooperation 
under situations of very scarce resources. 
 
 Bonobo groups survived by cooperating in locating and sharing 
environmental resources. Large groups with many cooperating individuals 
would have been at a clear competitive advantage because wide areas 
could be effectively surveyed for resources. Forming affiliation, 
`friendships', and sexual liaisons would have been very important in such 
a cooperative adaptation. It is unlikely that such elaborate social 
mechanisms would have evolved simply in response to environmental 
abundance of food resources. Cooperation thus evolved in the bonobo as a 
consequence of ecological scarcity, not abundance. The scarcity was 
brought on by climatic change (Boaz, 1997: 85). 
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Of course, what Boaz claims about bonobos is an inference based on other inferences (the 
turnover pulse hypothesis; an adapted savanna theory). Yet, the ecological argument is 
strong, particularly when we do not believe in l'évolution créatrice. There have been woods 
during the whole Miocene and both gorillas and chimpanzees are still happy with knuckle-
walking in their mostly wooded environments. There must have been something which 
forced our ancestors to walk upright more and more. Paleoclimatology shows clearly that 
forests became more mosaic during the Pleistocene. This tendency corresponds nicely with 
the evolution of Australopithecines. The evolution of the bonobo corresponds with a period 
of aridity which is documented widely in the fossil record. It is more than reasonable to 
assume that bipedality offered a series of advantages in a more open environment. Vervet 
monkeys, marmots, and many other ground-living species, even hares, do sometimes stand 
upright to scan their environment if there is danger nearby. Kangaroos probably have lived 
in more open environments than deer and have evolved an upright posture in which they 
find themselves allen Dinge einsam gegenüber, as Straus would say. A combination of the 
need for continual alertness in an open environment and the need to scan this environment 
for pockets of food may have been the original selection force initiating the evolution of 
bipedality. Further advantages may subsequently have turned an occasional bipedalism in an 
obligatory bipedalism in which it was more profitable to have efficient feet than another pair 
of hands. 
 If it is true that the Miocene ape Oreopithecus was bipedal this may also throw 
light on the evolution of bipedalism. Oreopithecus, found in Tuscany and Sardinia, is found 
within an assemblage of species characterized by dwarfing, which probably resulted from 
living on an island without predators (Köhler & Moyà-Solà, 1997). It is thought that 
bipedalism in Oreopithecus could have evolved because the lack of predators allowed a 
more vulnerable way of locomotion. If this is true, one wonders whether bipedalism in 
Australipithecines started also in a relatively predator-free environment or whether 
Australopithecines had special ways to overcome their vulnerability, for example weapons 
(Wrangham, 2001). Apparently, bipedalism has not only advantages, but disadvantages as 
well. 
 
7.4 THE APE THAT STARTED TO EAT MORE MEAT 
As we can also learn from Oreopithecus and other bipeds, explanations of bipedality are not 
automatically also explanation of uniquely human properties. The existence of the robust 
australopithecines proves that it is a healthy strategy to separate explanations of bipedality 
and explanations of, for example, the enlarged brain. Clearly, the climatic changes of about 
2.5 million years ago, when for the first time an ice-cap covered the poles and the climate in 
Africa became drier and colder than ever before, coincide with the origin of two new types 
of hominids - Paranthropus and Homo -, of which only one is characterized by an enlarged 
brain.  
 According to Brain (1981) and Foley (1987) the two different evolutionary trends 
among hominids can best be explained as different strategies in coping with the problems 
posed by the dry season. When dry seasons were increasingly characterized by a scarcity of 
plant food, one trend was the evolution of robust australopithecines - I like the name 
Paranthropus to stress that they constitute a specific lineage. With their heavy teeth they 
could live from coarse, hard and dry fruits and from seeds: this is inferred from the heave 
ridge on top of their skulls to which heavy jaw muscles were connected and form their 
patterns of teeth-wear. Another reaction to the problems posed by a dry environment could 
be a shift to more meat consumption. During the dry season many savanna animals tend to 
congregate around the remaining water resources and the early hominids could have used 
this opportunity. Certainly, the dentition of early Homo habilis is compatible with an 
omnivorous diet of which meat was a part. 
 There has been much 
discussion concerning the question 
whether the first hominids were 
scavengers or hunters (e.g. 
Blumenschine & Cavallo, 1992). 
The presence of toothmarks of 
large carnivores on about 11 to 15 
% of the bones at the hominid sites 
at Olduvai George suggest that at 
least a part of the meat was first 
used by large carnivores: 
toothmarks are sometimes found 
on the more meat-rich parts of the 
bones, while human cut marks 
appear at the non-meat-bearing 
bones (Shipman, cited in Binford, 
1986). 
 
 Tooby and DeVore 
(1986: 221) have criticized the 
idea that early hominids were scavengers on the ground that scavenging would be 
inefficient and dangerous, given the risks of returning predators and the risks that the flesh 
is poisoned by micro-organisms. Observations on chimpanzees show, however, that in this 
species scavenging is at least sometimes practiced (Hasegawa, 1983). Clearly, it would be 
wrong to rely totally on a priori arguments in excluding scavenging. Early hominids may 
have had an advantage over other scavengers, because they had tools at their disposal with 
which they could have opened the thick skin of very large animals (Toth, 1986; Foley, 1987: 
22). Above that, they may have had the wits to understand the habits of a leopard and to use 
this knowledge to steal its preys from the trees in which they were stored (Cavallo, 1990). 
Finally, unambiguous proof of systematic hunting does not show up in the archeological 
record of Africa (Voormolen, pers. com.).  
Fig. 7-4. Major climatic coolings at 5, 2.5, and 0.9 
myr ago may have caused speciation-events in human 
evolution. Changed and redrawn after Brain (1981), Lambert 
(1989), and Lewin (1993). 
 All in all, the most accurate description of the original Homo survival strategy 
could well be characterized as ecological opportunism optimized by tool use. The increase 
in brain size of Homo habilis and particularly of Homo rudolfensis may have been in part a 
consequence of the general higher encephalization quotients of predators (Jerison, 1973) or 
of animals living on variable and unpredictable resources (Eisenberg, 1981) and it may at 
the same time reflect an increase in meat consumption. It would be very naive to suppose, 
however, that hominids relied totally on meat, as apes have difficulty in digesting meat and 
there is even a ceiling to the amount of protein that can be processed by the human liver and 
kidneys (Speth, 1988). There is more reason to assume that in hominids scavenging and 
hunting were male strategies for obtaining rich quality food with which they could `show 
off' and which they could exchange for higher status and other favors (Hawkes, 1991). This 
hypothesis is compatible with the observations of Boesch and Boesch (1989) on 
chimpanzees in Tai-forest, where only male chimpanzees participate in hunting. 
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 According to Hawkes (1991) 
men in hunter-gatherer-societies 
preferentially target resources which are 
more widely shared, also outside their 
nuclear families. Their strategy is less 
directed to a constant provisioning of 
daily food and more to an occasional big 
bonanza that can be widely shared and 
with which they can gain status. When 
hunting is conceived as a risky male 
strategy to obtain high quality food, 
constant gathering of resources by 
women is just the other side of the coin. 
 I therefore do not believe that 
the hunting hypothesis (Tooby & 
DeVore, 1986; Stanford, 1999) and the 
gathering hypothesis (Tanner, 1986) are 
incompatible. Tanner (1986) uses observations by Boesch & Boesch (1984) to show that 
female chimpanzees both use tools more than males and use them in a more complex way. 
To me this only proves that the different and compatible food strategies that Hawkes noted 
by hunter-gatherers and that inspired her to her `showing-off hypothesis' were in principle 
already there at the times of the common HUCHIBO-ancestor. 
 
Fig. 7-5. Cladogram representing a splitter's 
view of the genus Homo. From Tattersall & 
Schwartz, 2000. 
 Happily enough, different hypotheses with respect to early human food habits need 
not to be completely speculative. A transition to more meat eating will cause many changes 
which directly or indirectly leave traces in the archeological record (Shipman & Walker, 
1989; chapter 10). Changes in dentition are well known; more recently Aiello & Wheeler 
(1995) have pointed to a possible link between changes in the digestive system and the 
increase in brain size. According to their `expensive tissue hypothesis' the enormous energy 
requirements of growing a large brain could only be obtained by a radical shortening and 
simplification of the digestive system. Thus, the amount of meat consumption may well 
have correlated with brain size, leaving a clear trace in the archeological record. Also, 
changes in the structure of the vertebral column and the rib cage may reflect the size of the 
guts and the belly. In this context a comparison of the stature of Lucy with that of the 
Nariokotome boy is enlightening: Lucy was relatively thick-waisted and potbellied, the 
Nariokotome boy had narrow hips and a long torso (Walker & Shipman, 1996). Both the 
relative brain size and the general figure of the Nariokotome boy (Homo ergaster) would 
thus already point to an increase in meat intake. Yet, brain size would cross a critical 
Rubicon only much later, perhaps correlating with a point during prehistory in which 
hunting became a systematic, highly specialized cultural activity, often directed to one 
species of prey, which did not only offer some extra proteins in hard times, but which had 
become completely indispensable for the supply of food. 
 
7.5 HOMO: A LARGE BRAIN, DEPENDENT CHILDREN, AND FATHERS WHO 
CARE 
By now a series of fundamental differences between Australopithecus and Homo have 
become clear. Australopithecus was probably at least partially arboreal, it was largely a 
vegetarian, and it probably was polygamous. All this is based on the analyses of its feet, its 
teeth, its rib-cage and hips and its degree of dimorphism. In the discussion between 
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Holloway and Falk on the properties of the australopithecine brain, I tend to believe Falk 
who thinks that the australopithecine brain was ape-like (Falk, 1992). There are good 
reasons to suppose that Homo, at least Homo ergaster (the Nariokotome boy), was different 
and was distinguished by an at least partial carnivorous diet, a complete transition to bipedal 
walking and running, and a different social structure in which cooperation and possibly 
mutual defense of a `focal site' played a major role. 
 This does not sound quite spectacular. Our genus apparently evolved simply 
because its progenitors started to eat more meat in reaction to certain climatological 
changes. But why would a hunting ape evolve a large brain, extraordinary social habits, and 
start creating an enormous array of different cultures? Why would it become a visionary, an 
artist, a scientist? There are many other predators, even group hunters, who are not by far as 
intelligent as humans are. Certainly the hunting/scavenging/gathering model does not 
explain everything. 
 Perhaps we have to look for clues elsewhere. Humans are different from other apes 
in several aspects and each of those could give us a clue. One of them is that we are, apart 
from the gibbon, the only great ape  forming nuclear families. We are apparently the only 
HUCHIBO-ape in which fathers at least sometimes care for their children. We are also the 
only ape that not only builds sleeping nests each night - this is also done by chimpanzees 
and gorillas -, but that lives in more or less permanent homes. Finally, compared to other 
apes, we mature very slowly. Our children are extremely dependent for a relatively long 
period. Could all those properties somehow have something to do with each other? 
 The idea that there is something special about the human maturation process is by 
no means new. The dutch anatomist Bolk claimed already that man, in his bodily 
development, is a primate fetus that has become sexually mature [eine zur Geschlechtsreife 
gelangen Primatenfetus] (Bolk, 1926, cited in Gould, 1977). The swiss biologist Portmann 
claimed that man, given its growth rates, `should' have a gestation period of 21 months 
(Gould, 1977). Apparently, we are born premature. This is further proved by the fact that we 
keep growing at a rate which is characteristic of the fetus for at least a year. 
 But why would we be born too early? The simple answer may be that it is simply 
the best compromise given, on the one hand, our relatively big brains, and, on the other 
hand, the shape of our pelvis, which is adapted to bipedalism. The female pelvis is already 
somewhat broader than the male one as a result of which women cannot run as fast as men 
do. At the same time, even after nine months, human child-birth is a risky, painful event, 
which often caused death to women in the past and which currently still causes much 
consternation. An early birth combined with an extended period of postnatal brain-growth 
seems simply the only solution that evolution could devise to build an extraordinary big 
brain. 
 Fig. 7-6. Patterns of brain growth. In humans and Homo erectus the relatively fast fetal 
growth continues after birth. Based on Stanley (1996: 155) and Walker & Shipman (1996: 
224). 
 Given these considerations, it is not unreasonable to assume that the essence of the 
transition from Australopithecus to Homo had something to do with the increasing 
dependency of the child. The transition to meat-eating enabled brains to grow, but growing 
brains cause birth problems. These may only be solved simply by giving birth `too early', 
which is what was claimed by Portmann. The idea was taken up by Robert Martin in 1981 
(Walker & Shipman, 1996). One of its defender is Steven Stanley in his Children of the Ice 
Age (Stanley, 1996). According to Stanley climatological changes initiated by the closing of 
the isthmus of Panama between about 3.1 and 2.5 million years ago, and resulting in an 
accumulation of a permanent ice-cap at the north pole, forced our ancestors to leave the 
trees and to live on the ground. It was "the need for self-defense while living freely on the 
ground [that] was the primary driving force behind the natural selection that created the 
large brain of Homo (Stanley, 1996: 175)". The evolution of this large brain was achieved 
by the revolutionary new maturation pattern with many behavioral implications which 
according to Stanley arose relatively fast in Homo rudolfensis.  
 
 After birth a monkey or chimpanzee fails to maintain the high rate of fetal 
brain growth that endowed it with such a large head when it entered the 
world. It embarks almost immediately on the second phase of growth - 
what I call phase II - in which its brains expands much more slowly all the 
way to adulthood. Humans differ from lower primates in retaining high 
fetal rate of brain growth - phase I - through the first year of life after 
birth. The result is a one-year-old infant who is endowed with an 
enormous head that houses a brain more than twice as large as that of an 
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adult chimp. Not until an age of about one year do humans settle into the 
sluggish Phase II of brain growth... 
 
 In humans the persistence of the high fetal rate of brain growth beyond 
birth amounts to a retardation of the brain's development. It is not simply 
our brain that matures slowly, however, but our entire body. This 
condition arose because natural selection found no way of singling out the 
brain for delayed maturation. It accomplished the delay by slowing down 
the overall rate of bodily development immediately after birth. The result 
is that, although we grow rapidly in physical size after birth, we remain 
physically helpless while the fetal pattern of brain growth more than 
doubles our brain size by the time of our first birthday. Although our brain 
then switches from the [fast] Phase I to the [slower] Phase II, our slow 
overall rate of maturation lingers on. We continue to lag far behind apes in 
the level of physical development throughout our growing years (154-55). 
 
Stanley then goes on to argue that the evolution of the large brain of Homo by means of a 
slowing of the development amounted to a profound trade-off, "one of the most remarkable 
evolutionary compromises in the history of life". On the negative side were the physical and 
mental deficiencies of immature offspring that, from the earliest days of Homo, constituted a 
great ecological handicap for the parents. "From the beginning extended child rearing has 
robbed parents of time that they could otherwise have spent gathering food, making tools, or 
constructing shelters, and it has restricted mobility and complicated confrontations with 
enemies". On the positive side were the vast benefits of the new brain. In the game of 
natural selection, the positive value of the large brain clearly outweighed the negative side 
effects of infantile immaturity. "Otherwise, quite simply, our brain would never have 
evolved." 
 
 For the natural selection to create the large brain of Homo, the many 
benefits conferred by the incipient brain not only had to outweigh the 
problems imposed by helpless infants but also those imposed by the high 
rate of metabolism of the large brain itself. Recall that brain tissue requires 
an enormous supply of energy. Fatty meat and bone marrow are rich 
sources of energy, and ... we can imagine that early Homo turned to them 
increasingly as its brain evolved toward larger size. The brain itself would 
have played an important role in the capture of animals that supplied the 
meat and marrow. In other words, the large brain of early Homo must have 
played an important role in stoking its own metabolic furnace (173-74). 
 
 
Stanley then argues that, while Australopithecus probably did not engage in pair-bonding 
(on the basis of its level of sexual dimorphism), complex cooperation in hunting and self-
defense may have required less competition in sexual affairs. 
 
 Human ancestors may have had little reason to engage in pair-bonding 
until members of a troop were cooperating in complex ways. Males could 
have worked more compatibly within hunting parties if, instead of vying 
with each other for females on the home front, each understood that a 
particular mate awaited him on return from a hunting expedition. 
 It is also easy to see how pair-bonding would have benefited Homo in 
rearing physically immature offspring. Natural selection probably favored 
any male who became part of a nuclear family in order to help train his 
own offspring. These progeny were more likely to survive and reproduce, 
passing on their father's genes, than were offspring that a father left in the 
care of an unaccompanied mother during their lengthy childhood. 
Likewise, natural selection probably favored females who were inclined to 
enter common-law marriages, which favored dependent children with two 
devoted parents (177). 
 
 
 
Fig. 7-7. An attempt to schematize the causal relationships postulated by Steven 
Stanley in his Children of the Ice Age (1996). 
In figure 7-6 I have tried to schematize some of the causal relationships illuminated by the 
synthesis of Stanley. There are certainly weak points in his argumentation. For example, I 
doubt that the need for self-defense while living on the ground was the only cause of the 
evolution of the large brain. Paranthropus was also living on the ground and did not evolve 
such a large brain. It seems to me that the initial cause of hominid brain expansion must be 
sought in a relatively complex survival strategy which required a relatively complex social 
system, a relatively detailed memory, a relative long learning period and relative complex 
communication skills. I have already referred to the higher encephalization quotients of 
predators and animals living on variable and unpredictable resources. I can also refer to the 
relatively long learning period of juvenile sea-birds compared to continental birds 
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corresponding with the relative difficulty of foraging on open seas. In this context Stanley's 
remark about the large brain of early Homo that must have been stoking its own metabolic 
furnace is to the point. 
 His arguments referring to the dependency of the human child also fit in this 
context. Apparently evolution has slowed down the maturation process in order to lengthen 
the learning period. Also, the idea that there has to be some kind of link between the 
dependency of the human child and the structure of the human family is old and was put 
forward already by Pope and Locke in the seventeenth century (Gould, 1977). Paternal 
investment is something which distinguishes us from chimpanzees in which the paternity of 
a child is uncertain. The fact that human testes are much smaller than those of chimpanzees 
also points into the same direction: direct sperm competition in humans is not as strong as in 
chimpanzees. 
 Yet, we do not know when pair-bonding became an important factor in our lineage. 
It probably did not come in one strike. At the time it did become important, however, it may 
have had far-reaching consequences in combination with other factors. At the moment that a 
sexual division of labor arose, sexual selection may have given a new twist to human 
evolution. Apart from pure fertility, new criteria may have become important. Both males 
and females had more reason to choose partners with whom cooperation, perhaps 
communication, was possible, and which to some extent were reliable and exhibited 
parental skills. To assess these qualities in advance is a talent, and perhaps a large part of 
the brain of modern man is devoted to it. To what extent we owe our large brains to sexual 
selection remains unclear, however (Miller, 2000). Something must have changed 
fundamentally at the moment that pair-bonding became necessary as a result of the 
increasing dependency of the human child. 
 This increasing dependency can also be interpreted as an altriciality brought about 
by the transition to a predatory life-style (Walker & Shipman, 1989; 1996). Many predators 
are relatively altricial. A predator has to learn more than a herbivore or a fructivore and it 
needs a longer time to mature, therefore. 
 All this remains rather speculative, however. We still have to find ways to fit this 
story into the paleontological record. Perhaps we first have to study another dimension of 
the ape-human transition to find more empirical clues. In table 7-2 I have listed some of the 
differences between Australopithecus/Paranthropus and Homo which I have discussed 
and/or postulated.  
 
7.6 AUSTRALOPITHECUS, HOMO, HOME BASES, AND FIRE 
As can be seen in table 7-2, one of the changes that may have been brought about by the 
transition from a largely herbivorous diet to a more carnivorous diet, may have been 
necessity of more complex geographical routines. Although apes are territorial and do make 
sleeping nests, they do not have permanent home bases as most humans currently do. As a 
result, many researchers have concluded that the first home bases constituted a crucial phase 
in the process of hominization (Isaac, 1978). 
 Why wouldn't Australopithecus have had home bases? At least one important 
researcher has claimed they had. Lovejoy's paper on `the origin of man' (1981) was written 
in the wake of the finds of Lucy and the `first family' (Australopithecus afarensis) and 
Lovejoy projects the origin of the human family back much further than Stanley, to 
Australopithecus. Lovejoy argues that the unique reproductive system of humans, in which 
females and males form lasting bonds and males provision their own offspring, arose all of a 
sudden, ex nihilo as a reaction to the extreme K-selected reproduction strategy of their 
 Australopithecus Homo 
Life-style Terrestrial/arboreal Terrestrial 
Food Largely vegetarian Partly carnivorous 
Sexual 
system 
Polygamy without 
paternal investment 
Perhaps increased 
paternal investment 
Geographic 
routines 
Probably still 
sleeping in trees or 
cliffs, no permanent 
home bases 
Increasingly complex as a 
result of tools & food 
exchange, altriciality, 
group defense 
Children Relatively precocial Secondary altricial 
Learning 
period 
Relatively short Increasingly long 
Group size Kin groups Increasingly large 
 
Table 7.2  Some discussed and/or postulated differences between 
Australopithecus/ Paranthropus and Homo. 
prehominid ancestors. In chimpanzees females are busy for more than two years with only 
one child. They always have both to carry the child with them and to provide it with food. It 
would be more efficient, according to Lovejoy, when the female could stay home with the 
children while daddy would look around for food in the dangerous outside world, and would 
be able to carry it homewards in his hands, walking bipedally. The time between two births 
could become smaller and one female could produce more children. Once upon a time, apes 
- Lucy's grandparents, for example - suddenly discovered this more efficient reproductive 
strategy and males started to walk upright and started returning at home with their freed 
arms full of food. Once this strategy was discovered it was so successful (in terms of 
reproductive success) that the upright walking apes seized the world from all other ape 
species. 
 Thus, Lovejoy sees a connection between upright walking on the one hand and 
pair-bonding, home bases and paternal investment on the other hand. However, there are 
several new concepts and data that make Lovejoy's theory implausible. First of all, most 
researchers conclude from the size differences of the Hadar hominids that there was a strong 
sexual dimorphism in Australopithecus, which points to polygamy (males have to be larger 
to defend more females). Second, Lovejoy seems to dream about a kind of paradise in which 
Adam and Eve lived largely solitary. However, the idea that one mutant female would leave 
her group and start a solitary life is improbable given the evidence on predation of leopards 
on australopithecines (Brain, 1981). The idea that her partner could leave her alone and still 
be sure of his paternity is also improbable. As we have seen, there are also enough other 
explanations of bipedality. Most explanations cluster around the savanna-model and this is 
still the most likely explanation. Further, the idea that such an extreme transition in 
reproductive strategy as the one from polygamy to monogamy could arise ex nihilo and not 
in reaction to a major change in food strategy following a major change in the environment 
is very naive. At the moment it seems likely that this change was constituted by an increase 
in meat consumption. Finally, even in modern  
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humans monogamy is only practiced in some societies and the model of Lovejoy assumes 
that is was already universal around three million years ago.3
 At the moment the model of Lovejoy shows, above all, how we should not try to 
model the transition to a more modern live-style. Much more is needed than a series of 
reasons why humans are `better adapted' than their ancestors. Perhaps they were not: who 
claims that it is always better to be smarter? At least Ecclesiastes and Dostoyevsky knew 
better. One cannot claim that something is `better adapted' without knowing to what 
circumstances it is supposed to be adapted. Evolution does not strive `to make things better' 
apart from a climatological/ecological context. 
 To explain things like the origin of male parental investment and the home base in 
humans we have to ask ourselves, first, why a situation could arise in which females could 
become increasingly dependent on male provisioning. This situation could be the above 
mentioned dry season in an increasingly savanna-like Africa. When the home ranges that 
males had to cross in their search for food became very extensive and when there were at 
least some periods during the year in which male provisioning, became an indispensable 
extra food source for females and offspring, a situation could arise in which both parties 
could profit from a meeting area to exchange food (Tooby & DeVore, 1986: 224). Probably 
the food brought in by males was meat. 
 Second, it would be nice if we at least tried to formulate a testable hypothesis. If 
we had reason to believe Lovejoy, it would make sense to start looking for 4 myr old home 
bases. The idea that the Australopithecus-Homo transition, the AH-Erlebnis, was essentially 
a herbivore-carnivore transition, makes Stanley's idea that Adam and Eve belonged to Homo 
rudolfensis much more plausible. But there are also good reasons to drop the `atavistic pair-
bonding hypothesis' - Adam-and-Eve theory-II' - altogether. Some of the same arguments 
against the theory of Lovejoy can be raised also against an the idea of an Adam and Eve 
Homo rudolfensis. Living in groups is much more safe in the context of the savanna's high 
predation levels, for example. It is not clear whether the encephalization of Homo 
rudolfensis had progressed enough to require pair-bonding. Why would we assume that the 
transition from polygamy without specified gene-conscious paternal investment to 
occasional monogamy with caring, responsible fathers happened overnight? It seems to me 
that we are still in the midst of this transition today. 
 For one thing, archaeologists are very critical even about early Homo-home bases. 
The interpretation of some important Olduvai sites, where stones and bones were 
concentrated, as `living floors', `home bases' or `central places' (e.g. Isaac, 1978) has been 
contested by Binford (1981) who claimed that the assemblages could also have been created 
by carnivores and water. Since then it has become clear that hominids did indeed process 
large quantities of meat at some of these places (e.g. Bunn & Kroll, 1986), but that does not 
mean that these were home bases.  
 One of the most important researchers of the sites thinks that early hominids kept 
their stone tools there and processed meat quickly to evade competing predators (the `stone 
cache hypothesis', Potts, 1984; 1987). Other authors have proposed that hominids instead 
defended such places against predators: they call this the `resource-defense model' (Rose & 
Marshall, 1996; fig. 7-7). These authors refer, for example, to the behavior of chimpanzees 
 
3 However, monogamy is present times is common in stressful (temperate) environments. 
Under savanna conditions scarcity of food may have caused monogamy (pers. comm. Hans 
Roskam). 
in front of stuffed leopards as shown in the famous experiments of Kortlandt (1980), and 
claim that "early hominids would have responded similarly to the risk of carnivore predation 
by intensifying cooperative behaviors, perhaps using branches or stones as simple defensive 
weapons" (Rose & Marshall, 1996: 314). If the resource-defense model is right it is to be 
expected that the `focal sites' which were defended were lying very strategic, with a 
panoramic view on the surrounding landscape. 
 It seems to me that the resource-defense 
model is compatible with the find of the 1.7 million 
years old Homo erectus female `1808' who stayed 
alive despite having hypervitaminosis A, probably as 
a result of eating carnivore liver (Shipman & 
Walker, 1989; Walker & Shipman, 1996). If sick 
individuals were cared for and kept alive, there 
probably were save places to do so. The same goes 
for the increased length of the period of infant 
dependency. The pattern of dental development of 
the Nariokotome-boy shows that he matured at a 
different speed than either chimpanzees or humans 
(he was a nine-year-old comparable to a thirteen-
year-old human). His relatively slow maturation 
speed compared to chimpanzees - and probably also 
compared to australopithecines - can be interpreted 
as implying a relatively long learning period. This 
would be compatible with the idea that the juvenile 
hominids during this period (1.5 myr ago) became 
increasingly dependent and that it required more and 
more cooperation to raise them. 
 
 
 Also, it is probably no accident that the first 
signs that fires may have been generated stem from 
around 1.3-1 million years ago from the cave of 
Swartkrans (Brain & Sillen, 1988). Could this not imply that this cave was used around this 
time as a refuge or home-base? At least Brain and Sillen themselves, the discoverers of 
these oldest known hearths, suggest that they functioned as a defense against predators, 
because the bones in them were heated to such high temperatures that any meat on them 
would have been inedible. With the find of these hearths, with the find of `1808', together 
with our knowledge of a beginning of a longer maturation phase in Homo ergaster, we now 
have at least good reasons to suppose that something like `home bases' existed at that time. 
Fig. 7-8. The resource-defense 
model according Rose & Marshall, 
1996. 
 At the same time, it has to be admitted that certainty is hard to get. A recent 
expedition to the Zhoukoudian (reported in Tattersall & Schwartz, 2000) has undermined 
older claims about hearths and home bases at this important chinese `Sinanthropus' or Homo 
erectus site. As a result Tattersall and Schwartz conclude that it is still possible that "the 
initial exodus of humanity from Africa, and more specifically the penetration by hominids 
of harsh northern climes, was accomplished without the aid of fire" (Tattersall & Schwartz, 
2000: 156). The first compelling evidence of fire and cooking comes from a 700,000-year-
old site in Thailand, where a hearth (a circle of fire-cracked basalt cobbles) plus artifacts 
and animal bones was found. 
 On the other hand, during the whole Pleistocene the posterior teeth of Homo 
erectus are gradually becoming smaller (Wolpoff, 1993), which could point to a 
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gradual increase of the role of cooking. Certainty with respect to hearths and fires is, of 
course, very hard to get, and, at the same time, Homo erectus is a very different species than 
anything that existed before. This explains why recently a group of theorists could come 
with the bold claim that it was the accidental discovery of cooking that made us who we are. 
They claim that the improvement in nutrition that enabled the brains of protohumans to 
expand was not just the result of more meat intake, but the result of the new possibilities 
afforded by cooking. As a result of the drier climate around 1.9 myr ago, wood fires would 
not have been unusual. Some australopithecines (Homo habilis in this view has to be seen as 
Australopithecus habilis) may have discovered that there were highly edible foods, such as 
roasted roots, left in the burned areas and that it is even possible to transport or create up the 
required fire yourself. The result would not only have been completely new food sources, 
but also completely new social structures, because cooking required premeditation and 
protection of collected items. Wrangham (2001) speculates that females may have started to 
bind with one male to have their `kitchens' (collected vegetables and fruits) protected. If you 
had a bad hunting or gathering day, it must have been relatively easy to steal some of the 
food that your neighbors had just collected. (As every student of insect behavior knows, 
kleptoparasitism is a very widespread phenomenon in nature.) 
 Whether the first humans were hunters, gatherers or cooks, apparently the amount 
in which their behavior was directed at future goals has increased. Early humans found 
themselves in an increasingly dangerous environment in which food was increasingly hard 
to get and had, at the same time, increasingly dependent children. Something must have 
changed dramatically and it seems to me that Wrangham (2001) is right in claiming that the 
AH-transition as witnessed by anatomical changes must have been more dramatic than all 
later changes together. 
 
 In comparison to the great shifts from our ape past, there has been little 
change for 1.9 million years in features such as body size and degree of 
sexual dimorphism, or shape of the foot or the shoulder, or nature of the 
teeth or the face. This relative conservatism of human morphology 
suggests an equivalent conservatism in selective pressures (Wrangham, 
2001: 143). 
 
Both the hunting and the cooking hypothesis suggest that this change was brought about by 
a transition to a more delayed consumption of food. Indeed, many of the no doubt 
exaggerated claims about the animal-man distinction focus on subjects like planning and 
premeditation. 
 Given the fact that the great apes build sleeping nests each night, the concept of 
making yourself comfortable at a safe site has a history much longer than the human genus. 
But the new kind of predator ape that arose at the African savannas and woodlands about 
two million years ago, could have profited a lot by more permanent home bases were their 
increasingly dependent children were safe, their foods prepared and shared, and which they 
could defend to large carnivores. The idea that already early Homo had some form of home 
bases should not be dismissed too fast. Instead, it is to be hoped that archaeologists and 
paleontologists continue to look for traces of such places, because we may still simply miss 
some essential pieces to be able to complete the puzzle. 
7.7 DID HOMO ERECTUS INVENT LOVE? 
All this does not point to a nice place under a tree where Homo rudolfensis Adam and Eve 
were playing with Abel while enjoying their daily meal. Even a close reading of the book of 
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Genesis reveals that there must have been other people around already, because Cain was 
afraid of them after having killed Abel (Gen. 4:14). Apparently, there was already more than 
the primary family if there was such a family at all. The increased dependency of the human 
child in Homo ergaster/ erectus could well point to a change in the mating system during 
the ape-human transition in which fathers started to care more for their offspring, but the 
resulting system of pair-bonding must have been different from that in many monogamous 
birds and the gibbon in which pairs remain on their own small territory. In humans, families 
have their `territories', but males remain at the same time mutual dependent and do 
cooperate in a group territory (I do not claim that there are no birds or other animals with 
systems with both family- and group territories). 
 The human `mating system', if such a thing exists (see chapter 8), seems to consist 
of temporary or more stable pair bonds embedded in a tight system of male cooperation. It is 
possible that it did not arise full-blown in one strike, but that there existed a stage with some 
parallels to that of the bonobo, in which males and females exchanged sex for meat. Like 
the bonobo, early Homo may have had a proto-economy, based on the universal currency of 
sex. The human mating system, however, may also have evolved from a more polygamous 
system, in which gradually more dominant males had to cooperate and in which they were 
gradually forced to accept and respect each other's sexual relationships as a result of the 
power of women and in order to evade conflict. 
 A series of authors defend the hypothesis that monogamy did only arise with the 
appearance of archaic Homo sapiens and its relatively big brain (Foley & Lee, 1989; 1991; 
Aiello, 1996, Knight, 1991). Initially, a network of female kin may have helped pregnant 
and nursing Homo ergaster/erectus females with the extra work required by dependent and 
relatively large-brained children (Kohn & Mithen, 1999). 
 It is not unlikely that paternal investment has started as a system of exchanging 
meat-for-sex on a regular basis. In chimpanzees meat is shared also to some degree, in 
contrast to plant food, and males seem to know very well what they are doing when giving 
meat to particular females. Males use the sharing of meat to entice females to have sex; 
females in estrus are more successful at begging for meat from males; and, males are also 
more apt to hunt if a sexually receptive female is present (Haviland, 2000). Paternal 
investment may have started within a polygamous system in which the best hunters were 
motivated to translate their hunting success into mating opportunities. Yet, at the moment 
that females became increasingly dependent on extra proteins from males, and that their 
children became increasingly dependent, it would become increasingly difficult for one 
male to provision his whole harem. At least for some, less popular females, it would become 
advantageous to motivate also the less dominant, less successful males to start collecting 
meat and other food for them. It is not unlikely that the transition to a more egalitarian 
mating system was brought about partly by female strategies (Turke, 1984; Knight, 1991). 
 Kohn & Mithen (1999) suggest that Homo ergaster /erectus /heidelbergensis males 
may have used their skills in producing relatively sophisticated Acheulian handaxes to 
impress and attract females. Although they probably exaggerate the extent to which there 
was a dichotomy between a purely artistic technology and a functional technology, it seems 
not unlikely to me that craftsmanship contributed to social status, and with that, ultimately, 
to reproductive success. It seems unlikely to me, however, that artistic skills were the only 
skills on the basis of which males where selected. In modern humans, artists are sometimes 
those boys that initially are not selected by the girls and that have to go to extreme lengths 
to draw their attention. Also, contrary to the suggestions of Miller (1997, 1999) - and 
according to the above mentioned `dual selection theory of cultural abilities' (5.14) -, art 
may not only attract females, but it may also enhance one's status within the male network. 
Sexual selection may have played an enormous role during human evolution, but the context 
in which humans choose their partners differs enormously from the context in which, for 
example, peahens choose peacocks. 
 The human mating system is deeply affected by the fact that human males are both 
cooperators and competitors. This ambiguity in the relationships between males can already 
be seen in chimpanzees (De Waal, 1981), but must have augmented further with the relative 
importance of group hunting and groupwise self-defense. When at some time during 
prehistory females became increasingly dependent on occasional extra food provisioning by 
males, but males could obtain such extra resources by cooperation only, dominant males 
could no longer monopolize all females as a matter of course. Young successful hunters 
would otherwise abandon the group and certainly some females would follow them. Also, to 
get as much extra food as possible, females had both to compete increasingly with one 
another and to ensure themselves part of the booty. They could do so by introducing extra 
elements of conditionality and exclusivity to sexual relationships which increased the 
certainty of paternity for males. Of course, this would not lead to a system of pure 
monogamy, but simply to an increase in special bonds between males and females, ignited 
by feelings of love and secured by sentiments of jealousy (based on preadaptations like 
chimpanzee `consortships' as described by Tutin (1975) and Goodall (1986: 453)). At least 
in modern humans this system can explain such characteristics as concealed ovulation, 
continual receptivity and patterns of reciprocity in courtship and sexual selection 
(Alexander & Noonan, 1979; Turke, 1984), although some claim that continual receptivity 
simply is an effect of the higher hormonal levels required for bipedalism (Spuhler, 1979). 
 There are, however, several 
reasons to assume that this typical 
human mating system started in Homo 
erectus. An important indication is that 
the degree of sexual dimorphism 
decreases in early Homo (table 7-3). As 
we have seen, dimorphism usually 
correlates with polygyny, and 
apparently the degree of polygyny 
decreased already in Homo erectus. 
This could be a sign that more 
permanent relationships existed 
between males and females which 
softened male-male competition. 
Length (m) Average 
individua
l 
__ __ 
Australopithecus 1.26 1.38 1.13 
Homo 1.71 1.80 1.60 
Weight (kg) 
Australopithecus 31 35 26 
Homo 48 51 43 
 Another line of reasoning 
starts from parallels with the mating 
systems of carnivores. Walker & 
Shipman (1989; 1996; see also Swisher, Curtis & Lewin, 2000) have always stressed that 
the Australopithecus-Homo transition is explained as a result of a herbivore turning 
carnivore. The teeth of the Nariokotome boy show a wear pattern reminiscent of the teeth of 
meat- and bone-eating carnivores, such as hyenas (Walker & Shipman, 1996). According to 
Walker & Shipman, the spread of Homo erectus from Africa resulted from the need of 
carnivores of a larger feeding area. If the recent quite spectacular dates are correct (not all 
paleoanthropologists agree), and Homo erectus has lived in Java from 2 million years ago 
up until 27.000 years ago (Swisher, Curtis & Lewin, 2000), and this spread beyond Africa 
Table 7.3 Estimated mean body size 
and weight of Australopithecus versus 
Homo. Calculated from data from 
Swisher, Curtis & Lewin, 2000, who cite 
McHenry, 1994. 
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was indeed prompted by the relatively low population densities of predators, then Homo 
erectus was a predator around that time. Both the problems and the temporary salvation of 
`1808' points to a predator life style with a tight social structure around a home-base around 
1.7 million years ago. One-and-a-half-million-years-old stone tools from Koobi Fora exhibit 
wear patterns caused by cutting meat, wood and soft plant tissue (Keeley, L.H. & N. Toth, 
1981). Note that this is also consistent with the cooking hypothesis, which however also 
requires a change in mating system. 
 All this could point to a transition from an occasional scavenger in early Homo 
(Homo habilis/ rudolfensis) to an obligatory hunter in Homo ergaster and Homo erectus. It 
could also point to a transition of a opportunistic here-and-now consumer to a species 
specialized in delayed consumption and in food preparation. This could mean that Stanley 
was too `optimistic' about Homo rudolfensis. Of course, only more complete evidence about 
early Homo can help to resolve these issues. In essence it have been the more complete 
skeletons, like Lucy and the Nariokotome boy, which have helped paleoanthropology 
beyond pure speculation. While Lucy has proven once and for all that bipedalism and brain 
size did not evolve together, the 1.8 million-year-old Nariokotome boy has demonstrated 
that early Homo ergaster/ erectus was already a tall, relatively modern-looking meat eater 
with an already somewhat longer youth or learning period (Walker & Shipman, 1989; 
1996). 
 Although apparently not everyone agrees, the reduced sexual dimorphism at this 
stage points to a different relationship between males and females, perhaps a system of pair-
bonding. As we all know, at least all novelists and song-writers, pair-bonding or `love' in 
the context of a multimale society is a very thorny and complicated affair which requires a 
lot of brain-power. Certainly, it could have been an extra factor promoting the evolution of a 
large brain, although many animals manage without this. Bigger brains, however, cause 
children to be more dependent, and so we come full-circle. 
 
7.8 GRADUALISM AND THE GAP BETWEEN ANIMAL COMMUNICATION 
AND HUMAN LANGUAGE 
Sometimes it may seem although we know almost nothing about our own evolutionary story 
with certainty. There are gorillas, chimpanzees and bonobos, there are us, modern humans, 
and there is a collection of fossils. How we should destile a story on the basis of these three 
components is not at all clear. Yet, if we would immediately stop all attempts to do so we 
would be certain that our curiosity would never be satisfied. And although there is not much 
certain, we at least have an impressive collection of fossils and tools, including two very 
complete skeletons of two very old hominids, Lucy and the Nariokotome boy. The best 
thing we can do is to continue building models and to hope for more finds that either 
weaken or strengthen particular models. 
 So far we have concluded that humans have probably split off from the 
Australopithecines, because they were forced as a result of climatological changes to rely 
more on ecological opportunism, meat-eating, perhaps cooking or other forms of delayed 
consumption, at least in times of scarcity with respect to fruits. This specialism required a 
large brain which was also furnished by it, causing problems at childbirth, subsequently 
solved by a `premature' parturition. The resulting dependent children forced males and 
females increasingly to cooperate to be able to raise them. At what time during prehistory 
the transition to a system with at least some pair-bonding and paternal investment occurred 
is unclear. Probably Lovejoy and perhaps even Stanley are wrong in their attempts to 
project an Adam-and-Eve system back more than two million years. The Nariokotome boy, 
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however, shows evidence of regular meat-eating and a lengthened youth period. The 
anatomical changes between Australopithecus and Homo are more fundamental than any 
changes that happened in Homo thereafter. So perhaps we have to believe that all happened 
already then. Perhaps Adam and Eve belonged to Homo ergaster/ erectus. God knows, 
although the book of Genesis contains conflicting stories and does not add any dates. 
 There is also not much certain about the origin of home bases and the controlled 
use of fire, apart from the fact that they originated somewhere between 2 and 0.7 million 
years ago. Some claim that humans left Africa without fire, others that humans were already 
cooking their meals 1.9 million years ago. Is it really wise, then, to go on and speculate 
about the origin of language? Yes, because speculation may inspire hypotheses which may 
throw new light on phenomena and in the end may even prove to be testable. As is proven 
again and again, in science one never knows what one will be able to know in the future by 
approaches and techniques yet unfathomed. 
 Some have linked language to the home base. The linguist Bickerton has 
suggested, for example, that home bases have functioned as an instigator of language 
evolution. At least one other species with a `home-base', the honey-bee, has developed a 
reporting system with which scouts can reports their observations to the home-front 
(Bickerton, 1990: 154). In a similar way, Homo erectus could have developed a rudimentary 
language to point other group members to potential food sources or dangers. According to 
Bickerton it was Homo erectus that first used a system of `protolanguage', a presyntactical 
language which allowed a rough classification of food-items and in which information about 
the environment could be communicated. According to Bickerton protolanguage enhanced 
the ecological flexibility of Homo erectus and was thus responsible for its spread beyond 
sub-Saharan Africa. 
 Paleoanthropologists use different clues to assess an early hominid's linguistic 
talents. One clue may be the small enlargement of the cortex called Broca's area which is 
sometimes visible in endocasts of skulls. It is already exhibited in Homo habilis/rudolfensis. 
Broca's area, associated with motor control of speech, is also visible in endocasts of the 
Nariokotome boy, Homo ergaster. In principle, it is possible to infer from this that Homo 
started to speak early on (e.g. Taylor, 1996). Yet, it is not sure whether Broca's area may not 
have had, or even still has, other motor functions. 
 The behavioral and cultural evidence is sometimes seen as standing in complete 
opposition to the brain evidence. Desmond Clarck is reported to have said with respect to 
the stone tools of Homo erectus that if their makers were talking which each other, they 
must have been saying the same things over and over again for a very long time (Potts, 
1996: 140). As a result, many anthropologists and psychologists (Lock, 1999) opt for a 
relatively recent language origin. Walker's research on the Nariokotome-boy shows that its 
vertebral canal was not wide enough to contain a spinal cord like that of humans which 
enables us to control our respiration during speech. The spinal cord of the Nariokotome-boy 
cord was small like that of other animals (Walker & Shipman, 1996). The communication 
system of this hominid, taken into consideration also its brain size, apparently did not 
contain the enormous range of sounds that modern humans are able to produce. 
 That does not mean, however, that erectus was either stupid or mute - a 
Pithecanthropus alalus (speechless ape-man) as postulated by Haeckel. Recently, it has 
been discovered that erectus lived already on Flores Island, Indonesia, across the so-called 
Wallace's Line separating the faunas of Asia and Australia, at about 900.000 - 800.000 years 
ago. That means nothing less that this species was intelligent and socially organized enough 
to construct rafts to cross the seventeen kilometers water separating Sunda from the other 
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parts of Indonesia. According to the linguist Fischer the crossing of this strait required 
planning and cooperation. 
 
 This implies use of language allowing conditional syntax: `If we do this, 
then this and this will happen'. It seems appropriate to infer from the 
Flores Island evidence that already nearly a million years ago Homo 
erectus was capable of expressing just such a form of conditional 
proposition in her and his speech (Fischer, 1999: 39). 
 
There is also new anatomical evidence that language is not exclusively associated with 
anatomically modern people. The linguist Lieberman has for a very long time contributed to 
a pessimism with respect to the language abilities of Neanderthals on the basis of their 
postulated larynx morphology (Lieberman, 1984, 1991). This pessimism has now been 
relativized by the find of a nearly complete hyoid bone with a Neanderthal in Kebara, Israel. 
This free-floating bone is attached to the larynx and to throat muscles that are important to 
speaking (Johanson & Edgar, 1996). The presence of this bone in the Neanderthal suggests 
that they may have been able to speak. In all, there is much evidence showing that there has 
been going on some language evolution during the more than million years of Homo erectus 
presence. 
 Perhaps we should care not to focus one-sidedly on a human-like physical vocal 
apparatus. The linguist Steven Fischer defines language even as a `medium of information 
exchange' (Fischer, 1999). Language is to some extent a `multiple realizable' talent, because 
it can be fulfilled by many media as shown by the variety of communication systems 
displayed in the animal kingdom (recently one even speaks about communication between 
plants and the predators of their parasites). Obviously, one can work with a narrow and a 
wide definition of language, including only a few or many elements in one's definition, just 
as this is the case with respect to knowledge (chapter 1; tab. 7-4). The human vocal 
apparatus has evolved to transmit fast amounts of information in a very short period of time. 
As part of the language system of a `winner' it does its job so exceedingly well that we are 
seduced to think that it is the only system possible. Yet, if it is true that one can learn some 
bonobos, chimpanzees, dolphins, sea-lions, and even parrots to communicate meaningfully 
using symbols and that, for example, vervet monkeys have different alarm calls for different 
predators (see chapter 1), there is reason to doubt that we are the only animal with language 
- at least with symbols. Now that the secret codes of more and more animal communication 
systems are being cracked, it becomes clear that they often contain referential elements that 
go beyond expressing emotional states only. A series of field observers acquainted with 
chimpanzees believe that the about three dozen different call-types of chimpanzees may 
contain more information about the world than is currently known - information not only 
referring to subjective emotional states (Goodall, 1986; Boehm, 1992). Researchers of the 
State University of Ohio have recently found that chimpanzees can refer via their calls to 
different, specific kinds of food (Bartlett, Boyd & Whiten, 2001). In the wild, they can 
probably at least differentiate between food-calls referring to meat and to vegetarian food 
(Boehm, 1992). Christophe and Hedwige Boesch discovered that a dominant male in the Taï 
National Park was giving directions to subgroups that were out of sight by a combination of 
drumming initiated by pant-hooting. After the alpha male had drummed the group abruptly 
changed direction. 
 
 Insects Birds Crows Dolphins/a
pes 
Homo 
erectus 
Man 
/Parrots    
/Mammals   
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 Another consideration is that there is a vast difference between understanding and 
speaking a language, and between categorization of things and relations, and being able to 
transmit such knowledge. My just two-year old son Bram understands many things but is 
still largely unable to speak. He fills the gap with a few gestures which he has picked up (for 
example a gesture which can mean `it has gone away'/ `it is not there'/ `empty'/ etc.), by 
pointing and by expressing his moods. The meaning of such gestures is often very clear in 
combination with these expressions, though understanding is completely context-dependent 
and requires knowledge of his habits, hobby's and personality. The total number of 
meaningful signals he is able to emit is large4. This goes no doubt also for chimpanzees, 
which also know each other's psychology, a large number of physical and facial displays, 
and which are also able to learn and understand all kinds of gestures. At this point the series 
of chimpanzee sounds and gestures discovered in the wild is gradually becoming larger. 
Yet, even if chimpanzees would be able to communicate with each other via sounds, 
gestures and other displays, there need not be a one-to-one relationship between knowledge 
and ability to communicate. Chimpanzees certainly know a lot of plant and animal species, 
but I doubt that they have specific signals for each of them. Our familiarity with and 
intimate knowledge of the world is always bigger than our capacity to express it. 
 The psychologist Merlin Donald has attempted to break the dogma that cognition 
and language always evolve together. In his Origins of the Modern Mind (1991) he claims 
that a series of cognitive evolutionary innovations preceded the evolution of language. The 
 
4 Since I wrote these lines his vocabulary has increased dramatically in just a couple of 
months. 
Grammar 
 
    x  ?  x 
   
Arbitrary symbols 
with meaning 
 
   x  x  ?  x 
    
Signal-object 
reference 
 
   x  x  ?  x 
    
Personal call 
 
   ?  x  ?  x 
    
Expression of 
emotional states 
  x  x  x  x  x 
     
 
Information exchange  x  x  x  x  x  x 
       
Signals  x  x  x  x  x  x 
       
Table 7-4. Some elements of language competence as they are spread through the animal 
kingdom. Included are results from training programs. For data see Herman, 1984; Parker & 
Gibson, 1990; O'Connor & Peterson, 1994; Vauclair, 1996. 
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`missing link' between the ape's knowledge of its environment and human symbol-mediated 
knowledge is a cognitive style characterized by conscious imitation and conscious 
controlled learning without language. Donald calls it mimetic culture and claims that 
prelinguistic children, illiterate deaf-mutes, and artists other than writers prove that human 
cognition is not based exclusively on language. According to him "without language, the 
human mind is still far superior to that of the ape" (165). Homo erectus was the embodiment 
of this kind of knowledge. The culture of Homo erectus includes tools which could not have 
been made by apes, because they require a level of planning and control far beyond their 
`episodic' (here-and-now-bound) culture, but this does not necessarily presuppose language.  
 
 The stone tools of erectus required expert fashioning: archaeologists require 
months of training and practice to become good at creating Acheulian tools. They 
have to learn, and remember exactly how to strike a sharp edge and not break off 
the finished part with the next blow. The appropriate materials have to be 
remembered; to flake or chip a stone, two stones of relatively different hardness 
must be employed, the harder one as the shaping tool. The blows have to be 
modulated as a function of the type of stone; certain stones break in such a way 
that their edge is sharp and elongated, others flake in a different way. Such skill 
would not have been restricted to the use of stone: since there were so many other 
easier, but perishable and breakable, materials available, tools were almost 
certainly made first from materials like bones, teeth, shells, skins, and wood. 
  Toolmaking was probably the first instance of behavior that depended 
entirely upon the existence of self-cued mimetic skill. The reproduction could not 
be dependent on immediate environmental reinforcers or contingencies. Tool 
manufacturing is usually done at a time and place remote from those where the 
tool is finally used. By contrast, apes use as tools objects the find in the 
immediate temporal and spatial vicinity of the task. Tool manufacture, in other 
words, demands an ability to self-cue and reproduce or re-enact the scenario 
leading to the tool's manufacture in the absence of immediately present materials 
or even an immediate need for the tool (179-180). 
 
According to Donald, language could have evolved only on the basis of an already existing 
mimetic culture. Language involves the invention of an arbitrary set of symbols: apes and 
other animals can be taught elements of such a language, but they did not invent it 
themselves. "The invention of symbols, including words must have followed an advance in 
thought skills, and was an integral part of the evolution of model building." Only after 
humans had started inventing systems of symbols there was a selection pressure directed at 
the modification of the vocal apparatus. As always, behavior precedes anatomical 
adaptation. 
 If Donald is right this could explain at the same time the relatively sophisticated 
level of Homo erectus-culture, its conservatism, and the absence of some of the later 
anatomical adaptations for speech in this species. Yet, the evidence seems far from 
conclusive to me. The fact that the brain of Homo erectus became larger over time could 
point to a gradual increase in intelligence; and I do not see why this would not include some 
linguistic skills. As my son Bram proves to me, there is a lot you can tell with only a small 
collection of gestures and words, and Homo erectus gives the impression of having done 
just that. Over time this collection of gestures and words may have become larger, 
gradually. It seems to me that Donald is artificially widening the gap between chimpanzees 
and humans. Detailed studies of chimpanzees (e.g. De Waal, 1981) have pointed to elements 
of planning and conscious control in chimpanzee behavior. Should the evolution from the 
probably chimpanzee-like mind of the common HUCHIBO-ancestor to the human mind not 
be analyzed as the result of selection pressures improving particular skills that are already 
present in chimpanzees? Despite all these criticisms, however, I still find Donald's idea that 
language and cognition should be separated very important. 
 In this respect the hypotheses 
put forward by the archeologist 
Steven Mithen in The Prehistory of 
the Mind (1996) could be relevant, 
too, although he comes with a 
different approach with which Donald 
disagrees (Donald, 1999). While 
Donald sees the evolving hominid 
mind as an integrative whole that has 
gone through three different stages, 
Mithen tries to explain the different 
cognitive stages during hominid 
evolution as a result of the 
independent development and 
subsequent reintegration of a series of 
cognitive modules. He is a believer in 
the modular version of evolutionary 
psychology of Tooby and Cosmides 
(e.g. 1992) with their `Swiss-army-
knife' metaphor of the mind, but he 
links the `Swiss army knife mentality' 
especially with the early human mind. 
The `big bang of modern human 
culture' would be explained by new 
connections between these 
independently evolved cognitive 
modules (fig. 7-9). In this context he 
speaks about the `cognitive fluidity' of 
the modern mind. 
 Although I find such models 
very appealing, I find it hard to decide between them or to judge about them on the basis of 
our current knowledge. It is always risky to speculate about cognitive stages between the 
apes and man as long as we do not know enough about apes. As I said before, chimpanzee 
researchers still feel that they have not yet cracked the `code' of chimpanzee 
communication. At the same time, a whole range of higher cognitive abilities have been 
found in chimpanzees, both in the wild and in labatories, that strengthen the case for a 
gradualistic approach. For example, in her overview, Goodall (1986) refers to abstraction 
and generalization, symbolic representation, displacement in time and space, concept of self, 
inferring purpose to others, and intentional communication, among other things. She 
finishes her list with recounting the story of Vicky playing with an imaginary doll. It seems 
to me that especially Merlin Donald makes a caricature of the chimpanzee mind when he 
attributes exclusively `episodic culture' to it, but that even Mithen is too focussed on 
downplaying chimpanzee intelligence. 
 
Fig. 7-9.The multiple intelligences of Pan and Homo 
according to Mithen (1996: figs. 4, 10, 15, 16, 17, 26 
combined). The modern human mind is seen as a 
reintegration of the independently working modules 
of early humans. 
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 With respect to the evolution of language, I found a paper by Christopher Boehm 
(1992) very revealing. He discusses the approximately seven long distance vocalizations of 
chimpanzees (pant-hoots, food-calls, whimpers, screams, waa calls, hunting calls, predator 
wraas) and speculates about their proto-linguistic properties. These calls do not require 
additional nonvocal information and are often used in short exchanges in which both parties 
take turns as in human conversation. According to Boehm, the tendency of chimpanzees to 
split and reorganize continually within their often forested group-territory (to form a 
`fission-fusion society'), may explain their vocally-dominated communication system. 
Chimpanzees are very good listeners and without seeing each other they often know exactly 
where `everyone' is. Their calls, while containing a strong genetic component, are improved 
by imitation: infants imitate their mothers (remember, in captivity, the bonobo Kanzi 
learned a series of symbols that researcher's tried to teach her mother). Chimpanzees may 
have the ability to extract so much information from each other's calls that they are highly 
`pre-adapted' to decode strings of signals that refer to specific contexts, objects or situations. 
Boehm even finds back rudimentary versions of most of Hockett's `design features' of 
language. 
 All this shows that Donald's diagnosis of chimpanzee culture as completely bound 
to the here-and-now is almost certainly a caricature. I am tempted to postulate that his 
diagnosis of Pithecanthropus alalus is a caricature, too. Homo erectus must have had 
certainly the cognitive skills of a chimpanzee, but as a result of its transition to a more 
delayed consumption, it must have been even better at categorizing, planning, and making 
complex reciprocal altruistic calculations. Donald is probably right in his diagnosis that 
Homo erectus had developed the ability to train oneself and to transcend one's immediate 
situation much further than the chimpanzee as testified by his sophisticated tools. The same 
goes for other skills that may have served as pre-adaptations for the acquisition of language, 
like the urge to classify (Aitchinson, 1997) and to share knowledge. Given the fact that 
chimpanzees and bonobo's can be taught at least a collection of symbols, it is very unlikely 
that Homo erectus did not at least have a rudimentary language with which it could share its 
knowledge with respect to the natural environment and with which it could perhaps even 
discuss social matters. 
 This brings me to a final theory which I find highly relevant within the discussion 
about the origins of language. During the last decade the idea was launched that there are 
perhaps connections between language evolution and both group and brain size. Robin 
Dunbar (1993; 1996) hypothesizes that language was invented at the point that grooming no 
longer sufficed to maintain the increasing number of social contacts resulting from 
increasing group size. Because the complexity of the social network also correlates with 
group size, brain size would have evolved parallel to group size. Dunbar points to a parallel 
in bats, in which some hypersocial species also have larger brains. If Dunbar is right, the 
brain sizes of extinct humans reveal the complexity of their social lifes. Language would 
have evolved as a kind of social glue which holds relatively large network of direct and 
indirect reciprocal altruistic relationships together. Certainly, most language that we use 
helps us to make promises, appointments, etc.. Language plays also an essential role in 
advertising one's qualities and has certainly been one of the focal points of sexual selection. 
Most conversations are not much more than a clean and standoffish way of grooming. The 
fact that sometimes information is exchanged which not only refers to the weather shows 
that our reciprocal altruism is not only about services, but most of all about information. 
Language as a form of grooming and language as a form of information exchange are two 
sides of our specific system of reciprocal altruism. 
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 With that we come to the question of cooperation and groups size. At that point 
evolutionists and, especially, sociobiologists will immediately return to the level of ultimate 
questions. One of the key questions in which sociobiologists are interested is why group 
sizes increased during human evolution. What drove the process toward larger groups with 
more direct and indirect reciprocal altruism? Why was language more and more needed in 
humans in contrast to other apes and other animals? What selection pressures are 
responsible for the evolution of such specialized abilities, which require not only such a 
large brain, but also such an extended learning period? It seems to me that theories like 
those of Donald and Mithen remain at the proximate level and do not address these 
questions. To find theories that try to answer ultimate questions (questions not referring to 
how, but to why) we have to return to sociobiology and evolutionary psychology. 
 Yet, sociobiology and evolutionary psychology do not offer one standard 
explanation of human origins. At the moment there is not really a consensus about the 
forces that `drove' human evolution. In the next chapter, I will try to compare the three 
theories that seem to have the best papers to me and decide which one is right, and to what 
extent. 
  8   
  *** Why some apes became 
humans: the role of runaway 
selection \\  
 
  I will not attempt to prove this theory in any absolute sense, for I am not sure that there is such 
thing as `absolute proof'. Both the theory and the evidence for and against it are presented only as 
food for thought, as a possible approach to the study of human evolution and human nature which 
has not yet been fully explored. If the theory is sound, however, it has many far-reaching 
implications. It implies that there is no sharp line between `good' and `evil', and that cooperation, 
communication, courage, and love are very closely related indeed to conflict, deception, terror, and 
hatred. It implies that every increase in the size of the brain was produced by the force of mixed 
emotions of love and ferocity. It implies that every step of the long, bloody journey from ape to 
man increased not only the size of the brain but also its ability to recognize more and more people 
as friends. It implies that the hand-axe not only killed `them', but also swelled the ranks of `us'. 
Today our brains can understand `us' in terms of social groups as large as 700 million. But the 
hand-axe has been chipped and polished and fashioned into the hydrogen bomb, and we still aim 
the bombs at `them'. 
 Robert Bigelow, 1969 
8.0. INTRODUCTION 
Let us assume that I have until now succeeded in explaining human bipedality, some aspects 
of the human mating system, and the human tendency to eat meat. With that I have not 
come close to my initial demand of giving an explanation of human evolution that is 
phylogenetically plausible, paleontologically adequate, evolutionary feasible and 
explanatory sufficient and specific. What is needed is an explanation that bridges the gap 
between a special, bipedal hunting ape (let us say, Homo erectus) and the highly culture-
dependent and linguistic ape that we currently are. In this chapter I will compare, evaluate 
and to some extent mix and integrate three competing hypotheses with respect to the last 
phase of our evolution. Because these hypotheses all relate to properties of human behavior, 
I will try to delve somewhat deeper into behavioral changes that accompanied human 
evolution, particularly changes in social structure and in the mating system. 
  What has to be explained? I have already pointed out that we cannot start from the 
assumption that nice properties like the ability to learn and speak a language or the ability to 
feel empathy are of such inherent value that evolution can be understood as a process of 
breeding them (as some exobiologists seem to think). Instead, we have to explain why there 
is one species of ape with a brain that is three times larger than that of its closest living 
relatives and why this ape needs linguistic abilities and sometimes even moral qualities that 
seem unnecessary for the simple task of surviving and reproducing with which most 
organisms fill their days and which form the ultimate `reason' for the existence of any living 
species whatsoever. We have to explain why this species is completely dependent on 
culturally transmitted habits, traditions, symbols, and tools in every domain of its life, and 
why it lives in societies that are larger than that of `ordinary' hunting species, like lions and 
hyenas. We have also to explain why there is only one such species on earth and why there 
are not much more transition forms, for example hominid species with smaller brains, 
smaller vocabularies, and more modest ambitions.  
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8.1. ALTERNATIVE EXPLANATIONS 
Hunting and gathering. To some extent this is the standard hypothesis, supported by many 
sociobiologists, evolutionary psychologists, and behavioral ecologists. Because 
chimpanzees are both fructivores and occasional carnivores, this is also a very safe theory to 
start with. I have shown already (chapter 7) that it is supported both by the new evidence on 
chimpanzee hunting and by new analyses on the Nariokotome boy which show that it was a 
hunter. An (ultimately climatologically induced) transition from omnivore, herbivore or 
fructivore to partial carnivore can explain a series of characteristics which emerge in Homo 
ergaster. Yet, even within the frame-work of the theory that our ancestors were hunter-
gatherers, a series of questions remain unanswered, for example: 
1. Why did humans evolve high intelligence in contrast to other hunters (gatherers)? 
Lions and hyena's do not need language, morality and a capacity for abstract 
thought to hunt their prey; ants do not need a big brain to gather food. 
2. Why do humans, even in primitive societies, tend to live together in groups that are 
above the optimal size required for group hunting (gathering)? Why did not group 
size decrease as hunting weapons and skills improved during human evolution? 
(Alexander, 1987: 79)? 
Given the good credentials going with the hunting and gathering hypotheses, we should not 
dismiss them too fast, and investigate their explanatory potential and limits further. 
 Sexual selection. The two other theories that I want to discuss, are both based on 
the assumption that human uniqueness requires a special (albeit naturalistic) explanation. 
The excessive talents displayed by humans fall outside the scope of ordinary natural 
selection, and point to a kind of runaway selection in which traits become `hypertrophied'. 
Runaway selection can be defined as a process of directional selection that works 
autocatalytic and cumulative. Runaway selection is often the result of sexual selection, 
because it is here that it is important to exceed all others, again and again. The moment that, 
for example, peahens have to choose between different males, any trait that indicates fitness 
and health can become a criterium. Hence, an apparently arbitrary trait, like the number of 
`eyes' in the peacock's tail, can become important enough to become a strong selection 
factor. At some point in their evolution peahens started to prefer peacocks with longer tails 
with more `eyes' in them, and as a result the peacock's tail became `hypertrophied'. 
 The sexual selection theory of human origins assumes that the human brain is 
comparable to the peacock's tail (e.g., Parker, 1987; Mestel, 1995; Ridley, 1994; Miller, 
1996; 2000). If either protohuman males or protohuman females with relatively larger brains 
or with more cognitive abilities have become relatively attractive, runaway selection could 
have shaped a series of unique human abilities. In most species, sexual selection breeds 
special characteristics in the sex that has to compete for access to the most investing sex 
(Trivers, 1971; see chapter 4), but if we assume that those characteristics are not linked to 
sex-specific chromosomes they might well be inherited by the other sex as well. Above that, 
there are enough species in nature in which a kind of mutual sexual selection of the sexes is 
going on and in that respect, sexual selection needs not to be disruptive, but might well be 
directional (see fig. 5.5). 
 Yet, there are still a whole series of problems with sexual selection as an 
explanation of human uniqueness. Perhaps most important, sexual selection theory fails to 
explain why it only occurred in the human lineage (and not in that of, for example, chimps). 
To some extent it is a somewhat easy hypothesis: if you can not explain, for example, why 
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birds started to fly, just suppose that at some point female protobirds (some kind of dinosaur 
it is currently thought by most paleontologists) were attracted to males that could jump and 
stay in the air longer and longer. If you cannot explain why a brontosaur was so big or a 
shrew mouse is so small, you can just refer to the specific tastes of female protobrontosaurs 
and proto shrew mouses. That would mean that an ecologically uninformed sexual selection 
hypothesis lacks explanatory specificity. 
 Thus, there must have been already special conditions under which sexual selection 
was promoted and a sexual selection theory of human evolution should be able to show 
what it put in motion, and when. 
 Intergroup competition theory. Like sexual selection theory, the intergroup 
competition hypothesis invokes some kind of runaway selection process. Like sexual 
selection theory, intergroup competition theory goes back to Darwin. In his Descent of Man 
he writes: 
 
 When two tribes of primeval man, living in the same country, came into 
competition, if (other circumstances being equal) the one tribe included a great 
number of courageous, sympathetic and faithful members, who were always 
ready to warn each other of danger, to aid and defend each other, this tribe would 
succeed better and conquer the other. Let it be borne in mind how all-important 
in the never-ceasing wars of savages, fidelity and courage must be. The 
advantage which disciplined soldiers have over undisciplined hordes follows 
chiefly from the confidence which each man feels in his comrades. Obedience, ... 
, is of the highest value, for any form of government is better than none. Selfish 
and contentious people will not cohere, and without coherence nothing can be 
effected. A tribe rich in the above qualities would spread and be victorious over 
other tribes: but in the course of time it would, judging from all past history, be in 
its turn overcome by some other tribe still more highly endowed. Thus the social 
and moral qualities would tend slowly to advance and be diffused throughout the 
world (Darwin, 1871: 498). 
 
Thus, the general idea of the model is that an arms race between different groups of 
protohomomids could lead to the runaway selection process for social and moral capacities 
of which the human psyche is postulated to be the outcome. 
 This idea was further expounded by a large series of authors in some form. 
Yet, during the last fifty years a much smaller collection of authors has tried to give it a 
scientific basis. Bigelow (1969) uses it in his brilliant The Dawn Warriors to explain the 
threefold brain enlargement during human evolution. It was, however, Richard Alexander 
(Alexander, 1987; 1989; 1990) who tried to place it into the solid framework of modern 
evolutionary biology and who introduced a whole series of new concepts to do so. His 
reasoning can be summarized as follows (see fig. 8-1):  
- At the moment that early hominids reached `ecological dominance' the threat from 
predators was replaced by intraspecific `balances of power'. 
- Bigger, stronger and more disciplined groups were better able to defend a territory. 
As a result of this group sizes increased far beyond the optimum size for 
hunting/gathering bands. 
 - To be able to live together in large 
groups with many non kin-related 
conspecifics, humans developed 
reciprocal altruism to a degree in 
which it became `generalized' 
reciprocity (Trivers, 1971) or `indirect' 
reciprocity (Alexander, 1979; 1987), 
meaning a form of reciprocity in which 
third parties record reciprocal relations 
to learn about the reliability and `moral 
profile' of group members who are 
potential cooperators for themselves.  
- In such a situation it becomes 
important to look like a very reliable and generous cooperator. This can either be 
achieved by really being a generous cooperator or by deception, which costs less 
energy but more intelligence. A runaway selection for mental proficiency and 
complexity arises. 
Fig. 8-1. Alexander's `balance of power' 
hypothesis. 
- Because dominant males were increasingly dependent on cooperation with other 
males, they had to renounce their reproductive monopolies. `Reproductive 
opportunity leveling' enabled big groups to overcome potential sources of internal 
disruption (Alexander, 1979; 1987: 71). 
 
8.2. SOME UNIVERSAL HUMAN BEHAVIORAL CHARACTERISTICS THAT 
HAVE TO BE EXPLAINED 
Evolution works just like any alchemist, starting with one material, for example iron, and 
turning it into some other material, for example gold, via a series of distinctive steps. The 
ingredients with which human evolution started were those of the common HUCHIBO-
ancestor (7.2.), which as far as we now know may not have been completely unlike the 
chimpanzee in many aspects. The bonobo has split apart from the chimpanzee at a later 
stage and its similarities with man are probably products of convergent evolution. In chapter 
7, we have looked to some of the selection pressures that may have molded the common 
HUCHIBO-ancestor into a predator ape. We are now interested in the selection pressures 
that molded this predator ape into a highly cultural species. 
 But what is culture? In part II we have already concluded that culture as a body of 
not genetically inherited customs, knowledge and ideas shared by groups does not float 
above its biological substratum. It is a way in which particular species fulfill particular 
needs which have to be adapted to environments which cannot be foreseen by selection. At 
least some aspects of culture seems to be somehow driven by forces within the power 
pyramids of societies. Cultural abilities could thus be linked to the drive for status or by 
sexual selection. It is now time to apply this rather abstract model and look how `gene-
culture coevolution' has started and worked within our evolution. 
 Somehow cultural abilities and our large brains must be linked to underlying 
changes in behavior. For example, culture as we know it nowadays is intimately linked to an 
extremely long learning period of youngsters, which is a biological given. It is also linked to 
our lives in the enormous societies with which we share a language or languages. From a 
sociobiological point of view, all this inspires research in behavioral changes that somehow 
have propelled gene-culture coevolution and in the socio-sexual structures in which our 
 
 
 
 304
  
 
 305
                    
ancestors lived their lives. Thus, before we go on with our exploration of the three models 
which we want to compare, let us try to make an inventory of some of the domains in which 
behavioral changes took place during the process of directional selection that produced our 
species. 
 
An increased group size. One of the most important behavioral characteristics of modern 
humans is that they live in relatively large societies almost everywhere in which groups 
maintain contacts with other groups and in which relatives and friends are remembered, 
even when they have moved to other groups. Some of the social intelligence required for 
this way of living is certainly present in the chimpanzee which lives in `fission-fusion' 
societies in which subgroups are continually formed, for example at a particular fruit tree of 
which the fruits are ripe at that moment and in which, at the same time, a system of complex 
alliances within the group determines the dominance hierarchy. Yet, party size in 
chimpanzees is generally smaller than that in, for example, baboons and bonobos. 
 What forces may have initiated a tendency to form larger groups? Perhaps Foley 
and Lee (1989) are right when they point out that the patchy grassland/bushland habitat, in 
which they suppose that Australopithecus afarensis lived, would promote larger group sizes 
because of predator avoidance (also, Mithen, 1994). If the idea of Aiello & Dunbar (1993) is 
right and relative brain size correlates with group size, groups may have become gradually 
bigger during the evolution of the genus Homo. This would mean that predation levels 
would have increased or at least would have remained constant. There are some clues about 
the predators that must have made the lives of Australopiths sometimes extremely hard. 
There has been found an Australopithecus head with two holes in his head corresponding to 
two leopard teeth and several authors have suggested that the Taung child has been killed by 
a large eagle (Berger, et al., 1994). Australopiths coexisted with a series of sabertooths and 
other large cats, including Dinofelis which could well have been a specialized hominid 
consumer (Brain, 1981)1. These cats all went extinct, however, and one wonders what 
predators forced groups of hominids to become larger then, if Aiello and Dunbar are right. 
 It has been suggested also that larger groups were functional in the context of a 
dependency on animal carcasses: larger groups would be better able to deal with competing 
scavengers and they offer more "opportunities for food sharing and/or tolerated theft" (Kohn 
& Mithen, 1999: 521). In that case, we would have to compare our ancestors with vultures 
jostling and quarrelling around carcasses, perhaps with the difference that they sometimes 
dragged away the carcasses and cooperated in defending and butchering it. This might give 
us clues about the size of those groups. 
 Apart from the inference that one could make on the basis of their theory (which 
links brain size with group size) it is, however, generally hard to find data on group size 
during human evolution. On the basis of their excavations archaeologists tend to believe that 
group size increased with the coming of modern Homo sapiens. One of the few clues to 
group sizes in human evolution is constituted by the travelling distance of materials and 
artifacts, which starts to become impressive in modern Homo sapiens, too. 
 
 Moderate sexual dimorphism. Sexual dimorphism in all HUCHIBOs is relatively 
 
1 Some of the bones of the even older hominid, millenium man, Orrorin, six million years old, also show signs of 
predation by leopards. 
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mild compared to more distantly related hominoids like gorillas and orangutans. Sexual 
dimorphism may have been relatively large in the common ancestor of all anthropoids, 
because a candidate for this species, Aegyptopithecus, which has been found in the Fayum 
Depression in Egypt and is dated approximately 27 million years ago, shows considerable 
dimorphism (Frayer & Wolpoff, 1985). In orangutans and gorillas it is relatively large. The 
measures of the sexual dimorphism of Australopithecus differ: if one uses the canine teeth, 
it seems relatively large (Frayer & Wolfpoff, 1985); if one uses the length of the hindlimb 
joints, it is somewhat above that of chimpanzees and bonobos, but below the sexual 
dimorphism of gorillas and orangutans (McHenry, 1991). On the basis of mandibular 
canines Frayer and Wolpoff (1985) have calculated a gradual decline of the sex differences 
from Homo habilis to Homo erectus and Homo sapiens, with a somewhat bigger difference 
in the European Neanderthals. Other authors, however, postulate that the sexual differences 
within the genus Homo were small from the very beginning (Stanley, 1996, pp. 178-179). 
 Sex differences in size are often thought to correlate with the amount of polygyny. 
They also result in different food habits. In chimpanzees females spend much more time in 
fishing for termites than males (McGrew, 1992, p. 91) and females also eat more insects 
generally. On the other hand, it is the males who do most of hunting, especially on prey that 
is relatively difficult to get, like monkeys. Females sometimes catch ungulates, but generally 
they are more gatherers than hunters (McGrew, 1992, p. 103). McGrew notes cautiously 
that `it is tempting to interpret this difference as a possible `pre-adaptation' for the evolution 
of a system of sexual division of labor' (McGrew, 1992, p. 105). I am tempted to add (in the 
spirit of chapter 7) that this sexual division of labor could have made a longer period of 
childhood dependency possible, because it created a situation in which females and 
juveniles could stay behind longer at a relatively safe `home base', were males would return 
at regular times with a surplus of extra proteins. All this would fit the hunting hypothesis 
nicely. 
 Although sex differences in size are only moderate in our species, there are a series 
of important physical and psychological differences between the sexes. The physical 
differences must probably be explained as a result of encephalization (width of the pelvis) 
and of sexual selection for neotenous mothers (relatively light complexion of the skin, hair, 
breasts). Within evolutionary psychology, a series of profound psychological differences 
between the sexes are often attributed to a long stage of hunting and gathering during 
human prehistory. Females are better at remembering spatial configurations and objects and 
are very good in incidental, nondirectional learning of such configurations. Males are better 
at performing mental rotations and (as a result of that) at reading maps (Silverman & Eals, 
1992). Women do better on precision manual tasks and on mathematical calculation tests. 
Men, however, are more accurate in target-directed motor skills, such as aimed throwing, 
and do better on tests on mathematical reasoning (Kimura, 1992). In the use of speech, 
studies of aphasia suggest that women use their hemispheres more equally than men do 
(Kimura, 1992), which is also supported by the fact that their corpus callosum is bigger (e.g. 
Moir & Jessel, 1991). One of the effects seems to be that women have less difficulty in 
`finding the right word' to express their feelings and are generally more close to their 
feelings and to their body. Several other female psychological characteristics suggest that 
women are somewhat more inclined to stay at the homebase and embellish it. It may be 
argued that throughout a large part of human evolution, females were somewhat more 
linked to the homebase and relatively more involved in the raising of children, which would 
also explain their linguistic superiority (Dunbar, 1996). 
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 Male dominance. While chimpanzee societies seem to be relatively male 
dominated, female bonds seem to be much stronger in bonobos (Parish, 1994). In 
chimpanzees, coalitions of males seem to form a center of power in the midst of the group; 
in bonobos, males are thought to be more markedly linked to particular females (De Waal, 
1995). Male bonobos often need the support of their mothers to become powerful, and 
males can only become dominant if they have the support of equally dominant females in 
the group (Kano, 1992). 
 These far-reaching social differences are thought to have arisen as a result of banal 
ecological causes. Female bonobos are thought to be much more powerful as a result of the 
omnipresence of terrestrial herbaceous vegetation: groups do not have to split at any 
moment, which enables females to stay together and form relatively strong coalitions. 
Adolescent females can become part of the female social network of a group by starting an 
emotional and sexual relationship with more adult females. As a result of the power of these 
`lesbian matriarchies', bonobo males have become much less aggressive and `demonic' than 
chimpanzees. Whereas gorillas and chimpanzees both are very aggressive toward females 
and children, this strategy does not seem to work in bonobos (Wrangham & Peterson, 1996). 
 The fact that species which are so closely related as chimpanzees and bonobos can 
have almost completely opposite social systems demonstrates the far-reaching consequences 
of small changes in power and dependency. It may show also that particular oscillations 
during human history which are normally attributed to `culture' could result from changes in 
ecological and economic conditions (as I have demonstrated in chapter 6). It would be 
interesting to make a list of the probable causes of female versus male dominance during the 
evolution of all primates. The more female-dominated social systems probably could be 
promoted by a lack of predators (e.g., on Madagascar: Richard, 1987), relaxed food 
competition, and a low dependence on meat; the more male-dominated systems could be 
promoted by a situation in which males can take advantage of the competition between 
females, by a dependence on meat, or by an increased level of intergroup competition. 
Wrangham explains the similarity of humans with chimpanzees (and not with bonobos) to 
an inability to form female coalitions in a savanna-like environment as a result of the 
scarcity of food. Yet, if females at some point in our evolution became dependent on male 
provisioning or protection this could have been a factor of even more importance, because 
female competition over male support could easily have broken down female coalitions. 
Also, it would be interesting to investigate whether human societies that live under the 
threat of war become relatively male dominated (which could, of course, support, the 
intergroup group competition hypothesis). 
 Feminists have often speculated about an original human society in which females 
were more powerful than males and sometimes have referred in this context to Bachofen's 
work Das Mutterrecht (1861), which had considerable influence on Engels and thus on the 
Marxist tradition. Given the fact that in apes - in contrast to most monkeys - females 
disperse, that chimpanzee societies are mostly dominated by a small coalition of often 
related males, and that there are no human societies that are really female dominated, such 
an original matriarchal society is extremely unlikely. Even Hatshepsut could only become 
pharaoh by wearing an artificial beard. Whether we like it or not, there are good reasons to 
suppose that patriarchies are at least as old as gorillas and chimpanzees (Hrdy, 1997). The 
original female dominated society has probably been at least ten millions years old. Yet, as 
the case of the bonobo shows, small ecological changes can have dramatic consequences in 
a relatively short time. 
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 Multimale groups with some sperm competition. If sex differences in size correlate 
with the amount of polygyny, australopithecines may have been relatively polygynous, even 
compared to chimpanzees. According to some theorists, the fact that chimpanzees live in 
multimale groups does not prove anything about the common HUCHIBO ancestor: it can 
have been like the gorilla in this respect. Schröder (1993) gives three arguments for a more 
gorillalike social system: 
1.  The remarkable sexual dimorphism in Australopithecus, `more likely indicating an 
intense competition between males to control access to females than gametic 
competition'. 
2. The fact that modern humans exhibit moderate polygyny, but not promiscuity. 
3. The fact that female gorillas do not show sexual swellings and that the sexual 
swellings of chimpanzees and bonobos could be a derived trait. 
However, the idea that early hominids had a social structure somewhat more similar to that 
of gorillas than to that of chimpanzees remains implausible. Not only are we much more 
related to chimpanzees, as indicated by most molecular analyses, but one of our oldest 
recently discovered hominid ancestors, Ardipithecus ramidus (White, Suwa & Asfaw, 1994, 
1995), displays many similarities to chimpanzees as well. Given the fact that the 
environments in which chimpanzees have lived have shrunk and expanded several times, 
but never completely vanished, it is not unreasonable to assume that the chimpanzee is still 
similar to the common HUCHIBO ancestor (Wrangham & Peterson, 1996). In that case, 
bonobos and hominids are the product of isolated populations that have drifted apart into 
regions that were more deeply affected by the climatological and ecological events of the 
last five or six million years (Boaz, 1997). 
 As I noted already, Foley and Lee claim that the patchy grassland/bushland habitat 
in which they suppose that Australopithecus afarensis lived would promote larger group 
sizes because of predator avoidance. Larger group size implies that adult males must have 
associated together. Even in gorillas a dominant silverback male often tolerates one or more 
silverbacks - one extraordinary group in Rwanda even includes seven silverbacks 
(Wrangham & Peterson, 1996, p. 147) - so even gorillas cannot be said to live in unimale 
groups. Further, the discovery of the `First Family,' a place were at least 13 individuals of A. 
afarensis were found together (Afar Locality 333; e.g., Johanson & Edgar, 1996, p. 126), 
may give us a real hint of the group composition of that species. This group consisted of at 
least three large individuals who probably were males and at least two small-bodied 
individuals who may have been females. 
 Finally, Schröder's suggestion that the human mating system could have evolved 
directly from a more gorilla-like polygynous system is implausible given the behavior of 
human females. It is probably a universal rule that the degree of female promiscuity 
correlates with the amount of `sperm competition' and, therefore, testes size in males 
(Martin & May, 1981; Harcourt, Harvey, Larson & Short, 1981, 1981; Hrdy, 1997; sperm 
competition is the competition between ejaculates of different males for the fertilization of a 
female's eggs, Birkhead, 2000). If the human mating system was really characterized only 
by moderate polygyny, but not by promiscuity, the size of the human testes would be 
smaller. Given the fact that the human testes are halfway between those of gorillas (small) 
and chimpanzees (big), it is much more plausible to assume that the human mating system 
has evolved out of a more chimpanzeelike, partly promiscuous system as a result of a 
process of reproductive monopolization of females, which started as a result of some kind of 
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ecological crisis. 
 Special bonds between males and females. All in all, although we don't know 
anything with certainty about the mating system of the original HUCHIBO ancestor and that 
of Australopithecus, we have good reason to use the chimpanzee as a model. In 
chimpanzees there exist three different types of mating relationships (Nishida & Hiraiwa-
Hasegawa, 1987, p. 169, order changed): 
1. Possessive matings of alpha males who may prevent other males from mating (and 
may occasionally use force or threats). 
2. Opportunistic matings in which males copulate freely in the presence of other 
males. 
3. Consortships in which a male and a female seclude themselves from the rest of 
society to have an exclusive relationship for a few days or even weeks. Often these 
consortships are initiated by males, and sometimes a male forces a female 
aggressively to follow him (Wrangham & Peterson, 1996). 
Because the tendency to monopolize females in an aggressive way is shared with the gorilla, 
this probably has to be seen as the oldest mating pattern. It is interesting to speculate about 
the circumstances that would promote a specialization in one of these mating strategies: 
1. Possessiveness is probably favored in situations in which males are not mutually 
dependent and are able to monopolize as many females as possible, and in which 
females are unable to form strong coalitions, 
2. Promiscuity is probably favored in circumstances in which males are related or 
mutually dependent, in which aggressive possessiveness does not work as a result 
of female coalitions, or in which females may promote some competition to ensure 
fertilization by the strongest males. 
3. Consortships are promoted by a situation in which females have an interest in 
having special relationships with particular males, perhaps because they need some 
extra support for their childrearing activities. 
While the first strategy reminds one of gorillas, bonobos seem to have dropped this strategy 
altogether and to have evolved in the direction of promiscuity (Kano, 1992; De Waal, 1995, 
2001). The human mating system can be seen as descending from the third mating strategy. 
If this is true, the human mating system may have been promoted by a situation in which 
females had an interest in having special relationships with particular males. What would 
have promoted this tendency? 
 Helpless infants and prolonged childrearing. In chapter 7, we discussed already 
some hypotheses with respect to human `altriciality'. It is currently thought that the 
increased encephalization during the evolution of Homo, together with the limits posed to a 
broadening of the hominid pelvis, necessitated a revolution in which babies were born 
relatively premature (an idea already defended by Portman in 1941, see Gould, 1977, it is 
also defended by Waters, 1996). In fact, in comparison with other primates, a species with 
the general retardation in growth rate, with the brain size and the longevity of humans 
would need a gestation length of twenty-one months (Leakey, 1994). The early birth of the 
human baby has created a situation in which it lives as a kind of extra-uterine embryo for 
more than one year, during which it needs much attention and care by the parents - which 
defines us as a clearly altricial species. Even in our modern, extremely egalitarian and 
efficient industrialized societies, many women stop working temporarily after childbirth. In 
most cases fathers are sorely needed in the raising of children, and some extra assistance by 
grandparents is very welcome as well. It is clear that this creates a social situation that is 
completely different from that which we see in bonobos and chimpanzees and that at best 
shows a dim resemblance to the behavior of a series of New World primates. 
 The retarded growth rate of humans extends far beyond the baby phase, however, 
and this could be a clue to the selection pressures responsible for its origin. As a result of 
this retardation, human children have a very long period in which they can play and learn 
and in which they thus can train their social and cultural abilities. It seems likely that this 
extended learning period is the original reason that the growth rate was slowed down in 
humans. Table 8-1 shows the sequence in which permanent molars erupt in macaques, apes, 
and humans. Following the anatomist Adolf Schultz, these ages are taken to represent the 
end of infancy, the beginning of adolescence, and the beginning of adulthood, respectively. 
 One of the few clues to the evolution of this retardation is offered by the analysis of 
the age and developmental stage of the Nariokotome boy. On the basis of data on brain size 
and dental development, Holly Smith has calculated that the Nariokotome boy was about 65 
to 75 percent of the way toward adulthood, but followed a growth pattern different from 
both chimpanzees and humans. He had his second permanent molars and lower permanent 
canine erupted, but his upper canine still emerging. She estimates that the boy was about 
nine year old, but was comparable to a twelve- or thirteen-year-old human child. This means 
that if her calculations are right, Homo ergaster was about 1.8 million years ago already on 
the road towards an extended youth. That would mean that already 1.8 million years ago at 
least some extra paternal care was needed and at least some extra learning was required to 
 Macaque Chimpanzee Homo 
erectus 
Modern 
human 
End of infancy, 1st permanent 
molar 
1 year,  3 years,  
5 months 4 months 
? 6 years 
Beginning of adolescence/ 
puberty, 2nd permanent molar 
(twelve-year molar) 
3 years, 6 years, 
3 months 5 months 
? 11/12 years 
Beginning of adulthood, 3rd 
permanent molar (wisdom 
tooth): end of growth in 
height, complete fusion of 
most parts of skeleton 
5 years, 11 years 
10 months 5 months 
? 18 years 
Brain weight [body weight] in 
Kg 
0.09 [7.28] 0.41 [36.36] 0.83 
[58.60] 
1.25 
[44.00] 
Encephalization quotiens acc. 
to Martin [Jerison] 
1.78 [1.95] 2.38 [3.01] 3.34 
[4.40] 
6.28 [8.07] 
Estimated maximum age, 
defined as 12-15 x infancy 
(fits Goodall, 1996; no data on 
macaques found) 
17-21 years 40-50 years  72-90 years 
Table 8-1. Ages at which permanent molars erupt in macaques, chimpanzees and humans 
(based on Walker & Shipman, 1996), combined with brain weights, encephalization quotients 
(Aiello & Dean, 1990), and estimated mean maximum ages. 
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be prepared for the life that protohumans then lived. 
 A recent study relativizes the data gathered by Smith, however. On the basis of a 
comparison of the growth patterns of teeth and enamel of Proconsul, Australopithecus, 
Homo erectus, Neanderthals and modern humans the study concludes that the extended 
growth of modern humans evolved relatively late. It is even unclear to what extent 
Neanderthals display modern human growth patterns (Mayell, 2001). It is to be hoped that 
this kind of research will at some point settle the moment that modern human growth 
patterns evolved, because this will make a lot clear about our evolution. 
 Increased paternal investment and grandparenting. In many regards, the whole 
group of primates stands out with behavioral patterns that are somewhat unusual for 
mammals. The behavioral patterns of our ancestors were already extremely diverse if we go 
back to the period in which New World monkeys and Old World monkeys were not 
separated (Small, 1995). In the New World monkeys we find a series of characteristics that 
are typical for some hominids, for example, female dispersal, the existence of groups within 
groups (spider monkeys, Robinson & Janson, 1987), and, finally, monogamy and paternal 
investment (marmosets and tamarins, Hrdy, 1981; Kinzey, 1987). The enormous behavioral 
potential of our ancestors is further proved by rich variety of hominoid lifestyles: from 
monogamy (gibbon) to polygamy (gorilla), from almost solitary (big males in the 
orangutan) to extremely social (bonobo). Such lifestyles are, of course, a product of both 
phylogenetic inertia and ecological factors, like the presence of predators, the threat of 
conspecifics, and the dispersion and variety of food items. Yet, the fact that one can find a 
series of hominid traits back in the New World monkeys means that they did not have to 
arise ex nihilo and that primate behavior may apparently change relatively easy with 
changing ecological circumstances. 
 In both chimpanzees and bonobos there does not seem to exist a special father-
offspring bond, as it is unknown who has fathered a particular child. It may actually be in 
the interest of females to leave the question open as to who the father is, as an anti-
infanticide strategy (Hrdy, 1981). Perhaps this can explain why infanticide in chimpanzees 
occurs much more seldomly than it does in gorillas, in which about one out of every seven 
children is killed and in which `it looks as though most infants unprotected by a silverback 
are killed' (Wrangham & Peterson, 1996, p. 148). However, even in a situation in which 
paternity is not certain, males may behave in accordance with an (unconscious) calculation 
of probabilities. In baboons there is no paternal certainty either, but males do sometimes 
help the children of their female `friends', partly to please their mothers, partly because they 
might be the fathers themselves (Strum, 1987). In chimpanzees there is a positive 
relationship between survival of offspring and the amount of meat that their mothers get at 
kill ((McGrew, 1992, p. 110, combining data from Goodall, 1986, pp. 62 and pp. 310; 
Stanford, 1995). Sometimes alpha males share their meat exclusively with females with 
which they have consorted. This is especially revealing if we realize that consortships do 
often result in successful conception (Goodall, 1986, p. 471-477). Thus, although 
chimpanzee behavior gives us no indication of the existence of a father-child bond in the 
common HUCHIBO ancestor, `sex contracts' could have evolved as a result of an increased 
dependence on meat, and paternal investment could have increased gradually parallel to an 
increased paternal certainty. 
 In our own species, probably about 80-90% of all children in all cultures have been 
fathered by their purported father. (Russell & Wells, 1986, estimate that p or paternity 
certainty is 87% and compare this with the p of 91% in Yanamamös, obtained via genetic 
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research; Thornhill, Gangestad & Comer, 1995, point to figures from 1957 in which p was 
93% and Bellis & Baker, 1990, found that 6% of a sample of British women with one main 
partner reported their last act of sexual intercourse to be outside this relationship). As `extra-
pair copulations' have simply to be considered part of monogamous breeding systems (this 
even goes for gibbons, as shown by Reichard, 1995), such figures show that it pays for 
human males to exchange paternal care for paternal certainty. In that respect Murdock could 
claim that the nuclear family was universal and that polygyny simply means that one man 
has more than one family (cited in Kinzey, 1987). Many psychological theories exist 
proposing effects of the presence or absence of the father at home (e.g., Chisholm, 1993), 
and there is reason to assume that the presence of a father of relatively high rank may have 
profound influences on the future rank and possibilities of a human child. Even in modern 
cultures, children in father-absent households have significantly less time to stay at home 
and absorb culture (Chisholm, 1993). Children from unstable families tend to start their 
sexual and reproductive career at an earlier age (Kim, Smith & Palermiti, 1997) and 
therefore have less time for education. Children from small families, in which parents have 
relatively much time to invest, have more chance in getting jobs and becoming socially 
successful (Terhune, 1974, cited in Boyd & Richerson, 1993). I suppose that all of this has 
to be considered as the ultimate consequence of a trend which already started in the 
chimpanzee in which males with more meat mate more and in which females that receive 
more meat produce more offspring (McGrew, 1992, p. 110, combining data from Goodall, 
1986, pp. 62, 310; Stanford, 1995). This tendency must have become decisive at moments 
that our ancestors, perhaps during dry seasons during the ice ages, became exclusively 
dependent on meat. 
 If we could observe the whole trajectory from ape to human we would note an 
increased level of parental investment. Parental care in humans often continues well beyond 
the age at which children are able to reproduce themselves. Different authors have 
hypothesized that menopause is an adaptive phenomenon enabling older women to invest in 
their grandchildren rather than in their own children (Williams, 1957; Alexander, 1979, 
1990; Hill & Hurtado, 1991; Pavelka & Fedigan, 1991). This may have been especially 
functional if the mother was high in rank and had many grandchildren. Apparently a mother 
who gradually has lost the advantage of being young and attractive can better use her 
acquired wisdom and power to assist several children at significant moments in the raising 
of grandchildren rather than simply to continue exhausting her own body and having 
children of her own. The evolution of menopause can probably be best explained within the 
context of the need of an increased period of dependence of young individuals on their 
family and especially within the context of the increased helplessness of the babies (Peccei, 
1995). 
 An interesting possibility is that grandmothering is an older phenomenon that 
paternal investment in our lineage. According to some authors the extra costs of giving birth 
to a large-brained babies was first carried by female kin alliances and only later by 
provisioning males (Kohn & Mithen, 1999). This would place the almost universal tensions 
between mothers-in-law and husbands in a wide evolutionary context. 
 Concealment of Ovulation and Sexual Privacy. It is generally agreed that the loss 
of estrus and the concealment of ovulation constitute a major difference between 
chimpanzees on the one hand, and humans, on the other hand. Without calendars, many 
women themselves do not have even the slightest idea when they are ovulating, let alone 
their potential partners. Several hypotheses have been proposed to explain this difference; 
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some of these are compared by Alexander (1990), who has given them eloquent names. The 
`prostitution hypothesis' explains concealment of ovulation in human females as a result of 
the necessity for females to obtain meat in exchange for sex. Females could obtain more 
meat by increasing their period of sexual attractivity (Symons, 1979, scenario A). The 
`cuckoldry hypothesis' sees concealment of ovulation essentially as a female reaction to a 
more monogamous lifestyle. By not advertising the exact moment of ovulation, females may 
have made it, in some situations, difficult for their partners and easy for their lovers to 
fertilize them, enabling them to get just the genes that they need most (Benshoof & 
Thornhill, 1979; Symons, 1979, scenario B; see also Schröder, 1993). Alexander's own 
favorite is the `paternal-care hypothesis,' which stresses the ability of women to conceal the 
exact timing of ovulation in order to force a specific male partner to a more continuing 
investment (Alexander & Noonan, 1979). 
 An ingenious explanation of both estrus and its loss is offered by Hrdy (1981). 
Hrdy argues that the promiscuity of many female primates is a very effective way of 
confusing the issue of paternity and reducing the possibility of infanticide. By mating with a 
whole series of males, a female forces these males to consider her children as possibly their 
own. In a situation in which females are monitored by harem leaders or husbands, the best 
way of continuing to confuse both these partners and extra-pair males about their possible 
paternity would be to conceal the moment of fertility. This would provide females the 
flexibility they need to spread illusions or at least confusions about the paternity of their 
children. Probably we should call this hypothesis the `confusion hypothesis.' 
  Fortunately, some new empirical discoveries have gradually been made that may 
help us to choose among such hypotheses. The Austrian ethologist Karl Grammer 
discovered, for example, that the behavior of women may change around the time that they 
are ovulating as a result of a changed perception of androstenone: most of the time this odor 
repels them, but not so around the time of ovulation (Grammer, 1993). Grammer himself 
interprets this as proof for an explanation for concealed ovulation that stresses the female's 
chances of obtaining good genes outside the pair bond by mating quickly and at the right 
moment. Other researchers have shown, or claimed, that women can to some extent regulate 
the effectiveness of an insemination by having an orgasm or not (Baker & Bellis, 1993). 
Both discoveries can be cited as evidence in favor of a version of the cuckoldry hypothesis 
in which even females themselves are ignorant about their own intentions. 
 There is also evidence that can be used in support of other models, however. For 
example, if one compares the sexual behavior of chimpanzees and bonobos, it is striking 
that the duration of the maximum swelling in estrus is much longer in bonobos (20 days 
compared to 9.6 days; Kano, 1992)2. Whereas chimpanzee males compete intensely for 
copulations at the time that ovulation approaches, bonobos are much more indifferent and 
seldomly fight. It can be argued that female bonobos conceal their ovulation (Wrangham & 
Peterson, 1997) in order to be able to protect their choice of the right father, which in their 
society need not be the most aggressive male. The advertising of ovulation in chimpanzees 
could be interpretated, then, as an adaptation to a male-dominated society that ensures both 
confusion about paternity and fertilization by the most dominant males. In bonobos the most 
aggressive males are no longer the most desirable fathers, and females no longer need to 
 
2 However, these figures are based on bonobos in captivity and wild bonobos seem not to be as sexually obsessed  as 
captive ones (Stanford, 2001). 
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stimulate aggression between males: they only need to confuse. This would strengthen the 
confusion hypothesis, especially for bonobos. 
 One can argue that humans have evolved in an opposite direction, however. As 
noted, humans differ from both bonobos and chimpanzees in that females need some 
assistance of the father in the raising of helpless offspring. If they would advertise their 
exact moment of ovulation, those males would not be interested anymore at other moments. 
Human females are therefore both attractive to males at each stage of the monthly cycle and 
cryptic about their exact moment of ovulation. Originally this system may have evolved out 
of the habit of male chimpanzees of sharing meat preferentially with females with which 
they have consorted. For Australopithecus the prostitution hypothesis may have been right. 
During the period of encephalization (Homo) such ephemeral exchanges would have 
become insufficient for the sustainment of the dependent mother and the helpless baby, 
however. Instead of an exchange of one copulation and one piece of meat, an exchange 
between an enlarged possibility of paternity and a lasting favoritism must have evolved, 
with a matching psychological motivation system (falling in love). For that period, the 
paternal-care hypothesis could well be right. 
 Perhaps the paternal-care hypothesis also needs to be supplemented by both the 
cuckoldry and confusion hypotheses. At the moment that societies started increasingly to 
consist of pair-bonded couples, females could still feel that they needed the protection of the 
most dominant males, which were not necessarily their own providers. The same 
concealment that helped them to bind their permanent partners may also have helped them 
to get the support of these dominant males and allowed them to swap partners at any 
moment that they found favorable. 
 We can conclude, therefore, that the different explanations for the concealment of 
ovulation do not exclude each other. If the original HUCHIBO ancestor exhibited a mating 
system similar to that of chimpanzees, an increased dependence on meat may well have 
made it more attractive to females to join males in consortships and to exchange sex for 
meat. These consortships may have changed into somewhat longer bonds at the time that 
more paternal investment was needed. Concealment of ovulation in such a situation may 
have helped females to keep their special friends or partners sexually interested while at the 
same time enabling them to collect a set of superior genes occasionally. 
 
8.4. WHICH THEORIES ARE COMPATIBLE WITH THIS KNOWLEDGE? 
A. THE HUNTING HYPOTHESIS. 
Apparently, the increased period of helplessness of human infants and, simultaneously, the 
increase in male investment have been the crucial factors that changed the mating system of 
the common HUCHIBO ancestor and Australopithecus into the human lifestyle. As I said 
already, this increase in paternal care could be explained by assuming a period of increasing 
dependence on meat. The ice ages started 2.5 million years ago and Africa became drier and 
drier; to assume that one line of australopithecines became increasingly dependent on meat 
is by no means unreasonable. There is much other evidence as well that could point to an 
increased dependence on hunting. In their analysis of the changes one would expect in a 
vegetarian species that is becoming carnivorous (which I already mentioned), Shipman and 
Walker (1989) enumerate the following: 
1. An increase in either speed or sociality (adaptations required to catch prey), 
2. A change in dentition or the appearance of a meat-processing industry, 
3. An increase in `free' time, 
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4. Changes in the digestive tract, 
5. Either a decrease in body size or an increase in geographic range as a result of the 
availability of less food per square kilometer, 
6. A change to a more altricial pattern. 
One can find most of these changes in the transition from Australopithecus to Homo: 
1. The increase in brain size could point to a social life of increasing complexity 
(Aiello & Dunbar, 1993). This increased brain size may have been possible only as 
a result of an availability of more proteins (Aiello & Wheeler, 1995). 
2. The Oldowan stone technology featuring sharp edges capable of slicing meat 
appears at about the same time that Homo appears. Compared to the molars of 
Australopithecus, the molars of early Homo were small, while the incisors were 
larger, which seems to point to a diet in which coarse plant foods were less 
important. 
4. Whereas Lucy was relatively potbellied, analyses of the Nariokotome boy show 
that he had a long torso and narrow hips, like modern humans. Walker and 
Shipman (1996) attribute the differences to the much smaller guts of H. erectus. 
5. As Shipman and Walker noticed already, geographical expansion is characteristic 
of Homo erectus. Since 1989, when they wrote their article, it has appeared that the 
geographical expansion of Homo erectus happened much earlier than originally 
thought, which strengthens their argument that it resulted from changing food 
habits necessitated by the first ice age. 
6. Shipman and Walker argue that the relative brain size of early Homo was only 
possible as a result of an increase in gestation length, which they see as the most 
unambiguous sign that Homo is a `herbivore-turned-carnivore.' 
Shipman and Walker also provide other evidence of both increased sociality and 
carnivorism in Homo erectus at about 1.7 million years ago. They mention a female 
skeleton of Homo erectus from this period, KNM-ER 1808, with a large amount of ossified 
blood on her bones, which proves that she suffered from acute hypervitaminosis A and yet 
survived for several weeks prior to her death. They claim that the only way in which this 
would have been possible is if this unlucky female was supplied with water and possibly 
food and protection from predators during this period. At the same time, hypervitaminosis A 
is best explained by the consumption of meat: one can get it by either eating something like 
one hundred pounds of carrots or by eating one pound of carnivore liver. It seems likely that 
KNM-ER 1808 happened to eat somewhat too much liver, as is also suggested by the 
microwear of her teeth, which is comparable only to the microwear patterns that show up on 
the teeth of meat-and-bone-eating carnivores, like hyenas (Shipman & Walker, 1989; 
Walker & Shipman, 1996). 
 Another change that may have been the ultimate result from a change to a more 
carnivorous lifestyle is the increased dependence on a home base for the exchange of meat 
and other goods (Tooby & DeVore, 1986). The increased helplessness of the babies also 
may have necessitated such a change. The amount of offspring that a female could raise 
could increase by no longer bearing them individually, as in chimpanzees, but simply 
`storing' and feeding them at home base (Lovejoy, 1981; see chapter 7). This tendency 
would reinforce the necessity of reliable paternal aid, which could only be obtained by 
giving the male an increased sense of paternal certainty. If Homo lived in a fission-fusion 
society centered at a home base, this may also have created the desirability of a 
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communication system of increased complexity, either to report on the environment to the 
`home front' (Bickerton, 1990) or to form complex coalitions at the home front (Dunbar, 
1996). If Homo was an efficient hunter, there may also have been more `free' time, which 
could be used for `cultural' displays. Of course, at the moment it is unclear whether we 
should project all these adaptation back as far as Homo habilis or Homo rudolfensis. They 
may have only emerged gradually, or as a result of additional crises. 
 In an analysis that still is close to that of Lovejoy (1981), Hill (1982) speculates 
that the transition to hunting would lead to male provisioning, which would allow females a 
greater freedom to concentrate on parental care. 
 
 This change would probably reduce infant mortality considerably, and thus, the average life span 
would increase. More importantly, with a greater number of organisms living to older ages, the 
advantages that could be obtained from averting causes of death later in life (aging) would increase 
greatly and thus provide the selection pressure for greater longevity. Organisms with a longer 
juvenile developing period might then be more able to outcompete others in adulthood (through 
learning, etc.), but such a longer period of development would necessitate an increase in the birth 
interval. This long period of juvenile dependency would, however, have an even more important 
consequence. If juvenile offspring had a very low probability of surviving their mothers' death at, 
for example, under ten years of age, it would be an unwise strategy for a female to continue to bear 
offspring when the probability of her death within the next ten-year period was quite high. Old 
females with a low probability of surviving another ten years should shift their reproductive 
strategy. The optimal strategy for a female under these conditions is to assist in the parental care of 
her own daughters' offspring, and to cease reproductive effort herself (p. 539). 
 
Thus, a whole set of human characteristics seems to be explained by applying a version of 
the hunting hypothesis. Above that, it is strengthened by the analysis of fossilized bones and 
stone artifacts from several sites along the African Rift Valley (e.g., Bunn & Kroll, 1986). 
 Of course, as is well known, these same bones and artifacts are sometimes used to 
defend the hypothesis that early man was a scavenger, but several writers have pointed to 
the fact that this would bring our ancestors into serious competition with a list of other 
scavengers (Tooby & DeVore, 1986; Walker & Shipman, 1996). Also, scavenging and 
hunting are completely compatible and both chimpanzees (Hasegawa, Hiraiwa, Nishida & 
Takasaki, 1983) and Hazda hunter-gatherers in northern Tanzania (O'Connell, Hawkes, 
Blurton Jones, 1988) use both techniques at the same time, although scavenging in the 
Hazda accounts for only 20% of the carcasses and scavenging in chimpanzees is only rarely 
observed. The same pattern is found at the middle Pleistocene site at Aridos (Spain), where 
undisputed proof of elephant butchery was found that differs fundamentally from marginal 
scavenging (Villa, 1990). It should also be noted that many predators, from buzzards to 
lions, occasionally indulge in scavenging. 
 Another question is whether 
meat has ever been the exclusive 
nourishment of our ancestors 
(Tanner, 1987). This is unlikely, as 
we have a maximum sustained 
protein intake below about 50% of 
calories. It is even speculated that the 
ability of Eskimos to live on a diet 
with a protein intake of about 45-
50% is due to a unique genetic 
capacity not seen in other 
populations (Speth, 1989). To 
discover the difference between the 
diet of a hominid and a real 
carnivore, one only has to compare 
one's dinner plate with the bowl of 
one's cat. Of course, as KNM-ER 
1808 and the modern race of 
hamburgereaters demonstrate, meat 
is sometimes eaten more than is 
healthy and often is venerated as a 
supreme source of energy. As both 
chimpanzees and hunter-gatherers 
are predominantly vegetarian, the safest conclusion is that our ancestors have always been 
opportunists. Meat, however, may have enabled them to survive during periods of the ice 
ages in which the dry season became relatively long and exacting and, at a later stage, 
during the long winters on the Eurasian continent. 
 
Fig. 8-2. Components of a hunting hypothesis of human 
cultural abilities. 
 Does the hunting hypothesis explain the origins of culture? This brings us finally 
back to the question of whether the hunting hypothesis can explain the origins of the 
complex culture in which we live now. To some degree, it can. Hunting may have afforded 
the extra proteins needed to grow a big brain; it may have necessitated a more complex 
stone industry; and it may have encouraged increasing cooperation and the need to pass on 
skills and techniques from generation to generation; and it may have encouraged the use of 
complex communication. Indirectly, it may have brought together individuals from three 
generations, thus encouraging cultural transmission. Finally, it may have eventually 
stimulated the occupation of home bases at which individuals from different generations 
could pass on their skills. 
 As shown by the data of our maximum meat intake and actual food habits show, 
the hunting hypothesis must be combined with a theory about gathering. Several writers 
have stressed that gathering may have been as important as hunting and that chimpanzees 
use tools predominantly in the context of nut cracking and insect collecting (Tanner, 1987). 
The first step that may have enabled Australopithecus, used to living along the border of 
tropical forests, to survive in a relatively dry environment may have been the opening up of 
new food sources below the ground: roots. In fact, in Tongo, a forest in eastern Congo with 
almost no rivers and lakes, a small population of chimpanzees lives with a tradition of 
digging and eating roots as a local adaptation to water shortage (Wrangham & Peterson, 
1996). It seems that the skill of root digging is complex enough to stimulate a new 
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dependence on the acquisition of skills through social learning, mainly between mother and 
offspring, as envisioned by Parker and Gibson (1979) and King (1994). From this 
perspective, the fact that Australopithecus has a brain that is slightly larger than that of the 
chimpanzee can be explained. Australopithecines may have been dependent on foods that 
were already hard enough to get to force them to relatively intelligent behavior, which may 
have pre-adapted particular populations for the even more demanding task of hunting and 
the processing of meat and bone marrow. 
 Thus we can speculate that an increased dependence on difficult food sources, 
necessitating `extractive foraging' (Parker & Gibson, 1979), may have forced our ancestors 
to become smarter. Parker and Gibson even postulate that such a transition may have 
furthered their linguistic proficiency: 
 
 The prehistoric ecological transition to extractive foraging on foods that were both 
difficult to obtain and process would have resulted in mandatory parental provisioning of 
post weaning children. Abortive attempts by children to open tough nuts, dig deep tubers 
from the ground and engage in other complex activities would have resulted in need for 
parental aid. Many parents would have anticipated their children's difficulties in 
accomplishing these tasks and would have come to their aid as soon as interest was 
evidenced by the child by pointing, vocalizing, reaching, etc. The probable result would 
have been that certain vocal or manual gestures would have acquired specific meaning 
within individual mother-infant pairs. 
 
Yet, some questions remain. The first is why big brains and culture did not arise during the 
evolution of Australopithecus already. This question was given a first sketchy and 
speculative answer by Stanley (1996): their brainsizes may have been limited because they 
were unable to care for the helpless infants that need to be born if babies with big brains 
have to be born. As australopithecines probably were still partly adapted to a life in the 
trees, to which they had to flee from predators, they did not have their hands free to carry 
such infants. Only as a result of a climatic change that created an environment with fewer 
trees and with less food generally was a small population of australopithecines forced to 
start specializing increasingly on meat during the dry season, while they were unable to 
climb back into the trees for safety. The same skills that may have allowed them to hunt in 
groups may have enabled them to defend themselves from predators. 
 The second question is why our culture is so complex if it only evolved to enable 
us to hunt and why we tend to live in groups that are much bigger than would be efficient 
for group hunting. Obviously, living in relatively big groups has many disadvantages, 
especially for hunters. Also, as is shown by a variety of carnivores, one certainly needs to be 
clever to be able to hunt, but one does not need to be able to write poetry. Why would 
humans have started to live in groups of increasing size, and why would their brains have 
become bigger and their culture much more elaborate than would be required for mere 
hunting? 
 It is especially this last question which forces us back to theories which assume a 
certain role for runaway selection mechanisms, like sexual selection and intergroup 
competition. A certain amount of sexual selection has certainly be going on during our past, 
because both males and females show characteristics that are sex-specific and apparently 
not very functional in terms of pure natural selection: beards and breasts, for example. 
Certainly, hunting-and-gathering can be combined with sexual selection, because a 
cooperation between the sexes based on an exchange of food, sex, and care could 
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complicate the solicitation procedures for new partners. Such complicated solicitation 
procedures could have driven the evolution of intelligence. On the other hand, human 
intelligence seems to be designed to do much more than to impress potential partners. 
Humans cooperate within large networks and, strangely enough, they feel sometimes 
obliged to invest in a common good. Certainly they are sexual creatures, but they are to 
some extent extremely social creatures as well, even in their most private thoughts. Why 
would they tend to live in groups that are much larger than would be efficient for hunters 
and gatherers? 
 It is wise to delve into the theories on runaway selection, thus, not because the 
hunting-and-gathering theories are misguided, but because they seem incomplete. We 
should keep in mind, thus, whether these theories are meant as replacements or as 
supplements. 
 
B. SEXUAL SELECTION THEORY. 
A possible link between sexual selection and neoteny. Explanations of human evolution, 
based on sexual selection, sometimes give the impression of being meant as complete and 
self-sufficient models. Recently, there has been a revival of interest in such models (perhaps 
beginning with Parker, 1987). Geoffrey Miller has refined a model in which the threefold 
brain enlargement during human evolution is explained as a result of the bilateral sexual 
selection of the sexes or of sexual selection in which the selected properties of one sex 
happen to be inherited by offspring of the other sex as well (Mestel, 1995; Miller, 1996; 
2000). Normally one would expect properties that evolve as a result of sexual selection to be 
represented especially in one sex, but as both sexes share most chromosomes, it is at least 
possible to imagine the sexual selection of properties that are highly advantageous to one 
sex and neutral to the other sex. Miller proposes that the most important trait that has been 
selected during human evolution is simply the ability to produce impressive courtship 
displays in the form of music, dance, poetry, rhetoric, and the like. Male humans would 
create art and culture just `to impress the girls', thus for the same reason that male peacocks 
display their feathers and ruffs defend their leks. Females also would need at least some 
creativity to be able to bind the males and lure them into investing in their offspring. This is 
called the `Scheherezade strategy' by Miller after the heroine of the Arabian Nights who had 
to tell the sultan a story every night to seduce him not to kill her after having slept with her. 
Miller claims that most artists have their peak at a relatively young age, just when they are 
most sexually active (or most actively pursuing sex). 
 In his popular book The Red Queen: Sex and the Evolution of Human Nature 
(1994), Matt Ridley connected the idea of sexual-selected creativity with the already 
somewhat outmoded idea of neoteny, the idea that many human characteristics can be 
explained simply by the persistence of youthful characteristics in adult life, caused by the 
workings of genes that slow the maturation process. He reasons that in a situation with a 
certain degree of monogamous pairbonding and paternal assistance in childrearing, males 
should be particularly interested in females with a lot of residual reproductive capacity. If 
mating is just a transitory, noncommittal activity for males, there is no reason to be selective 
about female partners, but the more time it takes to concentrate on one particular female and 
the more the road to polygyny is blocked, the more important it becomes to have as many 
children with one female as possible. As a result, it would become adaptive for females to 
look as young as possible and neoteny genes in women would continually be selected and 
even be inherited by their sons. As neoteny genes are supposed not only to cause someone 
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to look younger, but also to influence brain-
body ratio and overall behavioral flexibility 
and inclination to play and to learn, this would 
mean that they could cause an increase in 
general intelligence as well. 
 Neoteny is often too easily used as an 
explanation for human uniqueness, however 
(e.g. Gould, 1977). Brian Shea (1992) warns 
that theories that refer to neoteny are often too 
simple to account for uniquely human 
properties. Almost none of the morphological 
features associated with bipedal locomotion 
can be related to neoteny, for example, and 
while it is true that an adult human looks like a 
juvenile ape in that she or he has a relatively 
big brain and little prognathism, this 
resemblance is caused by completely different 
patterns of bone distribution. In particular, the 
construction of the pharynx of an adult human 
does not look like that of an juvenile ape, and 
the evolution of speech therefore cannot be attributed simply to neoteny (Shea admits, 
however, that neoteny can account for the resemblance between the skull and face of a 
juvenile common chimpanzee and those of an adult bonobo, so he does not completely 
exclude the possibility of the mechanism in some evolutionary trajectories). All in all, 
neoteny theory suffers from an overdose of explanatory monism, and it is not advisable to 
invoke neoteny as an explanatory deus ex machina that can be invoked for all kind of gaps 
in our theories. 
 
Fig. 8-3. Sexual selection explanations for 
properties that cause humans to create culture 
already pressuppose specific mating patterns. 
 With respect to the question whether sexual selection should be considered as the 
only theory, Ridley himself admits that there is a general problem with sexual-selection-
based theories of human evolution in that they are circular. As Hans van der Dennen notes, 
`prime-mover' theories of human evolution often are unable to reply to the question "What 
moved the prime mover?" (Van der Dennen, 1995). Ridley himself answers that evolution 
often is circular and works by bootstrapping. There need not be a single cause-and-effect 
relation, because "effects can reinforce causes". "If a bird finds itself to be good at cracking 
seeds, then it specializes in cracking seeds, which puts further pressure on its seed-cracking 
ability to evolve" (Ridley, 1994, p. 332). 
 Ridley forgets here, however, that birds do not "find themselves good at cracking 
seeds" on any given day of their evolutionary history and do not specialize apart from the 
rest of an ecosystem. If they change their food habits, the most likely cause is a slight 
disturbance within the ecosystem because of geological or climatological factors (e.g., 
Grant, 1991). His argument that "evolution is circular" fails because evolution is driven by 
many external factors, such as the amount of solar energy, the composition of the 
atmosphere, and geological and climatological factors. If something like bootstrapping 
happens in evolution, there are always forces that set this bootstrapping process in motion. 
 Thus we have to conclude that if something like the sexual-selected neoteny 
mechanism has worked during specific periods of human evolution, it presupposes at least a 
series of environmental pressures that drove human evolution it in the first place. To be 
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more specific, at least the unique combination of paternal investment and long-term `sex 
contracts' (Fisher, 1982) between males and females have to be explained first, as these are 
absent in chimpanzees and bonobos. At the moment that these sex contracts were in place 
and males had to invest in particular females for a relatively long time, they also had good 
reasons to look especially for young (neotenous?) females with a lot of residual 
reproductive capacity. At the same time, females would have good reasons not only to look 
for good genes, but for good fathers as well. 
 The link between prolonged childhood, paternal investment, and cultural abilities. 
It may even be postulated that these long during sex contracts underlay the whole spectrum 
of human cultural abilities in a very direct way: culture presupposes learning and a complex 
culture presupposes a very long learning period. It is difficult to imagine that a chimpanzee 
mother, without the aid of a father, could give her child so long a period of carelessness 
with relation to subsistence that the child could go on learning for decades, as children in 
our culture often do. Of course, it is true that in many cultures the periods in which children 
are dependent and the amount of paternal investment are limited. Nevertheless, it is 
reasonable to assume that there is a link between the unique property of our mating system - 
paternal investment coupled to an obsession with female fidelity (e.g., Daly & Wilson, 
1988) - and the prolonged period of parental investment that might be a sine qua non for the 
acquisition of complex culture. Even in modern cultures, children in father-absent 
households have significantly less time to stay at home and absorb culture (Chisholm, 
1993). Children from unstable families tend to start their sexual and reproductive career at 
an earlier age (Kim, Smith & Palermiti, 1997) and therefore have less time for education. 
Children from small families, in which parents have relatively much time to invest, have 
more chance in getting jobs and becoming socially successful (Terhune, 1974, cited in Boyd 
& Richerson, 1993). At the other end of our evolutionary spectrum, there is the correlation 
that I mentioned already between the meat received by female chimpanzees and the amount 
of offspring that survive. 
 But such a link between prolonged childrearing and the evolution of culture does 
not yet give an explanation for either of them. We still have to explain why some ancestral 
males started to invest in children and their mothers in exchange for a certain degree of 
paternal certainty (partly achieved by female fidelity, partly by male possessiveness, which 
was at some later stage reinforced by the cultural practice of marriage). We have to assume 
that there was a period in hominid evolution in which mothers simply could not do without 
the help of fathers, as a result of which children for which the mother was not able to obtain 
paternal investment were seriously at a disadvantage. Thus, again, we have to return to the 
hunting hypothesis, which is also compatible with our knowledge of chimpanzees. We now 
know that the chimpanzees at Gombe hunt on a regular basis, especially during the dry 
season (Stanford, 1995). We also know that females that are able to obtain meat have more 
offspring and we know that, from the perspective of males, more meat means more matings. 
McGrew (1992) mentions an alpha male who distributed meat mainly to females with whom 
he consorted and to his mother. Together, these tendencies may have been enough to push 
some populations of australopithecines or hominids which became increasingly dependent 
on meat on the road towards `sex contracts' in which paternal investment and paternity, or 
paternal certainty, were exchanged. 
 Yet, all this leaves a series of 
questions unanswered. If an increased 
paternal investment was at some point 
necessary, why would this tendency 
work in an apparently autocatalytic way 
to produce more dependent children with 
longer learning periods? From the 
viewpoint of sexual selection theory the 
answer could be that females started to 
choose good hunters and fathers3, which, 
however, require a longer learning 
period, and thus more paternal 
investment. A feedback loop was thus 
created in which more an more paternal 
investment was needed every generation 
to make better hunters and fathers (fig. 8-
4). 
 The question lingers, however, 
how successful this process is in 
explaining cultural abilities. It is here 
that we have to return to Miller (1997; 
2000) and his thesis that language, art, 
and perhaps morality are all products of 
sexual selection. Kohn & Mithen (1999) 
have made a first attempt to test the 
potential of this explanatory model by 
applying it to the production of 
handaxes, especially those that are much 
too big and beautiful to be `just' functional tools: 
 
Fig. 8-4. As a result of an increased necessity of 
paternal investment, sperm competition was to some extent 
replaced by the sexual selection for best mates at some 
point during prehistory. 
 
 We propose that handaxes functioned not just to butcher animals or process 
plants but as Zahavian handicaps, indicating `good genes'. Those hominids ... 
who were able to make fine symmetrical handaxes may have been preferentially 
chosen by the opposite sex as mates. Just as a peacock's tail may reliably indicate 
its `success', so might the manufacture of a fine symmetrical handaxe have been a 
reliable indicator of the hominid's ability to secure food, find shelter, escape from 
predation and compete successfully within the social group. Such hominids 
would have been attractive mates, their abilities indicating `good genes' (Kohn & 
Mithen, 1999: 521). 
 
On the basis of these assumptions, Kohn and Mithen do an attempt to trace sexual selection 
back into the paleontological record. According to them, sexual selection was coupled with 
`substantial male provisioning' only in late stages of human evolution. If they would be right 
not only Lovejoy and Hill (see chapter 7) would project paternal investment back into 
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3 In fact, females started probably to zigzag between good hunters and good fathers, as they still do, their sexual 
careers being a long learning process resulting in the best compromise they are able to bind. 
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prehistory far to much, but I would do the same when I postulate a link between hunting and 
paternal investment. Probably we simply need more study and more data to settle this issue. 
At this point, the most important point, however, is that they agree that sexual selection 
presupposes particular mating systems. Sexual selection supplements the hunting 
hypothesis, but does not replace it. 
 Personally, I doubt, however, whether sexual selection theory is complete itself. If 
all cultural expression could be understood as indirect sexual displays, why would so many 
of them not be directed at women, but to other men? I certainly believe that a rock start has 
many sexual opportunities that ordinary mortals do not have, and that this may partially 
motivate someone to be a rock star, but I doubt whether this same kind of reasoning works 
for a cosmologist or for a philosopher (yet, see Dunbar, 1996, for interesting experiments 
showing that male academic conversations change and that males start to display their 
erudition more when women are present). If the hunting theory augmented with sexual 
selection would explain all there is to human culture, I would expect much less cooperation 
and much smaller societies. As Wilson put it already: "sex is an antisocial force in 
evolution" (Wilson, 1980 [1975]: 155). In a society dominated purely by sexual selection, 
art would probably be a more important segment of society, because it constitutes more 
opportunities for bluffing and displaying mental complexity. Thus, I certainly believe that 
sexual selection theory is partially right, but I think there are other forces active as well 
which have made us the extremely social species that we currently are. The rest of this 
chapter is dedicated to the intergroup competition theory, a theory that seems necessary to 
explain the structure and size of modern human societies. 
 
8.5. INTERGROUP COMPETITION AND GROUP SELECTION 
As we saw, according to the intergroup competition hypothesis of Darwin, Bigelow, and 
Alexander, protohumans had to form relatively large communities to defend themselves 
against other such communities, apparently trying to exploit the same area. Arms races 
between different groups of protohomomids could lead to a runaway selection process for 
social and moral capacities of which the human psyche is postulated to be the outcome. As 
we saw already, Darwin had already envisioned such a process, but he was not very clear 
about the exact level of selection involved. Bigelow, who in his Dawn Warriors (1969) uses 
the theory as an explanation for the threefold brain enlargement during human evolution, is 
more precise in his formulations. He writes: 
 
 Those groups with the most effective brains, and hence with the greatest capacity 
for effective cooperation in attack or defense, maintained themselves longest in 
the most fertile and otherwise desirable areas. In these areas they produced more 
offspring, and additional groups. Those with the most effective brains and the 
most efficient in-group cooperation were less often massacred wholesale by other 
groups, and less often driven into deserts to starve (Bigelow, 1969: 5-6). 
 
This passage immediately reminds us of Maynard Smith's article on group selection in 
which he clearly distinguishes group and kin selection and states that "in the long run 
evolution by group selection requires group extinction just as evolution by individual 
selection requires individual death" (Maynard Smith, 1976). According to Maynard Smith 
the features favoring group selection are "small group size, low migration rates, and rapid 
extinction of groups infected with selfish alleles" (idem) - a situation which probably does 
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not often prevail (Williams, 1966). Only when these conditions are met, group selection 
might simply `override' individual selection even in a situation where individual and group 
interests conflict (Wynne-Edwards, 1962). 
 Originally, sociobiologists tended to identify the mechanism of intergroup 
competition with group selection. For example Alexander and Borgia write in 1978 that 
 
 Human groups represent an almost ideal model for potent selection at the group 
level. First, the human species is composed of competing and essentially hostile 
groups that have not only behaved toward another in a manner of different 
species but have been able quickly to develop enormous differences in 
reproductive and competitive ability because of cultural innovation and 
competitive ability because of cultural innovation and its cumulative effects. 
Second, human groups are uniquely able to plan and act as units, to look ahead, 
and to carry out purposely actions designed to sustain the group and improve its 
competitive position, whether through restricting disruptive behavior from within 
the group or through direct collective action against competing groups 
(Alexander & Borgia, 1978: 470). 
 
The mechanism proposed by Edward Wilson is somewhat less clear. In his Sociobiology he 
speculates about a special evolutionary mechanism which he calls genosorption, which, not 
only causes, but also results from increased mental powers (Wilson thinks of an 
`autocatalytic process', Wilson, 1975): 
 
 If any social predatory mammal attains a certain level of intelligence, as the early 
hominids, being large primates, were especially predisposed to do, one band 
would have the capacity to consciously ponder the significance of adjacent social 
groups and to deal with them in an intelligent, organized fashion. A band might 
then dispose of a neighboring band, appropriate its territory, and increase its own 
genetic representation in the metapopulation, retaining the tribal memory of this 
successful episode, repeating it, increasing the geographic range of its 
occurrence, and quickly spreading its influence still further in the 
metapopulation. Such primitive cultural capacity would be permitted by the 
possession of certain genes. Reciprocally, the cultural capacity might propel the 
spread of the genes through the genetic constitution of the metapopulation. Once 
begun, such mutual reinforcement could be irreversible. The only combination of 
genes able to confer superior fitness in contention with genocidal aggressors 
would be those that produce either a more effective technique of aggression or 
else the capacity to preempt genocide by some form of pacific maneuvering. 
Either probably entails mental and cultural advance. In addition to being 
autocatalytic, such evolution has the interesting property of requiring a selection 
episode only very occasionally in order to proceed as swiftly as individual-level 
selection. By current theory, genocide or genosorption strongly favoring the 
aggressor needs take place only once every few generations to direct evolution. 
This alone could push truly altruistic genes to a high frequency within the bands 
(Wilson, 1975: 573-74). 
 
In 1981 Daniel Vining jr. tried in his article `Group selection via genocide' to produce a 
mathematical simulation which shows that group-selection-induced altruism (= a gene-
induced talent for Bigelow's cooperation-to-compete) can evolve. According to Vining 
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(E.O.) Wilson is too optimistic about the frequency of the genocidic episodes needed. He 
comes to the rule of the thumb that "the group extinction rate must be of the same order of 
magnitude as the rate of selection against individual deleterious trait within the group", 
independently postulated by D.S. Wilson. 
 In their attempt to make the whole debate on group/individual selection in human 
evolution more testable Soltis, Boy and Richerson (1995) have gathered data on group 
extinction rates in five regions of Papua New Guinea and Irian Jaya from the 
anthropological literature. In their sample, the percentage of groups suffering extinction 
each generation (every 25 years) ranges from 1.6% to 31.3%. They conclude that it may be 
"a plausible mechanism for the evolution of widespread attributes of human societies over 
the long run" (1995: 483). 
 Yet, intergroup competition theory should not be identified with group selection. In 
fact Wilson's term `genosorption' suggests another mechanism than pure genocide: the dual 
strategy of genocide directed at males, and abduction or even rape directed at fertile women. 
It is this dual strategy about which we can find many historical reports, from the Israelite's 
way of dealing with the Midjanites (Num. 31: 17-18) to the Serbs selectively killing 
Muslims men at Srebreniza. Often, cooperation in warfare, or the `male coalitional strategy' 
(Van der Dennen, 1995) underlaying it, has direct effects on one's individual reproductive 
success: think of the concubines gained by the Greek heroes like Achilles and Agamemnon 
or by Roman generals, think of the reports on the abduction of virgins (Sabines, etc.), think 
of the link between warfare and rape (the weird lecture of Prof. Crammacher in Vestdijk's 
Schandalen, 1953), think of the Yanomamös. According to the reports of Chagnon fierce 
warriors have more reproductive success, because of their apparent popularity among 
females and/or because it offers them opportunities to collect women (Chagnon, 1988). In 
the Yanomamö 10 to 20% Yanomamö women have been captured in raids, the number 
increasing in ecological desirable areas (Chagnon, 1992). All this would imply that it is in 
the interest of individuals to join a raid or war. It is thus not necessary to invoke group 
selection to explain the tendency of males to cooperate in intergroup competition. 
 Since Dawkins radical criticism of group selection (which was continuous with 
Williams (1966) criticism of the concept and Maynard-Smith's analyses) group selection 
could not be used anymore as a deus ex machina. It is one of the merits of Alexander that he 
has freed the balance of power hypothesis from its identification with and its complete 
dependence on group selection (see especially, Alexander 1989: 462-64). The effect of 
competition between groups is not necessarily complete genocide or extinction (and at least 
during history the genetic borders between groups are often blurred by the effects of slave-
making, rape and the occupation of concurred countries). Rather, the competition between 
groups creates an environment in which the conflict between the interests of group and 
individual are minimized and in which individuals are selected on their abilities to cooperate 
in large networks. The genetic mechanism underlying individual altruism and heroism is not 
comparable to kin selection (not based on the sharing of genes) but is a complex form of 
reciprocal altruism in which more than two parties can remember each individual 
contribution to the group's well-being and in which `moral status', as the running account of 
one's signs of benevolence towards the group, becomes therefore desirable in its own right 
(see also Slurink, 1989). Trivers has called this form of reciprocity `generalized reciprocity' 
(Trivers, 1971; 1985), but Alexander prefers the term `indirect reciprocity' because 
generalized reciprocity "has a history of usage that is vague because it includes, among 
other things, nepotism" (Alexander, commentary to Slurink, 1992). In a system of indirect 
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reciprocal altruism individuals are selected on their ability to attain high moral status not 
only through genuine altruism but also through convincing show. 
 
8.6. ECOLOGICAL DOMINANCE AND THE PALEONTOLOGICAL RECORD 
Another major clarification in Alexander's version of the intergroup competition theory, 
christened by him the `balance of power' theory or `cooperation-to-compete' hypothesis, is 
the realization that the hypothesis would be incomplete without an explanation why the 
process occurred in protohominids and humans and not in other species. As we saw, his 
answer is the ecological dominance of evolving humans which "diminished the effects of 
`extrinsic' forces of natural selection such that within-species competition became the 
principal `hostile force of nature' guiding the long-term evolution of behavioral capacities, 
traits, and tendencies, ... more than in any other species" (Alexander, 1989: 458). 
 The idea is that levels of intergroup conflict increase on the moment that predation 
by other species decreases. The moment that the population levels of a species are not 
corrected by predators of other species the new limits will be fixed by intraspecific conflicts 
over territory and resources. Alexander speculates that the `turning point' at which 
`ecological dominance' is achieved and at which predation pressure is replaced by 
interspecific `balances of power' already could have been passed by the chimpanzee 
(Alexander, 1989: 458, 473-75). This means that the `initial  kick' that started the process 
could be given more than five million years ago, at the level of the common ancestor of 
hominids, chimpanzees and bonobo's - which I call the common HUCHIBO-ancestor. 
 However, as we saw already, chimpanzees, orrorins, nor australopithecines can be 
called completely ecologically dominant. Chimpanzees are sometimes predated by leopards. 
According to Brain's `Swartkrans leopard hypothesis' the collection of australopithecine 
bones in the Swartkrans cave may have been the result of the leopards' habit of taking prey 
into a tree in order to avoid competition with hyena's (Brain, 1983). The holes in one of the 
autstralopithecine craniums, SK 54, match exactly with the canines of a leopard. To account 
for the fact that in the oldest member of the Swartkrans cave more than 50% of the 
macrovertebrate remains are from either hominids or cercopithecoids, Brain has more 
recently speculated that leopards exploited the sleeping sites of the Baboons and 
Australopithecines. Also, it is very plausible that there existed a specialized predator of 
primates, a plausible candidate of which is the false sabertooth, Dinofelis. 
 Above that, there are other 
animals (bears, lions, tigers, elephants) 
`ecologically dominant' and some of 
these (lions) even exhibit signs of 
intergroup conflict, but nevertheless we 
see no signs of runaway selection on 
brain size in these species. To make 
things even more complicated, 
intergroup conflict seems to be a 
characteristic of more savanna-dwelling 
primates (Ciani, 1992), but none of them 
shows runaway selection either. In 
response to one of my papers (1992), 
Alexander sent me a handout with figure 
8-5 which, however, gives no causal 
mechanism. It would be nice if we could 
more exactly point to the factors that 
singled protohominids out and that 
brought them at some point in the position of becoming a predator above other predators 
(Slurink, 1993). 
 
Fig. 8-5. The human evolutionary trajectory. In 
humans, a combination of ecological dominance and social 
complexity triggered a further evolution of psychical 
complexity via intergroup competition (redrawn from a 
handout of Alexander). 
 Clearly, we have discussed already some of the preadaptations that destined our 
ancestors, contrary to other species, to become both ecological dominant and involved in 
intergroup competition. For example, all HUCHIBOs share a tendency towards female 
exogamy and towards cooperation between kin-related endogamous males (Wrangham, 
1986; Ghiglieri, 1987). They all have group territories that they defend in a cooperative way 
and chimpanzees sometimes try to enlarge this territory by raiding into a weakened 
neighboring community, like humans do (see Ghiglieri as cited in 7.2). This new kind of 
reproductive strategy could be a consequence of the opportunities offered by the shared 
interests of a group of kin-related males. In most primates males are exogamous and 
therefore more competitors than cooperators. The development of a high-risk/high pay-off 
strategy like organized aggression is highly unlikely to arise in females, because they are 
not likely to gain much reproductive advantage from it. 
 In a response to one of my papers in which I claimed that chimpanzees are not yet 
ecological dominant, Alexander stressed that this cooperation between kin-related males is 
"an effective anti-predator device that pre-adapts for a balance-of-power race". Apparently, 
he thinks of observations and experiments, like that of Adriaan Kortlandt which showed that 
groups of chimpanzees can be very aggressive towards a stuffed leopard (this experiment 
was filmed). It would be interesting to know to what extent males take the initiative in such 
cooperative assaults and to what extent they are indeed unique, as suggested by Alexander. 
(Many species are aggressive towards their predators; owls and birds of prey are often 
teased by crows and other birds). 
 Of course, we have mentioned a whole series of adaptations which could have 
made some early hominids relatively more ecological dominant than other species. The 
combination of bipedalism with the regular use of stone tools could have improved the 
efficiency of throwing (throwing forms a part of the way in which chimpanzees deal with 
predators). If early hominids at some point started to eat more meat, as suggested by the 
hunting hypothesis, this could have given new impulses to their creativity with weapons. 
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Above that, it could have stimulated their search for safe home bases, which were also 
relatively predator free. The most tempting hypothesis, not only cherished by me, but by 
many other thinkers on this topic, is the idea that the increased dexterity with tools 
combined with the discovery of relatively safe and dry home bases led to the discovery of 
fire, which may have been used to get these home bases even safer. This idea seems to be 
supported by the research of C.K. Brain in the Swartkrans and Sterkfontein caves. At the 
end of this end of his extensive report (Brain, 1983), he concludes that the different layers in 
the cave represent a fundamentally different ecological position of the successive hominids. 
The change is summarized in the statement that "the hunted became the hunters" (Brain, 
1983). 
 
 At Sterkfontein, the interface between the top of Member 4 and the bottom of Member 5 
represents a time interval crucial in the course of human evolution. During this interval the 
gracile australopithecines disappeared from the Transvaal scene and the first men appeared. 
In this interval, too, the evolving men mastered a threat to their security that had been 
posed by the cave cats over countless generations. During Member 4 times the cats 
apparently controlled the Sterkfontein cave, dragging their australopithecine victims into 
its dark recesses. By Member 5 days, however, the new men not only had evicted the 
predators, but had taken up residence in the very chamber where their ancestors had been 
eaten. 
  How the people managed this is not recorded, but it could surely have 
been achieved only through increasing intelligence reflected in developing 
technology. It is tempting to suggest that the mastery of fire had already been 
acquired and that this, together with the development of crude weapons, tipped 
the balance of power in their favor... (Brain, 1983: 273) 
 
Many other writers have speculated that the discovery of fire could have initiated a 
transition to a completely different life style (Poirier, 1987; Goudsblom, 1989). The 
discovery of fire may have enabled the conquering and defending of caves and with that it 
may have created a place of relative safety from predators and climatic uncertainties. With 
that, however, it may have given the impetus for new levels of intraspecific conflict, 
focussing on the most desirable home bases. 
 It is a pity for this beautiful idea that opinions on the first discovery of fire were not 
at all converging during the last decade. More than a decade ago Brain and Sillen (Brain & 
Sillen, 1988) claimed to have found evidence of the use of fire in the Swartkrans cave of 
more than one million years ago. It was claimed that traces of hearths were found in 
Zhoukoudian, were thick layers of ash seem to indicate that the fire was kept burning for 
long periods (Rukang & Shenglong, 1983). However, currently some leading 
paleontologists seem to doubt that the thick layers of ash in Zhoukoudian derive from 
human activities and Tattersall & Schwartz even cite an Israeli-Chinese team that has 
concluded that the ash layers in Zhoukoudian derives from fires outside the cave of which 
the ashes have washed into the cave (Tattersall & Schwartz, 2000: 156). On the other hand, 
there is now the hypothesis of Richard Wrangham and others according to which the 
transition to cooking made humans distinct from the very start, 1.9 million years ago 
(Wrangham et al., 1999; Wrangham, 2001). One argument in support of this hypothesis is 
that the teeth of Homo erectus are gradually becoming smaller during the Pleistocene 
(Wolpoff, 1984). It seems to me that, while indisputable evidence of hearths is hard to get, 
fossil evidence is much harder to refute. Homo ergaster/ erectus is characterized by a 
decrease in sexual dimorphism, a reduction in the size of the gut and a growth in brain 
volume that all point to a revolutionary change in diet. The argument of Wrangham (2001) 
that this need not to be a transition to meat eating, but that it could be caused by a transition 
to cooking could well be right given our present degree of knowledge or ignorance. This 
hypothesis is compatible with the intergroup competition hypothesis, because the discovery 
of fire could well explain the transition to ecological dominance. For all these reasons, it is 
to be hoped that paleontologists will give us finally some definite answers with respect to 
the origin of the control of fire. 
 We have now arrived at a somewhat improved version of Richard Alexander's 
model (figure 8-1) in which the unknown `cause x' is replaced by at least a hypothetical 
explanation of ecological dominance and in which the feedback system of causes leading to 
a runaway selection of moral and intellectual capacities is revealed (see figure 8-6). With 
this model at hand, we are now able to have a fresh look at the paleontological record. Are 
there any signs that may show that hominids at some point became increasingly `ecological 
dominant'? 
  Extinction of other species. At the 
moment that some hominids became ecological 
dominant, their numbers were no longer 
controlled by predators. Subsequently, we 
might expect them to increase in numbers, 
which must have had led to local over-
exploitation, which may have led to the 
extinction of prey animals. Especially at later 
stages of human evolution, such effects can be 
discerned. For example, researchers found that 
at different places people changed their 
hunting habits with respect to small game. 
While they were first harvesting easy-to-catch 
prey, like tortoises and shellfish, at some point 
(in Israel at 100.000 years ago, in Europe 
around 30.000 years ago) they turned to 
species that are much harder to catch, like 
birds, hares and rabbits. This could indicate 
that the easy-to-catch prey species were 
probably in short supply, as a result of over-
exploitation (Palmer, 2000). Another example 
is offered by the effects of mass hunting. In 
later stages of human evolution, and especially 
with Neanderthals and modern humans can we 
discern very clear traces of mass hunting 
techniques that probably have driven many prey species into extinction (`prehistoric 
overkill', Martin, 1967). At the same time many large species of mammals go extinct. 
Although some of these extinctions coincide with climatic changes, it is highly plausible 
that modern man played a large role in them, because the patterns of extinction coincide 
with his presence, especially outside Africa. One example of a very fast process of 
extinction was the extinction of different species of American land animals that coincides 
with the first Americans, the Clovis people. 
 
Fig. 8-6. A slightly modified version of 
Alexander's theory of human evolution. 
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 Larger groups, more gracile individuals, more hierarchical social structures, 
higher population densities. There are many signs betraying deep social changes and an 
increase in group size during the Middle/Upper Paleolithic transition (Pfeiffer, 1983). The 
very fact that people were more lightly build can be interpreted as an indication that 
cooperation within the group became more important than the sheer force of the individual. 
Apparently it was more important to belong to a strong group than to be strong yourself. 
The appearance of body ornaments (White, 1989) and status burials indicate a 
compartmentalization of society that can only have resulted from a division of labor and a 
new sense of hierarchy. An indication of the higher population densities in Cro-Magnon 
man compared to the Neanderthal is given by the fact that on the central Russian Plain there 
are only half a dozen known Neanderthal sites, while there are more than 500 Cro-Magnon 
sites (Pfeiffer, 1983). 
 A need for new food sources, ultimately resulting in the origin of agriculture. After 
the colonization of new areas by Homo sapiens we often see a succession of food habits 
starting with big game hunting and ending with agriculture (Martin & Klein, 1985). As the 
life expectancy of farmers compared to hunter-gatherers actually decreases (Cohen, 1987: 
269), there is no reason to assume that this series of changes is a result of `progress'. Rather 
the changes are born out of necessity. As Cohen (Cohen, 1977) shows the discovery of 
agriculture could have been the result of prehistoric overpopulation. This fits very well in 
the intergroup competition model, because it shows that modern humans were ecologically 
dominant and their numbers were not corrected anymore by `external forces'. 
 In all, while the Sterkfontein research suggests that the relative vulnerability to 
predators may have been a difference between Australopithecus and Homo, many signs of 
ecological dominance are scarce until the appearance of Homo sapiens (see Slurink, 1996, 
for a review on the ecological position of Homo erectus). Intergroup competition may have 
been an important force during human evolution - as testified by some evidence of violence 
and autopredation in early humans (see below). At the time of Homo sapiens, however, we 
see a whole series of fundamental changes that very clearly show an increased level of 
intergroup tension. 
 It is plausible, therefore, to assume that this increased level of intraspecific tensions 
is linked - via an increase in the need for within-group cooperation - to the sudden 
acceleration in the evolution of cultural and creative abilities introduced in Europe by Cro-
Magnon man. Specifically, an increasingly sophisticated language may have enabled our 
ancestors to cope with an environment in which old habits of living in relatively small 
groups had to be abandoned as a consequence of an increasing hostile within-species 
environment. Paradoxically, a runaway selection for creative and moral capacities may have 
been the result of within-group arm races resulting from increased between-group arm races. 
An increase in group size as the result of arm races between groups may have given new 
reproductive opportunities to leaders that were able to manage such larger groups. Their 
skills as leaders must have been based on the ability to manipulate the group with symbols 
and on the abilities to cooperate in networks, to plan forward and to think strategically. The 
idea is that selection on this abilities happened both within the group at the level of 
individuals and between groups, in the sense that groups that were better organized were 
able to gradually or suddenly replace or invade less well organized groups. 
 Yet, at the moment this is all 
speculation. In my first paper on this subject 
(Slurink, 1992), I speculated that only Homo 
sapiens crossed the `ecological dominance 
barrier'. Alexander, who had to review the 
paper, retorted that ecological dominance is 
never a completely absolute concept: there are 
degrees of ecological dominance. Thus, 
perhaps we have to design a figure like 8-7, in 
which different hominid species are ecological 
dominant to different degrees: apes with 
cooperating males (e.g. chimps) are more 
ecological dominant than other apes, for 
example, and hominids that use fire are more 
ecological dominant than those without. This 
could imply that intergroup competition may 
have been a causal influence already in the evolution of the chimpanzee mind (as suggested 
by Alexander), but that its role still increased in the hominid lineage. To me, this seems the 
most plausible idea, but it is also an idea which is rather difficult to test. 
 
Fig. 8-7. Speculative degrees of ecological 
dominance in a few homininae. Ecological 
dominance is inversely proportional to number of 
individuals killed by predators or parasites. 
 
8.7. COMPATIBILITY OF HUNTING AND INTERGROUP COMPETITION 
All this points to the idea that our ancestors were ecologically dominant predators that 
gradually became more fierceful and thus more dominant over other animals. This means 
that the hunting hypothesis and the intergroup-competition hypothesis are compatible, but 
refer to some extent to different phases within the evolution of the genus Homo. An increase 
in parental care and a home base to exchange food and to protect increasingly helpless 
juveniles can already have been a characteristic of a carnivorous primate like Homo 
ergaster/erectus, although recent research stresses the relatively late origin of the extended 
youth phase (as we saw, see Mayell, 2001; more research is forthcoming). A situation in 
which there were no longer other predators powerful enough to cope with Homo 
ergaster/erectus and its protected home bases could have given rise to increased 
competition for favorable sites and to the necessity to join relatively big and strong groups. 
 Thus the home base may have played a crucial role during human evolution. 
During the transition to a lifestyle as hunter it enabled our ancestors to find a place to 
exchange food; gradually it became more important as a place where children could be 
reared and protected; but finally, it became itself a scarce resource and the object of 
competition among different groups. Only this last factor can explain adequately why group 
sizes in our species seem to be above the optimum with relation to cooperative hunting 
(Alexander, 1979). Also, only this last factor can explain a tendency to socially respected 
monogamy. 
 Pair bonds and reproductive-opportunity rewards in a multimale society. All in all, 
the pattern that suggests itself is that man started as a predator, but at some relatively late 
point in prehistory increasingly turned into a warrior. Probably this can help us to explain 
the typical paradox of a species in which males to some extent mutually respect each other's 
relationships to particular females. The external pressure of a threat from foreign groups 
created a situation in which group members became mutually dependent and were forced to 
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extinguish sources of intragroup conflict like conflict over females. There was a need for 
rules that would curtail an escalation of intragroup conflicts, and a tendency toward 
`reproductive-opportunity leveling' (Alexander, 1987) would do so. 
 At first sight the concept of reproductive-opportunity leveling might seem an 
artificial deus ex machina. However, one can find many examples in the anthropological 
literature that show how it might work. For example, the Mehinaku of Brazil have very 
outspoken ideas about what it is to be a real man: a real man is someone who is not lazy, 
who regularly provides food for the people and who shares it altruistically. A real man is 
also a good wrestler and a strong personality. Anyone who does not fulfill this image is 
looked down upon by both men and women. The important point is that the women of these 
disrespected men, as a result of this lack of respect, also deceive them. According to David 
Gilmore (1993), who uses studies of Thomas Gregor, "the sexual norms of the Mehinaku 
allow tacitly that a women deceives a bad wrestler. Knowing this, most of these women 
have adulterous relationships while their husbands are sulking helplessly" (p. 129). The 
important point is, of course, that a bad wrestler also makes a bad warrior and that the norms 
of manhood refer to some extent to cooperativeness and potential heroism. 
 This is even more clear in the Yanomamö. Chagnon (1988) has shown that 
Yanomamö men who have made the most victims in intergroup conflicts, that is those who 
are the best killers (unokais), also have the most women. Of course, it would be important to 
show that cowardice and desertion are also punished and thus that satisfying the norm of the 
society is the only way to be reproductively successful. 
 Perhaps these examples show that Alexander's concept of reproductive-opportunity 
leveling is not entirely correct. Probably it should be replaced by `reproductive opportunity 
trading' or even by the idea of a `reproductive-opportunity rewards system'. The point is that 
not just anyone in a society gets reproductive opportunities, but rather, the coalition of 
dominant individuals rewards those men whom they find helpful or indispensable. We 
should not forget that the balance-of-power model is not a model of Wynne-Edwardsian 
group selection, but a model explaining why human societies are characterized by so much 
moralistic aggression toward noncooperators and why such a relatively high level of 
cooperation can be achieved among nonrelated individuals. 
 The idea behind the model of Alexander is that the only way in which a multimale 
society in which paternity was totally uncertain could turn into a society in which paternity 
was certain, but in which children were nevertheless safe from other males, was by 
introducing an extra motivation for males to cooperate. To cite Alexander: 
 
 Prevention of infanticide ... would be a massively important way that a male might help 
his female and the offspring he sires. Suppose a female begins to restrict her 
copulations, excluding certain males or excluding all but a single male. In a primate 
resembling chimpanzees we are justified in assuming that such a female would place her 
offspring in jeopardy of infanticide by the disenfranchised males within her own group. 
Because of her loyalty to the male who mated with her, it would profit him to defend 
her offspring against attack, at least under circumstances where this would not have 
been the case before, and assuming that his loyalty had some chance of being effective 
in preventing infanticide. If unity among males is sufficiently important, then 
rudimentary social reciprocity among males in connection with defense of the group or 
the `exporting' of aggression ... could cause a male's importance to the group, and the 
importance of overall amicability among males, to prevent males who could not 
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copulate with a particular female from attacks on her offspring or on the male who 
undertakes to defend them. Obviously respecting the right of the offspring of other 
individuals or families to exist and go about their business is also part of the social 
cooperativeness - the moral system - of humans today (1990, p. 32). 
 
As might be expected from an evolutionary perspective, human culture seems to be the 
coincidental product of a series of cumulative adaptive changes. These may have started as a 
result of climatological change and ecological instability (Potts, 1996), which forced 
particular groups of chimpanzeelike HUCHIBO ancestors to open up new food sources, 
which required new cognitive abilities. Probably the genus Homo resulted from a group of 
australopithecines that no longer was able to retreat into the trees and that became 
increasingly dependent on meat at the beginning of the ice ages. The birth of helpless 
children may have stimulated the origin of more or less exclusive pair bonds within the 
multimale societies of these early humans, although certainly not all authorities agree on 
this topic and this issue has to be resolved empirically. At some later stage, when early 
humans became increasingly ecologically dominant, these pair bonds may have been one of 
the most important requirements of more complex societies because they enabled the origin 
of a reproductive-opportunity rewards system that allowed the evolution of a complex 
division of labor within the competing societies. At the same time, these pair bonds may 
have given the process of sexual selection a new twist, with choices focussing on (for 
males) residual reproductive capacity and good motherhood and on (for females) good 
hunters/warriors and good fatherhood. 
 Anyhow, mutually respected pair bonds in multimale societies are postulated to 
have been a part of a system which was driven by arms races between these societies. Thus, 
the `antisocial' force of sex, could become subjugated by the binding forces of a common 
goal, the defense and well-being of one's own group. All this seems to be reflected in the 
structure of our own mind, which is to some extent a living fossil, in which often the forces 
of sexual and social imperatives (but almost never categorical imperatives) clash. There is 
reason to believe that we would be much simpler, and perhaps much happier, creatures 
without these internal conflicts. 
 Human evolution as a multicausal process. The idea that human evolution is a 
multicausal process could, in principle, be an all-too-easy solution for someone who wants 
to stay friends to everyone or who has not the courage to draw clear conclusions. On the 
other hand, however, simple monocausal models of human evolution have a seductive 
charm, certainly for philosophers since Thales. Would it not be nice if we were able to 
summarize our understanding of human evolution in a simple formula that one could write 
down in one's handpalm? Ten years ago I often thought of Alexander's theory as just such a 
simple model and I asked myself questions about the possibility of a relationship between 
the size of a planet and the chances of the evolution of complex cultures or the premature 
death of such cultures as a result of the mutual annihilation of conflicting parties in the arms 
races required. 
 I have to admit that I still find such speculations very interesting, but I have 
become milder with respect to multicausal models. Sometimes it is not unreasonable to 
assume complex causal sequences and the real challenge is to choose between `Thales' (the 
mono-causalist) and `Aristotle' (the multi-causalist) in each different case. The complex 
sequences of actions that are needed for baking a cake or developing a photograph are 
examples of causal `programs' that overrule (but not transcend) the law of entropy or 
nature's tendency towards chaos (Slurink, 1991). One needs not to believe in the analogy 
between baking a cake or creating a human being to believe that human evolution was 
driven by a complex sequence of phylogenetic and climatological causes. Perhaps the most 
important insight here is the realization that human beings have never been nature's goal and 
that all subsequent stages of human beings represented adaptative solutions in their own 
right. Human beings need to have been bred as simply perfect hunters, perfect gatherers, 
perfect cooperators/warriors, or perfect lovers, but their natures probably reflect a history in 
which at different times different skills were crucial, and in which at all times trade-offs 
existed between the necessity to exercise different skills. Different adaptations may have 
accumulated as a succession of different deposits and, just as piles of deposits are molded 
by all kinds of forces in geology, a pile of such adaptations can still be further molded by 
natural and sexual selection. 
 The best way to find the causal 
chains that created humans is to start 
looking at our similarities with 
chimpanzees. Like chimpanzees, males 
in humans do cooperate, hunt, and do 
compete with males from other groups. 
An increased level of intergroup 
competition could well have 
characterized hominids during all of their 
history. Yet, it is not unreasonable to 
assume that only when humans became 
fierce predators they became fierce 
competitors with their own kind. It is not 
unreasonable to link this transition to a 
more carnivorous habit to climatic 
change and the growth of African 
savannas on the one hand and to the one 
distinctively human characteristic which 
separates us from chimpanzees on the 
other hand - which is male-female 
bonding and the existence of at least 
some paternal investment. As carnivores 
are more altricial, need more time to 
learn, and are often more intelligent than 
herbivores, an increased meat 
consumption could thus have initiated a 
socio-sexual revolution with deep 
consequences. The resulting extended 
childhood could have played a role in enabling humans to climb on top of the whole food 
pyramid and bringing them into competition with their own kind. Thus, we come to a 
multicausal model which integrates several models at the same time, but which is not simply 
another piece of oecumenic eclecticism (fig. 8-8)4. 
 
Fig. 8-8. Two or more causal chains may have 
reinforced each other in producing the bipedal social & 
culture-dependent predator apes that we are. 
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4 The following sentences from the above mentioned handout show that Alexander, too, believes in multiple causes 
or is at least aware of the role of all kinds of preadaptations, including group hunting: "Presumably, primates became 
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8.8. EVIDENCE FOR A LINK BETWEEN INTERGROUP VIOLENCE AND 
HUMAN EVOLUTION 
Beautiful as this multicausal model may be, however, all this would remain speculation 
without at least some evidence that there really has occurred between-group-competition-
induced arms races which have driven the evolution of the human mind. Is there such 
evidence? As I claimed in chapter 2, one cannot ask for a definite proof of theories that refer 
to the world - one can only show that a particular theory has more verifiability, `robustness' 
(a consilience of inductions à la Whewell), and explanatory power. These virtues distinguish 
promising and less promising theories. As many evolutionary epistemologists stress, 
theories have to compete and their humble proponents are only their temporary hands and 
brains. Instead of trying to proof my favorite theory, I will just put the weight of the 
evidence and the arguments on a virtual scale and compare it with the weight of the contra 
arguments. If I succeed in tipping the balance in favor of the intergroup competition 
hypothesis, this should cause a paradigm shift in the heads of my readers. What evidence 
and arguments do we have to place on the scales in favor of the intergroup hypothesis? 
 
1. The argument based on the necessity of an extra explanation for the evolution of human 
intelligence and the human brain. This is a central point for Alexander: the hunting 
hypothesis simply does not explain enough. Specifically, it does not explain the largeness of 
human groupings, the extent of human cooperation and the exaggerated nature of human 
intelligence. 
 Of course, the weight of this arguments might be matched by a counter-weight if a 
competing theory would offer a better explanation. The theory of sexual selection does 
explain the oversized nature of the human mind, but it does not explain that human males 
often cooperate. Above that, while girls are sometimes impressed by a nice poem or 
painting, human males (ànd occasionally females) create complex formulas and machines 
that are hard to evaluate for relative outsiders. Of course, women are impressed by status, 
but the fact that humans are so hierarchical and tend to live in such big groups still remains 
unexplained. If sexual selection could explain it all, why would males and females not just 
live together in pairs and defend territories while gathering the nuts, fruits and roots and 
hunting the rabbits within that limited area? 
 Thus, I tend to combine intergroup competition and sexual selection theory. They 
seem to me not mutually exclusive, but even complementary to some extent. Even in 
chimpanzees hunting and raiding into foreign territory is a loaded with sexual interests, 
because the good hunters can preferentially share meat with fertile women and if a group 
succeeds in absorbing another group, the dominant males have obviously more females to 
choose from. At the moment that our ancestors became increasingly dependent on the 
supplement of meat to their diet, a trade based on sexual opportunities and meat could 
evolve into a trade based on paternal certainty and paternal investment. If a group of males 
could suppress the rivalry among themselves by some degree of reproductive opportunity 
 
evolutionary primed for the production of species likely to give rise to trajectories like those of apes and humans because of a 
arboreal existence, leading to stereoscopic vision, hands, and eventually a relatively complex mentality and social life. Humans 
and chimpanzees are also included among the few carnivorous primates, a behavioral tendency that aids group cooperativeness 
when group hunting accompanies it, and probably sharpens mentality in ways that contribute to success in some kinds of social 
competition" (Alexander: handout). 
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levelling, they could both hunt larger prey and dominate larger domains. This would 
reinforce a system of pair-bonding in which females would be torn between good 
hunters/fighters and good fathers and in which mutual sexual selection would become 
complex enough to favor relatively oversized brains. 
 
2. The argument based on the relatedness of humans and chimps. Both species are clever 
machiavellists, have `demonic', cooperating males, which cooperate-to-compete (in the 
words of Bigelow) and even know `war' in the sense of the intentional crossing of territorial 
borders, motivated by some kind of aggression. Goodall gives a description of the 
Chimpanzees patrols that have crossed a territorial border: 
 
 Chimpanzees taking part in patrols tended to travel in close compact groups. 
Travel was silent, with frequent pauses to look and listen. Often an individual 
stood bipedally, to see over the tall grass or stare down into a valley or ravine 
ahead. From time to time the party stopped and sat silently, watching and 
listening: sometimes they climbed into a tree; at other times they sat, often within 
arms reach on some ridge overlooking a neighboring valley (cited in Eibl-
Eibesfeldt, 1995: 457). 
 
If such patrols meet `foreign' chimpanzees, they will start to threat and to impose at them or 
throw stones at them. If the `enemy' does not withdraw, lethal aggression will occur. Males 
will run forward, screaming and barking, and they will kill or attempt to kill whatever 
`foreign' chimpanzees they meet, including females and children. Goodall even describes 
how two males start eating an infant while it is still alive. As a result of such aggressive 
encounters, a strong group can gradually exterminate a weak group (see also Goodall, 
1986). Competing theories cannot ignore this striking similarity with human imperialism 
and should be able to answer the question why such similarities appear. 
 Of course, it has been attempted to argue that both human and chimp warfare is the 
exception rather than the rule as it has been argued time and again that prehistoric or 
`primitive' peoples were/are living peacefully. The idea of peaceful primitive societies is as 
old as humankind and even after it has been criticized time and again as a myth (for 
example by Bigelow, 1969; Eibl-Eibesfeld, 1984, 1995), it re-emerges each time in different 
guises. For example, the anthropologists Knauft argues for "a U-shaped evolutionary 
trajectory of selected features of human violence", which disturbs the analogies between 
apes and man. It is shown by van der Dennen's The Origin of War (1995: especially chapter 
7), however, that peace in humans is a complex phenomenon, which results from complex 
political and ecological choices. In other words, peace is a choice in the context of the 
possibility of war. Van der Dennen has collected data on relatively peaceful societies for 
more than fifteen years, but does not see their existence as a falsification of the similarities 
between man and chimpanzee. `War' (intentional raiding into foreign territory) in both 
chimps and man is a `male coalitional strategy', but we are not necessary living in wartime 
all the time. Rather, peace is "an adaptive response to particular political ecologies" (Van 
der Dennen, 1995: 537). 
 
 
3. The paleontological evidence for intergroup competition during human evolution. There 
is good reason to believe that the `U-shaped evolutionary trajectory' of intergroup 
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aggression refers in reality to our Unknown past or to our general Ugnorance. Let me give 
some extra evidence. 
 
a. Indirect evidence: cannibalism. In my papers, I refer to cannibalism as a sign of 
intergroup competition. Cannibalism need not to have been absent, the invention of 
pathological imagination or the result of a pathological condition. In the animal kingdom, 
cannibalism is a widespread phenomenon which arises in a variety of contexts. In insects 
and spiders it is sometimes part of a mating system in which the residual reproductive 
capacity of males drops after mating. In many owls and birds of prey, the youngest `reserve' 
chickens are eaten by their older siblings when there is not enough prey to feed them all. 
Many predators also occasionally feed on their conspecifics simply as a consequence of the 
difficulty or disinclination to distinguish them (1% of Goshawk prey are other Goshawks). 
In a series of species, including large carnivores such as hyenas, lions, and leopards, 
cannibalism seems to be an accidental by-product of overpopulation and ecological 
dominance. It would be interesting to know who is eating who in such species, specifically 
whether members of groups do sometimes eat other group-members. Goodall (1986) 
mentions six cases in which infant chimpanzees were seen to be killed and/or eaten by other 
chimps, but only three of them were members of other groups (1986: 284). In humans, 
cannibalism directed at babies or deceased group-members seems sometimes linked to a 
difficulty to obtain other kinds of meat (the book of Lamentations records that after the fall 
of Jerusalem in 587 B.C. "mothers, full of tender care, cooked their own children into food 
in their need, at the ruin of my people", Lam. 4: 10). Thus, cannibalism is not necessarily 
rare, but it is neither necessarily linked to intergroup competition. 
 Yet, in many primitive societies cannibalism is clearly directed at members of other 
groups and often it is thought that one can obtain the spiritual power of the enemy by eating 
the contents of his skull or by eating the heart (Hurons). In the cannibalistic empires of the 
Toltecs, Mayas and Aztecs it were prisoners of war that were ritually slaughtered at a daily 
basis and the flesh was probably used to reward the warlords (Harris, 1977). 
 Formerly, one needed only to find a broken skull or a skull missing its base to 
conclude that early humans, too, were head-hunters and cannibals. Von Koenigswald, for 
example, writes about the `head-hunters' of Ngandong (Von Koenigswald, 1956). In the 
mean time, however, Binford has come and archaeologists have become reluctant to jump to 
such conclusions: aren't there always alternative explanations, whether hyenas, 
watertorrents or other biological or physical forces which can break a skull in some way? 
Nowadays one has to find almost the `the smoking gun' (or a smoking campfire with charred 
hominid bones) to justify a claim about cannibalism. 
 It is also in this critical spirit that one should place Paul Bahn's review on 
cannibalism in the Cambridge Encyclopedia of Human Evolution (1992), which also forms 
part of the critical discussion of the evidence in Hans van der Dennen's The Origin of War 
(1995). Bahn argues that the few real cutmarks that have been found (he mentions that 
Krapina Neanderthals) could result from mortuary practices in which bodies are left to 
decompose and are finally defleshed before being buried. One can point in this context to 
the habits of the Australian Aborigines, but also to mortuary practices of the inhabitants of 
the oldest city, Catal Huyuk in which even vultures were used to deflesh the death. He also 
points out that the Neanderthal skull in a `ring of stones' found at Monte Circeo simply was 
a hyena den in which a ring of stones resulted from a land slide. 
 In a recent review, Tim White concludes that nowadays even cutmarks on the skull 
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alone are not considered definite proof, which is probably the reason that he does not even 
mention the Bodo skull, a Homo heidelbergensis skull which shows clear signs of deliberate 
defleshing according to himself (White, 1981). It has at least to be clear that forceful 
hammering was used to reach the nutritionally valuable tissues to exclude the alternative 
hyena-hypothesis. In general one can say that the patterns of cutting, chopping, hammering 
and burning has to match the hypothesis of the intentional defleshing of a body that is not 
already rotting. 
 Yet, White argues that even given such extreme high standards of evidence, 
cannibalism can be attributed to ancients humans, and, according to White, its frequency is 
striking (White, 2001: 53). While Bahn still argues that definite evidence for cannibalism 
has never been found, White cites research in which human myoglobin has been found in 
cooking pots and in human coprolites (of the Anasazi in Colorado). Apparently the 
accumulation of such evidence in recent years has again tipped the scales in favor of 
prehistoric cannibalism. According to White, Homo antecessor, found at excavations near 
the Sierra de Atapuerca of Northern Spain dated at about 800.000 years ago, certainly was a 
cannibal, as was Homo neanderthalensis in Krapina (Croatia) and Moula-Guercy (France) 
and Homo sapiens in several young sites in Northern America (White, 1992; Defleur et al., 
1999; White, 2001). It was in these last sites, which are only 900 years old, in which a habit 
of preparing human flesh in cooking pots was demonstrated. Apparently, the meso-american 
states did not invent cannibalism, but it was already a widespread practice in prehistoric 
times. 
 Given the combined evidence of ethnography, history, and archeology, the `weight 
of evidence and arguments' are thus gradually tipping the scales in favor of prehistoric 
cannibalism again, but now in an intellectual climate in which the standards of evidence are 
very high. Currently, according to White "it remains much more challenging to establish 
why cannibalism took place than to establish that it did" (2001: 55). Given the fact that 
hominids are K-strategists which require a enormous energy to raise, given the value of 
males in defending their offspring, and given the intelligence of hominids, some forms of 
cannibalism are extremely improbable. Apart from the incidental consumption of beloved 
ones in times of extreme scarcity, intergroup competition is the most likely context of 
cannibalism in hominids. In an environment saturated with ecologically dominant predator 
apes such apes will occasionally turn to other kinds of flesh, as do all predators at times. 
Given their talent for intergroup competition, such apes will also increase their raids in 
foreign territories. If both strategies are combined, of course, one can kill two birds (or other 
predator apes) with one stone. Cannibalism simply is such an efficient way of overcoming 
overpopulation that it would be unlikely that it would never be rediscovered by predator 
apes with so many chimpanzee genes (the six cases of infanticidal cannibalism in 
chimpanzees reported by Goodall were all observed by humans and thus tips of the iceberg). 
 It should also be reminded that during long periods of prehistory, there existed 
more protohominid species at the same time. It is not unreasonable to assume that, for 
example, Neanderthals sometimes stole a sapiens-baby or vice versa (as chimpanzees 
occasionally hunt on baboons, or, in two cases, did attack human children, Goodall, 1986: 
282). Such attacks may have inspired `preemptive' strikes by sapiens. Such scenarios are as 
far as I know purely speculative, but that does not mean that they are unlikely or untrue. 
After all, given the relative short time of their coexistence, somehow sapiens must have 
played a role in the extinction of the Neanderthal. It is much harder to link the extinction of 
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the robust australopithecines or Paranthropus with the spread of Homo erectus, because 
they were not competitors with respect to food. 
 
b. Direct evidence: bones & art. Of course, to prove intergroup competition in prehistory, 
evidence for cannibalism is not enough. We need much more direct evidence, and given the 
scarcity of fossil material and the critical attitudes of modern archaeologists, this will 
always be very hard. Yet, Lawrence Keeley has succeeded in his War before Civilization to 
collect an impressive series of examples which goes far beyond the data that I have 
mentioned in the papers above. Keeley discusses, for example, the extraordinary high 
number of injuries and breakages in Neanderthals, which he however does not find 
conclusive. He then goes on: 
 
 Whenever modern humans appear on the scene, definitive evidence of homicidal 
violence becomes more common, given a sufficient sample of burials. Several of 
the rare burials of earliest modern humans in central and western Europe, dating 
from 34,000 to 24,000 years ago, show evidence of violent death. At Grimaldi in 
Italy, a projectile point was embedded in the spinal column of a child's skeleton 
dating to the Aurignacian (the culture of the earliest modern humans in Europe, 
ca. 36,000 to 27,000 years ago). One Aurignacian skull from southern France 
may have been scalped; it has cut-marks on its frontal (forehead). Evidence from 
the celebrated Upper Palaeolithic cemeteries of Czechoslovakia, dating between 
35,000 and 24,000 years ago, implies - either by direct evidence of weapons 
traumas, especially cranial fractures on adult males, or by the improbability of 
alternative explanations for mass burials of men, women, and children - that 
violent conflicts and deaths were common. In the Nile Valley of Egypt, the 
earliest evidence of death by homicide is a male burial, dated to about 20,000 
years ago, with stone projectile points in the skeleton's abdominal region and 
another point embedded in its upper arm (a wound that had partially healed 
before his death) (Keeley, 1996: 37). 
 
Keeley then goes on to discuss a series of more recent examples, including the human 
skeletons found at Gebel Sahaba, in Egypt, a site which is thought to be 12,000-14,000 
years old. From his report I learn that the cemetery has been used over several generations. 
"Over 40 percent of the fifty-nine men, women, and children buried in this cemetery had 
stone projectile points intimately associated with or embedded in their skeletons." Above 
that, twenty of the adults had multiple wounds, and the wounds on children were all in the 
head or neck. The excavator estimated that more than half the people buried there had died 
violently (see also Wenke, 1984: 285, Klein, 1989, and Wendorf et al., 1970). 
 According to Keeley both the Mesolithic and Neolithic must have been periods full 
of conflict, given the archeological evidence. He mentions, for example, the Ofnet Cave in 
Germany in which "two caches of `trophy' skulls were found, arranged `like eggs in a 
basket', comprising the disembodied heads of thirty-four men, women, and children, most 
with multiple holes knocked through their skulls by stone axes" (Keeley, 1996: 38). He also 
mentions two mass killings from the Neolithic, one in Germany (Talheim, ca. 5000 BC, 34 
persons killed by at least 6 different axes) and one in France (Roaix, ca. 2000 BC, more than 
100 persons killed by arrows). Keeley summarizes his finding by claiming that "the 
archeological evidence indicates ... that homicide has been practiced since the appearance of 
modern humankind and that warfare is documented in the archeological record of the past 
10,000 years in every well-studied region" (Keeley, 1996: 39; Van der Dennen, 1995; see 
also Louwe-Kooijmans, 1990, on an excavation in the Netherlands of a group of prehistoric 
people apparently all killed at the same time). 
 Archaeologists since Binford have, of course, been right in being very critical 
about all kinds of evidence for violence and cannibalism. Yet, it is wrong to assume that 
they are so keen about finding evidence for violence that they are inclined to overinterpret 
their data. A good example of this is offered by Ötzi, the 5300 year old man from the glacier 
at the Austrian-Italian border. First it was assumed that Ötzi had simply died from the cold, 
but recently (june, 2001) an X-ray has been done from a different angle and a spear-point 
was found in his left shoulder-blade (Van Loon, 2001). Ötzi is an example of an extremely 
well-preserved person. One wonders how often archaeologists miss the real cause of death 
of one of our ancestors. 
 Art. Another source of direct evidence of prehistoric warfare is offered by 
participants or observers themselves. It consists of prehistoric drawings or paintings of 
intergroup conflict. It appears that these are relatively seldom, as realistic portrets of 
humans are. As prehistoric art was probably not intended to picture the world realistically, 
but was probably linked with totemism, hunting magic, ritual or education, one can hardly 
expect that it directly answers our questions. After all, changes are small that from all his 
work precisely Picasso's Guernica will be found in the year 20.000 or so. Yet, even the 
small sample of books that I am able to consult yields several examples of prehistoric 
paintings of intergroup competition. 
1. While I do not find examples of franco-cantabrian 
rock art depicting intergroup conflict in the best article 
on this art that I can find (Breuil & Berger-Kirchner, 
1961), rock art from the Spanish Levant contains 
several hints to intergroup conflict (Bandi, 1961). An 
old predecessor of Guernica comes from a cave near 
Morella la Vella, Castily, Spain. I have tried to redraw 
it with my mouse (fig. 8-9). It depicts a battle between 
two groups of archers that apparently carry a basket 
with arrows on their back in two cases. Other paintings 
depict a group of warriors, an execution, and a warrior 
hit by arrows (Bandi, 1961). Of course, one can discuss 
the meaning of some of these individual paintings: the 
warriors can be dancers, the wounded warrior could be 
victim of a hunting accident (Van der Dennen, 1995: 
210). Yet on the whole there seem to be enough 
paintings that justify the conclusion that violence and war was not unknown to the painters. 
 
Fig. 8-9. Fight between two 
groups of archers as depicted in a cave 
near Morella la Vella, Castily, Spain. 
Redrawn with computer mouse. 
2.  While European rock art is wellknown, there is much more African rock art which stems 
from a period from 20,000 to very recent. Gowlet (1993: 144) shows a picture of intergroup 
conflict with warriors carrying bows and arrows from Cape Province, South Africa, dated 
between 8,000 and 3,000 years ago. Eibl-Eibesfeld (1995: 461) shows a photograph taken 
by himself of an apparently old Bushman painting on a rock found near the farm 
`Godgegeven', Warden, South Africa, on which we can see relatively gracile Bushmen with 
spears and perhaps bows and arrows fighting a more robust tribe carrying handaxes. He has 
also shows a picture from a somewhat more sophisticated painting, dating ca. 4000 BC, in 
which two groups of warriors fight each other with bows and arrows, one of them 
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apparently trying to prevent the other from stealing their cattle. Other examples are 
mentioned in Van der Dennen (1995: 209-211). 
3. Van der Dennen (1995) also reproduces on its cover a photograph of an at least 10,000 
year old rock painting from Australia. The paintings are from a collection of battle scenes 
painted on rocks by northern Australian Aboriginals from Arnhem land, dating from 6000 to 
10,000 years BP. 
 
 In the earliest works male `dynamic' figures are shown in combat, carrying large 
spears, hurling boomerangs, dodging spears and chasing one another with raised 
weapons. Some figures have spears sticking out of their bodies while others are 
bending down to help fallen comrades. Scenes produced some 6000 years ago 
show more `modern' weapons such as spear-throwers and three-pronged spears. 
They also portray more numerous and larger battles involving leaders with 
special headdresses and dozen of warriors. Most earlier works depict small 
skirmishes or one-to-one contests (Van der Dennen, 1995: 211). 
 
It seems to me that all this evidence together gives us good reason to believe that there is not 
necessarily such a thing as a `U-shaped evolutionary trajectory' of intergroup aggression. I 
am much more inclined to draw a straight line between chimpanzees and us and to 
hypothesize that a tendency to form male coalitions has existed all the time, while from time 
to time there have been ecological circumstances which promoted an increased level of 
intergroup competition. The fact that cannibalism has been documented in Homo 
heidelbergensis and even in Homo antecessor could support this view. To me, it seems that 
there are two further arguments which support a view in which violence is part of the human 
condition. 
 
4. The argument based on current human psychology. One of the presuppositions of - or 
`ideas behind' - evolutionary psychology is that the structure of the human mind is not a 
kind of tabula rasa which is filled in by the specific culture that is prevalent at some point 
in time, but that it is an old and sometimes very specific and detailed questionnaire designed 
by evolution. In that questionnaire a large number of questions is already filled in by genes 
and hormones even before one's birth, another large number of questions is filled in by 
genes and socio-ecological circumstances during one's entire lifespan, and the remaining 
questions have to be answered with an already specialized brain belonging to a specific sex-
age class, fighting for its position in a specific social dominance system, carrying the load of 
a specific history of socio-sexual success and failure. To put is simply, the human mind is 
old and specialized as a result of a long evolutionary history. It is probably even too 
simplistic to call it a `stone age mind', because many modules of the mind are probably 
older than the stone age. It is therefore very sensible to study the great apes, because we 
have probably more in common with them than we are inclined to realize. The fact that 
chimpanzees are political animals that continually build coalitions, that ostracize particular 
individuals that have harmed the current coalition, that can conspire against `enemies', etc., 
instructs us to look beyond the stone age. We are the reincarnations of an old race which has 
recently been upgraded, but still carries the marks of its history. 
 Social psychologists have designed a series of studies that demonstrate that humans 
are inclined to identify themselves with a group that labels itself in contrast to other groups. 
Of course, one can do such experiments oneself, for example, by carrying binoculars or by 
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citing Nietzsche, which will immediately attract members of virtual clan of people with 
common interests. Social psychologists, however, have conducted controlled experiments in 
which artificially groups of boys were formed that, although they were formed ad random, 
soon started to form their own `culture' and dominance hierarchies. Here is how Oatley and 
Jenkins describe part of an experiment of the psychologist Sherif: 
 
 In Phase III the investigators moved to studying relations between groups. They 
arranged a tournament of competitions between the two groups, the Bulldogs and 
the Red Devils, including tug-of-war, football, and baseball, with cumulating 
points and coveted prizes of camping knives for every member of the group that 
got the most points. Success of one group would mean failure for the other. At 
this point - though not before - boys started to make distinctions between `us' and 
`them'. Accusations and name-calling began between the groups. Fights between 
members of one group and the other started to occur. Frustration increased angry 
attitudes and actions towards the outgroup. A proud self-glorifying attitude arose. 
Each group believed itself to be strong and fearless - each individual believed 
himself to possess all the strengths of the whole group. While an affectionate, 
interreliant attitude was present within the ingroup, the outgroup was seen to 
have very negative qualities (Oatly & Jenkins, 1999: 306). 
  
In the first real textbook on evolutionary psychology that I know of (Buss, 1999), the 
possibility of a human `talent' for male cooperative fighting and a human `talent' for 
homicide is discussed seriously. At a purely theoretical level, Buss shows that it could be 
adaptive to form coalitions to raid a neighboring tribe, even though this includes the risk of 
dying. Of course, one has to assume that engaging in warfare has reproductive advantages. 
One only has to remember the Yanomamös and the dutch children born from our Canadian 
liberators in world war II to see that this assumption is not as weird as it may seem. In the 
Yanomamös a significant percentage of women is captured in raids. But even in modern 
times, women tend to be attracted to uniforms (my wife claims to be an exception) and, 
especially, to winners. 
 In an attempt to find the `logic behind warfare' and to explain the fact that men risk 
their lives in the decision to engage in warfare, Buss argues as follows: 
 
 Suppose ten men form a coalition to raid a neighboring tribe. During the raid, 
five fertile women are captured. If all of the men survive, then the average gain 
sexual access is .50 of a fertile woman per man (five women divided by ten men 
equals .50 average per man). Now suppose five of the men die in the battle and 
the same five fertile women are captured. Now the gain for each of the five 
surviving men is a gain in sexual access of 1.0 fertile woman (five women 
divided by five men equals 1.0). The average gain across all the men who went 
into battle, however has remained unchanged at .50 (five women divided by the 
ten men who went into battle still equals .50). In other words, the average 
reproductive gains of the decision to go into battle are identical across the two 
conditions, even though in one case no men died and in the other five men died 
(Buss, 1999: 302). 
 
Of course, a lot of other factors are involved, which have varied throughout history, for 
example: the very fear that the other tribe will strike first, the value of the land that is 
  
 
 343
conquered, the value of the resources that are conquered, the risk of death (which is small 
currently for an American soldier in Iraq or Afghanistan), the consequences of desertion, the 
internal power relationships within the tribe, kingdom or state itself which may result in the 
need of an enemy, the possibility of kings, presidents, and generals to stay safe themselves, 
and currently even the economic value of factories producing arms. Evolutionary 
psychology does not deny all that. If war is, however, as old as humankind, it is not 
unreasonable to look for mechanisms in the mind that enable people to make optimal 
decisions in wartime. This is what Buss tries to do (in the footsteps of Tooby and 
Cosmides). He points, for example, to studies that indicate that men, in contrast to women, 
do frequently assess their own fighting ability, that gang membership pays in terms of 
sexual opportunities, not only in the Yanomamös, but also in American inner cities, that 
men hate traits in other men that make them more likely to desert. Of course, much more of 
those studies can be expected in the years to come. It seems to me, however, that there are 
already many indications that men have a tendency to form coalitions against other groups 
of men. It is surprising how eagerly people identify with their own sportsclub, their own 
profession, their own way of life. One only has to look what people do on a sunday 
afternoon: the very fact that a significant portion of them delights in watching two groups of 
young men in a ritualized fight should awaken all those thinkers who see prehistory as a 
time of peace and harmony. 
 
5. The argument based on the current omnipresence of human war, genocide and 
genosorption, and their role in the `progress' of human civilization. With that we come to 
the last argument. It is an argument which may not be decisive `objectively' - if something 
like that exists-, but which is decisive for me personally. The omnipresence of war and 
violence makes it very artificial to assume that it is purely a cultural artifact, which has 
arisen during historical times or just before history. For some reason, few assume that there 
was no sex and love before there were poets to write about it, but many assume that there 
were no wars before there were journalists. Even after a century of almost continuous war 
and genocide, the humanistic myth that man is `naturally good' still lives on. 
 Take the question placed central by Amnesty International: "Why do we kill people 
who are killing people to show that killing people is wrong?". The answer, of course: 
nobody kills for that reason. People kill people not to show that killing people is wrong, but 
because they feel threatened, hindered or hungry. There are even people who kill because it 
gives them a kick to do so. Given the fact that homicidal fantasies are in fact quite common 
among men (Kenrick & Sheets, 1993) and that chimpanzees may even murder formerly 
friends (e.g. De Waal, 1988), it is not unreasonable to ask the question, as Buss does, 
whether specialized homicide modules should be postulated (Buss, 1999: 306-09). 
 For the intergroup competition hypothesis such modules and even a regular 
repetition of outright genocide is not necessary, however. More important is it to show that 
arms races are often the motor behind `progress' and solidarity. Good examples are not hard 
to find. Take the stimulus that world war II had on the development of computers, 
information technology, and countless other disciplines. Take the race between America and 
the Soviet Union to be the first to put a man on the moon. Now that America has lost 
communism as the `enemy' that gives a boost to its self-confidence, identity and solidarity, 
it has finally found a new enemy in the form of `terrorism' (I do not claim that it is not an 
enemy, I only claim that an enemy is good for the mutual solidarity within a society). On the 
other hand, muslim fundamentalists seem to need `America' as an enemy for exactly the 
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same reason. The spirit of antagonism seems to form a part of human nature5. 
 Another point that seems necessary for the intergroup competition hypothesis to 
work is that it pays to be part of a people that is victorious. As I have pointed out before, 
whether group selection via outright sex-indifferent genocide is more common than male-
directed genocide (coupled to female-directed slave-making) and the process called 
genosorption by Wilson is uncertain. Maybe the nazis planned genocide in the twentieth 
century, but even they had their `fun department' in their concentration camps as a result of 
which some young, beautiful and fertile women survived. Genocide `according to Mozes' 
(who advises to save Midjanite virgins in Num. 31: 17-18), selective slave-making and 
genosorption `according to Caesar & co', has probably been a more common practice. If we 
look at the effects of invaders on the fertility of resident peoples, for example in the case of 
the Australian aboriginals and American indians, it becomes obvious that what counts is not 
purely a matter of war casualties, but above all the sheer number of babies that a people is 
able to raise if their land is taken over. What counts is not only who outnumbers who on the 
battle field, but above all who outnumbers who in the nursery. A socially not very 
successful Australian or American may have more children than a very wise aboriginal or 
an indian chief. 
 If this would be the case (which would require a careful demonstration on the basis 
of available numbers) it would show that it has advantages to belong to a strong, successful 
group. Selection at the individual level would have favored individuals who succeed in 
becoming and staying part of successful tribes by making themselves beloved, deserving, or 
even indispensable. It seems that this mechanism, coupled to sexual selection directed at 
`winners', can explain the kind of altruism and heroism that group-selectionists claim to 
explain, if not the whole gallery of supposedly-uniquely-human virtues from creativity to 
analytical intelligence. 
 
 
5 In this context, I am reminded of Sheldon, who found that the somatotonic component in human characters were 
exactly the `war making characteristic': somatotonic thinking is thinking in terms of antagonisms, dualisms, etc. As I said 
before, Sheldonian characterology deserves new studies. 
 
  * Epilogue * 
 
    One of the key questions ... is to what extent the biogram represents an adaptation to modern 
cultural life and to what extent is a phylogenetic vestige. Our civilizations were jerry-built around 
the biogram. How have they been influenced by it? Conversely, how much flexibility is there in 
the biogram, and in which parameters particularly? Experience indicates that when organs are 
hypertrophied, phylogeny is hard to reconstruct. This is the crux of the problem of the 
evolutionary analysis of human behavior. 
        E.O. Wilson, 1980 [1975], 272 
 
    In the face of all Darwinism, man represents the triumph of an animal that is unadapted and 
unadaptable. Without doubt he will constantly achieve partial adaptations, but each one of them 
serves him for a new adaptation. But an animal at once unadapted and continuing to live is, from 
the zoological point of view, a sick animal. Hence, without taking it now as a formal theory, but 
rather as merely an anti-Darwinian, although evolutionist, myth, which tries only to orient our 
intuition concerning how things could happen, we can imagine human origins like this: ... 
imagine man as a sick animal, suffering an illness which I will call symbolically malaria because 
he lived in infected swamps. And that illness, which did not succeed in destroying the species, 
caused in him an intoxicitation which produced a cerebral hyperfunctioning; this was the origin 
of a consequent excessive growth of the cerebral organs which brought with it, in turn, a greater 
degree of mental hyperfunctioning, the result of which was that man was filled with images and 
fantasies - in which, as is well known, even the superior animals are so poor; that is to say, he 
found himself with a whole imaginary world, therefore an interior world, which the animal lacks; 
an interior world confronting, separate from, and opposing the exterior world. And from then on, 
this last beast which is the first man has to live at once in two worlds - the one inside and the 
other outside - and therefore be irremediably and forever maladapted, unbalanced; this is his 
glory, this is his anguish. 
    Man is a fantastic animal; he was born of fantasy, he is the son of `the mad woman of the 
house'. And universal history is the gigantic and thousand-year effort to go on putting order in 
that huge, disorderly, anti-animal fantasy. What we call reason is no more than fantasy put into 
shape. Is there anything in the world more fantastic than that which is the most rational? Is there 
anything more fantastic than the mathematical point, and the infinite line, and, in general, all 
mathematics and physics? Is there a more fantastic fancy than what we call `justice' and the other 
thing that we call `happiness'? 
 J. Ortega y Gasset [1948-49] 1973, 247-248. 
 
It is time to come back to some of the `classical philosophical problems' which I mentioned 
in the introduction. With all due respect to the classical philosophers, we have come much 
closer to solving these problems than would be possible by reflection and conceptual 
analysis only - and without the contribution of evolutionary theory and the research that it 
has generated. Philosophy and human scientists alike can no longer neglect Darwin's 
intellectual dynamite - and cement - and the necessity to solve philosophical problems 
within the wider frame-work of scientific researching, model creating and puzzle-solving. 
The antithesis created by thinkers of the twentieth century, including Ortega y Gasset, 
between `Darwinism' and the concept of human uniqueness no longer holds: human 
uniqueness can be understood within the framework of evolutionary theory. Humans are 
unique as a result of their unique evolutionary trajectories and their uniqueness itself is thus 
not unique: man is `another unique species' (Foley, 1987), product of ordinary evolutionary 
processes, although it must be admitted that intergroup competition may be a somewhat 
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unusual process and although we have to admit that there is still a lot unclear about our 
descent. That, too, is a reason to cite Ortega: he remembers us that a Darwinian explanation 
of human origins will never be easy, although it is much more than pure mythology, and 
although there is no reason for despair given the number of fossils that are found almost 
continually and given also the theoretical progress that is made almost with the same 
speed.1
 Thus, let us look what we have got so far and have a look, again, at the list a 
`fundamental philosophical problems' presented in the introduction. 
- The problem of purpose and goal-directedness. This is what Darwinism has solved 
in the very first place. The goals and ends which are abundant in nature and which 
have been explained by a variety of metaphysical philosophies are postulated by 
Darwin to be emergent properties of systems that have been designed by a process of 
trial and error or variation and selection. Thus, Darwinism does not equal a 
physicalistic reductionism in which there is no place for purpose. It is, however, 
based on an `evolutionary reductionism' in which all ultimate ends and goals have 
been `tested' by natural selection. An organism that would be designed exclusively to 
write beautiful operas would soon go extinct. That does not mean that an organism 
writing beautiful operas will go extinct, but that one would expect that a goal like 
writing beautiful operas can be traced back to other, more fundamental, goals. There 
are good reasons to expect an overwhelming majority of goals and ends in nature 
that delay or evade extinction. Of all possible goals and ends, most will directly and 
indirectly cluster around survival and reproduction. 
- The problem of human uniqueness. While Darwinism holds that all goals are natural 
phenomena, it contends at the same time that there is no metaphysical barrier 
between man and other species. As I have tried to prove in chapter 1 and at several 
other places throughout this book, this claim has gradually found a solid foundation 
in all kinds of ethological studies. Many characteristics that once were thought to be 
uniquely human have now been found in other animals, at least in a rudimentary 
fashion. Consequently, most researcher now have chosen for the working hypothesis 
that those characteristics of man, which are (relatively) unique, have probably not 
arisen as a result of a unique process, but as a result of the same process of variation 
and selection that has molded the unique characteristics of all other species as well. 
In part III we have explored the possibilities of this working hypothesis, for which 
there seems to be no serious alternative. 
- The problem of knowledge. If one assumes that humans are neither unique nor 
products of a completely unique process, it is reasonable to relate the phenomenon 
of human knowledge to information processing systems within other mobile 
organisms. If one assumes that human knowledge and animal knowledge have a 
common origin, philosophical skepticism becomes a rather implausible assumption. 
The same goes for epistemological monism or foundationalism - that is a doctrine in 
which one aspect of knowledge (sensory input, reasoning, hermeneutical 
interpretation) is placed beyond all other aspects as the only infallible source of 
truth. Both skepticism and monism/foundationalism seem to arise from an 
insufficient awareness of the fact that knowledge evolved to orient organisms in 
                     
1
 It is a pity that Ortega did not study Darwinism deeper, because his The task of our time (El 
tema de nuestro tiempo, 1923) is in some aspects so close to an evolutionary naturalism. 
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their environment. Complex animals are often able to construct an image of their 
environment on the basis of sensory input from a variety of canals - an image that at 
a minimum should at least reflect some properties of the real environment to enable 
the organism to make adequate adaptive decisions in it. If one realizes that all 
knowledge has both to orient and to incite to adaptive action, both the strengths and 
weaknesses of the evolved knowledge apparatus become apparent. The adaptive 
interpretation of the knowledge apparatus thus offers an extra way of evaluating its 
reliability - supplemented with other ways we thus come to a mature, encompassing 
theory of knowledge, which is able to transcend traditional dichotomies such as 
those between empiricism and rationalism, subjectivism and objectivism, idealism 
and realism. The only sensible overall conclusion of such an evaluation seems to be 
that the knowledge apparatus is neither completely at loss in this universe, nor 
completely infallible. Within the realm of everyday live, we have to stumble on with 
it, occasionally hitting one of its limitations, just as one would expect of an 
apparatus designed by variation and selection. Within the domain of science, we can 
to some extent criticize aspects of the ways in which it represents the world, but such 
criticism is always based on an overall thrust in its pretension to give access to the 
world. 
- The mind-body problem. If we assume that minds evolved to guide organisms 
through a complex environment, we are also much closer to a solution of the mind-
body problem. Of course, not every aspect of this problem can be `solved' so easily, 
but we can exclude a series of positions. For example, simple epiphenomenalism, 
according to which mental phenomena are purely nonfunctional by-products, 
becomes implausible. In the words of one of the first evolutionary psychologists, 
William James "If pleasures and pains have no efficacy, one does not see ... why the 
most noxious acts, such as burning, might not give thrills of delight, and the most 
necessary ones, such as breathing, cause agony" (James, 1890: 144). The same goes 
for a dualism in which the mind has its own causal circuits, making their own 
calculations which then are subsequently sent to the body which executes the minds 
decisions passively. Such positions simply do not fit within the kind of evolutionary 
naturalism which arises in the wake of the Darwinian paradigm. From a Darwinian 
perspective one would expect the most striking properties of the mind to follow from 
a design ultimately directed at survival and reproduction. We can, thus, start asking a 
series of functionalistic questions: 
 - First, why would the mind evolve? The mind seems the product of the need 
for the centralization of information within increasingly mobile animals (the 
first ones which showed this centralization being the modest flatworm). 
 - Second, why would the mind represent `external' phenomena? To orient, to 
supply a kind of `map' to allow route planning, etc. 
 - Third, why would the mind follow its own logic? Because its goal is to guide 
in function of the goals of the organism. Ultimately its own goals are thus 
more important than the objectivity of its representation of external 
phenomena. 
 - Fourth, why do organisms need subjective experiences of the world? Because 
it is probably the essence of subjective experience that it is information that 
cannot be neglected and that is urgent. Subjectivity, then, would be the form 
in which the urgency of information and the necessity of adaptive action is 
installed and incarnated within animals. 
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 Within this view, even the way in which an animal experiences its world would be 
an adaptive phenomenon. All experiences, from pain to pleasure, are orchestrated 
within the experiential `theatre' in such a way that adaptive decisions arise from it 
spontaneously - I use this word, because the alternative word `automatically' would 
neglect this very experiential dimension. In chapter 3, I have also compared 
consciousness to a `dash-board', because dash-boards are clearly designed in a 
functional way to enable and facilitate fast and adequate reactions. Consciousness 
would then be a kind of circular dashboard through which the organism not only 
views the world, but also itself. 
 Is the `problem of consciousness' `solved' this way? No, because metaphors are 
always inadequate and with the dashboard-metaphor an unwanted `homunculus' 
sneaks in. No, because there is a whole series of design features of consciousness 
that still have to be explained. Yes, because with the realization that consciousness is 
an adaptive phenomenon (in the words of James "an organ, superadded to the other 
organs which maintain the animal in the struggle for existence"; 1890: 138), a frame-
work has been found in which all future discoveries relating to those features has to 
fit. An evolutionary theory of consciousness will encompass a whole series of 
insights from a whole series of disciplines that cannot be summarized in one 
handpalm - yet, the central point of adaptationalism must connect them all, even if 
the fact that adaptation is never perfect is acknowledged. 
- The problem of self-consciousness. If this is true, an evolutionary perspective would 
also offers new insights with respect to self-consciousness. Why would an animal 
"know itself"? In the first place, this could simply be a question of physical 
orientation. An animal is always located somewhere and its information of the world 
changes when it moves. It would help if this fact itself is represented in its neural 
system. Representations of its own speed, weight, jumping capacity etc. would 
greatly help it to avoid all kinds of disasters. The moment it starts to reproduce 
sexually and to live in groups some kind of sexual and social self-representation 
could facilitate sexual and social functioning. Yet, self-consciousness in at least one 
primate is much more than the ability to process information about one's own sex 
and social status. Why would we be able monitor our own experiences and 
intentions from a kind of meta-level, almost as if another individual is able to peep 
behind the scenes? Sociobiologists have approached this phenomenon from the 
theory of reciprocal altruism or cooperation. Within the context of arms race that 
emerge from the need both to invest in and to profit from cooperation, 
representations about plans and intentions from the other party become invaluable. 
Monitoring both your own intentions and those of that other party could be helpful 
to control one's investments in cooperative undertakings in function of their probable 
profits. At the same time, masking intentions, cheating, could be helpful, too, 
sometimes, and animals are not evolving to approach the Truth. If self-consciousness 
is an adaptive phenomenon it is to be expected that the knowledge of the self that it 
offers has evolved to incite optimal decisions. To profit maximally from a reciprocal 
altruistic relationship it often helps to be able to believe that the other has not done 
as much as you have done yourself - even if this requires self-deceit and a too 
optimistic picture about one-self or a too negative picture of that other party. From 
an evolutionary perspective, thus, self-consciousness is expected to be an essentially 
limited ability. 
- The problem of freedom and self-determination. In this book, I hardly addressed this 
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problem, yet I believe, with Roy Wood Sellars, that evolutionary naturalism forces 
us to look for solutions in a very specific direction (see also Slurink, 1989, chapter 5; 
and Slurink, 1996, on Sellars). The kind of transcendental free will, envisioned by 
philosophers from Plato to Kant, and even by some twentieth century philosophers, 
does not have any explanatory power - to the contrary, it obscures the fact that 
decisions are often highly characteristic for a particular person in particular 
circumstances. This is clearly a death alley and one that happens to be incompatible 
with an evolutionary perspective (in this case, alas, despite William James who was 
not always very consistent and was an indeterminist). Yet, the alternative to a 
transcendental free will is not fatalism nor a simplistic genetic or environmental 
determinism. As highly social and cultural primates, continually adapting our plans 
and self-images to new circumstances and challenges, we need to be creative all the 
time. All our decisions are based on interests, needs and emotions on the one side, 
and ecological and social circumstances on the other side. What we continually need 
is a kind of working hypothesis about ourselves - for example, about the things that 
are most likely to make us happy and the things which are most likely to happen, 
given our experiences so far. On the basis of this working hypothesis, which is 
continually revised, we make decisions that have consequences about what we are 
gradually becoming. Clearly, there is something going on here like `self-
determination', but it is not a kind of `pre-existential choice' as envisioned by Plato 
and Origen, nor a creatio ex nihilo of one's own nature, as envisioned by Sartre. It is 
a series of informed choices during which gradually a series of inherited 
characteristics are activated into a specific behavioral and emotional life, which 
includes an identity within a specific society. Within an evolutionary theory of mind 
there is thus no place for an absolute free will hovering above life, but to some 
extent there may exist something like freedom as a relative independentness of 
particular needs and motives and an ability to integrate all those drives into a social 
and cultural identity, even if this requires suppressing some drives in favor of others. 
On the whole, one would expect that this kind of freedom does not result in 
maladaptive decision-making, however. It does not stand in opposition, thus, to both 
physical causality nor to biological teleonomy (as defined by Mayr), but it is - to the 
contrary - based on both of them. If this is still a kind of determinism, so be it, but let 
us not forget that it is a determinism in which we are determined to determine 
ourselves. It is not a determinism that makes us purely into passive victims of 
causality, but which views us as unique causal processes that are at least partly in 
control themselves. 
- The problem of values and a meaning of life. In chapter 3, I introduced Pugh's so-
called value-driven design-system theory to illuminate particular aspects of 
consciousness which would be neglected if we would take consciousness purely as 
an information processing system. Consciousness is designed to enable adaptive 
decisions and it is able to do so because it subjectively experiences phenomena - the 
world is presented to consciousness not only as a show-box full of objects and 
relations, but as a field of meanings and values. It not only gives information and 
maps, but it gives directions, advice, commissions. To the extent that organisms 
share niches they often share evaluations about objects and territories as a result of 
which they often have to compete. One cannot claim, thus, that values and 
evaluations are purely subjective, but neither that they belong to some kind of 
platonic realm beyond the struggle for life. Darwinism does not force us to a 
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complete relativism in which the role of `virtual realities' like values is denied, but is 
simply incompatible with a discourse on values in which these are understood as 
independent of the conative beings for which they offer some guidance. Above that, 
if it is true that we are naturally selected value-driven design-systems, our primary 
values (in the language of Pugh, these are opposed to the partially individually or 
culturally acquired secondary values) are innate and products of variation and 
selection. That means that values do ultimately reflect attitudes which have proved 
to work in the context of reproduction and survival. That may seem a somewhat 
contra-intuitive insight, because we do not normally associate values with survival-
only. Yet, it has to be realized that primate and human survival has always been a 
matter of social cohesion, social status, and the effective display of moral and 
aesthetic qualities. Values do not reflect something beyond ordinary life, but do 
reflect the fact that ordinary life has more dimensions than food and sex only. 
 Within this context, the discourse on `the' meaning of life is also illuminated. Of 
course, all conscious organisms are designed to experience life as `meaningful', at 
least as long as they are on the right track and are doing well within the context of 
their own life program. Organisms that would continually feel that life is futile and 
without meaning whatsoever, would soon go extinct as a result of their indifference. 
The experience of life as meaningful is connected to the sense that life has a 
purpose, and this sense is connected to the human ability to make plans in which 
biological givens are adjusted to ecological and economic variables. Often the sense 
that life has lost its meaning is associated with loss and disorientation, the discovery 
that one's life program does not fit the factual situation anymore. Language in which 
is referred to `the' meaning of life often contains advice that may help people back 
on the right track and may help them find a new purpose. Often this language is 
used, however, to steer vulnerable people in a particular direction, to manipulate 
them. To make this kind of language more transparent it would be helpful if a 
discourse on a suppose `meaning of life' was replaced by a discourse on well-being 
and on more or less fulfilling and successful life-styles (see Slurink, 1989; 1994; 
2000 plus references). 
- The quest for the roots or foundations of society. Especially during the Greek and 
European Enlightment, both characterized by a belief in reason and education, 
philosophers started to ask why humans need to be social, why our current society is 
`rational'. Philosophers from Hobbes to Rousseau created their own fictional 
scenarios about the rise of the state. Yet, although the `state' is no doubt a relatively 
late product of human sociocultural evolution, the idea that humans were originally 
solitary animals, which has sometimes been launched, has become increasingly 
implausible. Even the oran-utang seems to be more social than previously thought, 
and the last decades we know that we are much closer related to the social living 
African apes than was thought before. Above all, most primates are social animals 
and most solitary animals are not so during all their lives. Sociobiology has 
generated a series of models which explain sociality and the various kinds and 
degrees of altruism without recourse to conscious rationality or transcendent values. 
Both kin selection and reciprocal altruism have been proven to play a role in human 
social behavior. Yet, to explain why humans live in very large cooperative societies, 
one has probably to refer to arms races between societies as wholes, which is done 
by the intergroup competition hypothesis of Darwin, Bigelow, Alexander, and 
others. 
 
 350
- The problem of good and evil. In chapter 4, I introduced a model which shows how a 
common good emerges as a result of both overlapping and conflicting interests and 
goals within a group of cooperators that can only together exploit particular aspects 
of their environment (fig. 4.9). If the interests of such cooperators would completely 
overlap they would not need words like `good' and `evil' to influence and `e-
motivate' each other. In a situation of complete conflict of interests and lack of 
communication, words like `good' and `evil' have no function either. Thus, 
moralistic language presupposes or creates a kind of `moral community' in which 
each individual is approachable and responsible. It refers to a field of common 
interests and goals, which may even extend into a common concern for such elusive, 
exotic and far-fetched issues as justice, the well-being of other animals or even that 
of other generations. To what extent one enters here a domain in which language is 
purely `emotive' or refers to realities that are at least shared by a group of speakers 
is, of course, a very complicated discussion. Yet, as animism demonstrates, humans 
are not by nature perfect ontologists and it is hard for them to believe that the 
universe is indifferent to their moral categories. Thus, philosophers since Plato have 
designed metaphysical systems in which the universe is soaked with human values 
and both science and naturalistic philosophy have a hard time in breaking thinking 
habits which fit our narcissism so well. Undoing the reification of good and evil and 
the moralification of nature does not lift us, however, "beyond good and evil", as 
Nietzsche thought, as long as we are part of a human community knit together by 
direct and indirect reciprocal altruistic relationships. Thus, a Darwinistic approach to 
morality should not be identified with moral relativism, although it rejects an 
absolutistic, metaphysical interpretation of moral categories. To be moral as a human 
is to be part of a network of cooperation and sympathy, which creates a `field of 
concern' that sometimes even extends beyond our own species, but mostly remains 
limited by the laws of direct and indirect reciprocal altruism. It seems to me that 
there is still a lot of analysis to be done in this area, which can be called 
`evolutionary ethics' (Again see Slurink, 1989; 1994; 2000, and references). 
- The problem of our origins, identity and destiny. With all these speculations we have 
certainly progressed, but many details and nuances remain obscured as long as we 
do not know precisely what kind of species we really are, where we come from and 
where we go. To be able to know what we are, we have to know other species as 
well, especially related species, and especially that aspect of their nature that is the 
hardest to discover - their mind. We have to reconstruct our origins not by giving the 
kind of `rational reconstruction' which was sometimes given by social philosophers 
on the assumption that the origin of human society was essentially a rational choice. 
What we need is an understanding of the selection processes that shaped humans 
from the ancestral apes that were their ancestors. Knowledge of paleoenvironments 
is required and knowledge of a great number of fossils. Thus such an understanding 
can only arise as a result of the work of many independent scientists. In part III of 
this book, I have given my own idiosyncratic synthesis of current knowledge. A 
series of climatological changes must have brought about the divergence of the 
African apes that we now see. Australopithecines seem to have evolved with both 
the ability to move in the open field and the ability to climb back into the trees, if 
necessary. The genus Homo apparently evolved, because some Australopithecines 
carved their own niche of opportunistic meat-eating at the moment that Africa 
became increasingly dry as a result of a climatic event at 2.5 myr ago. This would 
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explain, at least, why juveniles became increasingly altricial and why their 
maturation process took gradually more time, as demonstrated by the Turkana boy. 
This would subsequently explain why finally - at what point is unclear - something 
like pair-bonding and paternal investment evolved within the human lineage. As 
already said, the evolution of increasingly complex societies and language - these 
two are understood as mutually connected - may be explained in the context of arm 
races within groups, yet it is still hard to evaluate to what extent other mechanisms, 
like sexual selection, worked. Chapter 8 was an attempt to come to a balanced 
opinion on these subjects. One point is clear at this moment, and that is that we are 
still hardly certain about our origins, and with that about our identity and destiny. On 
the other hand, many cherished notions about human uniqueness and human destiny 
have passed away almost unnoticed while researchers are gradually solving the 
ultimate human puzzle. 
 
A large part of this book was devoted at demolishing the idea that man is a kind of 
suprabiological creature, a species that is able to fill in its nature entirely by a mysterious 
quality called `culture'. Hopefully, it has become clear that suprabiological species do not 
exist and that culture does not stand in opposition to nature. If man is a culture-creating 
animal, and I believe he is, than this does not mean that he does not have a nature and 
instincts. Rather, culture should be seen as the phenomenon of non-genetic transmission of 
information with which instincts can be better adapted to specific circumstances. It has 
become increasingly important in the human lineage as a result of specific selection 
pressures that lengthened the maturation process, probably partly as a result of more 
complex foraging strategies (hunting). Thus, culture as we know it in our species is a 
biological adaptation and linked to a long learning period, a large brain, a series of innate 
learning mechanisms, and a specific social structure (K-selection, paternal and 
grandparental investment, menopause). 
 The picture of culture as a luxurious way of inventing - from scratch - new ways of 
life, and experimenting with them, is completely misguided. Cultures are clearly adapted to 
particular environments, which is acknowledged by many anthropologists, including the 
cultural materialists. Sociobiologists and behavioral ecologists have gone further, however, 
and discovered, for example, links between the environment and aspects of the human 
mating system. They have been able to prove in many cases that cultural habits make sense 
within the frame-work of the same sociobiological theories (e.g. theories about kin 
selection, mating systems, parental investment, reciprocal altruism) that have been 
developed to explain behavior in other animals. They have found both behavioral 
mechanisms which continue to exist in our lineage despite the origin of culture, which often 
are somehow transformed by that culture, and behavioral mechanisms which seem to have 
evolved only after culture became more important. Gradually it has become clear, thus, that 
culture is not simply superimposed on a tabula rasa or on a biological substratum, but that it 
is an adaptive strategy of some species, which always will coevolve with other 
characteristics of the species concerned. Apparently our species in particular has become 
increasingly dependent on it as a result of a series of selection pressures which are hard to 
trace, but on which it is a challenge to speculate (part III). 
 Yet, culture as we know it in our species seems to have its own dynamics and 
restlessness, which make explanations purely in ecological terms incomplete. Apparently, 
culture is not exclusively designed to allow the adaptation to particular environments, but it 
is driven by other forces as well. Both sexual selection and the arms races within and 
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between societies almost certainly play some role in stimulating cultural progress. Yet, 
while there are good reasons to accept that both play some role, the contribution of each 
factor and their complex interaction remains a problem (chapter 8). Thus, one of the 
problems we encountered is not the lack of possible explanations, but their abundance and 
their compatibility, which makes analyses complex. As long as this situation continues, 
critics probably will repeat that any evolutionist can cherish his own favorite cocktail of 
explanations that gives him the best party. What is now needed, thus, are ways to come to 
balanced multicausal models. 
 One way that I have explored is the evolutionary historical approach in which causal 
factors are traced back to their roots. Thus, the course of sexual selection must be deeply 
affected by the transition to a mating system with paternal investment at some point after 
our split with the common ancestor that we share with chimpanzees and bonobos. 
Intergroup competition may be a factor even in chimpanzees, but it must have been 
intensified at the moment that our ancestors became ecological dominant. Such a historical 
approach may finally help us to decide what causal factors are still working today and what 
we can expect about their relative strength. Another approach is, of course, the ongoing 
project of analyzing the mechanisms behind modern human behavior. As our knowledge 
increases, the voices of the critics may gradually start to sound in the same way as a critic of 
meteorology would sound when he would claim that meteorologists are all wrong because 
all the factors to which they refer are ad hoc hypotheses. Gradually we may succeed in 
unraveling the complex web of factors that have molded the human species and its cultural 
activities. 
 This brings us to another point that the critics have been repeating all the time: the 
point that much human behavior is probably nonadaptive or maladaptive. This point was 
often repeated, especially in early twentieth century philosophical anthropology. Many 
philosophers have thought about man as a sick animal, an animal that somehow needed his 
extreme intelligence to compensate for his loss of strength or general vitality. Ortega y 
Gasset apparently even thought this thesis to be a kind of a falsification of Darwinism. 
According to him we are not only a sick animal, but even an animal afflicted by a 
maladaptive intelligence, an intelligence which makes us continually crave for the 
unattainable, like perfect circles, justice and happiness. Whole schools of philosophers and 
social scientists have thought that Darwin never could be completely right, because he did 
not explain the human animal, which is not adapted to a particular environment, but is 
continually creating new environments that suit his ever-changing caprices and mental 
excesses. 
 The idea of man's overall maladaption is one of the many unfounded prejudices, 
exaggerations or stereotypes still nourished by philosophers and social scientists about 
Darwinism, which are due partly to an incomplete knowledge of both Darwin and the 
organisms living in their own backyard. Whoever observes a Blackbird for two minutes in 
his backyard will probably witness already a small collection of `maladapted' jumps and 
steps. If animals would be completely adapted to their environments, we would not have 
evolution but Providence. Apparently maladapted behavior increases, of course, at the 
moment that an animal is learning by trial and error, as we see especially in young animals. 
Man does not only have an extended learning period, in his whole life he is learning by trial 
and error - but that does not mean that his overall behavior is completely maladapted. Also, 
nature has programmed especially males to take many risks and these risks seem 
maladapted, but their essence is that they sometimes are extremely profitable. Further, it is 
quite probably that we are a relatively young species and that many of our cognitive 
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modules are relatively young - it would be unreasonable to expect that they are perfect. We 
are changing our own environment so fast that it is hardly to be expected that we are 
adapted for all changes that we have brought about ourselves. Finally, from an evolutionary 
perspective our adaptedness and success is not measured in well-being - it is simply, and 
exclusively measured in reproductive success. Thus, from an evolutionary perspective the 
fact that many individual humans lead tragic lives, characterized by emotional instability or 
unhappiness, does not imply that man is a `sick animal'. 
 It has to be admitted, however, that dreams are a part of our lives, and that in that 
respect we are probably a unique species. Indeed, as Ortega argued, we are able to imagine 
straight lines, perfect circles, equality, and justice. Given the role such dreams play in much 
of our minds, the actual facts about human life sometimes seem sobering and even shocking. 
I do not see, however, why our ability to imagine perfect circles should lift us beyond the 
ordinary realities of growth, reproduction, competition, and death. In the end, these 
`ordinary realities' are not only the sources of suffering and tragedy, but also those of joy 
and comedy. It would be unwise to expect happiness and salvation only from what lifts us 
`above' other animals, and from our ability to combat or transcend nature. In the end, we are 
dependent on many of the functions that we share with other animals and when we are 
combatting, transforming or transcending nature we should beware of not combatting, 
transforming and transcending ourselves. The ideas of many philosophers and social 
scientists about human superiority reflect an attitude which has probably been disastrous 
already for many individual animals and many animal species and which in the end could 
even be disastrous for ourselves. 
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* Waarom sommige apen mensen werden. Competitie, 
bewustzijn en cultuur * 
 
Filosofische vragen komen voort uit de menselijke situatie en gaan altijd gedeeltelijk over de 
mens. Zij kunnen daarom het best beantwoord worden in samenwerking met die 
wetenschappen die het meest licht werpen op de mens. De moderne biologie leert ons het 
wezen van de mens te beschouwen in samenhang met zijn ontstaan. 
 In dit boek wordt geclaimd dat de evolutieleer cruciale bestanddelen bevat voor de 
beantwoording van een aantal fundamenteel filosofische vragen. Veel vruchteloze pogingen 
licht te werpen op kennis, bewustzijn en het wezen van de mens waren het gevolg van een 
chauvinistisch apart plaatsen van de mens en zijn unieke geest, waarbij de continuïteit van 
natuur en mens uit het oog werd verloren. Dit had natuurlijk alles te maken met de 
onbekendheid met het gedrag van mensapen en andere intelligente dieren, maar ook met een 
neiging de biologische en competitieve aspecten van het menselijk gedrag te verwaarlozen. 
Het rijk van de geest met haar abstracties en ideeën werd absoluut gesteld, aan de vraag naar 
de oorsprong en de bestaansmogelijkheid van een dier met zo'n geest kwam men niet toe. 
 De moderne evolutieleer en de moderne gedragsbiologie dagen ons uit ons 
chauvinisme te laten varen en bieden ons dan geheel nieuwe mogelijkheden filosofische 
vragen aan te pakken. Uiteraard berust ook de evolutieleer op vooronderstellingen. Zoals in 
de inleiding betoogd wordt is filosofie niet het denken zonder vooronderstellingen, maar het 
denkend zoeken naar juiste vooronderstellingen. Een los van alle ervaring zoeken naar het 
(statische) wezen van een aantal begrippen (de transcendentale benadering) resulteert eerder 
in een dogmatische houding dan het afpalen van effectieve begrippen binnen de context van 
het gehele web van kennis (de naturalistische benadering). Begrippen bestaan binnen de 
context van dynamische modellen van de wereld en ook de evolutieleer is zo'n model met 
repercussies voor de manier waarop onze begrippen de wereld in kaart brengen. In de 
inleiding wordt dan ook globaal aangegeven vanuit welk model van evolutie gewerkt wordt, 
niet om dit model te verheffen tot dogma, maar eerder om uit te komen voor de gehanteerde 
werkhypothese. Deze werkhypothese is de neodarwinistische evolutieleer waarin 
aanpassingen van organismen aan specifieke omgevingen het gevolg zijn van een proces van 
variatie en selectie: relatief aangepaste of succesvolle eigenschappen van organismen nemen 
toe in de populatie, omdat zij leiden tot de meeste nakomelingen. Binnen het kader van deze 
werkhypothese moeten de lichamelijke en geestelijke eigenaardigheden van de mens 
verklaard worden als gevolgen van eigenschappen die ooit voordelen hebben gehad bij het 
vinden van voedsel, partners en een veilige omgeving voor de voortplanting. 
 Deel 1, en met name Hoofdstuk 1 en 2 demonstreren hoe deze benadering licht kan 
werpen op verschillende aspecten van de kentheorie. De fundamentele kentheoretische vraag 
"(hoe) is kennis van de wereld mogelijk?" wordt daarbij niet ontweken, integendeel. Het 
sceptische antwoord dat de mens geen vat heeft op de `ware wereld' en dus opgesloten zit in 
zijn geest wordt echter als onvolledig ter zijde geschoven. De geest moet immers 
geëvolueerd zijn om te oriënteren en te sturen. Niet alleen de mens, maar ook andere dieren 
hebben behoefte aan informatie omtrent de wereld om juiste (de overleving/de voortplanting 
dienende) keuzes te maken. Deze informatie hoeft niet te vertellen hoe de wereld in elkaar zit 
los van het dierlijk standpunt van waaruit die informatie wordt verzameld en verwerkt, maar 
ze moet op een aantal punten wel bij die wereld aansluiten. Het is te verwachten dat de 
manier waarop die informatie (berustend op fysische aspecten van de omgeving) gefilterd, 
geïnterpreteerd en ervaren wordt bepaald wordt door de noodzaak het organisme te prikkelen 
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tot de `juiste' (aangepaste) keuzes. Kennis is in die zin wel een soort kooi waarin het 
organisme zit opgesloten, maar juist een kooi die het organisme op zijn eigen wijze toegang 
verschaft tot die wereld en die het in staat stelt zich er `vrij' in te bewegen - ofschoon het 
natuurlijk in feite geleid wordt door de wijze waarop zijn aangepaste cognitieve structuren 
het de wereld voorschotelen. 
 Naar analogie van de `kritiek van de zuivere rede' van Kant kan men zo een 
`rechtvaardiging en kritiek van de vitale rede' opstellen. De evolutieleer wordt dan gebruikt 
om voorspellingen te doen over de reikwijdte en adequaatheid van onze subjectieve 
kenstructuren. Er is dan dus geen sprake meer van een kantiaans transcendentaal onderzoek, 
maar van de ontwikkeling van een serie modellen waarin de dynamische relatie tussen de 
kenstructuren van het organisme en de fysische eigenschappen van de omgeving in kaart 
worden gebracht. De betrouwbaarheid van deze benadering is niet gebaseerd op de pretentie 
van streng redeneren vanuit een paar veronderstelde basiswaarheden (de benadering van de 
transcendentalisten), maar op een veelheid aan gegevens uit verschillende disciplines, die 
geïntegreerd worden. Als afzonderlijke details en deducties voor verbetering vatbaar zijn 
betekent dit nog niet dat de hele theorie als een kaartenhuis in elkaar zakt. 
 In hoofdstuk 2 worden zo, naar analogie van Kant, achtereenvolgens de zintuiglijke 
basis van kennis, de stereometrische `aanschouwingsvormen', de categorieën en de 
metafysische ideeën besproken. Daaraan worden echter de waardegeladenheid van kennis, en 
de linguïstische en sociale dimensie van kennis toegevoegd. De bespreking van deze 
verschillende aspecten van kennis vanuit een evolutionair naturalistische perspectief levert 
uiteraard een zeer onkantiaans plaatje op, alleen al omdat de tegenstelling tussen 
Erscheinung en Ding an sich opgaat in een perspectivistisch realisme. Binnen de context van 
deze bespreking wordt ook het radicaal sociaal constructivisme gekritiseerd, waarbij 
gewezen wordt op de divergentie tussen de factoren die de sociale acceptatie en de factoren 
die de ontologische adequaatheid van een theorie bepalen. Al met al wordt het beeld 
bevestigd dat evolutionaire kenleer compatibel is met een bepaald soort realisme, dat men 
`kritisch' (Roy Wood Sellars), `hypothetisch' (Gerhard Vollmer) of ecologisch zou kunnen 
noemen. 
 Daarmee is tegelijk gezegd dat vanuit deze benadering de eigenheid van het 
bewustzijn niet uit het oog wordt verloren. De wereld wordt altijd op een bepaalde manier in 
het bewustzijn gerepresenteerd. De wijze waarop het bewustzijn de wereld weergeeft is 
bepaald door de variatie en selectie van brein- en bewustzijnsstructuren en zal van dier tot 
dier, en dus ook van mens tot mens, enigszins verschillen. In hoofdstuk 3 wordt geclaimd dat 
de evolutietheorie een aantal aspecten van het bewustzijn kan verklaren die andere theorieën 
negeren, bagatelliseren of verwaarlozen. Daartoe behoren de volstrekt private aard van 
bewustzijn en de volstrekt onontkoombare aard van subjectieve ervaringen, hoe negatief ook. 
Weer stuiten we op de analogie van kennis en bewustzijn met een kooi: het organisme is niet 
in staat de wijze waarop het de wereld ervaart (fundamenteel) te wijzigen. Bij de mens blijkt 
dit doordat er, ondanks een spectrum aan verschillende culturen, in al die culturen een aantal 
universele basisemoties zijn. Deze emoties worden verklaard met verwijzing naar de 
theorieën van G.E. Pugh, die emoties vergelijkt met de waarden in de zogenaamde waarden-
gestuurd beslissingssystemen, een soort beslissingssoftware, die hij hielp ontwerpen (bij de 
mens is het dan hardware of wetware). Met andere woorden: als gevolg van selectiedrukken 
gericht op flexibiliteit zouden specifieke groepen mobiele organismen niet langer star 
voorgeprogrammeerd zijn met reflexen en kant-en-klare routines, maar met een systeem dat 
hen in staat stelt graden van wenselijkheden toe te kennen aan hun opties en simulaties om zo 
beslissingen op maat te maken binnen zeer uiteenlopende situaties. Ook een aantal 
eigenaardigheden van de menselijke geest zouden verklaard kunnen worden als we haar 
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opvatten als een door de evolutie ontworpen en bijgewerkt `dashboard', waarop van waarden 
voorziene informatie, opties en simulaties bij elkaar worden gebracht om tot daden te komen. 
Dit model zou het ook gemakkelijker kunnen maken om in te schatten welke dieren 
bewustzijn hebben: dieren die kunnen spelen en dromen, hebben wellicht het systeem van 
emotionele waarden-toekenning nodig om prioriteiten te kunnen stellen in de wildgroei aan 
simulaties die hun brein produceert. 
 In deel 1 bleek al herhaaldelijk dat de mens een door-en-door sociaal wezen is, 
waarvan de geest niet begrepen kan worden los van zijn sociale omgeving. Deel 2 van het 
boek is een verkenning van de evolutionaire wortels van samenleving en cultuur. Ondanks 
het feit dat de evolutieleer zelf vrijwel onomstreden is, bestaan er dusdanig koppige 
misverstanden over evolutie dat er een revolutie nodig was om wat meer helderheid te 
scheppen. Met name de sociobiologie, onderwerp van hoofdstuk 4, heeft in feite afgerekend 
met gemakkelijke verklaringen van verschijnselen in termen van `functionaliteit voor de 
overleving van de soort/groep'. Dat soort verklaringen gaan al te gemakkelijk voorbij aan de 
vele vormen van conflict en competitie binnen groepen en soorten en zelfs families. Veel 
eigenschappen van organismen, inclusief die van de menselijke geest, zijn in feite individuen 
van nut in hun competitie met andere individuen. 
 De sociobiologie heeft zelfs laten zien dat het individu geen eindstation is, maar 
slechts een tussenstation. Altruïsme en samenwerking ontstaan als individuen genen of 
belangen delen. Een gen dat altruïsme bevordert kan namelijk alleen evolueren als dit 
altruïsme `wel besteed' is. Bij de meeste diersoorten komt de mate van altruïsme 
overeenkomt met de mate van verwantschap. Omdat het individu in sexuele organismen het 
produkt van een tijdelijk conglomeraat van genen is kan men verwanten dan opvatten als 
`overlevingsmachines van dezelfde, zelfzuchtige genen'. 
 Dit soort metaforen heeft echter helaas weer veel nieuwe misverstanden opgeleverd, 
omdat ze een genetisch determinisme en reductionisme lijken te propaganderen. In hoofdstuk 
4 wordt eerst geprobeerd de sociobiologische stellingen in de historisch-theoretische context 
te plaatsen waaruit ze begrijpelijk worden en vervolgens wordt een poging ondernomen ook 
puur systematisch de misverstanden op te heffen. Historisch-theoretisch wordt de 
sociobiologie opgevat als een noodzakelijk geworden herfundering van de gedragsbiologie in 
de evolutiebiologie, systematisch wordt een verschil gemaakt tussen genetisch determinisme 
en evolutionair reductionisme. Evolutionair reductionisme houdt in dat de aangepastheid van 
eigenschappen in de holistische context van individuen en omgevingen wordt getest, maar 
slechts kan beklijven op basis van erfelijkheid en dus een minimale genetische aansturing 
(ook van leerprocessen en cultuur). Organismen zijn dus geen robotten, maar wel van nature 
gericht op overleving en voortplanting. Zonder die natuurlijke doelgerichtheid of teleonomie 
zouden ze namelijk uitsterven. Het gaat hier dus niet om een genetisch determinisme, maar 
wel om een hiërarchische benadering waarbij het `hogere' berust op het `lagere'. 
 De feitelijke wijze waarin de natuurlijke doelgerichtheid van organismen is 
georkestreerd is onderwerp van de evolutionaire psychologie, één van de gedaantes waarin 
het oorspronkelijke programma van de humane sociobiologie voortleeft. Het basisidee van de 
evolutionaire psychologie is dat niet alle gedrag adaptief is, omdat het proces van adaptatie 
heeft geleid tot het ontstaan van specifieke modulen die in het verleden meestal adaptief 
gedrag genereerden, maar dit niet altijd noodzakelijk doen. Juist in de moderne tijd heeft de 
mens zelf een omgeving gecreëerd die dermate ver afstaat van de `omgeving van 
evolutionaire aangepastheid' (term van Bowlby) dat niet te verwachten is dat alle gedrag 
adaptief is. Een gevaar van de evolutionaire psychologie is dat het ons ertoe kan verleiden bij 
elk onverklaarbaar gedragssegment al te gemakkelijk terug te grijpen op de traagheid of 
slordigheid van de evolutie. Alleen door voor allerlei gedragspatronen een veelheid van 
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hypothesen te testen binnen de context van onderzoek betreffende de onderliggende 
mechanismen en hun erfelijkheid kan men tot de juiste hypothese komen. 
 In hoofdstuk 5 worden verschillende hypothesen met betrekking tot de relatie van 
evolutie en cultuur, vooral bij de menselijke soort, vergeleken. De nog steeds tamelijk 
dominante modellen binnen de sociale wetenschappen gaan meestal uit van een vergaand 
plooibare menselijke natuur, waarop de omgeving of de traditie een doorslaggevende invloed 
heeft. Daarnaast staan modellen volgens welke culturele evolutie een soort autonoom proces 
is los van of naast de biologische evolutie. De sociobiologie en de evolutionaire psychologie 
doen ons verwachten dat mensen cultuur accepteren en doorgeven inzoverre en zolang het 
hun overleving of voortplanting dient. 
 Geen enkel model blijkt acceptabel dat voorbijgaat aan de autonomie van het 
psychologische niveau tussen genen en cultuur, zodat alle `dualistische' modellen als 
onvolledig kunnen worden weggestreept. Modellen die geen recht doen aan de inzichten van 
de gedragsgenetica en de evolutie van cultuurvaardigheden kunnen tevens worden 
weggeselecteerd. Er moeten verbanden bestaan tussen cultureel en reproduktief succes om 
het ontstaan en de instandhouding van cultuur te verklaren. Verschillende studies hebben het 
bestaan van dergelijke verbanden aangetoond. Het lijkt erop dat cultuurvaardigheden deels 
rechtstreeks lonen via sexuele selectie, deels indirect via de resulterende dominantie en 
macht. Het probleem is dat culturen wortelen in samenlevingen, waarin 
samenwerkingsverbanden en belangen conflicten door elkaar lopen. Juist in dit `substraat' 
kunnen de wapenwedlopen tieren waarin een veelheid van talenten kan lonen. Het idee wordt 
dan ook geopperd dat de verschillende karakters, in kaart gebracht door verschillende 
typologieën, een adaptief polymorfisme constitueren van strategieën die in verschillende 
socioculturele contexten vruchtbaar zijn. 
 Al met al is het duidelijk dat een evolutionaire psychologische benadering van 
cultuur (in een vrij wijde zin van het woord) niet alleen als enige overblijft, maar ook de 
meeste verklaringskracht heeft. Biologische individuen laten zich geen cultuur opleggen, 
maar plukken elementen uit bestaande culturen die ze kunnen gebruiken, om deze elementen 
vervolgens te modificeren en moderniseren conform hun eigen belangen. De evolutie van 
`memen' (cultuur-elementen) is geen autonoom proces, maar vormt de weerspiegeling van de 
samenwerking bij een soort roofaap (deze karakterisering wordt echter pas verdedigd in 
hoofdstuk 7), die moet samenwerken om op een intelligente manier de natuur te exploiteren, 
maar waarbij onderling om het grootste deel van de buit wordt gestreden en waarbij net als 
bij alle veel andere dieren wordt gestreden om reproduktieve mogelijkheden. 
 Dit model zou voor velen toch een beetje te abstract en te algemeen zijn als het niet 
verhelderd zou worden aan de hand van voorbeelden. Bovendien lijkt het model op het eerste 
gezicht geen recht te doen aan de veelheid van feitelijke culturen. Het is toch duidelijk dat 
culturen op de één of andere wijze omgevingsbepaald zijn en samenhangen met een bepaalde 
 levenswijze of vorm van ecologische exploitatie. In hoofdstuk 6 wordt daarom geprobeerd te 
laten zien hoe verschillende culturen ontstaan vanuit verschillende milieus via de menselijke 
natuur. Deze is niet zondermeer flexibel, maar omvat een serie conditionele strategieën. 
Afhankelijk van de machtsverhoudingen tussen de sexen en de mate waarin een cultuur 
hiërarchisch of niet is, zullen er bijvoorbeeld verschillende huwelijksvormen ontstaan. 
Afhankelijk van de kindersterfte, de veiligheid van de omgeving, de vorm van de ecologische 
exploitatie, en de beschikbaarheid van voorbehoedmiddelen, zal het kindertal fluctueren. 
Zelfs de levensbeschouwingen die mensen aanhangen staan onder invloed van ecologische 
variabelen, waartoe bijvoorbeeld ook de grootte van de samenleving behoort. 
 Terwijl in veel science fiction intelligente, cultuurscheppende soorten een 
vanzelfsprekend `eind'produkt van evolutieprocessen lijken te zijn (convergerend in vele 
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afzonderlijke sterrestelsels), is binnen een darwinistische benadering het ontstaan van alle 
soorten gebonden aan een zeer specifieke opeenvolging van omstandigheden. Vooralsnog is 
niet precies bekend hoe specifiek de klimatologische en ecologische omstandigheden waren 
waarin de naakte, rechtoplopende en in culturele verbanden samenwerkende roofaap `mens' 
gekweekt is, maar er bestaat wel een woud van theorieën over. Deel 3 is een poging de 
bomen in dit bos te zien door middel van selectieve kap en zorgvuldige 
kruisingsexperimenten. 
 In hoofdstuk 7 wordt de uniciteit van de mens eerst op een aantal punten 
gerelativeerd. De werkelijk unieke kenmerken worden vervolgens in een historisch kader 
geplaatst. De evolutie van mensachtigen lijkt het produkt van een gefaseerd proces dat steeds 
op gang wordt gebracht door klimatologische veranderingen. Deze dreven eerst groepen 
mensapen het oerwoud uit en dwongen vervolgens millenia later specieke groepen 
rechtoplopende aapmensen hun menu aan te vullen met relatief veel vlees. Het unieke 
menselijke paarsysteem, waarin beide ouders bijdragen aan de opvoeding van relatief lang 
afhankelijke kinderen, lijkt te moeten worden verklaard in de context van de overgang naar 
de jacht. De relatief lange jeugdfase, die al begint op te treden bij Homo ergaster, vormt 
vervolgens ook weer een basis voor de verwerving van een relatief complexe cultuur. 
 Waarom er echter een soort autokatalytisch proces van coevolutie van genen en 
cultuur ontstond, resulterend in taal en complexe cultuur, is niet eenvoudig te zeggen. Men 
ontkomt er in deze fase van onze kennis niet aan om hierover te speculeren, wat ik mijzelf 
ook toesta in hoofdstuk 8. In dit hoofdstuk worden drie modellen vergeleken: het al in 
hoofdstuk 7 verdedigde model waarin de overgang naar jacht centraal staat, het model waarin 
de extreme intellectuele vaardigheden van de mens worden toegeschreven aan sexuele 
selectie, en de hypothese van van Bigelow, Alexander en anderen, waarin de evolutie van de 
mens gezien wordt als een gevolg van wapenwedlopen tussen vroegmenselijke groepen. Het 
jachtmodel verklaart, zoals we zagen, de relatief lange jeugdfase en de samenwerking in 
kleine groepen, maar lijkt onvolledig te zijn, omdat het niet verklaart waarom mensen 
(verhoudingsgewijs) extreem intelligent zijn en dikwijls in wel erg grote groepen leven. De 
meeste roofdieren overleven uitstekend met een beperkte, gespecialiseerde intelligentie en 
ondervinden in al te grote groepen alleen maar hinder van elkaar. 
 De theorieën van sexuele selectie en van competitie tussen groepen zien beide de 
menselijke intelligentie als de resultante van een doorgeslagen competitie binnen de soort, 
van een soort op hol geslagen wapenwedloop. Beide kunnen gezien worden als aanvulling op 
de jachthypothese, niet als haar vervanging. Als paarbanden tijdens de menselijke evolutie 
steeds belangrijker werden zouden de eisen die aan partners gesteld worden ook steeds 
verder uit de hand kunnen zijn gaan lopen (net als dat bij pauwen en paradijsvogels het geval 
is). Niet alleen zou intelligentie en creativiteit geselecteerd kunnen worden als fitness 
indicatoren, maar ze zouden ook nodig kunnen zijn om het complexe spel van de 
partnerkeuze te kunnen spelen. 
 Volgens de theorie van competitie tussen groepen (eveneens teruggaand op Darwin) 
moet de oorsprong van de menselijke intelligentie eerder gezocht worden binnen het kader 
van wapenwedlopen tussen groepen. Op het moment dat sommige vroege hominiden 
`ecologisch dominant' werden hadden zij meer te duchten van andere groepen van de eigen 
soort dan van andere roofdieren. De optimale groepsgrootte die eerst werd bepaald door 
samenwerking bij de jacht zou nu verschuiven naar een grootte bepaald door samenwerking 
bij de verdediging van de eigen groep en haar thuisbasis. De menselijke intelligentie zou het 
gevolg zijn van de noodzaak te overleven en samen te werken binnen dergelijke complexe 
grote groepen, die op beslissende momenten eensgezind moesten kunnen opereren. 
 Een groot deel van hoofdstuk 8 worden argumenten voor de theorie van competitie 
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tussen groepen aangedragen, maar daarmee wordt niet betoogd dat sexuele selectie geen rol 
gespeeld zou hebben. Integendeel: juist binnen de context van complexe, grote groepen is het 
aangaan en onderhouden van duurzame paarbanden een netelige kwestie, bij de moderne 
mens niet voor niets gebonden aan regels en rituelen. In die zin kunnen de theorie van 
sexuele selectie en die van competitie tussen groepen beide waar zijn. Het is dan echter zaak 
in de overkoepelende theorie de verschillende causale verbanden goed uit elkaar te houden, 
zodat niet de indruk ontstaat dat men naar believen een portie sex en geweld in een lekker 
liggend verhaal samenflanst. Hoofdstuk 8 is daartoe een aanzet: het resultaat is een globaal 
model van de verschillende fasen in de menselijke evolutie waarin bepaalde mechanismen 
werkzaam zijn geweest. De menselijke ziel kan gezien worden als een soort fossiel, dat de 
sporen draagt van de verschillende processen. 
 In de uitleiding kom ik tenslotte terug op mijn belofte dat het evolutionair naturalisme 
antwoorden kan verschaffen op een aantal filosofische vragen. Ik laat zien dat de 
evolutietheorie doorwerkt in bijna alle belangrijke filosofische probleemgebieden. Omdat de 
evolutietheorie verklaart waarom wij bestaan neemt zij een centrale plaats in binnen ons 
huidig wereldbeeld. Omdat de evolutietheorie afrekent met geliefde noties over ons wezen en 
onze bestemming en ten dele onthult wat wij werkelijk zijn, en zelfs waarvoor wij hier zijn, 
biedt zij in feite het kader voor een nieuwe, wetenschappelijke gefundeerde 
levensbeschouwing. 
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